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Abstract 
This thesis argues that an appreciation of Don DeLillo's engagement with the 
problems of post-war philosophy of mind is essential to a full understanding of his work. 
It suggests that he examines various forms of scepticism that prevail in the postmodern 
treatment of consciousness and traces the disorientation to which they lead, especially the 
obstacles they present to the formation and development of subjectivity. Much previous 
criticism has tended to assume that DeLillo regards consciousness as effectively 
powerless, entrapped and determined by the action of all-powerful systems, whether 
technological, linguistic, or economic. By contrast, this thesis acknowledges the partial 
autonomy that DeLillo grants consciousness and notes his exploration of the various 
epistemologies open to it in contemporary culture. I argue that DeLillo's first six novels 
survey crucial questions in contemporary debates about consciousness, particularly those 
raised by the materialism and, paradoxically, the extreme intellectual abstraction 
characteristic of postmodern Western culture. Notable among these early themes are the 
reality and reliability of consciousness; the relationship between mind and body; the 
analogy between mind and computer; the properties of the right and left hemispheres of 
the brain, and the rational and intuitive modes of thought that they are said to govern. I 
suggest that DeLillo's subsequent novels are increasingly preoccupied by intuitive 
models of consciousness that allow mind a considerably greater ontological status than 
that accorded to it in postmodem culture. These range from the implication, in The 
Names (1982) and White Noise (1984), that mind may be more powerful than language, 
or the prospect of death, to the communal model of consciousness that prevails in Libra 
(198 8), Mao 11 (199 1), and Underworld (1997), which, I argue, is close to the model 
outlined in Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's work on schizophrenia. DeLillo's most 
recent novels, The Body Artist (2001) and Cosmopolis (2003), explore the possibility of 
a search for 'root identity', or consciousness as such, which, although seemingly driven 
by a desire to escape culture, remains quintessentially postmodern in its emulation of 
contemporary science's desire to account for the enigmatic relation between mind and 
body. 
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Introduction: Models of Consciousness 
The twentieth century witnessed a revolution in our attitude to consciousness. 
Psychoanalysis and much of modernist literature challenged radically the notion of 
mind and subjectivity as autonomous and self-present. Since World War Two, parallel 
developments in technology, neuroscience, and philosophy have shattered any 
semblance of consensus around the issue and fractured the debate into warring groups 
that often do not share even the same vocabulary or basic assumptions, let alone 
comparable views. Philosophers have even come to disagree on whether our 
experience of the mind is sufficiently similar that there really is a single entity we can 
refer to as consciousness. Daniel C. Dennett, for example, uses the differences 
between phenomenologists' accounts of mental experience to justify dismissing the 
'long-standing scientific tradition' that 'we all agree on what we find when we "look 
inside"'. 1 Why have scientific advances served to intensify the debate and render it 
more complex in a way that they have not with, say, the analysis of air or water? Is 
consciousness, for some reason, uniquely resistant to scientific explanation, or does 
objective analysis of the mind simply threaten our naive sense that there is something 
private, or even sacred, about our thought process? John R. Searle argues that the 
blend of mental and physical characteristics possessed by consciousness does present 
a unique problem. 2 Where science would normally reduce an object to its constituent 
parts, for example, analysing water as molecules of hydrogen and oxygen, the 
analysis of consciousness, according to Searle, demands recognition of its mental and 
physical aspects. A simple 'appearance-reality distinction', in which the 'appearance' 
of thought is explained as the 'reality' of fibres and neurons in the brain, is inadequate 
1 Daniel C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (London: Penguin, 1992), pp. 66-72. 
because, Searle contends, 'the appearance is the realily': the existence of 
consciousness is irreducible (p. 122). The philosophical problem is not new: what 
Searle refers to as reductionism, G. W. F. Hegel called scientific 'formalism'. 3 Hegel 
complains of science's readiness to believe that 'understanding is electricity' and 
canimals are nitrogen' and dismisses such methodology as a 'forceful procedure', a 
mere connection of 'sense-ideas', which 'brings and holds together elements to all 
appearances far removed from one another' (p. 109). But, in postmodernity, science's 
augmented ability to analyse the structure of the brain and build machines capable of 
reproducing elements of human thought has made consideration of the nature of 
consciousness particularly urgent and highly controversial. What ontological status 
should be attributed to consciousness? Does it work on the same principles as a 
computer? Of what precisely is it capable? What grounds do we have for trusting our 
perceptions? Perhaps surprisingly, comparatively little attention has been devoted to 
the response of literary artists to these challenging questions. 
It is in this troubled area, where philosophy and science meet uneasily, that 
this thesis on Don DeLillo begins. Rather than the post-structuralist theories of the 
subject or the varieties of linguistic and systems theory previously employed to 
explicate DeLillo's work, my early chapters emphasise his engagement with the 
problems of post-war philosophy of mind. In particular, I argue he examines various 
forms of scepticism that prevail in the postmodern treatment of consciousness and 
traces the disorientation to which they lead, especially the obstacles they present to 
the formation and development of subjectivity. DeLillo's novels have long since 
become a major area of interest for academic critics. Five book length studies of 
2 John. R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992) 
3 G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind trans. by J. B. Baillie (London: George Allen and 
Unwin, 193 1), p. 109. 
2 
DeLillo have been published, as well as numerous journal articles and book chapters, 
and the flow of critical work shows no immediate sign of abating. David Cowart has 
suggested that the quantity and high quality of the full-length studies published so far 
means that few more are now required. 4 Yet, the amount of criticism produced 
obscures the fact that many published articles concentrate on a handful of major 
novels, like White Noise (1984), LiLbra (1988), and Underworld (1997), and that less 
commercially successful earlier texts, such as Ratner's Star (1976), The Names 
5 (1982), and Americana (1971) receive comparatively little attention. Moreover, 
although critics provide what DeLillo has called 'a broad analysis of the social issues' 
in his work, often concentrating on technological systems or consumer culture and 
their numbing effect on the postmodern subject, they have left unexamined the 
relevance of DeLillo's work to contemporary debates about consciousness. 
6 
Accordingly, I suggest DeLillo's first six novels survey crucial questions in these 
debates, particularly those raised by the materialism and, paradoxically, the extreme 
intellectual abstraction characteristic of postmodern Western culture. Notable among 
these early themes are the reality and reliability of consciousness; the relationship 
between mind and body; the analogy between mind and computer; the properties of 
the right and left hemispheres of the brain, and the rational and intuitive modes of 
thought that they are said to govern. These novels often present contemporary culture 
as an unremittingly terrifying force, forging a world in which little value is attributed 
to consciousness and use of the mind is limited to highly abstract thought that 
4 David Cowart, The Physics of Language (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2002), p. x. 
3 Don DeLillo, White Noise (London: Picador, 1989, Don DeLillo, jLnderworld (London: Picador, 
1997) Don DeLillo, Libra London: Penguin, 1989), Don DeLillo, Ratner's Sta (London: Vintage, 
1991), The Names (London: Picador, 1989) and Don DeLillo, American (London: Penguin, 1990) 
excludes emotion and the body. In this hostile environment, subjectivity is either 
abortive or degenerates into the kind of schizophrenic 'false-self system', described 
by R. D. Laing. 7 In varying ways, therefore, Americana, End Zone (1972), Great 
Jones Street (1973), and Ratner's Star present quests for rapprochement with the body 
and belief in the trustworthiness and ontological status of mind. 
8 DeLillo's fifth and 
sixth novels, Players (1977) and Running Dog (1978), continue to present postmodem 
culture as nightmarish in its hostility to humane thought and behaviour, but portray 
characters that embrace the more nihilistic elements of postmodernity that destroy 
mind, emotion, and subjectivity. 9 In this respect, they double back on the trajectory of 
DeLillo's fiction thus far, but also prefigure his later interest in the seductive power of 
postmodern models of consciousness. 
In discussing the seven novels that follow, I argue that they take a generally 
more optimistic attitude to the opportunities available within postmodemity. The 
Names and White Noise explore the possibility of employing the characteristics of 
postmodern culture, particularly its concern with the notion of excess, to produce a 
model of consciousness that values mind above either language or death, which are 
often held to be significantly more powerful. Libra, Mao 11 (1991), and Underworld 
examine a more communal model of consciousness that prevails in postmodernity, 
which, though it limits the autonomy of the individual, may elevate the status of mind 
6 David Remnick, 'Exile on Main Street: Don DeLillo's Undisclosed Underworld', in The New Yorker, 
15'h September 1997, pp. 4248 (p. 47). 
7 R. D. Laing, The Divided Self- An Existential Study in Sanijy and Madness (London: Penguin, 1990), 
p. 69, p. 75. 
8 Don DeLillo, End Zone (New York: Penguin, 1986) and Don DeLillo, Great Jones Street, (London: 
Picador, 1998) 
9 Don DeLillo, Players (London: Vintage, 1991) and Running Dog, (London: Vintage, 1992) 
as such. 10 1 argue that these three texts portray a less pathological form of 
schizophrenia afflicting the American subject, which is related to the influence of 
capitalism and is close to the model outlined in Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's 
work on schizophrenia, particularly Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 11 In 
spite of this growing interest in psychological unity, however, in the five novels from 
The Names to Underworld, DeLillo portrays a fierce battle between modernist and 
postmodernist forms of subjectivity. A number of major characters cling tenaciously 
to discrete modernist forms of self, which equip them poorly for contemporary life, 
with its electronic mediation and unifying psychological forces. DeLillo suggests such 
characters must accommodate such emergent forces or die, sometimes literally. At 
times, DeLillo associates modernist subjectivity with paranoia, which he presents as 
an isolating frame of mind that resists the unifying forces of postmodernity and 
dismisses non-whites as mere waste. DeLillo's most recent novels, The Body Artist 
(2001) and Cosmopolis (2003), represent another apparent turn in the trajectory of his 
work, exploring the possibility of a search for 'root identity', or consciousness as 
such. 12 Paradoxically, this quest, which seems driven by a desire to escape culture, 
remains quintessentially postmodern in its emulation of contemporary science's desire 
to account for the enigmatic relation between mind and body and its implications for 
the nature of consciousness. 
Many critics have felt confident in categorising DeLillo as exemplary of 
postmodernism. Paul Civello, for example, argues boldly that DeLillo's work is a 
10 Don DeLillo, Mao 11 (London: Vintage, 1992) 
"Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. by Robert 
Hurley, Mark Seers, and Helen R. Lane (London: Athlone Press, 1984) 
12 Don DeLillo, The Body Artist (London: Picador, 2002) and Cosmopolis (London: Picador, 2003) 
postmodemist revision of Herningwayesque naturalism. 13 He suggests that, while 
Hemingway presents consciousness 'as an ordering principle', opposed to destructive 
natural force' (p. 3), DeLillo's 'postmodern transformation of the naturalistic form' 
(p. 112) presents 'the self with a new dilemma: how to locate the subjective self in and 
reconcile it to a world in which there is no distinction between subject and object' 
(p. 123). More recently, criticism has begun to explore the manifold tensions and 
overlaps in DeLillo's work between modernism and postmodemism, both in his 
aesthetic and his presentation of subjectivity. Certainly,, I suggest that DeLillo's 
relationship to modernism and postmodernism is more complex and ambivalent than 
Civello would acknowledge. DeLillo demonstrates no commitment to any particular 
aesthetic, but adopts the literary modes and techniques that assist him in exploring 
particular forms of consciousness. Indeed, form is often employed allegorically in 
DeLillo's work, that is, primarily as a metaphor to convey the mind-set of the 
character being represented. The result is an oeuvre that employs a complex mixture 
of modernist and postmodemist techniques and defies the boundary between 
modernism and postmodemism. Although the contemporary subject matter of the 
early novels --Rock music, Terrorism, Television etc. -- might lead one to expect 
quintessentially postmodemist texts, they often employ traditional or generic narrative 
modes and parody mainstream discourses, in a characteristically modernist fashion. 
Moreover, their protagonists sometimes aspire to discrete, modernist forms of 
selfhood, whose stability seems highly appealing, after the disorientation of 
postmodern culture. Yet, simultaneously, a contemporary cinematic aesthetic is often 
at work in these novels. This is manifest in the use of rapid 'cuts' between scenes, 
13 Paul Civello, American Literary Naturalism and its Twentieth-Centu! Zý Transformations (Athens, 
GA, University of Georgia Press, 1994) 
which mimics the style of avant-garde cinema, especially that of Jean-Luc Godard, as 
in End Zone, Players, and Running Dog, as well intense interest in the relationship 
between film and subjectivity, which is especially important in Americana. It is also 
sometimes apparent in a detached, cinematic mode of narration, which seems mimetic 
of the numbed, affectless mode of subjectivity that DeLillo often finds in postmodern 
America. I sometimes call this 'camera-eye' narration, after John Dos Passos' use of 
the term in his novel USA. 14 
DeLillo's later fiction contains the same idiosyncratic blend of literary modes. 
In The Names, a quasi-realist aesthetic resembling modernist naturalism is employed 
to indicate the anachronistic colonialist subjectivity of the novel's American 
expatriates. References to this aesthetic recur in subsequent novels, notably Libra and 
Mao II, usually in the form of allusions to Hemingway, who, justly or not, repeatedly 
serves DeLillo as the emblem of a naturalistic simplicity, which entails a one-to-one 
correspondence between signifier and referent. In Libra, Lee Harvey Oswald's belief 
that Soviet Russia will inspire him to write in Hemingway's style associates the 
country's stark material conditions with a naturalism that contrasts with the 
disorientating unreality of American culture (p. 160). These intermittent returns to 
naturalism may be partly inspired by Hemingway's considerable influence on the 
young DeLillo. In a recent interview, DeLillo admitted having once written a 'short 
story that was supposed to be like one of Hemingway's', before revealing that 
'Hemingway was the greatest for me at that time. And, to be honest, my fascination 
with him has never entirely faded'. 15 On the other hand, the later novels often engage 
14 John Dos Passos, USA (New York: Library of America, 1996) 
15 Peter Henning, 'An Interview with Don DeLillo', in Frankfurter Rundschon " 200'November 2003, 271, pp. 28-29, trans, by Julie Apitzsch at <http: //www. perival. com/delillo/ddinterview-henning. html>, 
last accessed 3 rd April 2005. 
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with visual culture in a typically postmodernist way. Mao II contains a number of 
photographs representing the contemporary events it references, while Underworld 
contains extended analyses of video footage and employs a more expansive form of 
camera-eye narration than that of the early fiction, which makes rapid connections 
between seemingly disparate groups. Paradoxically, though, Underworld also makes 
use of techniques like montage, which derive from modernist cinema, and is 
modernist in its proliferation of internal connections, which construct the text in the 
form of a closed, autotelic system. This is to be partly explained by Underworld's 
status as historical novel, which depicts the waning of modernist thought and the 
emergence of its postmodernist successor, but it also makes plain that DeLillo is not 
to be easily categorised, either aesthetically or thematically. 
DeLillo's novels range widely, and idiosyncratically, in their approach to 
consciousness and a study like this one therefore requires a considerable variety of 
theoretical ideas to do them justice. In the first half of the thesis, when I introduce the 
central issues of postmodern philosophy of mind, my references include 
neuroscientists, like Antonio Damasio, the mathematician Sir Roger Penrose, and the 
philosopher and AI specialist Daniel C. Dennett. Later, when I emphasise a more 
positive engagement with postmodem culture, I use the work of post-structuralist 
theoreticians like Jacques Derrida, Frangois Lyotard, Gilles Deleuze, and Felix 
Guattari. DeLillo often writes in opposition to the objectivist, quasi-scientific 
approaches to the mind that prevail in postmodernity and accentuates what John R. 
Searle calls the irreducibly 'first-person ontology' of consciousness (P. 17). It proves 
necessary for DeLillo's characters to recognise the fundamentally subjective nature of 
consciousness, both in order to appreciate the mind's full potential and to construct a 
mode of subjectivity capable of adapting to postmodernity, without suffering 
psychological breakdown. Consequently, I also make use of phenomenologists such 
as Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who are both examples of what 
David Porush calls 'holistic viewpoints which suggest that human beings can only 
know themselves as consciousness', and therefore particularly appropriate reference 
points for DeLillo's fiction. 16 My discussions of such philosophers are interspersed 
with citations of thinkers on topics such as linguistics and systems theory and 
quotations from scholars too numerous to list, which elaborate upon the eclectic list of 
subjects that DeLillo's novels address, such as religion, politics, historiography, sport, 
and warfare. By ranging widely, I aim to demonstrate the centrality of consciousness 
to DeLillo's fiction. I argue that his treatment of all these subjects is readily 
interpretable in the context of his concern with consciousness, indeed, that he often 
presents them, and his characters' reactions to them, primarily as manifestations of a 
particular model of mind, body, and selfhood. 
I implicitly include this concatenation of mind, body, and subjectivity under 
the title 'Models of Consciousness'. How far is this justified? Part of the usefulness of 
the term consciousness is that, to an informed readership, it connotes the intense, 
relatively recent debates surrounding Artificial Intelligence and the discoveries of 
neuroscience and the extent to which these have explained the 'mystery' of 
consciousness. It is also useful as a catch all term, which helps one overcome the 
extent and complexity of the disagreements on fundamental issues within philosophy 
of mind. Under its aegis, so to speak, the critic can construct a view of the relation 
between mind, body, and subjectivity that seems justified by the work of the author(s) 
whose oeuvre they are examining; in this case, that of Don DeLillo. There still exists, 
16 David Porush, The Soft Machine: Cybernetic Fiction (New York: Methuen, 1985), p. 68. 
for example, little agreement on the relationship between body and mind, or whether 
unconscious thoughts are part of what we call consciousness. On the latter question, 
DeLillo often leaves considerable ambiguity as to whether conscious or unconscious 
thoughts motivate the actions of characters. Rather than pursuing this frequently 
intractable question, I treat the unconscious as part of consciousness, adopting, as a 
working assumption, John R. Searle's view that 'The notion of an unconscious mental 
state implies accessibility to consciousness' (p. 152). On the mind-body relation, 
DeLillo lays frequent emphasis on the body's importance in promoting vigorous 
emotional and intellectual response. I therefore use thinkers such as neuroscientist 
Antonio Damasio, who argues that emotion is realised and expressed through the 
body and that such manifestations are essential to coherent thought. 
17 
The enigmatic relationship between mind and subjectivity is at the heart of my 
approach to DeLillo. Though Descartes' axiom 'I think, therefore I am' implies that 
thought gives rise directly to the sense of self, epistemology leads straightforwardly to 
ontology, a complex debate continues to rage about the nature of this relation. 18 Some 
theorists regard a sense of self as necessary to consciousness: others believe 
consciousness to be the sine qua non of subjectivity. Damasio proposes the former 
view: in evolutionary terms, 'something like a sense of self was needed to make the 
signals that constitute the feeling of emotion known to the organism having the 
emotion' (p. 8). Therefore, for a state to qualify as consciousness, it must not only 
provide awareness of worldly phenomena, but also of the self as perceiver: 
consciousness of the self as conscious. DeLillo not infrequently treats these issues 
17 Antonio Damasio, The Feeling of What Hapnens: Body and Emotion in the Making o 
Consciousness (London: Heinernann, 1999), p. 287, p. 41. 
'a Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. by Donald A. 
Cress (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1980), p. 17. 
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with wry levity, but always demonstrates an acute awareness of their complexity. In 
End Zone, the football player Bing Jackmin informs the novel's protagonist Gary 
Harkness that 'I sensed knowledge in the football', 'It was aware of its own 
footballness', only to be countered by Gary's knowing rejoinder 'But was it aware of 
its own awareness? That's the ultimate test, you know' (p. 23). DeLillo never endorses 
Cartesian dualism, but often presents the relationship between knowing and being 
with the directness that is implied by Descartes' 'cogito ergo sum'. Yet, for DeLillo, 
this is a causal relationship, never a logical one. He examines the numerous 
epistemologies available to the postmodem subject and, without moral judgement, 
studies the consequences for his characters' ontology, particularly with respect to the 
forms of subjectivity they produce. In using the term 'epistemology', I adapt it 
slightly from its classical sense of 'the theory of knowledge', to refer to any mode in 
which the mind may apprehend the world. 19 1 therefore apply it to the modes of 
thought adopted by characters and the theories of consciousness articulated or implied 
in the novels, categories that, because of DeLillo's habit of having characters take on 
certain theories of the mind as their personal epistemology, are sometimes identical. 
'Ontology' refers to the study of the nature of being. I employ the term throughout the 
thesis to refer to the forms of being, particularly the modes of selfhood, produced by 
the various epistemologies DeLillo examines. 
The dispassionate, even clinical, portrayal of characters' mental and emotional 
response, under the influence of various approaches to mental activity, constitutes the 
main content of DeLillo's novels and accounts for much of their mesmeric power. 
Their compelling force also emerges from DeLillo's distinctive prose style, which is 
often marked by a free, paratactic linking of clauses that suspends and defers 
19 Gregory McCulloch, The Mind and Its World (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 9. 
II 
meaning, in a way that verges on the hypnotic. In Great Jones Street, for instance, 
Bucky writes of the 'chance to remake himself, lean man of mystery, returning with 
the fabled tapes for all to hear, luring his crowds to near silence, their fear in baby 
bottles under their seats' (p. 149). The suspension of syntactic and narrative logic 
implicit in this style, which DeLillo adopts frequently, allows the reader to focus on 
the motions of his or her own consciousness and imagination and therefore to 
consider what I argue is the primary subject of DeLillo's novels. Moreover, its 
elliptical quality, which is achieved by the omission of certain conjunctions and 
prepositions, deliberately gestures away from language to emphasise mind and 
subjectivity as entities that exist independently of signification. 
I attribute considerable agency and autonomy to the human subject in 
DeLillo's work. My argument that DeLillo posits a causal link between epistemology 
and ontology implies that, in his work, epistemological shifts produce concomitant 
changes in ontology. Indeed, I argue that DeLillo depicts numerous characters that 
deliberately alter their epistemology, either in response to historical change or 
physical and mental dysfunction. Their success in this enterprise varies widely. But 
from the numerous variations on catastrophe and relief that attend their efforts, I 
suggest that it is possible, tentatively, to deduce DeLillo's view of which 
epistemologies may help to construct a self, capable of at least a measure of 
psychological stability. This will surprise some. Critics often suggest that DeLillo 
portrays postmodernity as having radically reduced the importance of the self. In 
particular, my view runs counter to an early, influential strain of thought in DeLillo 
studies, initiated by Robert Nadeau, which employed systems theory and the 'New 
Physics' to explicate the novels and often treated consciousness as wholly impotent, 
12 
trapped within the operation of impersonal mechanisms that utterly determine its fate. 
20 Nadeau had a particular influence on Civello and Tom LeClair, who both use forms 
of systems theory derived from scientific analysis. 21 Their work has exerted tacit 
influence on the many subsequent critics who believe that DeLillo's fiction merely 
represents the Baudrillardian 'simulacrum' that prevails in postmodern capitalism. 22 
The restrictive, hermetic closure of this simulacrum. bears close resemblance to the 
systems LeClair and Nadeau see in DeLillo's novels. The difference of the 
Baudrillardian view is that characters are not imprisoned by the determining action of 
linguistic or technological systems, but by radical alienation from reality. Yet, DeLillo 
often emphasises the dangers of losing a coherent sense of subjectivity and presents 
those characters that do so as enfeebled and neurotic, in desperate need of an 
epistemology that will provide them with a sustainable sense of self. As Damasio 
argues, 'the tendency towards one single self and its advantage to the healthy mind 
are undeniable' (p. 226). In 'The Power of History, DeLillo stresses the resilience of 
the self in the face of multiple contemporary attacks on its integrity. 23 He admits that 
postmodernity has left the self 'mazed, mercurial, scared half-crazy', but insists it 
remains 'free and undivided, the only thing that can match the enormous dimensions 
of social reality' (p. 62). 
Over recent years, some criticism has acknowledged the importance of 
DeLillo's concern with selfhood and the degree of autonomy his characters exercise 
20 Robert Nadeau, Readings from the New Book on Nature: Physics and Metaphysics in the Modem 
Novel (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1981), p. 162. 
21 Tom LeClair, In the Loop: Don DeLillo and the Systems Novel (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois 
Press, 1987) 
22 Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, trans. by Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor, MI: 
University of Michigan Press, 1994), p. 1. 
23 Don DeLillo, 'The Power of History' in The New York Times 7h September 1997, pp. 60-63. 
13 
in the construction of subjectivity. Curtis Yehnert writes of the 'strategies of self- 
creation' practised by many of DeLillo's characters and suggests that his work limns a 
4postexistential' notion of self, in which the creation of subjectivity is based on a 
'dialectic between form and formlessness'. 24 But, in spite of such useful contributions 
to the debate on DeLillo's treatment of ontology, the critical importance of 
epistemology and its dynamic relationship to ontology in DeLillo's work remains 
largely unrecognised. By overlooking these concerns, critics underestimate the 
complexity of DeLillo's analysis of the human subject and the American citizen's 
relationship with institutions like the corporation and the state. Rather than presenting 
individual behaviour as determined by vast institutions or technological networks, 
DeLillo portrays an intricate relationship between the prevailing models of 
consciousness in American culture and Americans' collective response to, sometimes, 
pernicious cultural forces. DeLillo repeatedly focuses on the relative psychological 
vulnerability of characters that accept theories emphasising the weakness of mind and 
the unreality of their perceptions. He distinguishes fastidiously between 
epistemologies, like these, that foster fragility and uncertainty and others that promote 
significant autonomy and independence. In interview, DeLillo has warned of 'a 
mechanism' in American 'culture' that 'tries to reduce any threat to consumer 
consciousness'. 25 He has also stated repeatedly his hope that his novels 'point out an 
opposition to the state, the industry consensus, and the runaway consumerism'. 26 
24 Curtis Yehnert, "'Like Some Endless Sky Waking Inside": Subjectivity in Don DeLillo', Critigue: 
Studies in Contemporary Fiction, 42 (2001), 357-66 (p. 361). 
25 Jonathan Bing, 'The Ascendance of Don DeLillo', in Publishers Weekly II Ih August 1997, pp. 261- 
3, at <httl2: //www. publishersweekly, com/article/OA164963html? text--ascendance+of+don+delillo>. 
last accessed 2d April 2005. 
26 Bo Green Jensen, 'The Triumph of Death', in Weekend Avisen , trans. by Jakob Schelander, 
13'h 
November 1998, at <http: //www. perival. com/deliIlo/ddinterview lensen. html>. last accessed 2 nd April 
2005. 
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Since the largest threat to 'consumer consciousness' is likely to be a population 
convinced of the accuracy of its own perceptions and its ability to make reliable, 
independent judgements, DeLillo's interest in American attitudes to mind is central to 
the dissident spirit of his work. 
Death plays a pivotal role in DeLillo's concern with consciousness. The 
distaste for the body that he finds in American culture is generally metonymic of 
endemic death-anxiety, which DeLillo often relates to terror of the unforgiving 
Puritan God. In the early work, this fear of mortality forestalls recognition of Searle's 
'first-person ontology' and locks characters into what Americana's David Bell calls 
'the third person' (p. 58). Rather than accept mortality, DeLillo's characters often 
adopt a third person view of their mind, which faithfully replicates the methodologies 
of the objectivist philosophies of consciousness, like behaviourism and Artificial 
Intelligence, which have been so influential in the post-war period. Evasion of first- 
person epistemology contributes to a loss of faith in the reliability of perception, 
which further hinders acceptance of 'first-person ontology' and creates a self- 
perpetuating cycle. DeLillo again seems notably Hegelian in the importance he 
attributes to overcoming death-anxiety, for the mind to flourish. Hegel argues it is a 
sign of the mind's power that it 'endures death and in death maintains its being' and 
asserts that 'mind is this power only by looking the negative in the face and dwelling 
with it. This dwelling beside it is the magic power that converts the negative into 
being' (PhenomenolgZy, p. 93). DeLillo's characters often see a necessity for 
confronting and overcoming death. They do so by risking death, reading about it, 
embracing the functions of the body, or, on occasion, by engaging in a process of 
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psychic merger with mortality that seems Buddhist in its quest for a union of subject 
and object. 
DeLillo's acknowledgement of a debt to Ernest Becker's The Denial of Death 
has often been noted. 27 He discussed the influence in a letter to Tom LeClair, from 
which LeClair quotes (Loop, p. 213). Yet, surprisingly, the fact that the book is a work 
of Rankian analysis has rarely been mentioned and DeLillo's affinities with Otto 
Rank have not been considered. The Denial of Death follows Otto Rank in regarding 
death-anxiety as the ultimate motivating factor in human behaviour. While DeLillo 
never adopts such a totalising perspective on mortality, his work is highly susceptible 
to a Rankian reading, most notably in his examination of the seductive power of 
American image-culture. DeLillo treats his characters' passionate relationship with 
the iconic images of cinema and television as the displacement of a powerful wish to 
escape death. The characters treat the stars of visual culture as alter egos blessed with 
eternal life, with whom they wish to identify and merge. In Rankian terms, these 
unreal figures exemplify the immortal 'double', which Rank believes recurs 
28 throughout art history and functions as a 'symbol of eternal life'. DeLillo's later 
novels never abandon this concern with death-anxiety, but after its explicit treatment 
in White Noise it fades somewhat as a factor in the characters' pathologies. Indeed, in 
DeLillo's subsequent three novels, Libra, Mao 11, and Underworld, there is a notable 
association of death-anxiety with modernist paranoia, with the implication that 
postmodernity presents the American subject with the opportunity of escaping the 
terror that haunted its Puritan past. Accordingly, The Body Artist and Cosmopolis 
provide DeLillo's most explicit and detailed portrayals thus far of protagonists who 
27 Ernest Becker, The Denial of Death (New York: Macmillan Free Press, 1973) 
28 Otto Rank, Beyond Psychology (New York: Dover Publications, 1958), p. 76. 
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achieve highly productive rapprochement with death. Both novels feature protagonists 
that encounter death at close quarters and so greatly enlarge their understanding of 
mind, body, and time. As in Heidegger and Hegel, it is only by courageous and 
patient 'dwelling beside' mortality that mind discovers its inherent 'power' and more 
is revealed of the complex ontology of the human subject. 
In Chapter 1,1 begin with a reading of Americana, DeLillo's first novel and, 
thematically, the Ur-text of his oeuvre. It contains, in embryo, many of the ideas that 
persist throughout DeLillo's work, including the inability of the protagonist to live in 
the 'first person' and the complicity of the American Corporation in undermining 
regard for consciousness. The novel is also particularly notable for its exploration of 
the ingrained asceticism that it presents as fundamental to American capitalism and 
masculinity. The television executive David Bell struggles to choose. between this 
destructive mainstream asceticism and a more traditional, perhaps more authentic, 
kind, which entails solitude, self-denial, and a realist appreciation of mind and world. 
Chapter 2 contains readings of End Zone and Great Jones Street, in which I argue 
against the view that their concerns are primarily metaphysical and propose that they 
portray a struggle to achieve an anti-Wittgensteinian, realist view of consciousness as 
ineffable but concrete and irreducible. The texts enact a paradoxical engagement with 
popular culture, treating it as both poison and possible cure. In Great Jones Street, 
underground drugs produce aphasia but allow the protagonist to save his fragmented 
consciousness from the disorientating image-culture of rock music. In End Zone, 
football is an apparent obstacle to cerebral activity, but also a source of order that 
facilitates mental discipline and private examination of consciousness. 
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Chapter 3 examines Ratner's Star, which takes as its conceit the 'unification' of the 
brain's right and left hemispheres and explores the uses of the intuitive and rational 
modes of thought with which these are associated. A group of elite academics seek 
the source of a radio message, which turns out to have emerged from a more advanced 
civilization of pre-history. Their neglect of body and emotion, which they associate 
with irrationality and death, robs them of the intuitive ability necessary to discover 
this truth. The novel suggests that exclusively abstract thought and the conflation of 
the self with intellect results in the creation of what R. D. Laing calls a psychotic 
'false-self system', which alienates the scientists from themselves, others, and their 
collective history. 
Chapter 4 focuses on Players and Runninjz Dog and continues this concern with the 
Laingian 'false-self system', investigating the fragile and artificial forms of 
subjectivity forged through human identification with technology, which DeLillo 
clearly considers a central pathology of postmodemity. I use Marxist theory and work 
on Artificial Intelligence to draw parallels between the abstraction of exchange value 
from labour and commodities in New York's finance markets, where the novel is set, 
and the desire to abstract a disembodied form of mind from the complex 
concatenation of mind, body, and self, which forms the human subject. 
Chapter 5 approaches The Names and White Noise, novels of DeLillo's middle 
period, which mark both an increase in his dedication to his work and a breakthrough 
in his career, when he won the National Book Award for White Noise. They also 
signal the beginning, in earnest, of his consideration of the models of mind and 
subjectivity required for successful adaptation to a postmodern world that is post- 
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colonial, globalised, and saturated by technology. I argue that he proposes a notion of 
mind as possessing unsuspected power and resilience and that its native force may be 
considered as in excess of signification and death, adversaries that have often been 
held to dominate it. 
Chapter 6 is the largest chapter of the thesis and deals with three of DeLillo's later 
and better known novels, Libra, Mao 11. and Underworld. I read them as offering an 
epic account of the centripetal psychological forces that have emerged in 
postmodernity and which encounter fierce resistance from adherents of modernism 
and its more discrete forms of subjectivity, who fear and resent a unified model of 
consciousness. The novels trace a dramatic evolution in DeLillo's thinking on the 
subject, in which the yearning for psychological unity comes to appear ever less 
pathological. This process begins with the unexpectedly creative destructive acts of 
Lee Harvey Oswald and concludes with the vast panorama of Underworld, in which 
the healing effects of what I call postmodem schizophrenia are apparent in the 
redemption and recuperation of races and individuals hitherto banished or ghettoised. 
Chapter 7 studies DeLillo's most recent novels, The Body Artist and Cosmopolis, in 
which he examines the possibility of the quest for what he calls 'root identity', which 
I read as meaning the fundamental nature of consciousness, or consciousness as such. 
Although the project appears to verge on the essentialising or primitivistic, 
paradoxically, it is characteristically postmodem, in its emulation of the efforts of 
contemporary science to account for the relationship between mind and body and its 
implications for the nature of consciousness. Nevertheless, the novels eschew the 
objectivism of scientific methodology and examine 'root identity' largely from the 
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internal, subjective perspective of the novels' protagonists. The result is two texts that 
interrogate the extent to which it is possible for the 'true' nature of consciousness to 
provide a pragmatic model for postmodem life. 
20 
Chapter I 
Americana: From Third to First Person Consciousness 
Critics of Americana (197 1), DeLillo's first novel, have generally proceeded 
from the assumption that, in this text, DeLillo evinces a marked scepticism towards 
unified, modernist conceptions of the self and suggests that, in a postmodern 
environment, subjectivity is necessarily unknowable and indeterminate. 
1 David 
Cowart, for instance, has remarked that in Americana TeLillo seems fully to 
recognise the tenuousness of all "subject-positions"'. 2 Robert Nadeau asserts that 
Americana demonstrates the way in which the electronic mass communications of the 
postmodern world have 'trivialized out of existence' the notion of an 'authentic or 
unique self .3 Similarly, critical writers argue that the protagonist and 
first-person 
narrator, the television executive David Bell, is disorientated by the instability of 
contemporary selfhood, which he blames on the influence of media technologies, and 
that he feels nostalgic for the relative coherence of modernist subjectivity. Cowart 
describes David as in search of a 'knowable, stable identity' and tormented by the 
'subject's inability to know a definitive version of itself (pp. 132-33). Tom LeClair, 
meanwhile, sees Bell engaged in a related but explicitly metaphysical quest to grasp 
an 'unsPlit truth'. 4 
In spite of subtle differences in their positions, these critics agree that David is 
unsuccessful in the quests that they attribute to him. However, I suggest that their 
1 Don DeLillo, Americana (London: Penguin, 1990) 
2 David Cowart, The Physics of Language (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2002), p. 13 1. 
3 Robert Nadeau, Readings from the New Book on Nature: Physics and Metaphysics in the Modern 
Novel (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 198 1), p. 162. 
4 Tom LeClair, In The Loop: Don DeLillo and the Systems Novel (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois 
Press, 1987), p. 39. 
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view that of David's 'failure' arises from a misunderstanding of the difficulty he 
confronts and the objective he pursues. Far from choosing between stable and 
indeterminate models of identity, David's conviction that his consciousness does not 
offer him reliable access to the world annuls any possibility of creating a recognisable 
form of selfhood. Seeking to evade what he believes is the illusory nature of his 
mental experience, he adopts the severe cognitive restrictions of an objectivist 
epistemology, which he calls 'third person' consciousness and which resembles the 
reductive analysis of behaviourist psychology. By objectivism, I do not mean 
objectivity as such, but scientific and philosophical methodologies that exclude 
subjective experience altogether. David is acutely aware of his objectivist approach to 
life. As he confesses, 'The only problem I had was that my whole life was a lesson in 
the effect of echoes, that I was living in the third person' (p. 58). DeLillo draws 
frequent parallels between David's and mindset and that of American culture in 
general and suggests that both lead to destructive and inhumane behaviour. Indeed, 
David's self-destructive rejection of 'first-Person' experience is treated as a 
characteristic, even archetypal, American pathology. Notably, David's doubts about 
the veracity of his perceptions are often the displacement of a pathological death- 
anxiety, which DeLillo presents as endemic to U. S. culture, and which causes David 
to fear all subjective experience. David demonstrates an inability to confront any 
situation involving death and eventually reveals that his phobia stems from extreme 
grief at his mother's death (p. 237). He refers repeatedly to his irrational fear of 
'disappearance' (p. 41), which renders him dependent upon his mirror image, the 
apparent immortality of which serves as apotropaic against death-anxiety. As David 
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puts it tellingly, with reference to his narcissism, 'I was blue-eyed David Bell. 
Obviously my life depended on this fact' (p. 11). 
His scepticism of mental experience causes severe paranoia. David's belief 
that first-person mental experience is illusory and valueless convinces him that media 
technologies are capable of distorting perception and memory, or even emptying the 
mind of valuable content. His displacement of personal anxieties onto technology is 
consonant with Curtis Yehnert's view that DeLillo's characters use 'the media to 
escape responsibility for their own lives'. ' Above all, Yehnert argues, they use their 
'mediated environment to flee their own inwardness' (p. 359). In the course of 
Americana, David seeks to overcome his self-imposed mental limitations and 
confront the 'inwardness' to which Yehnert refers. 
His problem is closely comparable to the one that John R. Searle diagnoses as 
the central theoretical difficulty of postmodem cognitive science and philosophy of 
mind. Searle argues that a purely materialist conception of the human subject has 
caused anxiety among theorists about acknowledging 'the irreducibility of 
consciousness and other mental phenomena' because they believe such an admission 
6 might commit them 'to some form of Cartesianism'. Consequently, like David, they 
'redefine the notion of consciousness so that it no longer refers to actual conscious 
states, that is inner, subjective, qualitative, first-person mental states, but rather to 
publicly observable mental phenomena' (p. 7). They therefore study the mind by 
adopting 'the objective or third-person point of view' (p. 10). Searle argues that this 
third-person epistemology often masks an unexpressed belief that 'consciousness does 
5 Curtis Yehnert, "'Like Some Endless Sky Waking Inside": Subjectivity in Don DeLillo', Critigue: 
Studies in Contemporary Fiction 42 (2001), 357-66 (p. 358). 
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not really exist'. Like the theorists Searle describes, David's materialist understanding 
of mind and body persuades him that consciousness has little substance or value. He 
therefore regards it as logical to adopt a third-person epistemology that is confined to 
phenomena that Searle calls 'publicly observable' (p. 7). In David's case, materialism 
results in the death-anxiety that causes him to avoid first-person experience. David 
shares with Searle's opponents the belief that if subjective human consciousness is not 
part of an immortal Cartesian 'soul', it has little ontological value and may, as Searle 
suggests his opponents believe, 'not really exist' (p. 7). Consequently, David believes 
his perceptions can be easily dismissed. Ironically, by rejecting the Cartesian view, 
David's position repeats Descartes' supposition that without the guarantee of 
perceptual accuracy, provided by God's existence, consciousness might be only a 
vision or dream. 7 If Searle is to be believed, this inadvertent recapitulation of 
Cartesianism is no coincidence. In his opinion, materialism's refusal to recognise 
what he calls 'irreducible intrinsic mental phenomena' means that it treats physical 
and mental as opposed categories and becomes 'the finest flower of dualism' (p. 26). 
In David, therefore, DeLillo depicts a protagonist whose anxieties about the 
ontological status of mind are representative of those that have preoccupied post-war 
philosophy. Consequently, rather than employing theories of the postmodern subject, 
which critics have hitherto used to explicate Americana, it may be appropriate to 
place the novel, and much else in DeLillo's oeuvre, in the intellectual context of 
contemporary debates about the ontological nature and status of consciousness. 
After arduous struggle, David eventually makes progress in his effort to 
confront his first-person consciousness and develop a model of self that is 
6 John R. Searle, The Rediscove[y of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), p. 2. 
7 Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosoph , trans. by Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1980), pp. 94-100. 
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recognisable as a 'subjectivity'. This psychological journey is accomplished in the 
course of a more literal one, during which he drives to parts of the Southern and Mid- 
Western United States, of which, as an insular New Yorker, he is completely ignorant, 
and then travels to North Africa. In describing this j ourney, the novel contains 
important elements of the Picaresque. It portrays an itinerant and increasingly poverty 
stricken protagonist, whose travels reveal the pathologies of his American social 
milieu, and who, in his role as television producer, is also what Carroll B. Johnson, in 
defining the 'pfcaro', calls 'the bearer of modem bourgeois values'. 8 DeLillo's most 
obvious American precursor in the postmodem Picaresque is Jack Kerouac's On the 
Road, whose main character, like David, flees middle-class life in pursuit of a more 
authentic American experience. 9 But, DeLillo's adaptation of this type of Picaresque 
'road novel' may also owe much to Jean-Luc Godard's A Bout De Souffle, which 
records the travels of a similarly desperate, albeit criminal, protagonist. 10 DeLillo has 
acknowledged, in interview, that 'Godard had a more immediate effect on my early 
work that anything I'd ever read' and even has David refer directly to the French 
filmmaker's avant-garde aesthetic, in calling 'a grainy day' the 'child of Godard and 
Coca-Cola' (p. 269). 11 Given that the Picaresque has been called 'a literature dealing 
with social nobodies', David's search for subjectivity makes DeLillo's use of the 
8 Carroll B. Johnson, 'Defining the Picaresque: Authority and the Subject in Gazmdn de Alfarache', in 
The Picaresque: Tradition and Displacement , ed. by Giancarlo Maiorino (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), pp. 159-82 (p. 159). 
9 Jack Kerouac, On the Road (New York: Viking Press, 1957) 
10 A Bout De Souffle. Dir. Jean-Luc Godard. SNC. 1998. 
11 Tom LeClair and Larry McCaffery, eds. An3qhing Can Happen: Interviews with Contempora 
American Novelists (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1983), p. 84. 
25 
genre highly apposite. 12 Where the Spanish picaro sought social status in order to 'be 
somebody', DeLillo's postmodern protagonist strives to value his mental experience 
and selfhood, in a culture increasingly inimical to subjective thought or individual 
identity. 
Once David embraces his 'first-person consciousness', he discovers 
considerable unsuspected capacities within the mind, including the potential for 
spiritual experience. Like many of DeLillo's novels, therefore, Americana examines 
the capacity of the mind, both for self-limitation and profound self-transformation. In 
exploring these possibilities, DeLillo depicts David employing two radically different 
perceptual frameworks, each of which produces a corresponding ontology or mode of 
being. If Brian McHale is right that postmodernist fiction takes ontology as its 
'dominant', while modernist work tends to pursue questions of epistemology, then 
DeLillo's exploration of the relationship between them would suggest that his work 
does not fit easily into either category. 13 However, Linda Hutcheon has suggested 
that postmodemism denies the validity of oppositions like the one between knowing 
and being, in light of which DeLillo's treatment of the two categories as close and 
overlapping makes his oeuvre appear characteristically postmodern. 14 Paradoxically, 
though, he continues to treat the distinction between knowing and being as valid and 
useful, consistently examining the ontological consequences of various 
epistemologies. In Americana, for example, a fundamental distrust of consciousness 
retards the development of a full subjectivity. Clearly, therefore, DeLillo does not 
12 Fransisco J Sýmchez and Nicholas Spadaccini, 'Revisiting the Picaresque in Postmodern Times', in 
The Picaresque: Tradition and Displacement ed. by Giancarlo Maiorino (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1996), pp. 292-307 (p. 293). 
13 Brian McHale, Postmodernist Fiction (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 10. 
14 Linda Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism: History. Theory and Fiction (New York, Routledge, 
1988), p. 50. 
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depict characters whose sense of self can be diminished or 'trivialized' by electric 
communication networks. Rather, by suggesting that the human subject has the 
potential to choose between competing epistemologies and their ontological 
correlatives, DeLillo hints at a model of mind capable of resisting technological or 
systemic restriction and playing a role in creating its own perceptual framework. 
In view of his role as first-person narrator, it is ironic that David's younger 
self made concerted efforts to avoid subjective mental experience. Because his 
narration offers the reader privileged access to his thought processes, it is apparent 
that, in the course of the novel, David begins to attach greater value to his experience 
of consciousness. After the conclusion of the diegetic narrative, when he has aged 
considerably, he gains the necessary maturity to make significant progress towards the 
first-person epistemology he has sought. It is worth dwelling on the irony of a first- 
person narrator who admits to suffering the pathology of a 'third person 
consciousness'. After all, if David were still living in the 'third person', it would be 
unfeasible for him to narrate the book at all, or to analyse his mental experience with 
the perspicacity he brings to bear upon it. Therefore, in pursuing and embracing 
subjective experience, he becomes competent to perform the self-reflexive role that 
enables his production of the narrative and makes possible the book's existence. This 
fact alone demonstrates David's progress towards first-person epistemology. 
However, early in the novel, David shares with the behaviourist psychologists of the 
1950s an objectivist tendency to exclude interior mental experience from 
consideration. Of behaviourism, as it was practised by its most celebrated exponent, 
B. F. Skinner, Laurence D. Smith remarks that the technique 'rejects as superfluous, 
even harmful, anything that interferes with the activities of observing or describing'. 
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15 Likewise, David's relationship with his mind is based on an epistemology that 
focuses exclusively on external appearance and response in isolation from any 
internal experience with which it might be said to correlate. 
By means of a flashback to David's adolescence, DeLillo demonstrates that 
this behaviourist objectivism has been habitual to David since his teenage years. 
David feigns laughter at an inaudible joke and remarks that 'I kept nodding and 
laughing. When he was satisfied he went away' (p. 189). Since, as David Cowart has 
shown, Americana is set in approximately 1970 and David is twenty eight years old at 
the beginning of the novel, David's puberty would coincide with the pre-eminence of 
behaviourism in American psychology (p. 13 3). The fact that David's adoption of 
objectivism coincides with this period suggests that the text includes a subtle critique 
of the pernicious influence exerted by this now discredited epistemology. As we have 
seen, this dismissal of mental experience has its corollary in excessive emphasis on 
his physical appearance. As so often in DeLillo's oeuvre, it is possible to observe a 
close correlation between epistemology and ontology. David's objectivism, which 
excludes the experienced interiority of the mind, has unfortunate ontological 
consequences; his self-esteem and general sense of wellbeing become extremely 
fragile. David recounts that his distrust of first-person experience disorientated him 
sufficiently that he had 'almost the same kind of relationship with my miffor that 
many of my contemporaries had with their analysts' (p. 11). In asking for his 
autograph, a 'teenage girl' exposes the vacuity of the glamorous persona he creates in 
this way, informing him naively that 'I'm not sure who you are', 'but I'm sure you 
must be somebody' (p. 13). 
15 Laurence D. Smith, Behaviorism and Logical Positivism: A Reassessment of the Alliance (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 1986), p. 270. 
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In Americana's early chapters, DeLillo shows David believes his mind to be 
both insubstantial and easily corrupted, indeed, that he comes close to the position, 
which Searle criticises fiercely, that 'consciousness does not really exist' (P. 7). He 
often implies that subjective experience possesses no intrinsic reality and that his 
mind is susceptible to fundamental corruption by media technologies. He reveals to 
his former girlfriend Wendy his belief that memory and perception deserve to be 
attributed no ontological status, replying to her request that they 'talk over old times' 
with the brusque 'There are no old times Wendy, the tapes have been accidentally 
destroyed' (p. 25). Moments like these, in which DeLillo's characters lament the 
inauthentic and unreliable nature of their perceptions, have sometimes convinced 
critics that DeLillo takes a view of postmodem reality that is very similar to that of 
Jean Baudrillard. In Simulation and Simulacra, Baudrillard argues that the 
postmodern world has been emptied of real content and can be experienced only as a 
series of simulacra. 16 He refers to the 'precession of simulacra' in postmodern life, 
which, he claims, generates a 'real without origin or reality'. But, this Baudrillardian 
notion of contemporary reality as simulacra is not the difficulty that plagues 
characters like David Bell. Rather, David is unable to accept that the phenomena of 
consciousness are irreducibly subjective. What he lacks, therefore, is what Thomas 
Nagel has called a 'realist' position on consciousness, the understanding that mental 
experience is entirely real, even though subjective. A proleptic episode early in the 
novel, one of four in the text, reveals to the reader that David eventually retires to a 
'remote' island. In doing so, as we will see, he moves much closer to this realist 
position (p. 14). Nagel's work is therefore of particular relevance to David's and 
objectivist epistemology. Indeed, Nagel points out that he undertook his realist work 
16 Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, trans. by Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor, MI: 
University of Michigan Press, 1994), p. l. 
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on consciousness in response to third-person epistemologies such as behaviourism, or 
what he refers to as the 'recently devised reductive analyses of the mental'. 17 Like 
DeLillo's protagonist in Americana, Nagel believes that in the postmodern world it is 
painfully necessary to demonstrate and assert the reality and value of subjective 
mental experience. He begins by pointing out that conscious experience is irreducibly 
subjective, declaring that 'the fact that an organism has conscious experience at all 
means, basically, that there is something it is like to be that organism'. He goes on to 
argue that this is what we may call the 'subjective character of experience'. Indeed, in 
Nagel's view, all third-person epistemologies fail in their effort to analyse subjective 
'experience' because, crucially, 'all of them are logically compatible with its absence' 
(p. 166). 
At the close of the diegetic narrative, David returns to New York from a 
lengthy trip to the western United States, undertaken in the hope of forging a more 
satisfying first-person epistemology. David Cowart has argued that the return to his 
geographical starting point implies a claustrophobic 'circularity' of structure in the 
novel, which functions as a formal indication of David's 'failure' (pp. 134-3 8). There 
is some persuasive evidence to substantiate this pessimistic view. DeLillo appears to 
suggest that, while in New York, David cannot escape the vacuity of his former 
persona. In particular, David informs us that on the return flight 'Ten minutes after we 
were airborne a woman asked for my autograph' (p. 377), a request that recalls the 
almost identical previous incident and suggests that life in New York will continue to 
direct David's attention towards his third-person mirror image. However, the view of 
Americana as ouroboric in structure fails to take sufficient account of the text's four 
proleptic passages, which establish a spatial and temporal trajectory beyond New 
17 Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions (New York: Oxford, 1986), p. 166. 
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York. In light of these, it is possible to read David's problematic return to urban life 
as providing the catalyst for him to sever ties completely with American life. It is 
noticeable that critics have sometimes dismissed these episodes with impatience, 
perhaps because they recognise that they subvert the notion that David's project ends 
in unalloyed failure. LeClair, for example, in the course of arguing that the structure 
of the novel is analogous to a loop, calls them 'present-tense interruptions' (p. 50). 
Since the judgements LeClair and Cowart pass on David's supposed 'failure' refer to 
the state of his subjectivity at the end of the text, it is vital to recognise that David's 
experience of mind and subjectivity ends, not in New York, but on an island near the 
4equatorial loin' of Africa, many years after this homecoming (P. 347). One must 
therefore base any judgement on David's final success upon the evidence of these 
passages. David's eventual flight from New York indicates that he finds the cultural 
environment there unpropitious for his purposes, and the prolepses strongly suggest 
that David recognises his former suspicion of consciousness to be, in part, the 
consequence of immersion in the American 'dream'. He declares explicitly that his 
sceptical view of mental experience as insubstantial, or 'an image made in the image 
and likeness of images', was the result of belief in this 'dream'. In making this 
admission, David also confesses that part of the dream's attraction was the third- 
person viewpoint it offered, which helps obscure the degree of exploitation and 
destruction that underlies American culture and allows him to ignore his considerable 
death-anxiety. He explains that 'The dream made no allowance for the truth beneath 
the symbols, for the interlinear notes, the presence of something black (and somehow 
very funny) at the mirror rim of one's awareness', a 'something black' that David 
makes clear amounts to 'an implication of serio-comic death' (p. 130). This analysis 
implies a view of his past techno-phobia as mere displacement of anxiety, particularly 
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with regard to death, which is similar to the view expressed by the engineer Samuel 
Florman. Of the widespread distrust of technology that he perceives in postmodern 
society, Florman asserts that the 'dread of technology is nothing other than a phobia, 
that condition which develops when people displace their anxieties ... in an effort to 
control them'. 18 
These prolepses occur at approximately equal intervals in the text and, 
consequently, the important realisations they articulate about David's mental 
pathology function in ironic counterpoint to his limited third-person epistemology 
within the diegetic narrative. They also suggest the profound transformations of which 
the mind is capable, in contrast to the crippling self-imposed limitations of third- 
person consciousness (p. 58). However, well before he retires to Africa, DeLillo shows 
that David is able to contrast the destructive third-person 'dream' of America with 
examples of relatively liberating, first-person experience. His classes in Zen 
Buddhism with Dr Oh fall into this category. The writing of Americana in the late 
1960s coincided with considerable growth of interest in Buddhism in the United 
States. DeLillo suggests that the value of such Buddhist influence for Americans lies 
in its contrast with the comparative sterility of the American 'dream'. He specifically 
contrasts the exploration of first-person experience and the possibility of 
transcendence that characterises Zen with this 'dream', which he represents in the 
form of the American corporations. David reports that when he fails to meditate and 
gazes at his classmates: 
Oh looked at me and motioned me down again, a whisper of 
his eyes, down, my child, this is your last chance, tomorrow 
18 Samuel florman, Blaming Technology: The Trrational Search for Scapegoats (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 198 1), p. 9. 
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the corporations come calling, never again will you come 
close to this moment, the chance to capture the sleep of 
awakening. (p. 177) 
The phrase 'the sleep of awakening' captures the notion that through the 
calm, apparently soporific self-examination of Zen, the students may gain the 
opportunity to 'awaken' from the third-person 'dream' of American culture. However, 
the students understand that, in David's words, 'a lifetime of small defeats was 
waiting' because 'Beauty was too difficult and truth in the West had died with chief 
Crazy Horse', dispiriting realisations that were the reason 'why Monday afternoons 
were so terrible' (p. 174). Part of Zen Buddhism's importance to David's mental life 
lies in its status as a realist philosophy that takes seriously the access to the world that 
consciousness provides. Zen is known for the notion that the self can become one 
with the object it perceives. Indeed, in Dr Oh's class, 'a student named Humbro ate 
his copy of D. T Suzuki's introduction to Zen' because, as David intones drolly, 'One 
must become a book before one can know what is inside it' (p. 175). Clearly, the idea 
that 'oneness' with an object is achievable relies on a belief that the mind, perceived 
rightly, allows unmediated access to the object. This is why the same D. T Suzuki 
argues that Zen Buddhism is what he calls a 'radical realism'. 19 Like Nagelian 
realism, it treats the reality of mind and world with equal seriousness. Suzuki believes 
that, in Zen, the mind can adopt an 'absolute standpoint', which gives the human 
subject access to the 'suchness' or essence of things (p. 72). 
It is therefore particularly interesting that, alone on his African Island, David 
returns to thoughts that are closely comparable to Buddhist doctrine. He claims that, 
19 Daisetz, Teitaro Suzuki, Studies in Zen, ed. by Christmas Humphreys (New York, Dell, 1978), p. 72. 
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in his writing, he has taken 'the middle path, neither heaven nor hell', echoing the 
common notion that Buddhism represents a middle way (p. 346). David also dwells on 
the notion of 'no-self, a doctrine, which, as Johannes Nobel points out, suggests 
'there's no personality at all, but a series of Skandhas that change every moment'. 20 
David informs the reader that 'Little of myself seems to be left' (P. 345). Viewed in 
the context of his former terror of 'disappearance' and need for 'every ego-scrap', 
such tranquil acceptance of dissolution represents significant progress in overcoming 
his neuroses (p. 41). Where he was previously unable to meditate, he now indulges in 
patient self-examination. In spite of this interest in Zen, David develops no 
programmatic adherence to its doctrines. Having begun to investigate realist 
epistemology, David remains curious about the experience of selfhood to which it 
might lead. After describing his delusions of philosophical grandeur, he remarks 
'Fortunately I always return to myself, a statement that implies an unaccustomed 
pleasure in the growth of a sense of subjectivity (p. 129). In spite of toying with 'no 
self, therefore, his quest accords with Harold Bloom's view of American ontology, 
which emphasises individuality above communal or inter-subjective experience. 21 In 
America, asserts Bloom, 'each of us is subject and object of the quest, which must be 
for the original self (p. 22). 
Nevertheless, in the novel's early chapters, David's death-anxiety confines 
him to an impoverished and objectivist third-person epistemology. DeLillo 
emphasises the importance of death in Americana by references to the Vietnam War 
and World War Two and the characters', particularly David's, terror-stricken reaction 
20 Johannes Nobel, Central Asia: The Connecting Link Between East and West and Other Lectures (Nagour: Arya l3harati Press, 1952), p. 112. 
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to these conflicts. When David mentions Vietnam in the first chapter he makes clear 
that he and his contemporaries rigorously avoid the subject and the consideration of 
mortality it entails. He reports that 'The war was on television every night but we all 
went to the movies' (p. 5). Notably, the line paraphrases the opening of Ernest 
Hemingway's story In Another Countly, whose protagonist is also haunted by death- 
anxiety and which begins 'In the fall the war was always there, but we did not go to it 
any more'. 22 Famously, Vietnam was the first televised war and David's professional 
concern with the medium suggests a significant personal reason must underlie his 
unwillingness to view this groundbreaking footage, a notion reinforced by his refusal 
even to discuss the conflict with his acquaintance Pru Morrison (p. 5). War and the 
terror it provokes re-emerge later, when David's attempts to embrace 'first-person' 
consciousness are comically stalled by his fear of death. He enquires about his 
father's experience of the Bataan death march and, notably, stresses that his interest 
lies in examining his father's first-person experience, demanding 'what it was like for 
you, not for other people'. But, David cannot maintain his courage for long and the 
revelation that his father 'buried a man alive' causes him to retreat in panic, promising 
'I won't ask you about it anymore' (p. 242). 
Early in the novel, though, David appears to have repressed death-anxiety and 
revels in reports of accidental fatalities, which he calls 'a tickle of electricity to the 
numbed brain' (p. 4). Only when he leaves the television network, supposedly, to 
make a documentary about Navaho Indians does this repression dissolve. A telling 
moment occurs on his drive west, when he considers a memo from an executive, 
21 Harold Bloom, The American Religion: The Emerizence of the Post Christian Nation (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1992), p. 3 1. 
22 Ernest Hemingway, 'In Another Country', in Men Without Women (London: Arrow, 1994), pp. 32- 
37 (p. 32). 
35 
which quotes St. Augustine on death and runs 'And never can a man be more 
disastrously in death than when death itself shall be deathless' (p. 99). The quotation is 
a clear metaphor for David's existential difficulties. Augustine's remark about the 
catastrophic results of death being 'deathless' seems particularly apposite in the 
context of David's repression and his extreme reaction indicates that he dimly 
perceives its relevance. He exclaims that 'It overwhelms me. I'm not sure why but it 
just hits me. It knocks me out' (p. 99). 
In addition to explaining the protagonist's apparent vanity, his death-anxiety 
allows the critic to elucidate David's obsession with cinema and what he calls 'the 
power of the image' in general (p. 3 1). As we have seen, identification with his 
supposedly immortal mirror image is apotropaic, warding off terror in a way similar 
to that effected by what the psychoanalyst Otto Rank calls the immortal 'double'. 
Rankian psychoanalysis regards death-anxiety as the primary cause of neurosis and 
suggests that identification with an inorganic, and hence immortal, alter ego, such as a 
cinema actor or mirror image, which Rank calls a 'symbol of eternal life', helps to 
ameliorate this fear. 23 A letter from DeLillo to Tom LeClair attests to the novelist's 
interest in Rankian analysis (Logp, p. 213). In this revealing missive, he admits to 
having been influenced by Ernest Becker's theoretical work The Denial of Death, 
which itself draws heavily on Rank's theories about the unconscious phobia of death. 
24 DeLillo demonstrates a similar concern with death-anxiety throughout his oeuvre. 
In Americana, he uses David's identification with Hollywood actors such as Burt 
Lancaster to suggest that postmodem America's pervasive image-culture is rooted in 
a national preoccupation with mortality. When David sees Burt Lancaster in From 
23 Otto Rank, Beyond Psychglpgy (New York: Dover Publications, 1958), p. 76. 
24 Ernest Becker, The Denial of Death (New York: Macmillan Free Press, 1973) 
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Here to Eternity, DeLillo makes explicit the protective power his protagonist finds in 
Lancaster's screen persona, having him claim extravagantly that 'He was like a city in 
which we were all living. He was that big' (pp. 12-13). Notably, From Here To 
Eterrifty deals with the challenge, which is prominent throughout Americana, of 
confronting the possibility of death during wartime. The film's title refers pointedly to 
David's difficulty in constructing an immortal, or 'eternal', image of himself. 
Lancaster plays a desk sergeant in World War Two, who enjoys a love affair with the 
wife of a superior officer, immediately before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. 
Such is Lancaster's apotropaic value to David that DeLillo compares it to the 
existential comfort derived from religious faith, declaring that Lancaster's image 
appeared 'the icon of a new religion'. Rank argues that representative art began in 
classical times as a search for the 'soul' (p. 10 1). Similarly, in David's eyes, Lancaster 
becomes an immortal emanation, through which the audience experiences salvation 
(pp. 12-13). 
When David makes a long autobiographical film, he metonymically transfers 
this sacred power of the screen image to the cinema camera. He speaks of it with the 
awe he previously reserved for Hollywood's iconic actors, asserting 'the prestige of 
the camera, its almost religious authority, its hypnotic power to command reverence 
from subject and bystander alike' (p. 86). The quasi-religious protective power of the 
camera is crucially important to David because he uses it to explore his troubled 
psychological history, particularly the disturbing genesis of his death-anxicty. 
Nevertheless, though cinema assists David in analysing his first-person experience, 
DeLillo suggests that the medium distances subjective experience and emphasises an 
objective, third-person approach to phenomena. Indeed, on occasion, DeLillo shows 
that David uses film to perpetuate his evasion of subjective experience. To his old 
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college friend Ken Wild, he admits that, although nominally the film is an 'attempt to 
explore parts of my consciousness', it is only 'a sort of first-person thing, but without 
me in it in any physical sense'. Significantly, though, the 'sense' in which he does 
appear is as a 'mirror image', that recurrent symbol of his alienation (P. 263). 
Awareness of this bad faith prompts David to wish the destruction of all images; to 
'smash my own likeness, prism of all my images, and become finally a man who lives 
by his own power and smell' (p. 236). It is therefore a measure of David's progression 
in his filmmaking and during his island-life that he does ultimately return to film, not 
as a strategy of evasion, but deliberately underexposing in an attempt to represent and 
thereby confront mortality. As he reports, 'I began to underexpose then, to become 
ever more crude, destroying shape and light, attempting to solve the darkness by 
entering it fully' (p. 347). 
In Understanding Media (1964), Marshall McLuhan argues that film provides 
precisely the opportunities for escapism that DeLillo depicts. 25 It was published in 
1964, two years before DeLillo began work on Americana, and the texts contribute to 
a characteristically postmodem effort to understand the relationship between 
contemporary technologies and the forms of subjectivity that correlate with their 
availability and use. McLuhan himself envisages his intellectual project as necessarily 
being carried out in partnership with what he calls 'The serious artist' (p. 19). He 
suggests that this artist, of which we may take DeLillo to be one example, 'is 
indispensable in the shaping and analysis and understanding of the life of forms, and 
structures created by technology' (p. 7 1). McLuhan argues that film operates 
according to the principle of 'sequentiality', performing a 'juxtaposition' of 'uniform 
and connected characters and qualities' (p. 315) and, like DeLillo, suggests that this 
25 Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (London: Routledge, 2001) 
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'sequentiality' provides an escape from reality to a 'world of fantasy and dreams'. 
Unlike DeLillo, McLuhan suggests film shares these qualities with the book and 
argues that this fact explains why literate societies took to movies with such 
enthusiasm (p. 318). By contrast, in Americana, DeLillo associates the novel form 
with David's search for a more subjective, first-person epistemology. Indeed, the 
transformation of what he calls the cinematic 'manuscript' into a written first-person 
narrative is emblematic of the shift David begins to make between third and first- 
person epistemology (p. 238). Formally, the novel obstructs the 'sequentiality' to 
which McLuhan refers, by the use of regular prolepses. Nevertheless, the fact that 
David takes 'pleasure' in the film and the novel may suggest that he has both third 
and first-person consciousness available to him and can alternate between these 
modes. Less optimistically, it may imply that he remains darkly drawn to the self- 
destructiveness of his former third-person existence (p. 347) 
The fact that all the crucial moments of progress in David's understanding 
occur as cinematic 'flashbacks' confirms that his filmmaking catalyses the release of 
repressed material about his early life. Of particular note is the relation between his 
death-anxiety and his oedipal family relationships that it reveals. In one analeptic 
episode, David recalls coming perilously close to sexual intimacy with his mother, 
who had just contracted terminal cancer. The moment is one of ecstatic anticipation, 
followed by the assertion of paternal law and inevitable guilt. He exclaims excitedly 'I 
would cry in epic joy and pain at the freeing of a single moment, the beginning of 
time', but reports, anticlimactically, that 'Then I heard my father's bare feet on the 
stairs. That was all' (pp. 196-97). It is worth contrasting the enthusiasm of David's 
sexual response to his mother with his confession that in his twenties he would 
habitually 'give nothing' to his lovers 'for fear that there would be nothing left for 
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myself (p. 41). This radical change in behaviour, which, he admits, causes him to act 
'the fascist' with his girlfriends suggests that the death of his primary love object, his 
mother, bequeathed him a terror of mortality that causes him to avoid emotional 
response (p. 42). Indeed, this connection between David's extreme oedipal longing 
and death-anxiety suggests that his Oedipus complex is also susceptible to Rankian 
analysis. Rank holds that the oedipal impulse is prompted by the desire for 
immortality, asserting that 'the incest of Oedipus with his mother' was motivated by 
'the universal desire to be one's own successor' (p. 124). It is therefore particularly 
notable that David appears to believe himself obliquely responsible for his mother's 
death, guilt that may be interpreted as displaced aggression, motivated by the desire to 
preclude the possibility of further children that might challenge his position. With 
reference to her cancer, he remarks ghoulishly that 'Inside her was something 
splintered and bright that might have been left by the spiral passage of my own body' 
(p. 196). 
DeLillo draws numerous parallels between David's compulsively third-person 
mental life and the third-person consciousness that he suggests prevails in the U. S. 
Glenn Yost, one of the interviewees in David's film, argues that television advertising 
makes intelligent use of Americans' tendency to live in the third person, declaring that 
'To consume in America is not to buy; it is to dream. Advertising is the suggestion 
that the dream of entering the third person singular might possibly be fulfilled' 
(p. 270). Glenn's notion of the 'third-person singular' has much in common with the 
notion of the 'Civilized American', which historian Stuart Ewen argues that 'Mass 
Industry' invented after World War Two to function as the target of their advertising 
campaigns. 26 Glenn also shares McLuhan's view that TV tends to engage the viewer 
26 Stuart Ewen, Captains of Consciousness: Advertisiniz and the Social Roots of the Consumer Culture 
(New York: Basic Books, 2001), p. 42. 
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as participant (pp. 340-48) and suggests, paradoxically, that by appealing to the 
consumers' subjective knowledge advertisers persuade them to shift from 'first person 
consciousness to third person' (pp. 270-1). This, he suggests, is accomplished by 
offering the audience realistic life style possibilities, exploiting what he calls 'the 
limitation of dreams' by admitting that the average citizen cannot hope for a love 
affair 'with Ava Gardner'; 'Only Richard Burton can accomplish that' (pp. 270-7 1). 
Although critics such as LeClair take the determinist view that media technologies 
'turn the first-person viewer into' 'the third-person singular', Glenn is adamant, and 
DeLillo gives us no reason to disbelieve it, that third-person consciousness is the 
archetypal American condition of mind and self (Loop, p. 55). According to him, 'In 
this country, there is a universal third-person, the person we all want to be', which 
4came over on the Mayflowe '. Glenn clearly believes that advertisers have merely 
exploited a preference for 'third-person consciousness' that was instantiated by the 
grand aspirations of American culture. Like the critic Curtis Yelmert, David takes 
Glenn's historical narrative seriously and shares Yelinert's shrewd conclusion that 
'Not dark conspiracy, but collective desire has created the simulacrum' (Sky, p. 359). 
Yelinert's view applies particularly well to David's deliberate taking of refuge in 
images, which makes his remark to Glenn that he speaks of 'third-person 
consciousness' 'with persuasiveness and verve' especially appropriate (p. 271). Their 
exchange recalls David's close acquaintance with advertising technique, through his 
father's work in the industry. The 'adolescent nights' he spent with his sisters 
watching the 'reels of TV commercials', which their father collected, gave him a first- 
hand education in the American simulacrum (pp. 84-5). If Glenn's view of television 
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advertising is correct, David's early exposure to U. S. consumer culture may have 
helped create the alienated third-person consciousness he later endures in adult life. 
Disturbingly, DeLillo suggests that the objectivism of 'third-person 
consciousness' is only one scion of a perverted, pernicious asceticism that is ingrained 
in American culture (p. 257). The view is comparable to Baudrillard's, in The Mirror 
of Production, that capitalism inculcates 'an ethic of asceticism, suffering and self- 
mortification'. 27 DeLillo is one of many post-war authors who view America's 
corporate work ethic as excessively austere. Americana's combination of corporate 
life and a concern with warfare particularly recalls Sloan Wilson's The Man in the 
Grey Flannel Suit, whose protagonist speaks of post-war New York as 'frantic parade 
to nowhere' full of men 'pursuing neither ideals nor happiness-they were puring 
routine'. 28 But DeLillo's analysis is notable for its careful comparison, and contrast, 
of this brutal ascesis with the more authentic type, which entails self-denial and what 
David calls 'simplicity'. When DeLillo uses the term asceticism in this way, he seems 
to mean a practice of austere self-discipline that gives rise to genuine tranquillity. He 
often associates this latter form with the abstemious life of Native Americans and 
opposes it to the 'symbolic' order of existence with which he associates the 
destructive American 'dream'. In his island retreat, David appears entirely persuaded 
of the merits of this austere lifestyle, asserting the value of 'purity of intention, 
simplicity and all its harvests' as weapons in the struggle against the 'larger madness' 
of American culture (p. 130). 
Notably, it is an Indian Chief named Black Knife who, in conversation with 
David's artist friend Sullivan, first hints that a perverted asceticism haunts the 
27 Jean Baudrillard, The Mirror of Production, trans. by Mark Poster (St. Louis: Telos Press, 1975), 
p. 64. 
29 Sloan Wilson, The Man in the Grey Flannel Suit (London: The Reprint Society, 1957), p. 284. 
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American psyche. Black Knife sees a grotesque forin of the ascetic impulse in the 
American urge to 'plan the destruction of everything that does not serve the cause of 
efficiency', such as 'trees' and 'mountains'. 'Hard to believe', he tells Sullivan, 'that 
we are ascetics. But we are, more than all the fake saints across the sea' (p. 118). 
David's restricted third-person consciousness is representative of the destructive 
objectivism that sanctions such environmental destruction, while the austere excision 
of the organic matter of 'trees' and 'mountains' parallels his horror of the mortal 
body. Nonetheless, just as David rejects his 'Fascist' behaviour, in favour of quiet 
'simplicity', Black Knife's jeremiad against the aggression of U. S. culture ultimately 
becomes a prophecy of peace and contentment (p. 42). He believes that after the world 
is 'on its knees before our crazed power', America's distorted asceticism will become 
the more authentic variety, which entails the rejection of 'symbols', and the nation 
will 'shed' the 'ascetic curse' (p. 120). 
The importance of Black Knife's analysis, both for David and the novel, is 
affirmed by DeLillo's treatment of Native Americans as an admirable model of the 
ascetic life and respect for subjective experience. It is a trip west to visit the Navaho 
Indians that first catalyses David's pursuit of first-person epistemology. During the 
journey, he refers repeatedly to an obese college acquaintance, Leonard Zajac, who 
dropped out to live with the Navaho Indians, and, in the process, 'lost forty or fifty 
pounds' and rid himself of 'inflammations' (p. 149). Towards the end of the diegetic 
narrative, visiting white settlers at an Apache reservation, David repeats the story 
(p. 357). His presence there and his interest in Zajac's progress towards self-discipline 
and health suggest Native American culture may provide him with a model for the 
achievement of the first-person perceptual framework that he later explores. He seems 
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to aspire to something like the experience of real-life settler, Flora Gregg Iliff, who, in 
his account of his years with the Havasupai, declares that 'They had taught me the 
beauty of unquestioning faith, of dignity and a tranquil mind'. 29 The importance of 
Native American culture to David is amplified by the striking relevance of the 
settlers' unprompted suggestions concerning his morbid fears. They stress the need to 
abandon mainstream American culture, which advice David later takes by fleeing to 
the tropics. Moreover, they insist that Apache life can help cure death-anxiety (P. 356). 
A young woman named Jill advises David 'If you let yourself be what you want to be, 
physically and spiritually, you can kill a lot of the death inside you' (p. 360). Tellingly, 
the mature David, who narrates the text, elaborates on Black Knife's analysis of 
American culture. By pursuing an ironic allegory between mystical experience and 
the architecture of the American 'low' motel, David intimates that mainstream 
American asceticism may be a distortion of the population's spiritual yearnings. As 
all dictionary definitions of the term allow, asceticism often refers to a variety of 
techniques designed for achieving closer union with the divine. Therefore, the 
comparison of mystical asccsis with the economically motivated form in which 
Americans indulge may suggest that the latter is vacuous and lacks legitimate 
ontological purpose. DeLillo makes obvious the continuity between David's ideas and 
those of Black Knife. David first mentions the 'rise of the low motel' as an image to 
fit 'our ascetic scheme' (p. 21 0) and then proceeds to offer a critique of the alienation 
of the motel customer, by comparing it ironically with the potentially liberating 
Buddhist experience of 'no-self. In such a place, David remarks, 'you can easily 
forget who you are'. 'You can sit on your bed and become man sitting on bed, an 
29 Flora Gregg Iliff, People of the Blue Water: My Adventure Among the Walapai and Havasupai Indians (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1954), p. 271. 
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abstraction to compete with infinity itself'. He also appears to liken the hotel's 
isomorphic structure, with its 'hundred hermetic rooms', to the repetitions of Buddhist 
practice and implies, with apparent irony, that such architectural monotony might lead 
to a comparable sense of salvation. The building, he writes, 'embodies a repetition so 
insistent and irresistible that, if not freedom, then liberation is possible, deliverance' 
(p. 257). DeLillo's choice of the word 'deliverance' may be significant because, as 
Sanskrit scholar Johannes Nobel points out, it is a literal translation of 'Nirvana', the 
Buddhist term for enlightenment or salvation (p. 102). David's allegory therefore 
suggests that the motel's sterile efficiency is a perversion of the American search for 
transcendence. It implies that where Americans seek 'deliverance', their objectivist 
third-Person consciousness allows them only numbing, mechanical reproduction. 
Horror at this American ascesis persuades David to embrace a more 
contemplative self-discipline, what Black Knife calls living off 'roots and berries' 
(p. 120). As critics suggest, David's finds his return to the image-obsessed culture of 
New York dispiriting. However, rather than a catastrophic finale to the novel, New 
York revivifies David's enthusiasm for the task of forging a first-person 
consciousness. Otherwise, he would not have abandoned New York for the African 
Island to which he flees. Critics judge David a failure because they do not appreciate 
the nature of his project. Cowart laments David's solitude and calls him 'the ultimate 
hollow man' (p. 13 8). Yet, David's solitude is not evidence of disaster but part of the 
ascetic self-discipline he practises to rid himself of the third-person consciousness that 
plagues the American 'dream'. David may experience a measure of 'hollowness' in 
his being, but it is neither happiness nor the comfort of a substantial, stable self that he 
has sought. Rather, he has wished to develop sufficient confidence in his subjective 
mental experience to enable the creation of some sense of self, however wounded or 
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attenuated. The evidence of Americana suggests that, in his pursuit of this goal, he is 
at least partially successful. 
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Chapter Two 
Beyond Signification: The Realist View of Consciousness in End Zone and Great 
Jones Street 
In Americana (197 1), DeLillo emphasises that David Bell's transition from a 
third to a first-person epistemology and the creation of a recognisable subjectivity is 
hindered partly by a conviction that his mental experience is unreal. David expresses 
the view that media technologies have overcome and co-opted consciousness to the 
point where 'We're all on tape' and the mind is denied access to reality by a 
sophisticated set of illusions. 1 In End Zone (1972) and Great Jones Street (1973), 
DeLillo isolates and elaborates upon this concern with the reality of mind. 2 In End 
Zone, he portrays a college footballer and, in Great Jones Street, a rock star, who both 
pursue solitude and asceticism, but whose most serious problems lie in the relation 
between language and mind. To varying degrees, Gary Harkness and Bucky 
Wunderlick harbour a troubling suspicion that mind may be ontologically dependent 
upon signification, which leads them to relegate thought to subservient status and treat 
the mutability of language as evidence of the unstable and factitious nature of mind. 
In the course of the novels, both narrators move appreciably towards a realist 
view of mind, which resembles that advanced by Thomas Nagel. In Mortal Questions, 
Nagel expresses concern at a tendency among postmodem theorists to reduce the 
mental to the physical and then to proceed as if the subjective 'phenomenological 
1 Don DeLillo, Americana (London: Penguin, 1990), p. 371. 
2 Don DeLillo, End Zone (New York: Penguin, 1986) and Don DeLillo, Great Jones Street (London: 
Picador, 1998) 
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features' of consciousness do not exist. 3 He argues that this is achieved by assuming 
that 'mental states are states of the body; mental events are physical events', rather 
than attending to the distinctive blend of the mental and physical that characterises 
them (p. 176), a synthesis that Maurice Merleau-Ponty, for example, attempts to 
4 
convey with his notion of 'organic thought'. This kind of reductive theory, Nagel 
believes, produces specious solutions of the otherwise 'intractable' mind-body 
problem, simply by avoiding the problem of 'consciousness' (pp. 165-66). Nagel 
suggests that 'consciousness' is 'left out' in this way, simply because theorists lack a 
vocabulary suited to its representation. Consequently, he appeals to what he calls a 
'realism about the subjective domain in all its forms', which 'implies a belief in the 
existence of facts' that are 'beyond the reach of human concepts' and may be 
unpresentable (p. 17 1). In recommending such exploration beyond language, Nagel, 
implicitly, opposes the early Wittgenstein, who insists philosophy should draw back 
from the ineffable because 'If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to 
answer it,. 5 Nagel's 'realism' proposes the opposite case, that 'there are facts that do 
not consist in the truth of propositions expressible in a human language' (p. 17 1). 
Gary and Bucky's scepticism is often comparable to that of Nagel's 
opponents. They ignore or belittle mind, partly because the mutability of signification 
causes them to question the stability of mind, but also because of its resistance to 
representation. Bucky's experience of media life destroys his faith in the reliability of 
language and mind and causes him to believe his self a mere 'dream, dependent on 
the factitious signifiers of rock culture (p. 92). Gary, meanwhile, accepts the low status 
3 Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 17 1. 
4 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. by Colin Smith (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1978), p. 77. 
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attributed to mind in postmodem capitalist culture and develops doubts about the 
stability and reality of mind, which cause him to feel alienated from his subjectivity. 
Consequently, he adopts numerous ascetic and religious practices, including self- 
starvation, to assist him in accepting and confronting the reality of mental life (p. 242). 
This fast occurs on the final page and results in admission to hospital. In interview, 
DeLillo stressed that Gary is 'trying to face' 'Something nameless' and admits that he 
was himself struck by its enigmatic quality: 'I couldn't give a name to it' (Anzhing, 
p. 83). This 'Something nameless', I suggest, is the unrepresentable reality of mind, 
which is an insistent presence in the novel, but which Gary finds impossible to 
approach directly. Instead, as we will see, he first studies death and nuclear holocaust, 
which persuade him of Nagel's point that the ineffable can be formidably real, and 
then applies the same principle to mind. 
Critics of End Zone, such as Tom LeClair, have focused on Gary's emphasis 
on signifier and referent as evidence that he is engaged in a metaphysical 'search for 
origins' and DeLillo is offering a critique of his protagonist's 'unrecognised 
acceptance of logocentric values'. 6 But DeLillo shows that Gary and Bucky 
ultimately recognise the irrationality of their linguistic anxiety and embrace what 
Mark Osteen calls 'silence and oblivion'. 7 Osteen argues that Gary embraces silence 
in order to further his metaphysical quest. For him, Gary's retreat from the Word is 
one of the 'pseudo-ascetic strategies' he employs to 'pare away complexities of 
choice and rediscover transcendence' (p. 3 1). By contrast, I argue that DeLillo's 
5 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logicus PhilosophiciLS. trans. by D. F. Pcars and B. F. McGuiness 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 196 1), p. 149. 
6 Tom LeClair, In the Loop: Don DeLillo and the Systems Noyll (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois 
Press, 1987), p. 80. 
7 Mark Osteen, American Magic and Dread: Don DeLillo's Dialogue with Culture (Philadelphia, PA: 
University of Philadelphia Press, 2000), p. 3 1. 
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protagonists merely use ideas of 'transcendence' to persuade themselves of the 
intrinsic value of mind. The novels explore the difficulty of accepting the irreducible 
reality of the mental, even in the absence of language, and, in doing so, explore the 
mysterious area that DeLillo quotes Hermann Broch as calling .. the word beyond 
speech"'. 8 Another significant Teutonic influence in the novel is Rilke, whose notion 
of the 'untellable' in his ninth Duino Elegy forms the basis for a module at Logos 
College, where Gary eventually enrols. 9 Though Gary does not take the course, its 
existence is allegorical of his incremental appreciation of ineffable or 'untellable' 
experience, which climaxes in the Texan desert, at which point he is moved to 
paraphrase Rilke's exhortation to 'rename the world' (AnZhing, p. 84). 
End Zone and Great Jones Street share an ambivalent concern with popular 
culture, which they celebrate and excoriate by turn. End Zone sometimes treats 
football as symptomatic of a brutal patriarchal capitalist culture that militates against 
cerebral activity or respect for mind. Yet, at other moments, it allows that the sport's 
fetishisation of order offers a framework for productive self-scrutiny and suggests that 
the freedom it allows players and coaches to name 'plays' emancipates the mind's 
creative power. Its concern with interiority, in the context of sport, is similar to that of 
DeLillo's story 'Total Loss Weekend', published the same year, which treats sports 
gambling, but rates its technicalities less important than 'the interior contest, the 
struggle that takes place within and beyond the limits of the point spread'. 10 In its 
analysis of sport as cultural symptom, End Zone bears comparison to Norman 
Mailer's 1967 sports novel Why Are We In Vietnam?, the apparent focus of which is 
8 Tom LeClair and Larry McCaffery, eds. AnZhing Can Happen: Interviews with Contempora 
American Novelists (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1983), p. 85. 
9 Rainer Maria Rilke, Quino Eleaies, trans. by J. B. Leishman and Stephen Spender (London: Hogarth 
Press, 1959) p. 85. 
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the aggressive competitiveness of a rural hunting expedition, but whose title implies 
that such brutal manifestations of American masculinity may be the driving force 
behind the nation's intervention in South East Asia. 11 Great Jones Street, meanwhile, 
emphasises the factitious nature of a rock music culture that thrives on the circulation 
of empty signifiers and which disseminates a sense of consciousness as equally 
vacuous and unreliable. Yet, its plot is also driven by a popular counter-culture drug, 
known as 'the product', which corrects Bucky's distrust of consciousness, by 
rendering him aphasic and heightening his awareness of mental reality. Like much of 
DeLillo's work, therefore, these novels treat American culture, particularly popular 
culture, as both poison and possible cure, capable, like Plato's pharmakon, of 
wreaking catastrophic destruction and providing ultimate redemption. 12 
Although End Zone is itself a piece of football jargon and its narrator a college 
player who claims 'My life meant nothing without football' (p. 22), most critics accept 
DeLillo's assertion that End Zone 'wasn't about football' (An3lhiniz, p. 83). DeLillo 
also makes explicit the importance of mind to End Zone, remarking that it 'seems to 
me to be about extreme places and extreme states of mind', a preoccupation with 
extremity that is manifest in the punning title of the text (p. 57). In spite of its 
secondary status, football performs crucial thematic functions. It is one of several 
experiences that provide Gary with the 'illusion that order is possible' (P. 112), all of 
which help calm his anxieties and create a less extreme 'state of mind' (De Curtis, 
p. 57). DeLillo suggests that sport diminishes disturbing thoughts of chaos, by 
providing a model of society 'that is rat free and without harm to the unborn', 
10 Don DeLillo, 'Total Loss Weekend', in Sports Illustrated, 270'November 1972,98-118. 
" Norman Mailer, Why Are We In Vietnam? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988) 
12 Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, trans. by Barbara Johnson (London: Athlone Press, 198 1) 
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'organised so that everyone follows precisely the same rules' (p. 112). As Douglas 
Keesey notes, football emphasises naming and, since 'language itself is a central 
theme of End Zone, the game is highly appropriate. 13 In DeLillo's words, 'It is the 
one sport guided by language, by the word signal, the snap number, the color code, 
the play name' (p. 112). Football's obsession with the fit between signifier and 
referent parallels Gary's later intent search for such correspondence, which reassures 
him that the mind is capable of accurate perception. As Gary notes, with approbation, 
'Each play must have a name'. 'No play begins until its name is called' (P. 118). 
Gary traces his anxieties about mind and language to childhood and, in 
particular, a sip in his room that read 'WHEN THE GOING GETS TOUGH THE 
TOUGH GET GOING' (p. 17). After years of observation, the words lose all meaning, 
a voiding of sense that both enchants and terrifies Gary. He observed a 'beauty' that 
'flew from the words themselves', which he calls 'a semi-self-re-creation from line to 
line' (p. 17), a formulation that alludes to Broch's notion of the 'dusk-enshrouded 
semi-creation' of what he calls the 'pre-divine'. 14 Yet, in spite of this 'beauty', he 
calls his realist discovery that 'words can escape their meanings' 'a sinister thing'. His 
ambivalence regarding his own views is traceable partly to the fact that Gary's austere 
father provided the sign as a disciplinary measure. This parent is firmly associated 
with patriarchal, capitalist values, which DcLillo satirises as the 'eternal work cycle, 
the blood-hunt for bear and deer', terms which call to mind Mailer's critique of 
patriarchal imperialism (p. 17). Consequently, Gary's youthful wish to assert the 
independence of mind from language and therefore question the referential power of 
language constitutes a challenge to what Lacan calls the 'Symbolic function', 
" Douglas Keesey, Don DeLillo (New York: Twayne, 1994), p. 34. 
14 Hermann Broch, The Death of Virgil, trans. by Jean Starr Untermeyer (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1977), p. 118. 
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'identified' with the 'name of the father' and the 'figure of the law' he represents. 15 
His guilty anxiety may therefore be prompted by fear of paternal punishment, as much 
as the disintegration of the symbolic order the 'name of the father' guarantees. This 
interpretation is confirmed by Gary's frequent sense of the deathly power invested in 
traditional signifiers, which frequently causes him to retreat from his sense that reality 
and mind are fundamentally independent of language. For example, reflecting on a 
team-mate's clichdd promise to 'go through a brick wall' for the coach, he confesses 
it to be 'full of reassurance, comfort, consolation' and stresses that it is 'easier to die 
than admit that words might lose their meanings' (p. 54). 
Gary struggles with William James' modernist paradox that although 
'Thought is always changing', 'Within each personal consciousness, thought is 
sensibly continuous'. 16 Frequently, his tendency to mistake the bewitching mutability 
of language and mind for unreliability means that James' certainty of the stability of 
consciousness eludes him. Notably, as in Americana, DeLillo counterpoints the 
tension of the diegetic narrative's quest with hints that his protagonist is eventually 
able to gain this assurance. After complaining of the monotony of college life, Gary 
muses that 'I had not yet learned to appreciate the slowly gliding drift of identical 
things' (p. 18), a phrase striking in its implication of James' paradox of movement 
and fundamental stasis. At the time of narration, therefore, he has somehow acquired 
the Jamesian faith in the continuity of consciousness that he lacks in the novel's 
15 Jacques Lacan, 'The Function of Language in Psychoanalysis', trans. by Anthony Wilden, in The 
Language of the Self, ed. Anthony Wilden (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), pp. 3-87 
(p. 4 1). 
16 William James, The Principles of Psycholog (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 
pp. 220-23 1. 
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diegesis, an implied accomplishment that subtly defuses the otherwise febrile tenor of 
the text. 
Gary employs myriad strategies in his attempt to accept the mind's stability 
and its independence of language. Football training is among the techniques that help 
him glimpse a measure of mental stability. The 'daily punishments on the field' 
become a 'pleasure' because 'I felt that I was better for it, reduced in complexity, a 
warrior' (p. 3 1). At times, exercise reconciles him to the mutability of mind and world. 
During squat-jumps, momentarily, 'The indifferent drift of time and all things filled 
me with affection for the universe' (p. 56). He adopts practices that emphasise 
personal autonomy and the mind, regularly spending 'some time in meditation' 
pursuing 'solitude, starkness, discipline upon discipline' (p. 3 0). Critics dismiss these 
practices as unhealthy --David Cowart refers to Gary's 'pathological asceticism'-- 
17 
but these are self-willed forms of repetition that he opposes to the culture's oppressive 
'human xerography' (p. 19). As Gary puts it, 'There were profits here, things that 
could be used to make me stronger' (p. 30). 
Many conclude that Gary's quest to 'achieve, indeed, establish some lowly 
form of American sainthood' is a despairing withdrawal from a mutable world (P. 20). 
But spirituality functions for Gary as a transcendental signifier, which he hopes will 
secure the status of mind. Tellingly, his references to religion occur in response to 
reductive analyses of consciousness. His response to the coach at Penn State is 
exemplary. After dismissing 'Oneness' as 'human xerography', his language turns 
religious, with the assertion that 'Oneness' ought to mean 'oneness with God or the 
universe or some equally redoubtable super-phenomenon' (p. 19) Such absurdly 
circumlocutory references to divinity cause LeClair to conclude that DeLillo satirises 
17 David Cowart, The Physics of Language (Athens, GA, University of Georgia Press, 2002), p. 32. 
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Gary's spiritual views (p. 70). DeLillo does wring considerable humour from the more 
ludicrous of Gary's practices, for instance, when Gary justifies walking in circles by 
the fact it 'is demanded by the mythology of all deserts and wasted places' (p. 42). 
Yet, the comedy lies mainly in Gary's lack of genuine belief and his failed attempts at 
conversion. The fact that his religious phase ends when his anxieties about 
consciousness begin to diminish confirms that these practices are palliatives for 
anxiety. After the novel's mid-point, references to religious ritual disappear almost 
entirely. 
As in all his first three novels, DeLillo heightens his emphasis on internal 
experience by narrating in the first person. Gary's tone is often darkly comic, to the 
point where irony sometimes seems pervasive. How seriously should one take his 
assertion that his problems will dissolve if only he 'walk in circles', particularly when 
he then proceeds to do so (p. 42)? This ambiguity in tone sometimes arouses concern 
about the true extent of his anxieties and evasions. Gary makes clear his dislocation 
from mind and subjectivity, but is less troubled than Americana's David, who doubts 
the existence of his selfhood. Gary reports a sense of 'exile' from something that is, at 
least, unambiguously existent, which he calls 'whatever is left of the center of one's 
own history', a description most applicable to memory and therefore mind (p. 3 1). 
This 'exile' is exacerbated by the contemptuous, objectivist view of consciousness 
that prevails at Logos (p. 2). DeLillo remarks that End Zone's characters display 
'fragmented self-consciousness', with a distinctly 'mechanical element' (AnAhing, 
p. 8 1). In part, this foregrounds the characters' fictionality. As DeLillo says, their 
'made-up nature' draws attention to their status as 'words on paper' (p. 8 1). But this 
fragmented, mechanistic consciousness also allegorises the characters' experience of 
themselves as fictional, which arises from the dismissal of mind as mere, unreliable, 
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mechanism that is encouraged at Logos. The point is emphasised by the novel's 
imitation of an avant-garde cinematic aesthetic, apparent in its division into brief 
episodes, which end abruptly, sometimes arbitrarily. Gary shows particular sensitivity 
to this disrespect for mind. He rejects the Penn State coach's emphasis on teamwork 
because it reduces the human subject to mindless automatism. Gary rejects the 
coach's idea of 'Oneness', which, he argues, really means 'elevenness' or 'twenty- 
twoness', and accuses him of exemplifying the 'human xerography' that plagues 
America, which he condemns, with comic portentousness, as 'spiritually disastrous' 
(p. 19). The same criticism is levelled at American culture in Peter Gent's sport novel 
North Dallas Fort , which was published a year after End Zone and is set in what its 
protagonist, football hero Phillip J. Elliott, calls 'a world striving for similitude'. is 
Trapped in a technologically driven culture, he concludes 'we are being manipulated 
by our machines' and 'the individual is dead' (p. 158). Like Theodor Adorno and Max 
Horkheimer, these novels of the early 1970s suggest American capitalism creates a 
mechanised culture that 'impresses the same stamp on everything' (p. 120) and 
cultivates a 'single mental state' that 'is not nuanced or extended in any way' (p. 127). 
19 
Gary briefly capitulates to his college's cynical approach to mind, which 
contrasts ironically with its metaphysical, even theological, name (p. 2). When the 
coach compares mind with machine, calling his players 'substandard, industrial 
robots', Gary follows suit, calling his team-mate Hobbs a 'retarded computer' (pp. 35- 
36). DeLillo notes that the characters' 'mechanical' quality manifests in 'wars of 
jargon', where quasi-scientific language is used to reduce the status of consciousness 
18 Peter Gent, North Dallas FgM (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1973), p. 40. 
19 Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment trans. by John Cumming 
(London: Verso, 1997), pp. 120-127. 
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(AnZhing, p. 8 1). When Tim Flanders describes his grandfather's 'whole identity' as 
'dominated by some tremendous vision', Buddy Shock uses quasi-technical language 
to deny its validity, replying pedantically that 'Identity' is 'An equality satisfied by all 
possible values of the variables for which the standardized expressions involved in the 
equality are quantitatively determined' (p. 57). Another student, Bing Jackmin, 
casually trivialises consciousness by attributing its properties to a football. He tells 
Gary 'it was too wild, too unbelievable', but 'I sensed knowledge in the football'. 
Unsettlingly for Gary, Bing's absurd account implies that the football is less alienated 
from its supposed consciousness than Gary himself. Rather than exiled from the 
'center' of its 'history' (p. 3 1), Bing's football 'knew it was the center of the game. It 
was aware of its own footballness' (p. 37). The denial of interiority at Logos 
stimulates surreal behaviourist analysis, which, in Laurence D. Smith's words, is a 
20 
psychology that offers a 'purely descriptive', third-person approach to mind. While 
singing drunkenly with team-mates, Gary is 'unsure' 'whether I was singing at all or 
just listening to Gus sing' and feels only the objective evidence of hearing his 'own 
voice' will suffice. Comically, but also disturbingly, Gary reports that 'I thought I 
could hear my own voice but I wasn't sure and so I stood there with Gus, not wanting 
to leave if I was still singing'. Gary is markedly upset by such alienation from mind 
and body, describing the experience as 'disgusting' and 'ridiculous'; an unremittingly 
'horrible night' (p. 100). 
In Gary's roommate, Anatole Bloomberg, DeLillo provides a robust counter 
force to the suspicion of mind that might otherwise overcome Gary. Bloomberg is 
20 Laurence D. Smith, Behaviorism and Logical Positivism: A Reassessment of the Alliance (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 1986), p. 270. 
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conspicuous for his proselytising faith in the intrinsic strength and value of mind. 
When Gary expounds an and theory of human behaviour, which excludes agency or 
emotion in favour of the dogma that 'History is the angle at which realities meet', 
Bloomberg extols the power of subjective thought and feeling (P. 46). He repeatedly 
describes his wish to 'unjew' himself (p. 46), which entails an effort to 'forge a new 
consciousness', stripped of Judaic traits, (p. 186) and advises Gary to 'transform your 
mind into a ruthless instrument. You simply teach yourself to reject certain categories 
of thought' (pp. 46-47). Bloomberg's advocacy of mental strength persuades Gary to 
consider his roommate more psychologically healthy than himself. He calls 
Bloomberg the 'opposite of death' and attributes a fully human ontology to him, while 
failing to distinguish his own from the animal, or even inanimate (p. 49): his remarks 
on their room include the terse description 'Bloomberg himself. Harkness himself or 
itself (p. 44). 
Death looms large in the American sports novel. The physical prowess 
required for athletic feats invokes its repressed opposite: the spectre of decay and 
mortality. North Dallas Folly concludes with the murder of Phillip J. Elliott's lover, 
while Bang the Drum Slowl ,a 1950s baseball novel, is half-comically preoccupied 
by a player called Pearson, who contracts Hodgkin's disease and is, as he announces, 
'doomeded' .21 Frederick Exley's A Fan's Notes opens with what its protagonist 
believes to be a heart attack. Like End Zone, in which Gary fears being driven mad by 
his martial obsessions, Exley's novel touches on insanity, depicting the author's time 
as a mental patient who, like Gary, finds in football a satisfying measure of order, or a 
liberating 'island of direction in a world of circumspection'. 22 More recently, David 
Foster Wallace published Infinite Jest, a novel concerned with the travails of the 
21 Mark Harris, Bang the Drum Slowly (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958), p. 219. 
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young recruits to the Enfield Tennis Association, but which also explores the deathly 
power of U. S. media, which is allegorised by an entertainment 'cartridge, so 
ecstatically enjoyable that it induces death. 23 Although End Zone is no exception to 
this tendency, critics have often accepted that DeLillo maintains a clear separation 
between football and nuclear holocaust. Many have been swayed, understandably, by 
two outright denials of any analogy between them. Gary's colleague Alan Zapalac 
maintains that 'Warfare is warfare. We don't need substitutes because we've got the 
real thing'. Similarly, DeLillo himself dismisses 'commentators', 'Willing to risk 
death by analogy in their public discussions of the resemblance between football and 
war' (p. 1 11). Recently, though, critics have re-examined the parallels between sport 
and warfare, which, as Cowart rightly insists, are readily detectable. Osteen compares 
football's 'impenetrable argot' of 'signals' with the recondite 'jargon of nuclear 
strategy' (p. 82), both of which persuade Gary of the possibility of order and 
counteract his fear that mind and reality are chaotic and illusory (p. 112). Gary quotes, 
with approval, his teacher Major Stanley's comparison between sport and war. As 
Stanley describes nuclear conflict, 'There'd be all sorts of controls. You'd practically 
have a referee and a timekeeper' (p. 82). Obversely, Gary's coach eulogises the 
harmony of football's warlike violence, which offers 'a sense of order even at the end 
of a running play with bodies strewn everywhere' (p. 199). 
Notably, the topic of death intensifies the students', particularly Gary's, 
concern for effective verbal representation. If death could be accurately depicted, 
reason Logos' appropriately rationalistic students, its horror might be overcome. They 
would like to emulate Tolstoy's Ivan Ilych in apprehending 'the idea' of death 'and 
22 Frederick Exley, A Fan's Notes (New York: Pocket Books, 1968), p. 7. 
23 David Foster Wallace, Infinite Jes (London: Abacus, 2004), p. 78. 
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not the idea only but as it were the reality itself. 24 On the difficulty of conveying the 
horror of nuclear holocaust, Gary laments that 'words don't explain, they don't 
clarify, they don't express, they're painkillers' (p. 85). At a team-mate's funeral, he 
complains acidly of the mourners that 'Death is the best soil for clichd', 'The trite 
saying is never more comforting, more restful, as in times of mourning' (P. 69). Since 
words fail, death must be represented by corporeal means: the players engage in the 
childish game 'Bang you're dead', in which one player verbally signifies gunfire, 
before 'The other person clutches a vital area of his body and then falls, simulating 
death' (pp. 31-32). It functions partly to ameliorate death-anxiety, enabling them 'to 
pretend that death could be a tender experience' (p. 34), but also provides the lesson, 
to which Gary will return, that the experience of death, like consciousness, as Nagel 
argues, can never be fully represented (p. 32). Indeed, the game is notable for its 
suggestion that there may sometimes be positive value in a lack of connection 
between signifier and referent. After all, in this game, adequate representation would 
entail an actual death. 
This ludic interlude proves typical of death's propensity to act as a source of 
catharsis, as well as terror in End Zone. The disquieting and comical rapidity with 
which DeLillo portrays Gary's involvement in several fatally 'destructive episodes' 
before he attends Logos alerts the reader, early on, to Gary's urgent need for such 
therapeutic crises (p. 32). At 'Michigan State', he is 'one of three players' who 
6converge' on a 'safetyman' and cause his death, after which he retreats to his 
bedroom for 'seven weeks' (p. 22). Next, the fearful prospect of service in Vietnam 
precipitates a considerable shift in Gary's consciousness. On seeing the word 
24 Leo Tolstoy, 'The Death of Ivan Ilyich', in The Death of Ivan Ilyich/The Cossacks/Happy ver Aft-e, r trans. by Rosemary Edmonds (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987), pp. 99-161 (p. 138). -Ev _ 
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'MILITARIZE' appear 'all over town' (p. 20), he is panic-stricken, but reflects later 
that 'It represented some form of apotheosis: 'The air was thick with it' (p. 17 1). He 
avoids the draft by enrolling at 'The University of Miami, but emphasises that, after 
this 'apotheosis', 'Repetition gave way to the beginnings of simplicity' (p. 20), a more 
significant change than Gary's deadpan delivery suggests. Because he uses 
crepetition' to imply a sterile 'human xerography' and 'simplicity' to refer to a more 
stable relation between mind and world, the shift between categories implies 
increased respect for mind (p. 19). When he reaches Logos, therefore, he has acquired 
6a passion for simplicity, for the true old things' and is prepared to confront his 
sceptical attitude to mind (p. 4). 
But Gary's most sustained meditation on mortality arises from his morbid 
interest in nuclear weaponry, which causes him to question his morality and his 
sanity, but also provides cathartic experience that eases his death-anxiety. In Gary, 
DeLillo portrays a protagonist who typifies the bewildered American response to the 
Cold War's destructive possibilities. The mental strain that the spectre of nuclear 
warfare causes him is congruent with a general decline in U. S. mental health during 
the Cold War. Margot A Henriksen argues that fear drove Americans to 'live a double 
life' and experience 'psychological torment', which is 'documented in the statistics on 
mental health'. 25 Gary is perturbed by his pleasure in studying mass destruction: after 
admitting that 'I liked reading about the deaths of tens of millions of people', he 
reports being 'seriously depressed' and wonders 'Had I gone mad? ' (pp. 20-21). 
Henrikson believes that the atomic bomb produced a 'schizoid' culture (p. 85), 
exemplified by Stanley Kubrick's Dr Strangelove, whose 'mixture of nihilism and 
25 Margot A. Henriksen, Dr. Stran[zelove's America: Sociejy and Culture in the Atomic Age (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1997), p. 86, p. 113. 
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good spirits' 'matched the destructive and creative potential of atomic chaos' (P. xxv). 
In its blend of terror and manic irony, Gary's narration often betrays something of 
Henrikson's 'schizoid' split. After an unsuccessful attempt to imagine Trestorms' 
and 'millions dead' in Milwaukee, which is forestalled by the fact that he 'had no idea 
what the city looked like' and 'could not imagine it in flames', Gary emerges from his 
bedroom to declare, in mock-heroic fashion, 'Milwaukee is spared' (pp. 43-44). M. 
Keith Booker explains the increase in mental pathology by the combination of rapid 
technological change and the bomb's terrifying power. 26 Like Henrikson, Booker 
describes the American malady as schizophrenic: in particular, he believes post-war 
Americans' sense of the stability of consciousness was seriously undermined, 
asserting that they suffered a 'schizophrenic' sense of discontinuity. He writes of the 
4vertiginous pace of change' in technology and its deleterious effect on the human 
subject's 'perception of continuity of selfhood over time'. Booker believes this 
disrupted 'any sense of historical continuity' and convinced Americans 'they were 
living in unprecedented situations to which the experience of the past was irrelevant' 
(p. 24). In similar vein, Gary reports that accounts of nuclear war were 'whispering 
shyly of cycles of destruction so great that the language of past world wars became 
laughable, the wars themselves somewhat naYve' (p. 21). 
The novel's early critics also emphasised what Cowart calls 'the parallels 
between the violence of war and the violence of football', subjects that receive 
roughly equal attention in End Zone (p. 20). Gary divides his attention between 
football and a preoccupation with nuclear holocaust that appears nihilistic, but which 
offers him what, in describing post-war U. S. reaction to the bomb, Margot A. 
Henriksen calls 'catharsis and awakening' (p. xxiii). End Zone was written after the 
26 M. Keith Booker, Monsters. Mushroom Clouds. and the Cold War: American Science Fiction and 
the Roots of Postmodernism. 1946-64 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001), p. 24. 
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Cold War boom in nuclear holocaust novels, which peaked in the 1950s and early 
1960s, and one might view its publication as demonstrating DeLillo's idiosyncrasy 
and courage, in working against literary fashion. What it does share with many 
gnuclear' novels is its deliberate defamiliarisation of atomic conflict, which jolts one 
into fresh understanding of its horror. James Morrow's This is the Way the World 
Ends portrays atomic incineration in the unexpected form of a sixteenth-century 
prediction by Nostradamus, who speaks of the 'fireballs hurled from great spears' that 
will haunt the end of the second millennium. 27 Tim O'Brien's The Nuclear Age 
depicts a child's disorientation at the possibility of global conflagration. 28 For its part, 
End Zone unsettles with its suggestion that postmodern American anxieties are 
sufficiently intense that contemplation of nuclear inferno may provide cathartic 
pleasure, as it does for Gary. 
In End Zone, the atom bomb is a sublime entity, comparable to death and the 
Lacanian real in its stem reality and resistance to representation. As David E. Nye 
points out, 'The specific advantage of the sublime is that it is beyond words'. 29 Nye 
takes the bomb as an exemplar of the 'technological sublime', whose invention 
formed 'the ultimate dead end of any attempted representation of the technological 
'thing in itself' (p. 290). Major Stanley takes a similar view and draws a comparison 
with divine ineffability, referring to the 'theology of fear' that surrounds the subject 
(p. 8 1). After nuclear weapons, declares Stanley, 'god is the force of nature itself, the 
fusion of teuterium and deuterium' (p. 80). DeLillo gently mocks the spiritual longings 
such weapons arouse, when Bloomberg parodies contemporary physics by speaking 
27 James Morrow, This is the Way the World Ends (London: Victor Gollancz, 2000), p. 8. 
28 Tim O'Brien, The Nuclear Age (New York: Dell Publishing, 1985) 
29 David E. Nye, American Technological Sublime (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), p. xiv. 
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of 'some unimaginable weapon able to pierce spiritual barriers, to maim or kill 
whatever dark presence inhabits the world' (p. 215). Much of the atom bomb's 
influence arises from these religious connotations, which anticipate DeLillo's analogy 
in Underworld (1997) between the mushroom cloud and the mystical 'cloud of 
unknowing'. 30 Gary's habitual use of the spiritual as guarantor of mental constancy 
therefore renders him doubly susceptible to the bomb's psychological impact. Nye's 
research on early atomic tests suggests this religious response replicates that of first- 
hand observers. Nye's informant notes that 'Religious feelings and quotations welled 
up in most of the witnesses. One felt as if he had been present at the moment of 
creation when God said "Let there be light... (p. 228). 
Gary yearns for the spiritual liberation that the nuclear sublime promises, 
demanding, paradoxically, that its cathartic power banish 'all sense of global 
holocaust' (p. 43). In The Fate of the Earth, Jonathan Schell indicates the possibility of 
a satisfying sublime in such morbid thoughts, describing 'The huge --the monstrous-- 
disproportion' between the bomb and 'the merely terrestrial creatures in its shadow. 
31 Surprisingly, critics see End Zone's nuclear sublime as entirely destructive. Osteen 
remarks that it 'voids possibilities of meaning' (p. 3 1). Yet, the bomb's capacity to 
defeat language is precisely its value; consideration of this quality leads Gary to 
appreciate the simultaneous reality and ineffability of mind inherent in Nagel's 
'philosophical realism'. In a pivotal scene in the Texan desert, the bomb's ineffability 
helps persuade Gary that mind possesses a similarly redoubtable, if unutterable, 
ontology. Gary begins by craving what Saul Kripke calls a 'rigid designator', which 
30 Don DeLillo, Underworld (London: Picador, 1998) 
31 Jonathan Schell, The Fate of the Earth (London: Jonathan Cape, 1982), p. 11. 
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'designates the same object' 'in every possible world' 32 , or, in Gary's words, 
'something that could be defined in one sense only, something not probable or 
variable, a thing unalterably itself (p. 88). Gary's desire for such epistemological 
certainty is unexpectedly consummated: he decides that a pile of 'simple shit, nothing 
more' is 'the one thing that did not betray its definition' and represents a perfect 
meeting of word and thing (p. 88). This satisfies his wish for what Lacan calls the real, 
or 'what does not depend on my idea of it', and contributes to his acceptance of the 
mind's independent reality, as one of the 'facts' that Nagel suggests are 'not 
expressible in human language'. 33 It seems appropriate that this meeting of 'word and 
thing' should assist Gary in accepting the existence of the ineffable, since the perfect 
union of signifier and referent would, logically, result in silence. Gary treats the 
episode as an existential epiphany and is stimulated to a series of associations that 
revolutionise his approach to mind (p. 88). He meditates on excrement as waste and 
fertile matter, 'shit in life cycle' and 'shit as history', and then recognises the creative 
and destructive potential of the nuclear sublime as similarly paradoxical. As in many 
of DeLillo's most striking passages, he adopts a paratactic style, which omits 
conjunctions and prepositions. 'I thought of men embedded in the ground', he writes, 
'all killed, billions, flesh cauterized into the earth, bits of bone and hair and nails, 
man-planet, a fresh intelligence revolving through the system' (p. 89). The 
accumulation of connected ideas in this passage appears climactic and creates an 
expectation of profound revelation, which arrives once images of death and 
regeneration cause Gary to reflect on equally dynamic shifts within the mind. Buoyed 
32 Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessijy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), p. 48. 
33 Bruce Fink, The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1995), p. 142 
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by the representational comfort of his excremental epiphany and the Nagelian insight, 
derived from the nuclear sublime, that what is unpresentable may, nevertheless, be 
real, he drops any neurotic need for linguistic correspondence to convince him of 
mental reality. Indeed, he describes a model of mind, blessed with at least partial 
autonomy and the capacity for profound self-transformation. He reflects that 'in some 
form of void, freed from consciousness, the mind remakes itself and concludes that 
'What we must know must be learned from blanked-out pages. To begin to reword the 
overflowing world' (p. 89). This necessity of learning from 'blanked-out pages' and 
the concomitant notion of the 'overflowing world' represents a 'realist' 
acknowledgement of mind and world's independence of language. Meanwhile, the 
final exhortation to 'reword' the world is a clear paraphrase of Rilke's instruction to 
'rename the world'. Gary has already witnessed this notion of 'leaming from blanked- 
out pages' in the module on the 'untellable', for which his colleague Howard Lowry 
is asked to memorise Rilke's ninth Duino Elegy in German; 'a language he did not 
understand' (p. 64). In light of the novel's persistent concern with this Rilkean notion, 
DeLillo's amusing presentation of its promotion at Logos seems only half-ironic. 
Gary's wish to learn from 'blanked-out pages' also offers further explanation of his 
powerful attraction to football, in which coaches are effectively able to 'reword' or 
'rename' their world. As Gary reports enthusiastically, 'each team uses an entirely 
different system of naming'; 'Coaches stay up well into the night to name plays' 
(p. 118). 
Although Gary shows signs of continuing anxiety, DeLillo provides crucial 
indications of the nuclear sublime's cathartic effects. Though it does not banish 'all 
sense of global holocaust', Gary's interest in nuclear war diminishes dramatically 
(p. 43). Where he had been 'the best student' in the 'Aspects of Modem War' tutorial, 
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Gary now admits that, during war games, 'I considered the scenario somewhat boring 
despite all the frenzy and tension' (p. 223). Moreover, the final chapters contain a 
proliferation of references to the contingency of relationships between signifier and 
referent. Gary makes few of these, but their accumulation and his acquiescence to 
them suggests a resolution of his neurotic linguistic concerns. Gary congratulates 
Bloomberg on his 'fabulous name', only for Bloomberg to reply dismissively that 
'It's a means of identification. It has no significance beyond that' (p. 187). When 
Gary's team-mate Taft Robinson forgets the name of the 'black stone of Abraham' at 
Mecca, he is quick to downplay its importance. 'A name's a name' he tells Gary, 'A 
place could just as easily be another place' (p. 24 1). 
With the inclusion of a story by the fictional 'Tudev Nemkhu', DeLillo also 
provides a dark allegory of Gary's formerly compulsive relation to language, which 
reaffirms the wisdom of his realist elevation of the status of mind. The narrative 
functions as a sly, comical morality tale, which is introduced by Gary's friend Myna 
and may be her arch comment on his intellectual predicament. It questions the 
wisdom of word fetishism, which 'Nemkhu' presents as a limited and fragile 
approach to reality. Nemkhu portrays creatures named Nautiloids who replace 
referent with the signifier, by producing 'likenesses' of objects, which each become 'a 
word rather than a thing', and feeding them into their 'own circuitry' (pp. 169-170). 
The Nautiloids thus transform themselves into the 'monadanom', or 'the thing that's 
everything', and thereby fulfil Gary's own fantasy of cancelling the mind-world 
relation. Finally, however, this concentration on the Word proves inadequate. In a 
clear parallel to Gary's Nagelian realisation that he must 'learn from blanked-out 
pages', the disorientated 'monadonom' is eventually forced to confront mind and 
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reality in the absence of signification, when, unexpectedly, the 'word just erased 
itself. It no longer exists' (p. 170). 
In spite of Gary's profound shift in consciousness, DeLillo denies the reader a 
harmonious or comfortable conclusion. The text terminates suddenly, after Gary 
starves himself to the point where 'High fevers burned a thin straight channel through 
my brain' and he is fed 'through plastic tubes' (p. 242). Although the illness is 
alarming, his disintegration may be interpreted as merely another productive catharsis. 
The simultaneously physical and mental nature of the illness-fever in the brain-may 
symbolise acceptance of the mind-body unity that, we learn in the final pages, coach 
Creed has long recommended (p. 237). Osteen argues that DeLillo's refusal to offer 
satisfying closure indicates DeLillo's rejection of the narrator's 'attraction to 
apocalypse' and endings in general (Osteen, p. 32). Although the peremptory 
conclusion may imply rejection of Gary's former pursuit of catastrophe and finality, 
this view disregards the rapid diminution of his fascination for holocaust. In spite of 
its unsettling violence, the conclusion is accompanied by a potentially fruitful new 
alliance for Gary, with Taft Robinson, who shares Gary's interest in 'Atrocities in 
general' (p. 241). After long discussion of Nazism, 'the teeth, the lampshades, the 
soap', which preoccupies Taft, Gary suggests to him, with apparent sincerity, that 
'There must be something we can do' (pp. 240-41). In this purposeful context, Gary's 
malnourished body represents his latest effort to purify the mind through mortification 
of the body. Although the disturbing image of a starving patient allows one the option 
of believing Gary remains enmeshed in terminal crisis, it is equally plausible that 
malnutrition is one more strategy, devised to counter and overcome his fear of the 
'nameless' and ineffable (AnZhing p. 83). 
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Great Jones Street 
The narrator-protagonist of Great Jones Street (1973), rock singer Bucky 
Wunderlick, finds a similarly partial solitude in which to examine mind and selfhood. 
He retires to the unoccupied first floor of a house in Manhattan's 'Great Jones Street', 
but finds himself besieged by admirers and becomes involved in a complex struggle 
for the possession of an aphasia-inducing drug, known as 'the product' (p. 132). He 
retreats from a media-saturated culture, whose vacuity feeds off a model of 
consciousness as unreliable and dependent upon the media's own factitious signifying 
practices. DeLillo describes Bucky as having a 'half-shattered mind' (AmhiLig, 
p. 82), Bucky's colleague Azarian dismisses him as that 'whole other myth' (P. 35), 
and Bucky himself regards his consciousness as a mere 'dream', which is easily 
manipulated by the fiercely capitalist record business (p. 92). The book therefore 
participates in a tradition of writing on rock music that takes as axiomatic the 
business' production of unreal and misleading mythifications of selfhood. In The 
Ground Beneath Her Feet, for instance, Salman Rushdie describes the young singer 
Vina Aspara as 'already passing into myth, becoming a vessel into which any moron 
could pour his stupidities, or let us say a mirror of the culture'. 34 In this text, Rushdie 
alludes repeatedly to the myth of Orpheus, which is also apposite to Bucky's 
transformational journey away from and back towards rock music. Bucky withdraws 
from rock's hall of mirrors, in the hope that solitude and meditation may help dispel 
his pathological sense of illusion. Through forced injection with the 'product', 
administered by his besotted fans, he eventually achieves 'Several weeks of immense 
serenity' in silent self-communion, which restores his trust in consciousness and 
persuades him to reengage with popular culture (p. 265). Before his aphasia, he is 
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diffident and vague, reflecting limply on becoming a rock ascetic: 'I might yield to 
the seductions of void', 'be the epoch's barren hero', 'a man who knew the surest way 
to minimize' (pp. 67-8). Afterwards, he ceases to identify mind or self with media 
artifice and claims confidently that 'When the season is right', 'I'll return to whatever 
is out there. It's just a question of what sound to make or fake' (p. 265). 
A major theoretical problem for the critic is the meaning, if any, of Bucky's 
silence and the reason for its revivifying effect. However, as Anthony De Curtis 
points out, Great Jones Street is not one of DeLillo's 'more highly regarded novels' 
and it may be this low opinion of the text that has led critics to dismiss Bucky's 
withdrawal as unproductive. 35 Cowart describes Bucky as a 'picture of anomie', 
'largely indifferent to his surroundings' (p. 34). LeClair even suggests that, by 
retreating, Bucky forfeits his human ontology and retains only an 'objecthood' that 
reduces him to a capitalist lackey (p. 105). Bucky does confront powerful capitalist 
forces, including his record company Transparanoia, the threatening omnipresence of 
which is symbolised by its unsuspected ownership of the building to which Bucky 
retires. But this critical response ignores DeLillo's emphasis on Bucky's interior 
experience (p. 8) and, in LeClair's case, risks replicating the objectifying practices of 
the system he purports to criticise. Bucky describes his enterprise as 'testing the 
depths of silence. Or one's willingness to be silent. Or one's fear of that willingness' 
(p. 25). I argue that this descent to dumbness convinces him of the concrete existence 
of the 'half-shattered' mind he distrusts and permits him to adopt a 'realist' Nagelian 
view of the unpresentable reality of mind (A=hing, p. 82). His mute exploration of 
34 Salman Rushdie, The Ground Beneath Her Feet (London: Jonathan Cape, 1999), p. 6. 
33 Anthony De Curtis, 'The Product: Bucky Wunderlick, Rock 'n Roll, and Don DeLillo's Great Jones 
2rge A' in Introducing Don DeLillo, ed. by Frank Lentricchia (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996), 
pp. 121-131 (p. 121). 
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consciousness also exemplifies what Curtis Yehnert calls the 'strategies of self- 
creation', which he believes DeLillo's characters adopt in response to the 
6 postmodern obliteration' of selfhood. 36 He calls the result a 'postexistential self, a 
concept of subjectivity grounded not on separation of psyche and socius but on a 
dialectic between form and formlessness' (p. 361). Yelmert's dialectic provides a 
useful method of theorising Bucky's experience. In silence, Bucky seeks the 
'formlessness', or, to use his term, 'wordlessness', of silence in order to embrace the 
'form' of his mind and reconstruct his damaged subjectivity (p. 361), or, as Bucky puts 
it, 'remake myself' (p. 68). During the cathartic process of injection with the 'product', 
which allows this reconstruction to take place, Bucky's responses become comparable 
to those of the autistic patients described by Oliver Sacks. Bucky becomes 'an island, 
cut off from the main', with an enhanced ability to focus on 'intense particulars'. 37 
He produces disorientating unpunctuated lists of these 'particulars', for example, 
'HAND FOOT ARM', 'NOSE TOE FACE' (p. 262) and discovers, in the process, 
what Sacks calls 'a mode of mind at the opposite extreme from the generalising, the 
scientific, but still 'real', equally real, in a quite different way' (P. 219). Silent 
concentration on 'particulars' therefore restores Bucky's faith in the reality of 
perception, even in the absence of 'human language' (Nagel, p. 17 1). Like death and 
the nuclear sublime in End Zone, mute contemplation convinces Bucky of the 
ineffable realities that Nagel insists upon, mind foremost among them. 
Bucky's fans demonstrate a tenacious attachment to their hero and a desire to 
merge with him, which suggests that, like Rushdie's narrator Umeed, who states that 
36 Curtis Yehnert, "'Like Some Endless Sky Waking Inside": Subjectivity in Don DeLillo', Critigue: 
Studies in Contemporary Fiction, 42 (2001), 357-66 (p. 361). 
37 Oliver Sacks, The Man Who Mistook His Wife For A Hat (London: Picador, 1986), p. 221, p. 219. 
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'the real was Vina' (p. 63), they treat him as representative of the unpresentable real or 
what Lacan calls the objet petit . Tony Tanner argues that DeLillo's 
depiction of 
these obsessive fans marks the beginning of an interest in the dynamics of crowd 
behaviour, which continues throughout his career. 38 He also suggests that DeLillo is 
fascinated by Elias Canetti's work Crowds and Power. 39 Although Tanner provides 
no evidence for this claim, Canetti's views are certainly pertinent to Bucky's 
experience. Canetti emphasises the sense of 'equality' (p. 30) that predominates in a 
crowd, which leads to the mass behaving as 'a single creature' with 'fifty heads and a 
hundred legs, all performing in exactly the same way' (p. 32). Bucky's intense 
interaction with his fans leads him to feel his mind has been subsumed into a similarly 
amorphous mass consciousness. He suggests that, by the 'final tour', his performances 
relied on the crowd's 'reduplicated noise' and that, if 'deprived of people's screams', 
their recent music would be 'next to meaningless' (p. 2). This symbiotic relationship 
eventually produces some threateningly proprietorial responses from his admirers, 
who demand either, his suicide, 'preferably in a foreign city' (P. 2), or retirement, 
although they eventually accept the inwardness entailed by his forced aphasia. As 
they declare menacingly, 'We're your group image, Bucky. You've come inside to 
stay' (p. 194). The fans' forcible projection of their anxieties and tensions onto Bucky 
causes him considerable disquiet and exacerbates his sense of personal dissolution. 
Notably, P-P Hartnett's recent novel Rock W Roll Suicide suggests that, over the 
intervening three decades, the dynamic between star and audience has shifted, so that 
less crowd emotion is transferred to the celebrity and more concentrated among the 
38 Tony Tanner, The American Mystery: American Literature from Emerson to DeLillo (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 203. 
39 Elias Canetti, Crowds and Power, trans. by Carol Stewart (London: Victor Gollanz Ltd., 1962) 
72 
devoted young audience. Like Bucky, the novel's protagonist Max comes to consider 
himself unreal, 'A construction of shadow and light that cannot be touched', but, 
although he is initially suspected of taking his own life after his disappearance, the 
'Rock W Roll Suicide' of the title is, in fact, his obsessive fan, who refuses to 
40 
contemplate life without him. In the late 1960s or early 1970s environment of Great 
Jones Street, though, DeLillo portrays the duties of stardom as more onerous. In the 
novel's opening passages, Bucky even accepts the decisive role that his fans play in 
his abandonment of his band. The irony of his reclusive withdrawal is therefore that it 
is prompted by his admirers' realisation that the 'culture had reached its limit' and 
their consequent cultic embrace of 'isolation'. Although they perceive Bucky's need 
for introspection before he does, they allow him to maintain the illusion of autonomy. 
As Bucky puts it, they became 'less murderous in their love of me, as if realizing 
finally that my death, to be authentic, must be self-willed' (p. 2). 
Bucky's eventual ambivalent 'return' to rock music creates an obviously 
circular structure. As DeLillo notes, the novel 'bends back on itself in the sense that 
the book is the narrator's way of resurfacing' (Anylhing, p. 87). The ouroboric pattern 
implies a non-judgmental approach to the simulacral play of signification that 
characterises media culture. This sense of authorial detachment is affirmed by 
Bucky's fulfilment of numerous rock archetypes, which suggests DeLillo has 
assembled his characteristics from those of 1960s rock W roll stars. One's sense of 
Bucky as an individuated consciousness is therefore diminished and the text 
constructed as a generalised examination of the impact of fame on individual 
consciousness. His solitary production of 'The Mountain Tapes' recalls Bob Dylan's 
'Basement Tapes', which were produced in the late 1960s (p. 20 1). The ferocious 
40 P-P Hartnett, Rock 'n' Roll Suicide (London: Sceptre, 2003), p. 144. 
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guitar-work in Bucky's band, which he describes as 'the brute electricity of that 
sound' (p. 12), suggests an allusion to Jimi Hendrix. As Simon Frith remarks, Hendrix 
emphasised the 'electric guitar' and the use of 'amplification as itself a source of new 
41 sorts of sound'. Moreover, Bucky's involvement with meditation and narcotics 
recalls the late phase of The Beatles, who, as Frith notes, had a 'public engagement 
with the trappings of hippie culture' (p. 79). 
In light of his composite character and submissive response to his devotees, 
DeLillo's use of the word 'authentic' to describe Bucky's actions may be partly 
ironic. As Keir Keighley remarks, in ancient Greece, the term authentic meant ... self- 
made... and, etymologically, the word therefore opposes the 'mass-produced' or 
'money-driven' (Frith, p. 134). Clearly Bucky cannot lay claim to such autonomy, 
whether financial or personal. Although, in rock, the term 'authenticity' has become 
so polyvalent as to be almost meaningless, Keighley points out, and Bucky's 
experience demonstrates, that the difficulty of its definition in popular music 
'underlines a general anxiety about the status of the modem self. Musical experiences 
considered 'authentic' are those which highlight or nourish individual identity' 
(p. 134). Rock's complex preoccupation with the 'real' and the 'authentic' therefore 
offers DeLillo an ideal opportunity to depict a character whose professional concerns 
naturally converge with a more general scepticism in American culture about human 
consciousness. 
A frequent trope of rock 'authenticity' is the solitary recording or 
performance, preferably with acoustic instrumentation. Prior to his disappearance, 
Bucky seeks musical legitimacy and personal autonomy in precisely this way, by 
recording 'The Mountain Tapes'. DeLillo's allusion to Dylan's 'Basement Tapes' 
41 Simon Frith, Will Straw and John Street, eds. The Cambridge Companion to Pop and Rock 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 82-3. 
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carries heavy irony: the songs' lyrical content is, in Bucky's words, full of 'childlike 
blandness' and an 'abnormal naturalness' and conveys a despairing conviction that 
consciousness is radically illusory (pp. 147-8). In interview, DeLillo describes a 
transition in Bucky's lyrics from 'extreme self-awareness' to 'child-like babbling' 
(An3jhin , p. 82). Song 18 examines such 'child-like babbling' and adopts a Nagelian 
position on the unpresentable reality of mind, by asserting the irreducible substance of 
illiterate infant consciousness; 'Undreamed of grammars float in my spittle' he 
announces, while assuming the persona of a young child (p. 205). The simple 
statements in song 20, '1 know my toes' and 'I touch my hand/One touch One', fall 
into the fon-ner category and suggest a pathological need to affirm the reality of his 
perceptions and a determination to overcome his alienation from the physical (P. 206). 
In this state, Bucky's responses are consistent with what Sacks calls the 'feeling of 
de-realisation' (p. 62) among patients who experience a loss of "proprioception" 
(p. 42), a hidden sense that he defines as being 'like the eyes of the body' and whose 
loss leads to a feeling of being 'disembodied' (p. 44). Through solitary communion 
with his music, Bucky seeks to restore his faith in mind, the loss of which has caused 
this sense of 'de-realisation' and disembodiment. 
Bucky's refusal to re-record and release the 'Mountain Tapes' is motivated by 
a paradoxical need to emphasise the reality and lasting ontological value of transitory 
mental experiences. As he tells his manager Globke, 'the effect of the tapes is that 
they're tapes. Done at a certain time under the weight of a certain emotion'. They 
'can't be duplicated in a concert situation' (p. 18 8). Bucky's sceptical attitude to 
repetition recalls that of Gilles Deleuze, who argues that authentic duplication is 
impossible, and therefore purely 'symbolic', because any supposed repetition will 
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occur at a later time and therefore fail to be identical. 42 Globke regards Bucky's 
attitude as a betrayal and responds self-righteously by stealing the tapes and 
announcing his intention to distribute them (p. 164). Yet, in the context of industry 
practice, Bucky's position may be interpreted as orthodox. As Michael Coyle points 
out, the record industry believes that 'The recording and not the performance is the 
"real" thing', a position that appears to vindicate Bucky's stubborn defence of his 
private recording. 43 Yet, the record industry also demands that the 'real' thing be 
made available for regular reproduction in performance. Consequently, Bucky's 
conviction that, in Deleuze's words, any reproduction contains a 'differential' that has 
been 'disguised and displaced' will not win him the commercial argument, but is, 
nevertheless, a skilful use of the industry's own logic, which demonstrates the 
hypocrisy of its position (p. xx). 
DeLillo emphasises the thematic connections between Great Jones Street and 
its predecessor. Bucky refers to End Zone's title, when announcing that his retreat is 
motivated by an interest 'in endings, in how to survive a dead idea' and a wish to 
extend his 'personal limits, in endland, far from the tropics of fame' (p. 4). DeLillo's 
sense of rock music as exploratory of the extreme limits of subjectivity and culture, 
what he calls 'a game at the far edge', 'a music of loneliness and isolation', persists in 
contemporary literary treatments of the genre (An3qhing, p. 82). In Polaroids from the 
Dead, Douglas Coupland has a fan at a Grateful Dead concert make the disturbing 
observation that 'The guys here all look like Charles Manson' 'and the women all 
42 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. by Paul Patton (London: The Athlone Press, 1994), 
p. 17. 
43 Michael Coyle and Jim Dolan, 'Modeling Authenticity, Authenticating Commercial Models' , in Readiniz Rock and Roll: Authentici1y. Appropriation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 
pp. 17-3 5 (p. 18). 
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look like Sharon Tate'. 44 In Foster Wallace's story 'Girl With Curious Hair, 
meanwhile, punk rock is associated with extreme violence and hallucinatory unreality, 
with a narrator who casually sets a fellow fan's 'beard on fire' and his friend who 
insists that a 'girl's curious hair represented radioactive, chemical waste product anti- 
immolation mojo'. 45 Bucky's own aspiration to transcend 'personal limits' extends to 
exploring the 'void' that Gary defines as a Rilkean aphasic space in which the mind 
'remakes itself' (p. 89). Like Gary, in his exploration of the aphasic void, Bucky views 
excrement as a representation of the real, where signifier and referent meet 
harmoniously. Reporting the words of a woman 'cataloguing various items along the 
sidewalk', Bucky is particularly struck by 'NEWSPAPER VOMIT SHIT', 'SHIT 
GARBAGE SHIT GARBAGE' (p. 260). 
The word 'void' recurs in Great Jones Street and the meaning Bucky attaches 
to it functions as an index of his progress in reconstructing his 'half-shattered' mind 
and 'remaking' his subjectivity. It first appears in the baroque and portentous opening 
paragraph, where he describes 'true fame', with camp melodrama, as 'a devouring 
neon' and the 'edge of every void', which, at first, seems a self-consciously clichdd 
reference to the fabled perils of rock stardom (p. 1). Later, though, the term grows in 
significance and its meaning oscillates between a sense of mental vacuity caused by 
the 'devouring' unreality of fame and the nihilistic idea of a drift towards emptiness 
and death, which, in moments of pessimism, is how he characterises his seclusion. 
Without a serious belief in the reality of mind, Bucky is vulnerable to the idealist 
notion, which his lover and 'groupie' Opel advocates fiercely, that signification only 
obscures a threatening meaninglessness. Her position recalls 2ilek's view that the 
44 Douglas Coupland, Polaroids from the Dead (London: Flamingo, 1996), p. 13 
45 David Foster Wallace, 'Girl With Curious Hair', in The Girl With Curious flair and Other Stories 
(London: Abacus, 1997), pp. 53-74 (p. 62, pp. 64-5). 
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'Real Thing' beyond language is neither unpresentable trauma, nor the experience of 
consciousness, but only a terrifying nothingness; in 2ilek's words, 'ultimately, the 
destructive void'. 46 When Bucky meditates, Opel argues that 'Evil is movement 
towards void' and remarks peremptorily that 'we both agree that's where you're 
heading' (p. 88). Notably, the media-constructed persona of Rushdie's Vina inspires, 
in acolytes and fans, similar visions of desolation beyond signification's shimmering 
web. As her lover Ormus Cama declaims, 'Love was Vina, and beyond Vina there 
was nothing but the void' (p. 15). The combination of her desire to rescue Bucky from 
the 'void' with her status as an ambitious groupie, who 'wanted to be lead singer' in 
4a hard rock band', but 'had no talent' (p. 12) suggests that she aspires to become a 
female Orpheus, who seeks to save Bucky from a self-created underworld. But, in 
spite of Opel's nihilism, mute examination of mind proves deeply rewarding for 
Bucky and constitutes the productive obverse of the, often pathological, 'extreme self- 
awareness', on which DeLillo remarks LARything, p. 82). Bucky reports approvingly 
that, when 'alone' and 'motionless as salt', 'I had centred myself, learning of the 
experience of an interior motion, a shift in levels from isolation to solitude to 
wordlessness' (pp. 85-6). DeLillo's choice of the simile 'motionless as salt' alludes to 
the Old Testament legend of Lot's Wife, affirming his apparent concern with legends 
involving paralysis and providing further evidence for the relevance of the Orpheus 
legend to Bucky's descent to the 'unimprinted level' of consciousness (P. 265). 
DeLillo presents Opel's disruption of Bucky's meditation with utter lack of 
sympathy. Under her influence, Bucky, like Gary, is alienated from the 'centre' of his 
being and 'became the thing that swirled' around Opel (p. 86). Yet, ironically, it is the 
46 Slavoi 2ilek, Welcome to the Desert of the Real: Five Essays on September II th and Related Dates 
(London: Verso, 2002), p. 12. 
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peripatetic and idealist Opel who eventually meets the undignified fate of Eurydice, 
by being reduced to 'objecthood' (Logp, p. 105). She declares herself 'luggage. By 
choice, inclination and occupation', before her reified status is humorously confirmed 
by her sudden death. In Bucky's comical statement of the obvious, she becomes 'Very 
still. Never to be challenged in this particular stillness' (p. 9 1). DeLillo emphasises 
the morbidity of her views, by having her continue to espouse her Zilekian position 
after death. 'Opel's mind' reappears 'in the room' as a spectral presence and prompts 
Bucky, as though hypnotised, to reaffirm her mantra that 'Evil is movement towards 
void'. Significantly, the recollection of Opel's idealism induces in Bucky the 
disorientating sense of 'disembodiment' and 'de-realisation' (p. 44), which Sacks 
associates with the loss of 'proprioception' (p. 42), and prompts him to a touchingly 
careful examination of the body. As he reports, 'I took off my shoes and socks, then 
sat on the bed and counted my toes' (p. ISO). 
DeLillo provides regular reminders of the extreme disorientation that 
prompted this sense of 'disembodiment' and 'de-realisation. Bucky's colleague 
Azarian reports near psychotic behaviour, on tour, when Bucky made 'unreal faces' at 
'some old woman in a wheelchair': 'laughing and babbling and down on your knees'. 
In Azarian's words, 'There was no reality', and 'I knew it wasn't a joke. It was too 
unreal for that' (pp. 34-5). Bucky's alienation from reality is also indicated by his 
encounters with duplicitous underworld drug-dealer Dr Pepper, who obscures his 
identity with a series of simulacral personae. Pepper, 'the scientific genius of the 
underground' (p. 59), hopes to acquire 'the product' and, to this end disguises himself 
as a lame brush salesman and, later, a professor of 'Latent History, who studies 
fantasised events that 'almost' or 'probably took place' (p. 75). Meanwhile, a stream 
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of fantastic news stories reminds the reader of the factitious environment Bucky has 
endured. Oblivious to Bucky's need for seclusion, Globke casually alerts him to the 
fact that he was 'seen stealing a can of pineapple chunks in Fresno' (p. 146). 
Bucky's sense of his mind as thoroughly mediated creates a vacuous and 
powerless sense of self. Like Rushdie's Vina, he becomes 'Literally selfless'; his 
'personality smashed' (p. 12 1). In the same way as Gary, he struggles to accept 
Nagel's dictum that the 'fact' of consciousness subsists independently of 'human 
language' (p. 17 1) and his wish to convince himself of the reality of mind and self 
therefore becomes a search for the signifier that denotes them perfectly. Walking 
through New York, he repeats his name in search of inspiration, but quickly discovers 
the limitations of language for this purpose: 
'Walking south on Broadway (downtown, always down), I 
repeated these sounds over and over, trying to penetrate vapour, to 
reach beyond the sounds to whatever it was that they designated, 
the dream guiding the body through the snow, wun-der-lick, object 
of the enquiry' (p. 92) 
Because Bucky's distrust of language convinces him that the signifier can only refer 
to a media-inspired 'dream', his search for the 'object' 'designated' by the signifier 
(himself) is abortive (p. 92). DeLillo's depiction of Bucky's alienation here is 
comparable to Herbert Marcuse's portrayal of the subject of postmodernity, who lacks 
an 'individual consciousness' distinguishable from 'public opinion and behaviour, a 
notion that is itself indebted to Adorno's conception of the media-conditioned 
personality as merely 'the centers where the general tendencies meet' a2ialectic, 
so 
p. 154). 47 Globke also regards Bucky's selfhood as mere impersonation, emptied of 
subjective content, and advises him to execute 'a surprise return to your old self. 
There was nobody better at it' (p. 10). Bucky's conception of mind as oneiric and 
unreal is typified by a nightmare in which he is 'dreamed by a preternatural entity' 
(the media? ) and reduced to the 'stale chemical breath of the dreamer' (p. 142). Again, 
the scene is comparable to the opening of The Ground Beneath Her Feet, in which 
Vina 'woke sobbing from a dream of human sacrifice in which she had been the 
intended victim' and is surrounded by 'the popping of flash bulbs' (P. 3). Bucky's 
distrust of mind is clear from the dream's account of him, even in his waking state, as 
'barely conscious'. He fully acknowledges the catastrophic loss of autonomy this 
causes, admitting 'The essential question was one of control', 'I went deeper now, 
struggling to produce a dream of my own' (pp. 142-3). 
Just as Gary rejects the mutability of language as evidence of the mind's 
instability, the superficiality and frequent falsehood of media discourse causes Bucky 
to distrust language and mind. Like Umeed, he nurtures an urge to 'break free into the 
real' (p. 223). His responses to journalists imply that the media undermines public 
consciousness and annuls the distinction between truth and illusion. He instructs 
'RUNNING DOG NEWS SERVICE', whose name foreshadows the automated 
thought that later pervades Running Dog, that they need not be accurate, since 
'Whatever you write will be true' (p. 2 1). 48 As one of Foster Wallace's characters 
remarks before a television appearance, 'Sincerity is out', 'The joke is now on people 
who're sincere'. 49 The singer's dark view of technology's power over mind is shared 
47 Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man: The Ideology of Industrial Society (London: Sphere, 
1964), p. 25, p. 24. 
48 Don DeLillo, Running Dog (London: Vintage, 1992) 
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by many media theorists, including Niklas Luhmann, who calls media outlets 
'recursively stabilized functional mechanisms, which remain stable even when their 
genesis and their mode of functioning have been revealed' . 
50 Bucky instructs the 
same journalist that 'Everybody under contract' at 'Transparanoia' 'has his or her 
facsimiles' and that, while Bucky 'is having his toenails clipped', 'You've been 
conducting an interview with his facsimile' (p. 24). Although his ex cathedra delivery 
of such maxims implies a despairing alienation from mind and subjectivity, the 
relative equanimity with which he receives reporters and record company 
representatives suggests that, even in hiding, he guards his public image carefully. His 
projection of an enigmatic persona may even indicate a canny awareness that, as an 
ABC journalist asserts, 'your power is growing', 'The less you say, the more you are'. 
(p. 128). Yet, Bucky also aims to achieve sufficient mental tranquility to facilitate his 
re-emergence into rock culture. Paradoxically, therefore, while he uses media outlets 
for self-publicity, he also adopts the role of a 'half-saint, practised in visions' and 
'informed by a sense of bodily economy', seeking, like Americana's David, to 
reconstruct his selfbood through the embrace of ascesis (p. 19). 
This self-discipline creates appropriate conditions for the re-interpretation of 
'void' as the contemplation of silence, which is central to Bucky's mission of self- 
scrutiny. As Robert Nadeau puts it insightfully, 'Bucky seeks to withdraw into the 
silence of awareness without symbolic content, wherein he hopes to escape his 
anxious need to match signifier with referent . 
51 Where he has sought linguistic 'form' 
to extricate himself from supposed 'formlessness', he now reverses Yehnert's 
49 David Foster Wallace, 'My Appearance', in The Girl With Curious Hair and Other Stories (London: 
Abacus, 1997), pp. 173-202 (p. 182). 
50 Niklas Luhmann, The Real i1y of the Mass Media, trans. by Kathleen Cross (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2000), p. I. 
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'dialectic' and embraces the 'formlessness' of silence as a way of accepting the 
reliable 'form' of consciousness. In the process, Bucky notes the arbitrary nature of 
the relation between signifier and referent but draws radically different conclusions 
from this than those of the post-Saussurean linguistics that have been so influential in 
postmodernity. Indeed, for him, the contingency of the relationship between signifier 
and referent diminishes the existential influence of language. To 'RUNNING DOG', 
he remarks playfully that the term 'malfeasance' 'carries tremendous weight in a court 
of law, 'Much more weight than misfeasance or non-feasance' (p. 2 1). When seeking 
coffee, he insists rigorously on the separation of referent and signifier, while also 
satirising his own pedantry and philosophy of language in general. He asserts casually 
that he is seeking 'some sign of a coffee can, but corrects his remark, by noting that 
'Either the coffee can would be there or it wouldn't. There was no sign involved' 
(p. 40). Bucky's attempt to withdraw from signification sometimes becomes slightly 
hysterical, disintegrating into bewildered assertions like 'Signs that serve no purpose 
are logically meaningless, according to something I'd read once' (P. 40), perhaps 
because, he secretly fears, like Opel, that beyond signification lies mere 'void': an 
unrewarding nothingness (p. 88). By these uneven stages, Bucky adopts a more 
flexible Kripkean, outlook on language, which acknowledges that names are not 
determined by 'some unique properties satisfied by the referent' but 'contingent 
marks of the object', and accepts the realist Nagelian position that mind exists 
independently of language (Kripke, p. 106). He lambasts himself as a 'votary of dupe 
and superstition' and scorns his linguistic preoccupations with the parodic dismissal 
that 'Spoon secured, named and agreed on, we pursue the formal concept to its 
inevitable end, which is coffee' (p. 40). 
51 Robert Nadeau, Readings from the New Book on Nature: Physics and Metaphysics in the Modern 
Novel (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1981), p. 169. 
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Significantly, the one character that asserts an existential connection between 
signifier and referent is treated with complete lack of sympathy. Edward B. Fenig is 
an obscure and lamentably uninspired writer who lives upstairs from Bucky and who, 
rather pathetically, believes they have 'something a little bit in common, at least 
retroactively', by virtue of their allegedly similar professions (p. 18). DeLillo 
mercilessly satirises Fenig's fetishisation of the signifier, which, in light of Bucky's 
fevered attempt to discard a similar obsession, appears backward looking or decadent. 
Considering the possibility of literary renown, Fenig claims 'I won't let it destroy me. 
Fame. The perfect word for the phenomenon it describes', at which point he supplies 
a ludicrous list of anagrams, 'Amef, Efarn. Mefa', which he believes fail to fit their 
referent with the same precision (p. 49). By virtue of their vaguely comparable 
vocations and linguistic anxieties, Fenig serves as a disturbing doppelganger of 
Bucky's. Indeed, read in terms of Gaston Bachelard's 'topoanalysis', with its 
association of 'the roof' with 'rationality' and 'solid geometry', Fenig's position as 
Bucky's 'upstairs neighbour' (p. 18) implies that he may function as the star's 
superego. 52 In this role, his professional failure and amorality provide a saturnine 
reminder of the obscurity that beckons, if Bucky remains at 'Great Jones Street'. 
Fenig's literary work on infancy parallels Bucky's engaging enquiry into infantile 
consciousness, in several songs, including the 'infantile babbling' of 'Pee-Pee-Maw- 
Maw' (p. 205). By contrast, however, Fenig examines infantile sexuality, in some 
remarkably distasteful fiction that he calls 'pornography for kids' (p. 5 1). Incredibly, 
in this work, he plans to hint at the 'Kaleidoscopic sex organs' of children, which, he 
believes, are capable of 'wild fiery pleasure' (p. 50). In every respect, therefore, Fenig 
52 Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, trans. by Maria Jolas (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1994), 
p. 8, p. 18. 
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represents a level of degeneracy to which Bucky fears descending, if he fails to 
overcome his scepticism about consciousness and return to work. DeLillo extends 
these parallels by suggesting that the sinister effects of pornography are similar to the 
destruction wreaked by the self-referring signifiers of rock. As Fenig asserts, 
'pornography' 'makes people easy to manipulate' by placing them 'on the level of 
things' (p. 223). Just as Bucky's sense of agency has been undermined, in writing 
porn, Fenig experiences a 'hardening of mechanisms' within him and complains that 
'I the writer was being manipulated by what I wrote' (p. 223). 
DeLillo provides another disturbing, but, ultimately, false analogy with 
Bucky's 'motionless' solitude, in the eccentric 'Happy Valley Farm' commune (p. 16). 
These uninvited visitors describe themselves as a 'new earth family', with an 
admiration for Bucky, rooted in a mistaken belief that he shares their ideological quest 
to 'return the idea of privacy to American life' (p. 16), which, according to Opel, 
involves 'some old idea of men alone with the land' (p. 60). Their name derives from 
the fictional paradise inhabited by Samuel Johnson's Prince Rasselas. 53 Like Bucky 
retreating from the materially comfortable but distorted world of rock music, Rasselas 
emerges from his unreal, womb-like home, where 'Every desire was immediately 
granted' (p. 3), to better acquaint himself with reality. But, where Rasselas finds the 
world cruelly disillusioning, Bucky is reinvigorated by his experience. The commune 
members, however, share Rasselas' jaundiced view of reality and their 'Revolutionary 
solitude' and determination to 'build inward' quickly becomes the corruption and 
violence of radical individualism (p. 194). One particularly aggressive member, 
Bohack, casually expresses the hope that he can 'wholesale dope' to fund his quest for 
inner experience (p. 194) and promotes 'mindless violence' as the only 'truly 
53 Samuel Johnson, The History of Rasselas: Prince of Abissinia (London: Oxford University Press, 
1971) 
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philosophical violence' (p. 191). But, unlike Fenig, who Bucky could ignore, Happy 
Valley are committed fans of Bucky's music and feel entitled to the psychic union 
with Bucky and influence over him that they once enjoyed (p. 2). Bohack tells Bucky 
that 'your privacy and isolation are what give us the strength to be ourselves. We were 
willing victims of your sound. Now we're acolytes of your silence' (P. 194). Bohack 
therefore attempts to force Bucky into the nihilistic 'isolation' that Happy Valley 
favours, by robbing him of speech. As narcotics expert Fred Chess instructs Bucky, 
before injecting him, the commune seeks 'the wrong kind of privacy, the old privacy, 
never again to be found' (p. 252) and, as Bucky's experience bears out, 'true privacy is 
an inner state'. 'The mind has to level itself across a plane of solitude' (P. 253). 
But, against the expectations of Happy Valley, the illegal drug of the counter- 
culture acts as 'pharmakon', repairing the damage inflicted by the poison of rock 
culture's vacuous media representations. Ironically, since Bohack's intention is to 
prevent any attempt from Bucky to 'step back into the legend' (p. 243), the process 
restores Bucky's faith in consciousness and encourages him to 'return to whatever is 
out there' (p. 265). Although Bucky is aware of the commune's penchant for violence, 
including their recent murder of Bucky's colleague, Azarian (P. 240), his dismissive 
response to warnings about the drug's side effects suggests little anxiety and 
considerable impatience for the anticipated benefits of aphasia. 'I know all this. This 
is boring', he tells Fred Chess, as Chess explains the possibility of damage to Bucky's 
left brain (p. 25 5). Asked for 'last words', Bucky repeats the infantile lyric 'Pee-pee- 
maw-maw', reminding the reader that the minimisation of language, perhaps even 
speechlessness itself, has long been his goal (p. 256). Bucky insists his retreat from the 
Word is blissful and reinvigorating, referring to the 'several weeks of immense 
serenity' that follow his 'withdrawal to that unimprinted level where all sound is 
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silken and nothing erodes in the mad weather of language' (p. 265). His ecstatic 
dumbness recalls Nye's remark that 'The specific advantage of the sublime is that it is 
beyond words' (p. xiv). Nye's view suggests that Bucky's aphasia is exemplary of the 
sublime and, since the drug is a manufactured product, the technological sublime. 
Once free of the 'mad weather of language' Bucky reports an augmented sense of 
physical reality (p. 265). He mentions that 'Having no words for things affected even 
my movements across the room. I walked more slowly, as though in fear of objects, 
all things with names unknown to me' (p. 264). 
Weeks of 'serenity' persuade Bucky to reconsider his former 2ilekian view of 
'void' as wholly destructive and contemplate other meanings of the word, one of 
which is introduced late in the text, when Bucky debates Upanishadic mysticism with 
Globke's wife Michelle. She is keen to persuade Bucky that the truly dangerous 
'void' is worldly 'attachment' (p. 237), which, in the context of Bucky's long 
'attachment' to fame and the signifier and his pursuit of asceticism as a 'half-saint' 
(p. 19), seems especially pertinent to his aspirations. R. D. Rande's view of the 
Upanishads' portrayal of mind suggests that these scriptures may have a similar 
relevance to Bucky's struggles with consciousness. 54 According to Rande, the 
Upanishads present a notably realist view of mind and attribute to it an exalted 
ontological status. In Rande's words, the Upanishads consider that self-consciousness 
constitutes the 'ultimate reality' (p. 197), while they also lay great stress on 'Thought- 
power' (p. 92) and treat 'Intellect' as 'the backbone of reality itself' (P. 86). 
Michelle's attempts to persuade Bucky that 'Non-attachment is the path to 
beyond-reality', 'where our true nature indwells', go unheeded. Bucky's 
54 R. D. Rande, A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy: Being an Tntroduction to the 
Thought of the Upanishads (Chowpatty, Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavari, 1968) 
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determination to accept reality is such that the suggestion that this 'reality' may be 
only another level of illusion is unwelcome to him (p. 237). But, in spite of this failure, 
Michelle is not the caricature that some critics have suggested. Although Globke 
reports wearily on her three years 'reading the Upanishads in paperback' and refers 
mockingly to her view that the East is the 'petal of all energy' (p. 9), the reader knows, 
and Globke admits, that he shows 'perpetual bad taste' and his sensibility is wholly 
untrustworthy (p. 237). Moreover, Michelle provides the novel's single moment of 
authentic emotion, by kissing Bucky's 'left temple' in a seeming gesture of 
compassion. Bucky's response is cynical: he suggests that the kiss demonstrates her 
'need for what she took to be my suffering' (p. 237). However, in the context of the 
drab irony to which the novel's other characters perpetually retreat, the incongruity of 
Michelle's unguarded and humane gesture associates mystical thought with the 
possibility of deliverance from the market-driven banality of Bucky's pop culture 
world. It is striking that confronted with his wife's concern for Bucky, even Globke 
becomes 'oddly deferential to the moment's solemnity' (p. 238). 
Given Bucky's blissful aphasic experience, his continued insistence to 
Michelle that motion towards 'void' is pure 'evil' is puzzling and implies that 'void' 
retains strong associations for him with a notion of the Real as emptiness, 
meaninglessness, and death. Indeed, there is significant evidence that Bucky's fear of 
'void' and 'wordlessness', is directly due to the displacement of death-anxiety (p. 86). 
When Fenig tells him of the 'retarded' boy on the floor beneath him, who 'can't talk 
or dress himself', Bucky connects the boy's muteness with his own horror of organic 
matter (p. 27). In Bachelard's terms, the boy's status as downstairs neighbour suggests 
that he represents the instinctual and physical qualities, generally attributed to the 
Freudian Id. Bachelard speaks of the 'irrationality of the depths', connoted by the 
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'cellar' (Space, p. 18). The fact that the child's dream life impinges regularly on 
Bucky's mind also suggests that he may be a manifestation of the singer's 
unconscious. Bucky remarks on the noise that emanates when the 'boy's dreaming' 
that 'I had never heard a sound so primal. It expressed the secret feculent menace of a 
forest or swamp' (p. 5 1). The image makes a further Bachelardian connection between 
'the presence of dormant water' and the 'melancholy' it inspires in Bucky, as well as 
supporting Bachelard's view of water as 'dream-like' and 'the land of total death'. 55 
Bucky's subsequent confession that he associates the boy's 'feculent menace' with 
the 'beauty and horror of wordless things' (p. 52) makes it plain that, for Bucky, fear 
of silence is fear of death, or what 2ilek calls the 'destructive void' (P. 12). 
DeLillo's repeated exploration of the importance of death-anxiety in the 
American psyche recalls his acknowledgement of Ernest Becker's influence, who 
argues that 'Consciousness of death is the primary repression, not sexuality'. 56 
Becker argues that the category of hero, to which Bucky clearly aspires, is born of 
collective desire to transcend mortality. In Becker's words, 'heroism is first and 
foremost a reflex of the terror of death' (p. 11). In his role as what he calls a 'hero of 
rock W roll' (p. 1), Bucky's lyrics betray an intense concern with death (p. 1). KC 
Sweetheart begins with the surreal and despondent lines, which appear to parody 
Samuel Beckett, 'Born in a hearse/Left foot first/Nursed on a hand-me-down nipple' 
(p. 97). The assertion in Nothing Turns that 'Nothing turns from death so much as 
flesh] Untouched by aging' (p. 10 1) indicates a preoccupation with the preservation of 
youth that is also apparent in Bucky's response to Globke's cutting observation that 
'one day you'll be thirty'. Bucky's adamant rebuttal of this obvious fact reminds one 
55 Gaston Bachelard, Water and Dreams: An Essay on the Imagination of Matter, trans. by Edith R. 
Farrell (Dallas, Tex.: Dallas Institute Publications, 1994), p. 7, p. 6, p. 74. 
56 Ernest Becker, The Denial of Death (New York: Macmillan Free Press, 1973), p. 96. 
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of rock heroism's dependence on the illusion that physical decay might somehow be 
eluded. 'Never', replies Bucky, prompting Globke to dismiss him sarcastically as the 
'ageless wonder' (p. 10). 
Bucky's international celebrity makes his death-anxiety fertile ground for 
DeLillo to return to the idea, first explored in Americana, that the iconic images of 
U. S. culture function as apotropaia, designed to ward off dea& Several characters 
draw an analogy between contemporary visual media and the burial rituals of ancient 
Egypt. At a party thrown by Bucky, an unnamed figure declares deceased cinema 
actors 'Dead but not really dead. Never really dead. The concept of movies is so 
fundamentally Egyptian' (p. 73). This notion of the cinema image as immortal 'alter 
ego' is, again, identical to Otto Rank's idea that art entails a search for the 'soul' and 
seeks to bestow immortality on its subjects. 57 DeLillo's view of contemporary 
Western culture's repression of death is close to the one articulated by Baudrillard, 
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with whom DeLillo's depictions of postmodem media culture are often associated. 
Baudrillard alludes to an 'irreversible evolution' towards marginalisation of the dead 
in the postmodern city, which has transformed our societies into death-cultures 
(p. 126). Its disturbing corollary, he suggests, is a massive return of the repressed: 
'The cemetery no longer exists because modem cities have taken over their function: 
they are ghost towns, cities of death' (p. 127). Having experienced being the subject 
represented in a profoundly visual rock culture, Bucky feels sufficiently detached to 
analyse the practices he has fled and avers that 'television is a study in the art of 
mummification', peopled by those who would 'dwell forever in hermetic substance, 
free of every ravage, secure as old kings asleep in sodium' (p. 13 6). He satirises 
57 Otto Rank, Beyond Psychology (New York: Dover Publications, 195 8), p. 10 1. 
5' Jean Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange and Death, trans. by lain Hamilton Grant (London: SAGE 
Publications, 1993) 
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Hollywood as a hieratic Baudrillardian 'death culture', where they 'tear the entrails 
out of dogs and cats and offer them up as devotions to dead movie stars' (p. 153), a 
characterisation echoed, a decade later, by Brett Easton Ellis in Less than Zero, whose 
Hollywood-born narrator is haunted by 'Images of parents who were so hungry and 
unfulfilled that they ate their own children' . 
59 B ucky's analysis of the death-anxiety 
implicit in American media culture implies acknowledgement of the mortal fear that 
has retarded his own acceptance of the silence he sought. Some, like Osteen, believe 
Bucky to be engaged in a quest for Thoreauvian simplicity, but life among actual 
death-prone organic matter would terrify him (Osteen, p. 46). Bucky's pretension to 
asceticism is a strategy designed to still the mind long enough to convince himself of 
its reality. Rather than what Osteen calls a 'moral form to master commerce' (P. 55), 
his silence serves to render credible the existence of mind and world, even after the 
withdrawal of what Nagel calls 'human language' (p. 17 1). 
59 Brett Easton His, Less than Zero (London: Picador, 1986), p. 207. 
91 
Chapter Three 
Ratner's Star: The Unification of Consciousness 
DeLillo's fourth novel Ratner's Star (1976) takes as its subject the arcane 
worlds of postmodern mathematics and science and deals, in particular, with the 
discoveries, intellectual and emotional, of the precocious fourteen-year-old 
mathematician Billy Twillig, recent winner of the Nobel Prize. 1 The eccentric cast of 
characters, with whom this brilliant but naive protagonist interacts, is a hyper-rational 
group of scientists that comprise the membership of a radical think tank, based 
somewhere in Asia. These academics serve as the perfect object of satire for DeLillo, 
whose theme, I suggest, is the self-reflexivity of the intellect and the limited 'human 
identity' that results, when the mental is regarded as the sole component of selfhood 
(p. 432). Throughout Ratner's Star, DeLillo uses the metaphor of 'joining the 
hemispheres' of the brain to suggest that, if used rightly, the mind might point beyond 
restrictive definitions of the self as purely intellectual (p. 195). He shows that the 
implicit trust that the scientists of 'Field Experiment Number One' place in their 
intellect becomes fanatical identification with the rational mind and leads them to the 
sterile assumption that this faculty is identical to subjectivity (p. 16). In the course of 
the novel, DeLillo places them in unexpected circumstances, in which this assumption 
begins to unravel, and in which they have to confront the consequences of their 
rejection of the body and of intuitive modes of thought. Many of these perturbing 
situations relate to the central task of the novel's protagonist, which is to translate a 
Morse Code message, consisting of 'One hundred and one pulses and gaps', thought 
to be from the inhabitants of a planet named 'Ratner's Star' (p. 47). This intellectual 
1 Don DeLillo, Ratner's Star (London: Vintage, 1991) 
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problem is notable for the simplicity of its ultimate solution and the intuitive, even 
unscientific, mode of thought with which Billy effects its discovery. The need for 
subjective insight unsettles the scientists' certainty that objectivist epistemology is the 
only useful model of thought and supports the views of Jacques Hadamard and Henri 
Poincar6, who DeLillo quotes in the novel, that intellectual breakthroughs arrive as 
spontaneous 'flashes' of insight (p. 297). Equally crushing to these elite academics, 
however, is the discovery that the source of the message is an advanced ancient 
civilisation that inhabited 'planet earth' in the 'very distant past' (p. 402-3). Near the 
end of the text, the archaeologist Maurice Wu uncovers evidence of beings who 
'resembled modem man both outwardly and otherwise' and who 'were capable of 
beaming radio signals into space' (p. 403). To their sadness, this realisation dissolves 
their faith in a linear evolutionary model of history. Their extreme reactions, which 
include think tank leader Rob Softly's hysterical retirement to a hole in the ground, 
suggest that their copious sacrifices of identity have been made for the sake of this 
grand but unsustainable illusion of permanent progress. 
When Billy 'steps aboard a Sony 747', on his way to a 'distant land', he 
believes his forthcoming project to be uncomplicated code breaking work, soluble by 
purely objective calculation; he has no suspicion that it will demand the resources of 
his whole self, physical, intellectual, and emotional (p. 3). Although all critics of the 
text emphasise the probing critique of scientific method DeLillo provides in Ratner's 
Star, few remark on the theme of selfhood that complements it and follows logically 
from it. David Cowart hints at it when, paraphrasing DeLillo, he remarks in passing 
on the 'limitation of identity' that Rob Softly suffers in his pursuit of 'logical rigour', 
but does not elaborate upon the remark or appear to recognise the central importance 
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of this theme (p. 272). Commonly, critics, including Cowart, have chosen to 
emphasise the critique of the scientific empirical method that pervades the text, 
Nadeau, for example, offering the representative and influential view that the text 
examines 'the inability of closed scientific paradigms to fully contain or define natural 
process'. 3 Similarly, Charles Molesworth contends that the 'satirical focus' of the 
novel is 'the totalizing impulse that must recontain all difference in a system of 
identity'. 4 
It seems likely that the flat and one-dimensional quality of the characters has 
discouraged critics from exploring the presentation of identity in Ratner's Star. When 
comparing the novel to DeLillo's earlier novels, Douglas Keesey remarks that there is 
even less 'emphasis upon traditional modes of characterization' and refers to the 
5 complaints of early reviewers that the text was populated by caricaturish figures. But 
this one-dimensional quality is employed by DeLillo, as it was in End Zone, to 
indicate a pathological rejection of interiority on the part of these characters, which 
precludes the full birth or exploration of selfllood. In conversation with Tom LeClair, 
DeLillo compares the two novels, in this respect. Referring to the 'made-up nature' of 
the characters in End Zone, he reveals that he 'took this further in Ratner's Star' and 
goes on to remark that, in the latter text, 'The people had to play a role subservient to 
pattern, form, and so on'. 6 If anything, in Ratner's Star, DeLillo is more eager to 
2 David Cowart, The Physics of Language (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2002), p. 160. 
3 Robert Nadeau, Readinjzs from the New Book on Nature: Physics and Metaphysics in the Modem 
Novel (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1981), p. 17. 
4 Charles Molesworth, 'Don DeLillo's Perfect Starry Night' in Introducing Don DeLillo, ed. by Frank 
Lentricchia (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), pp. 143-156 (P. 155). 
*5 Douglas Keesey, Don DeLillo (New York: Twayne, 1994), p. 66. 
6 Tom LeClair and Larry McCaffery, eds. An3jhinjz Can HapRen: Interviews with Contempora 
American Novelists (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1983), p. 8 1. 
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draw attention to the characters' transparency, largely in order to foreground their, 
often, abstruse ideas. He does so through the characters' j argon-filled speech and 
bizarre, often childish, behaviour. The text is filled with absurd and puerile characters 
such as Howie Weedon, who encourages Billy to spy on a woman that 'takes her bath 
every night at this time' and ask her to displays her 'titties' and 'cheeks' (pp. 40-42). 
Yet, just as in End Zone, where a sense of unreality is allegorical of the characters' 
experience, this 'subservience to pattern', which DeLillo mentions, seems true, not 
only of the characters' aesthetic function, but of their tendency to identify subjectivity 
with intellectual abstraction (An3jhing, p. 86). However, as DeLillo acknowledges in 
the same interview, in homage to Lewis Carroll's 'Alice' books, the novel is divided 
into two sections, 'Adventures' and 'Reflections', whose concerns are, respectively, 
what DeLillo calls 'positive, negative. Discrete, continuous. Day, night. Left brain, 
right brain'. This division situates the text in a tradition of fantastic intellectual 
comedy, which includes Jonathan Swift, as well as Carroll, and allows the selfhood, 
which is the repressed matter of Part One, to be more fully explored and revealed in 
the novel's second, 'night' and 'right brain', section (p. 87). 
The characters' thinness is also due, in part, to its generic status as a 
Menippean satire; a distinction it shares with Alice in Wonderland. ' As Northrop 
Frye puts it, the Menippean Satire 'deals less with people as such than with mental 
attitudes', while its characterization is 'stylized rather than naturalistic and presents 
people as mouthpieces of the ideas they represent'. 8 Joel C. Relihan summarises the 
7 Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1978) 
8 Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism: Four EaLa_ys (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), 
p. 309 
9 Joel C. Relihan, Ancient Menippean Satire (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), p. 3 
and M. H. Abrams, A Glossajy of Literajy Terms (New York: Holt, 1987), p. 167 
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genre as an 'unsettling or subversive combination of fantasy, learning, and 
philosophy', while M. H. Abrams asserts, with more precision, that 'its major feature' 
'is a series of extended dialogues and debates', in which representatives of various 
points of view 'serve to make ludicrous the attitudes and viewpoints they typify by the 
arguments they urge in their support'. 9 'Adventures' contains just such a series of 
debates, in which the limitations and contradictions of scientific and mystical ideas 
are exposed to a measure of ironic treatment. Yet, once the novel's emphasis shifts to 
exploration of selfhood and the 'right brain', these become less frequent and give way 
to meditations on subjectivity, sometimes delivered in the first person by individual 
characters. Given Ratner's Star's concern with the division and unity of 
consciousness, Mikhail Bakhtin's remarks on the genre are also highly illuminating. 
Bakhtin writes of 'Tbe dialogical attitude of man to himself (containing the seeds of 
the split personality) which appears in the menippea'. 10 In light of the doubleness of 
the novel's structure and its conceptual dialectic of left and right brain, Bakhtin's 
connection of the menippea with the notion of 'split personality' suggests that 
DeLillo's fourth novel may be particularly representative of its genre (p. 16). Notably, 
as we will see, the fissuring of mind and selfhood in Ratner's Star is strikingly close 
to the concepts of the 'disembodied self' and the 'false-self system' that R. D. Laing 
develops in his celebrated analysis of schizophrenia. 11 Relihan's views confirm the 
impression Bakhtin's view gives of the novel's typicality. Relihan glosses Bakhtin's 
reference to the dialogical in the menippea as a 'loss of central authority' or 'single 
point of view' and agrees it is highly representative of the form (p. 17). In accordance 
10 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics trans. by R. W. Rotsel Qn. pj: Ardis, 1973), 
p. 16. 
11 R. D. Laing, The Divided Self An Existential Study in Sani! y and Madneis (London: Penguin, 
1990), p. 69, p. 75. 
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with this, throughout the great majority of Ratner's Star, DeLillo's even-handed 
approach to mystical and scientific thought militates against any sense of such 'central 
authority' or imposed authorial viewpoint. Relihan asserts that the genre assumes 'no 
world can be understood' and that it therefore emphasises the 'inadequacy of 
preaching'. However, the difficulty of maintaining such studied neutrality is that any 
hint of authorial assertion will tend to draw 'the narrator and author into self-parody', 
which effectively means that in Menippean satire self-parody is almost impossible to 
avoid (pp. 24-5). The novel's closing pages, which address mathematicians directly, 
contain an element of just such 'self-parody'. In a climactic passage that covers 
several pages, the narrator accuses scientists of seeking 'metaphysical release', 
comparable to that achieved by mystics, at the expense of identity and self-awareness 
(pp. 432-33). The text therefore seems to preach, where previously it limned the 
impossibility of acquiring objectively verifiable knowledge. The informed reader is 
therefore left uncertain whether to attribute authoritative force to this peroration, an 
interpretation that would be supported by DeLillo's consistently satirical portrayal of 
his mathematicians, or to regard it as one more conflicting voice in the dialogical 
cacophony of the 'menippea' (Bakhtin, p. 16). 
DeLillo's emphasis on the fusion of intuitive and logical thought echoes much 
of the 'two cultures' debate initiated by C. P. Snow in the late nineteen fifties. 
Although Snow is English, the essay Thomas Pynchon wrote to commemorate the 
twenty-fifth anniversary of Snow's lecture, in which he asserts that the distinction 
between the 'two cultures' has since grown considerably less clear, demonstrates 
clearly that the influence of Snow's intervention reached DeLillo's generation of 
97 
American writers. 12 DeLillo's engagement with this debate appears to second the 
view expressed by Jacob Bronowski and Bruce Mazlish, in The Western Intellectual 
Tradition, that the 'creation of a contemporary culture' hinges on finding a 'coherent 
relation between science and the humanities'. 13 DeLillo repeatedly draws attention to 
multifarious examples of mystical and theological speculation in mathematical 
history, facts that demonstrate the split between the 'two cultures' to be of relatively 
recent origin and suggest the possibility of regaining what Morris Berman has called 
'unified consciousness'. 14 Berman's concerns are particularly relevant to DeLillo's 
concern with the alienation from self and body that attends purely objective thought. 
He examines the systematic separation of subject from object and mind from world 
since the Renaissance and argues for a reunification of these categories that is closely 
akin to the task ofj oining 'the hemispheres' of the brain, which is assigned to Billy 
(p. 195). DeLillo's ventures in science's deep past, which include the introduction of 
Pythagorean mysticism into his contemporary scientific scenario, suggest agreement 
with the fear of Snow's contemporary Michael Yudkin that the expansion of 
contemporary rationalistic science might develop imperialist tendencies that cause the 
'atrophy of traditional culture'. 15 Indeed, DeLillo describes the legendary mystic and 
mathematician, Pythagoras, as the 'guiding spirit' of the novel (An3lhing, p. 86). As 
Peter Gorman points out, Pythagoras created a rousing union of logical and intuitive 
12 Thomas Pynchon, 'Is it OX to be a Luddite? ', New York Times Book Review, 28th October 1984, 
pp. 1, pp. 40-4 1. 
13 J. Bronowski and Bruce Mazlish, The Western Intellectual Tradition: From Leonardo to HeRel 
(London: Hutchinson, 1960), p. vii. 
14 Morris Berman, The Reenchantment of the World (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 19 8 1), p. 74. 
15 F. R. Leavis, Two Cultures? The significance of C. P. Snow and Michael Yudkin, An essay on Sir 
Charles Snow's Rede Lecture (London: Chatto and Windus, 1962), p. 44. 
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thought, preaching that, in their immutability, numbers are comparable to Gods. 16 He 
also demanded to be treated as a demagogue and organised quasi-religious rituals, 
during which he was concealed 'behind a curtain' (p. 122). However, in spite of 
having the former mathematician Henrik Endor wistfully describe the cultic status of 
number and 'the intuition of the ancients, who believed that number is the essence of 
all things', DeLillo's attitude to his 'guiding spirit' is far from one of uncomplicated 
approbation (p. 195). Indeed, DeLillo provides a stem critique of what Alexander 
George and Daniel J. Velleman call the platonistic philosophy of mathematics, which 
17 
takes mathematics to exist 'quite as independently of us as does the natural world'. 
He suggests that this is an arcane strategy of self-annihilation, largely designed to 
banish the exigencies of physical existence. In the final chapter, he follows the bald 
statement that 'Mathematics is what the world is when we subtract our own 
perceptions' with the accusation that this 'subtraction' is the goal of platonistic 
mathematics, intended to remove its practitioners to the 'painless non-existence' of 'n 
space' (p. 432). Although the desire to banish physicality is recurrent in DeLillo's 
work, as we will see, in Ratner's Star, DeLillo posits a direct link between neglect of 
the somatic and the extreme, sometimes psychotic, behaviour of certain scientists. 
Endor, Billy's predecessor as code-breaker, who becomes the adolescent's 
unlikely mentor, demands a less hieratic union of rationality and imagination from his 
protdgd than that promulgated by Pythagoras. Endor addresses Billy from the hole he 
has inhabited since, unbeknown to colleagues, he understood that the satirically 
named 'Artificial Radio Source Extants, or 'ARSE', are an ancient culture attempting 
to inform their descendants of an imminent solar eclipse (p. 274). The satire is directed 
16 Peter Gorman: PZhagoras: A Life London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), p. 134. 
17 Alexander George and Daniel J. Velleman, Philosophies of Mathematics (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 
2002), p. 7. 
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at the scientist's blinkered inability to appreciate the message's reflexive path, which 
has not originated from 'Ratner's Star', but merely rebounded off it, back to its source 
on Earth. DeLillo imagines it forming a boomerang shape that resembles a scientific 
diagram, named in Billy's honour and known as the 'stellated twilligon', variations of 
which DeLillo uses throughout the novel to symbolise the often ideal, even illusory, 
nature of scientific claims to truth (p. 1 17). Endor's instructions to Billy use the 
metaphor of joining 'the hemispheres' of the brain to represent this union of scientific 
and humanistic 'cultures' and the liberating recognition of a self not restricted to the 
intellect. Endor's hopes for Billy's integration of consciousness receive prophetic 
support from Siba Isten-Esru, who remarks on the derivation of the name 'Twillig' 
from Ug -- to bind, as in " ligate " and "ligature... and demands archly 'Is it your 
destiny then to bind together two distinct entities? To j oin the unjoinableT (p. 155). 
As Cowart asserts, the novel presents this cultural union of science and humanism as 
immensely significant, an 'epistemic death knell, a paradigm shift like no other' 
(p. 15 1). Endor informs B illy urgently that 'It's the object of your labor, lad, to join 
the hemispheres. Bring logical sequence to delirium' and 'language and meaning to 
the wild child's dream' (p. 195). He especially urges Billy to make use of the 'right 
side of the brain' in order to enjoy 'Intuition and motion and the conquest of time' 
(p. 195). As the work of Gerard M. Edelman and Guilio Tononi makes clear, Endor's 
apportioning of right brain to the sensory and imaginative and left to logical and 
empirical thought has a substantial basis in anatomical reality. They mention the fact 
that, when a surgeon 'severs the large number of reciprocal connections between the 
two halves of the brain', severe problems then arise with the 'interhemispheric 
integration of sensory and motor information'. 18 Endor is particularly keen to 
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embrace this 'sensory' and, he believes, imaginative 'right brain'. Indeed, he makes 
clear that he inhabits the soil, in part, to counter the denial of the physical that he 
believes is endemic among scientists. The fact that Endor's quest for reconnection 
with the body takes him underground exemplifies Ratner's Star's connection of the 
somatic with the subterranean and, by implication, the unconscious mind. DeLillo 
suggests Billy's fear of both by his phobia of underground sites, which is rooted in a 
traumatic childhood visit to the New York subway. The excursion was prompted by 
his father's desire to expand Billy's notion of subjectivity to include irrationality and 
the unconscious, or, as DeLillo puts it, to introduce 'his lone son to the idea that 
existence tends to be nourished from below, from the fear level' (pp. 4-5). Therefore, 
when Billy arrives at the 'armillary sphere', in which the 'Experiment' is housed, 
what he learns of the architecture's subterranean underpinnings immediately alerts the 
reader to the possibility that his stay will force him to expand his concept of selfhood 
beyond mere rationality. Evinrude informs him that the building extends far into the 
ground and includes the 'old structure' as 'buttress for the foundation'. In the 
4 armillary sphere', quips Evinrude, 'the Great Hall' is really 'the Great Hole' (P. 204). 
Billy's preference for stem rationality, even objectivism, therefore makes him the 
ideal protagonist for Ratner's Star, since 'joining the hemispheres' involves a 
significant shift in his understanding of mind and subjectivity. We get some idea of 
this early on, when Eberhard Fearing, a fellow air passenger, professes admiration for 
Billy's 'Hard, cold and cutting' intellect (p. 6) and DeLillo states Billy's belief in the 
'arch-reality' of pure mathematics', along with its 'links to simplicity and 
permanence' (p. 13). Tellingly, when asked about the 'mystery' of mathematics, how 
numbers 'interconnect', he asserts crisply that 'I don't think we can talk about it being 
18 Gerald M. Edelman and Giulio Tononi, Consciousness: How Matter Becomes Imagination (London: 
Penguin, 2000), pp. 63-4. 
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a mystery. There's no mystery' (p. 23). Billy badly needs Endor's advice: in solving 
the radio code, Endor suggests, 'there's a point after which it's possible to stop 
digging and take the free fall. Use your imagination. That'll tell you when to make the 
switch' (p. 196). 
Under Rob Softly's leadership, right brain activity is severely restricted at 
'Field Experiment Number One'. DeLillo indicates these in a variety of ways, but 
most strikingly by Rob's habit of playing a game with Billy called 'halfball', which 
resembles softball, but with only one half of a sphere (p. 333). Rob tells Billy 'Get the 
ball, cut it in half and let's go play'. The game is so blatantly allegorical of Rob's 
crude sensibility that it foregrounds the clumsy nature of the symbolism involved and, 
again, draws attention to the novel as literary construct and Menippean Satire, in 
which 'form' and 'pattern' override the significance of individual characters 
(AnAhing, p. 86). Rob's scepticism is such that mystical ideas provoke him to the 
satirical use of gibberish words, such as 'Musjid pepsi kakapo' (P. 333). He later 
demonstrates his extreme rationality, by advocating the long discredited Fregean 
notion of a logical language, which he names Logicon. Such a language would be 
based upon the logicist assumption that, as George and Velleman put it, 'arithmetic is 
usually a direct development of the science of inference', or logic (p. 17). On the 
subject of Logicon, Rob insists that 'So-called intuitive truths have to be subjected to 
the rigors of logic before we can take them seriously' (p. 272). This emphasis on the 
primacy of rationality forecloses the possibilities of human subjectivity and, as Morris 
Berman argues, in relation to the empiricist revolution of the Renaissance, risks 
identifying 'human existence with pure ratiocination' (p. 34). As Berman suggests 
and, as Part Two of Ratner's Star bears out, conflating self with intellect diminishes 
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subjectivity and creates the alienating illusion of separation from the world. In 
'Adventures', DeLillo often explores the way mathematicians' emphasis on objective 
thought causes mental and physical enervation. In pursuit of rational thought and 
behaviour, Billy's hosts discourage modes of communication they consider 
excessively subjective. When Billy answers 'I have understood', he is requested to 
adopt a more impersonal mode of communication. 'Most people just nod', he is told, 
'It's more universal' (p. 17). Later, Billy's adoption of 'universal' communication 
even extends to supplementing this motion with an objective assertion of its 
occurrence: in reply to architect Soma Tobias, he remarks 'I'm nodding' (p. 77). This 
'rational' withdrawal from the subjective sometimes becomes an inability to 
experience subjectivity. Billy's chauffeur provides a comical example, when, while 
driving, he makes the apparently self-contradictory claim that 'I couldn't tell you 
what words I'm in the process of saying' (p. 83). Similarly, researchers often 
experience total estrangement from the body, which transforms straightforward 
physical acts into elaborate technical feats. When Billy flees from a pigeon and 
instructs his companion Evinrude to do the same, Evinrude replies helplessly that 'I 
don't know how to run' 'I never learned' (p. 236). Endor's desperate attempts to 
reconnect with the earth indicate that withdrawal from the body and the senses leads 
to similar feeling disconnection from the physical. As Berman states, the felt 
disjunction of mind and world, as experienced by the text's academics, is caused by 
disregard for the extent to which, as medieval alchemy accepted, and as contemporary 
quantum physics emphasises, 'we participate reality' (Berman, p. 144). Berman 
contrasts such 'total separation' of consciousness from its environment (P. 17) 
unfavourably with alchemical mysticism, which assumed the 'union of subject and 
object' to be a reality (p. 73). Berman also suggests that the human subject's retreat 
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from the world creates an ideal situation for capitalism. After such 'total separation', 
it is assumed that 'nature is dead' and, consequently, 'there are no restraints on 
exploiting it for profit' (p. 126). The insight is relevant to Ratner's Star, in which 
DeLillo associates scientific objectivism with the unsentimental detachment of 
capitalist economics. This connection is clear from Billy's first moments in the 'Field 
Experiment', when he catches sight of the 'small inscription: OMCO RESEARCH' 
and understands the project to be a mere scion of corporate capital. Ultimately, we 
learn that the Experiment is controlled entirely by 'OmCo' and that intellectual 
freedom at the think tank is highly vulnerable to alterations in business practice. At 
the text's conclusion, monopoly capitalism triumphs, at the expense of academic 
research, when 'OmCo Research' is 'acquired in a complicated stock deal by 
ACRONYM, a long-term international speculative monopoly that operates beyond 
maritime limits'. As Mainwaring informs Rob, their operation will now 'be 
restructured beyond present recognition' and, since Rob's 'identification with OmCo 
is greater than anybody's', he should consider his position. DeLillo's pointed 
omission of any reply from Rob suggests that, to the contrary, Rob understands that 
his objectivism will be entirely wholly compatible with the outlook of the incoming 
magnates (Ratner's, pp. 412-13). 
As one would expect of a novel that takes Pythagoras as its 'guiding spirit', 
Ratner's Star strays beyond the merely humanistic and gives mystical ideas prolonged 
and serious consideration. Nevertheless, as Jonathan Little rightly points out, DeLillo 
treats the noumenous with the same irony he applies to 'the limitations of the Western 
empirical method' and never allows 'readers an unironized or unmediated mystical 
encounter with the sacred'. 19 Although critics rarely make the point, DeLillo suggests 
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explicitly that scientists and mystics, in varying ways, engage in similarly credulous 
searches for 'metaphysical release' (p. 433). Early on, scientists observe an Aboriginal 
whirling dervish. With the help of 'tektite manipulation', a substance which, as the 
performer's spokesman acknowledges, is rumoured in New Age circles to be of 
&extraterrestrial' origin (p. 105), the Aborigine aims to replace 'Time and space' with 
'the nameless dimension of the whirl' and journey, by astral means, to 'Ratner's Star' 
(p. 106). The scientists' interest in such practices indicates a latent sympathy with this 
quasi-mystical project, which they rationalise weakly, by appealing to the need to 
investigate objectively 'every shred of evidence concerning the aborigine's totemic 
powers' (p. 100). DeLillo emphasises this covert comradeship, showing that the 
scientists frequently pursue ideas that mirror the mystical. These include the 
'mohole', named after its inventor, which, like the putative spirit world or paradise, is 
said to exist outside time and space, or as Mohole puts it, 'part of a theoretical 
dimension lacking spatial extent and devoid of time value' (p. 18 1). On arrival, the 
researcher LoQuadro tells Billy that the 'Experiment' has the distinctly unscientific 
aim of helping us 'think as a single planetary mind' (p. 65). Distinguishing science 
from less rigorous disciplines has apparently become an insuperable challenge. Cyril 
Kyriakos is writing a definition of science that 'ran some five hundred pages' (p. 3 1) 
and admits the heretical possibility that 'obscure ritual and superstition may be 
perfectly legitimate scientific enterprises' (p. 36). As we saw, in a long peroration, 
DeLillo compares the supposedly irreconcilable aims of science and mysticism. In 
this climactic passage, he attacks the scientific urge to 'unsnarl us from our delimiting 
senses' and suggests that scientist's urge for 'metaphysical release' is the desire to 
escape physicality; the 'pain, the life-cry'. He warns against a purely intellectual 
19 Jonathan Little, 'Ironic Mysticism in Don DeLillo's Ratner's Star', Papers on Language and 
Literature: a Quarterly Journal for Scholars and Critics of Language and Literature, 35 (1999), 301-32 
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victory over these somatic terrors, since to 'out-premise' them, 'by whatever tektite 
whirl you've mastered, would be to make us hypothetical, a creature of our own 
pretending, as are you' (p. 432-33). This reference to the 'tektite whirl' attributes to 
mathematicians a covert yearning for transcendence similar to the dervish's and 
implies that science and mysticism mirror one another's wish to overcome the agonies 
of bodily existence. Without a belief in transcendence, however, contempt for the 
somatic becomes a mere wish for self-annihilation: an unrestrained death-drive. 
DeLillo claims that 'In your earthly study of the subject, you went beyond its natural 
association with the will to live and found that it contained a painless 'nonexistence', 
the theoretical ideal of n-space' (p. 432). By pursuing this 'theoretical ideal', scientists 
achieve a near catatonic withdrawal from consciousness, what DeLillo calls 
'Awareness of not being self-aware', implying the near total destruction of their 
subjectivity (p. 433). Nevertheless, the scientists fail to acknowledge this imputed 
kinship with mysticism. Confronted by the injunction of the dervish's spokesman that 
God's name remain unspoken, they form 'a nearly general exodus', in protest at such 
unscientific credulity (p. 106). The comical disjunction between the scientists' covert 
wish for transcendence and their horrified rejection of actual mysticism emphasises 
that the preference for left brain thought arises from the apparent freedom it offers 
from the body and death, subjects that are never absent from mysticism. As Cyril 
remarks pertinently, early in the novel, 'Mysticism's point of departure is awareness 
of death', which 'doesn't occur to science except as the ultimate horrifying vision of 
objective enquiry' (p. 36). 
The result of their flight from physicality is a tortured dualism that creates 
what, in his analysis of schizophrenia, R. D. Laing terms a 'disembodied self (p. 69). 
(p. 304). 
106 
Laing's concern with the consequences of the psychical neglect of physicality is in 
sympathy with the concerns of much of DeLillo's work, which presents numerous 
disorientated characters, in desperate retreat from the body. Laing's fame in America 
increased appreciably at the beginning of DeLillo's writing career and DeLillo would 
almost certainly have been exposed to Laing's theories. When DeLillo was 
completing his first novel in 1970, for example, Laing undertook a 'coast to coast' 
tour of the U. S. The event was sufficiently high profile that he appeared on television 
in DeLillo's home town of New York, in conversation with Norman Mailer, and 
received requests for interviews from Penthouse, Reader's Digest, and the Times. 
20 
In The Divided 5elf, Laing argues vigorously that the etiology of schizophrenic 
psychosis is not traceable to repressed matter, but, rather, to a conscious sense of 
sontological insecurity' (p. 39). Like many of DeLillo's scientists, these psychotics 
regard their being as 'primarily split into a mind and a body' and envisage selfhood as 
consisting almost entirely of mind; or, as Laing puts it, 'they most closely identified 
with the "mind... (p. 65). In the case of Rob, DeLillo symbolises outright rejection of 
the somatic by his body being 'child-sized' (p. 26 1) and his head 'disproportionately 
large' (p. 262). Others, like Evinrude, convince themselves of their body's uselessness 
and attempt to disregard it (p. 236). Their flight from physicality in order to avoid 
death is what Laing would call the 'denial of being as a means of preserving being', 
which he believes typical of psychosis (p. 150). Given that the scientists have gained 
'Awareness of not being self-aware', this type of ontological contradiction seems both 
apposite and credible (Ratner's, p. 433). According to Laing, the 'disembodied self 
'becomes hyper-conscious'; a phrase that captures the febrile intellectual activity and 
relentlessly abstract thought these academics pursue (Laing, p. 69). Laing also remarks 
20 Richard I. Evans, Dialogue with R. D. Laing (New York: Praeger, 199 1), p. xxviii, p. xxxiii. 
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that this type of Schizophrenic ceases to perceive their body as the 'core' of their 
'own being' and sees it as only 'one object among other objects in the world' (P. 65). 
This, in turn, creates the same separation of mind and world that Berman sees in 
contemporary scientism. It leads to the creation of a so-called 'false-self system', 
which the patient projects, while nursing what Laing calls a 'shut-up self that is 
'unable to be enriched by outer experience', 'until the individual may come to feel he 
is merely a vacuum' (p. 75). In 'Adventures', DeLillo portrays numerous scientists, 
with a similarly vacuous nature, who present such a Laingian 'false-self to the world. 
Laing describes this 'false-self as 'an amalgam of various part-selves', which 
includes 'compulsive actions of every kind', an apt description of DeLillo's gallery of 
neurotic caricatures (p. 73). The negligible information DeLillo provides about each, 
their uniformly waspish wit and lush eccentricities, added to the speed with which 
they appear and depart the text, contribute to a sense that they are devoid of content 
and virtually interchangeable. 
The novel contains numerous references to the creation of false selves and, 
increasingly, the recognition that, beyond these factitious masks, there may subsist an 
embryonic subjectivity that exceeds mere intellect. In 'Reflections', moments of such 
understanding increase in frequency and the alienated ciphers of 'Adventures' are 
either abandoned or begin to explore beyond their stunted, disembodied selves. But, 
in Part One, DeLillo focuses on the artificial forms of selthood that populate the 
novel. He shows that even Billy and Endor have sought energetically to split mind 
from body and create false selves designed to afford them immortality. Significantly, 
the scientist and mystic Ratner tells Billy that he 'reminds' him of a 'A golem' or 
'artificial person', which, according to 'secret manuscripts', may be manufactured 
from earth and water, provided that the Kabbalistic name of God or YHVH is recited 
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over the mixture (pp. 225-26). In light of Laing's theory, Ratner's reaction is 
unsurprising. Billy's terror of organic matter may impel him to seek to become an 
'artificial person', forging a 'disembodied self and creating an attendant 'false-self 
system'. Indeed, DeLillo often draws particular attention to Billy's phobic reaction to 
the body. In the first chapter, Billy hesitates to use an air plane toilet, on the basis of 
an unwarranted suspicion that an 'elderly woman' may have 'left behind some 
unnamable horror, the result of a runaway gland. Old people's shitpiss' (P. 6-7). 
DeLillo also remarks dryly that Billy 'often occupied himself with thoughts of rot. His 
own death, wake and burial were recurrent themes. Of secondary interest was the 
putrefaction of his immediate family' (p. 37). Such visceral preoccupations may also 
prompt Billy's interest in the cognitivist model of the mind as an information- 
processing machine, his thoughts on which may extend to fantasies of fusing his mind 
with a computer, thus creating the ultimate 'false-self system'. Cognitivist theories of 
mind are often criticised for their exclusion of the somatic. Roger Penrose, among 
others, has alluded to the dualism that they imply. 21 Similarly, Elizabeth A. Wilson 
has suggested that 'cognition is the projection of the masculine desire to be free of the 
body'. 22 Driven by fantasies of escaping the 'rot' and 'shitpiss' of the human 
condition, this disembodiment is likely to attract Billy to this theory of consciousness. 
Certainly, several episodes testify to the close attention that he pays the notion of 
computational 'thought'. He betrays his preoccupation with the union of mind and 
computer early on, when, unprompted, he relates to LoQuadro a movie plot, in which 
a computer that 'dreams' is opened to reveal 'little pieces of baby human brain tissue 
grafted onto the circuits' (p. 77). One also notes his exceptional ability in arithmetic, 
21 Roger Penrose, Shadows of the Mind (London: Vintage, 1995), p. 396. 
22 Elizabeth A. Wilson, 'Loving the Computer: Cognition, Embodiment and the Influencing Machine', 
in The Body and Psychology ed. by Henderikus J. Stam (London: Sage Publications, 1998), p. 79. 
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as well as Edna Lown's remark that there is 'a strong computational strain running 
through' his work, facts that evidence a latent willingness in Billy to think like a 
machine (p. 285). Tellingly, when Rob suggests he have a 'Leduc electrode' inserted 
into his brain and fuse his mind with the vast 'Space Brain' computer, Billy hints at 
previous interest in the possibility, admitting it 'Sounds familiar, talk of this 
combination' (p. 244). His indecision may even indicate a temptation to accede to the 
plan, in the light of which his protestation that 'I don't know how I let it get this far' 
rings hollow (p. 246). Billy's notion of eradicating his human mind may be interpreted 
as the ultimate logic of objectivism: that subjective consciousness be utterly 
destroyed. If, as Berman claims, modem science treats nature as dead matter, it is only 
logical that it learns to regard mind with the same scepticism, or even contempt. As 
Berman explains, this tendency is exacerbated by the always bewilderingly prolix task 
of analysing the mind. The failure to 'explain mind (or Mind)' leads directly to less 
respectful attempts to explain 'it away'. Consequently, as has occurred throughout the 
postmodern era in which DeLillo has written, theories proliferate that seek, either 
explicitly or implicitly, to question 'The reality of Mind' (p. 237). 
In his latter guise of earth-dwelling hermit, Endor provides an early exemplar 
of the deleterious effects of the factitious, apotropaic self that Laing describes. 
Endor's false, disembodied self robs him of a stable sense of reality and leaves him 
desperate to re-establish contact with the physical. After years of scientific research, 
Endor's desire to credit his perceptions is such that he denies all of modem science. 
Pathetically, he claims that 'It's the sun that moves around the earth'. 'It moves. We 
see it. I'm tired of denying such evidence' (p. 87). Laing asserts of the false, 
disembodied self that 'Losing the conditional, it loses its identity; losing reality, it 
loses its possibility of exercising effective freedom of choice in the world' (p. 142). By 
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choosing an irrational viewpoint, Endor reclaims, perversely, this 'freedom of choice', 
lost through separation from the 'conditional' of physicality (P. 142). Endor explains 
his extremism to Billy, by complaining that scientists 'don't extend the senses to 
probe microbe and universe. We deny the senses. We deny the evidence of our senses. 
A lifetime of such denial is what sends people into larva-eating rages' (p. 87). By 
accepting sensory data uncritically, he rejects science's tendency to seek meaning 
'within' or 'behind' phenomena, which he implies is motivated by fear of the organic. 
As so often in DeLillo, flight from physicality is metonymic of death-anxiety. 
Laing's definition of psychosis as the 'denial of being as a means of preserving bging' 
is thus appropriate to the bewilderment of Endor's colleagues, who flee the somatic to 
evade thoughts of mortality (p. 15 0). Endor's self-interment is only one example of the 
imitation of death practised throughout Ratner's Star to preserve psychological 
equilibrium. Endor's subterranean refuge prefigures that of Rob, who, after 
discovering the non-existence of the Ratnerians, chooses burial, rather than 
confronting the failure of 'logical rigour' to interpret the radio signal (p. 272). 
Questioning such logic would entail revivifying the 'shut-up self' he has long ignored; 
by now, as Laing writes of psychotic patients, he has become 'afraid not to be dead 
and lifeless' (p. 113). Having gained 'the kind of dismal insight that caused twinges of 
professional shame', Rob seeks the hole's womb-like comfort to avoid the painful 
process of enlarging his subjectivity (LRatner's, p. 435). Even the journalist, Jean 
Venable, a mere visitor to the think tank, is a victim of this double bind. Ludicrously, 
Jean tells Billy she 'loved pretending to be dead' to amuse her husband and admits the 
tactic was intended to preserve a state of 'being', since she hoped such morbid 
gaming might shore up her marriage: 'When he'd lean over me for a really close look, 
I'd jump up screaming. That would keep our marriage going for another week' 
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(p. 3 15). Like the scientists who seek 'non-existence', Jean refers wistfully to the 'pain 
of being self-aware', hinting that these ludic episodes may be rooted in a genuine 
death wish (p. 396). 
'Reflections' examines a more reasoned case than Endor's for rejecting 
science's claims to absolute truth. Several characters gain a seemingly neo-Kantian 
awareness of the limitations of scientific enquiry, or what Little calls 'the Western 
empirical method' (Little, p. 3 04). In 'Reflections', this awareness of the intellect's 
natural reflexivity creates a gradual expansion of these characters' sense of self. In 
Critique of Pure Reason, Kant states that 'All our intuition is nothing but the 
presentation of appearance. The things that we intuit are not in themselves what we 
intuit them as being'. 23 Thus Kant's transcendental aesthetic, with its notion of the 
inaccessible 'thing in itself (p. 99), sets an apparently indissoluble limit to the 
aspirations of the 'Western empirical method'. Similarly, Billy remarks that 
'mathematics' did not 'grow against' the real objects of 'nature', 'but imagination', a 
manifestly Kantian insight in its suggestion that intellectual systems have no 
verifiable link to the world beyond mind (p. 80). LoQuadro seconds this view, 
questioning the notion of intellectual progress and the evolutionary model of history, 
remarking that science 'curls into itself and bends back and then thrusts outward in a 
new direction. It refuses to be contained' (p. 65). In philosophy of mathematics, 
LoQuadro's Kantian exposition makes him an intuitionist, which entails the belief that 
'mathematical reality' 'remains to be determined through our mathematical activity' 
(George, p. 96). The difficulty with this Kantian intuitionist disconnection of mind and 
world is that it lacks a guarantee of the mind's sanity. If consciousness has no bearing 
23 Immanuel Kant. Critigue of Pure Reason, trans. by Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett 
Publishing, 1996), p. 94. 
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on reality, how can one distinguish fact from illusion, or madness from genius? The 
transcendental subject of Kantian philosophy is uncomfortably close to the psychotic 
self which, in Laing's words, is 'transcendent, empty, omnipotent, free, in its own 
way' but 'comes to be anybody in phantasy, and nobody in reality', while, in object 
relations, it is condemned to be 'related primarily to objects of its own fantasies' 
(p. 142). The implication is that the mathematician, working steadily to determine this 
intuitionist 'mathematical reality', always verges on becoming Laing's psychotic 
'split' self. Nevertheless, DeLillo suggests that awareness of this intellectual 
reflexivity can counteract any tendency to self-annihilation, or to being 'nobody in 
reality' (p. 142). In 'Reflections', those who continue in their objectivist dogmatic 
slumbers remain subject to psychotic alienation, while more self-critical scientists use 
recognisably Kantian insights to deconstruct their fallacious selves. Maurice Wu 
exemplifies this realisation of a larger, undiscovered ontology. He recognises Kant's 
point that the mind cannot penetrate 'the intrinsic character belonging to the object in 
itself (Kant, p. 99), through an analogy with the 'echolocation' that bats employ for 
navigation; an insight that DeLillo suggests causes Wu to see science as absurd. The 
bats around Wu locate their position relative to surrounding objects by sending out 
'ultrasonic frequencies' and tracing the angle of their reverberation (p. 395). After 
'pondering the reflecting mechanism of this kind of navigation', and, by implication, 
making the connection between 'echolocation' and the reflexivity of scientific study, 
Wu 'sat laughing into the night' (p. 395). 
Wu's insight leads to a model of self that extends beyond ratiocination. In 
these passages, DeLillo conveys this expansion of subjectivity formally by omitting 
any indication of where Jean's thoughts end and Wu's begin. The reader must infer 
from the context which is being described, creating a blurring or fusion of characters 
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in the reader's mind, which implies that mind and self may be larger entities than their 
instantiations in individual beings. The possibility recalls LoQuadro's view that the 
centre exists to create 'a single planetary mind' and causes the remark to haunt the 
novel as a quasi-mystical possibility, susceptible to neither confirmation nor denial 
(p. 65). In Wu's case, DeLillo emphasises that the fact that the 'environmental 
demands of the cave were few' creates propitious conditions for effecting radical 
inward change, offering him the ideal opportunity to 'remake himself (p. 3 8 1). Wu 
approaches this task through meditative experience of the mind, a process that, in The 
Politics of Experience, Laing calls the exploration of 'the inner space and time of 
consciousness' and which he recommends for the treatment of alienation and 
psychosis. 24 DeLillo presents this reformation in the same esoteric language of 
meditation that the narrators of his earlier novels sometimes adopt, suggesting that 
Wu's desire to transform himself arises from a similar need for a subjectivity that he 
can recognise and value. The emptiness of the cave means that Wu perceives 'the 
smallest irregularities in the silence and semidarkness with brilliant quickness and 
clarity' (p. 381). He is therefore able to 'build within himself a separate presence, 
something unremembered, a receptive mentality' that frees him from his 'Wu- 
experienced causal reality' (p. 381). 
In Part Two, Billy also explores unfamiliar areas of subjectivity and 
appreciates that his objectivist epistemology neither provides a complete model of 
mind, nor creates a satisfactory sense of self. Consequently, he examines more 
intuitive modes of thought, which assist him with the riddle of 'Ratner's Star', at the 
centre of the novel. Early in the text, Billy expects mathematics to create a vision of 
24 R. D. Laing, The Politics of Experience and The Bird of Paradise (London: Harmondsworth, 1967), 
p. 105. 
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his mind, which is coextensive with his identity. In his words, 'The work's ultimate 
value was simply what it revealed about the nature of his intellect. What was at stake, 
in effect was his own principle of intelligence or individual consciousness; his 
identity, in short' (p. 117). Towards the end of 'Adventures', however, Billy sees the 
limitations of this logically created self, especially its inability to explain his 
creativity, the spark of inspiration he contributes to otherwise computational 
intellectual processes. DeLillo explains that 'Because his work's natural tendency was 
to provide a model of his own mind, of himself as a distinct individual, he was 
puzzled by the lack of an adequate vocabulary for mathematical invention, by his 
inability to understand what made his mathematics happen' (P. 238). DeLillo 
emphasises that invention relies on subjective, meditative states of mind that the 
objectivism of the 'Field Experiment' disallows. Significantly, Jean Venable quotes 
Henri Poincare's assertion that he received creative inspiration in 'sudden flashes' 
(p. 297). Similarly, prior to solving mathematical problems, Billy is inert and 
withdrawn, exhibiting a lack of 'voluntary motion' and 'coherent speech' (pp. 237-8). 
In this near senseless state, Billy realises that the 'Ratnerian' code is structured 
according to 'Notation by sixty' (p. 239). DeLillo rather wryly indicates the epic 
quality Billy attributes to this insight, his sense that he witnesses the idea 'unerase 
itself, most evident of notions', while remaining 'oblivious to everything but one 
emerging thought' (p. 23 8). The literature on mathematical invention often describes 
what Jacques Hadamard calls the 'spontaneous and almost involuntary creation' 
reported by many mathematicians. 25 The notion of creation being preceded by 
physical lethargy also figures in Hadamard's work, which notes the extreme 'fatigue' 
25 Jacques Hadamard, An Essay on the Psychology of Invention in the Mathematical Field (London: 
Dover, 1954), p. 18. 
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that can give rise to creativity, as well as the catalysing effect of 'unconscious ideas' 
(p. 34). This resemblance to Hadamard may be coincidental, but DeLillo's admission 
that, in writing Ratner's Star, he aimed to 'immerse' himself in mathematical 
literature, these details may bear the influence of the French scholar C, ýLnything, p. 85). 
The possibility is supported by a reference to what Hadamard calls the 'special 
"bump" on the head', which the phrenologist 'Gall' believed indicated mathematical 
ability (p. 3). When Cheops Feeley touches Billy's head, he exclaims 'The 
mathematician's bump'. 'You've got it all right' (p. 243). Like Hadamard, Thomas S. 
Kuhn cmphasises the 'individual skill, wit, or genius' needed 'to recognize' an 
anomalous test result as a creative discovery (p. 173). 26 Notably, in the context of the 
novel's concern with the importance of unified consciousness, Kuhn also insists on 
the necessity for a tension between 'convergent', or conformist, thought and more 
'divergent', original thinking (p. 226). Billy's own intellect develops from purely 
convergent objectivism, to a more divergent approach, which allows him to depart 
from stereotyped cognitive patterns, exploring intuitive and unconscious sources of 
invention and directly contradicting Rob's view that 'The slightest intuitive content 
has to be eliminated from our finished work' (p. 272). 
Billy's quest for a vocabulary to articulate or explain 'invention' leads him to 
speculate that creativity emerges from unexplored regions of subjectivity, which he 
calls 'the unknown self' (p. 237). Although Billy initially fears this 'self, his 
exasperation at Rob's insistence on communicating with the Ratnerians through a 
'logistic cosmic language that is based on mathematical principles' demonstrates his 
understanding of the limitations of objectivist epistemology (p. 273). After Rob 
26 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Essential Tension: Selected Tradition in Scientific Tradition and Change 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), p. 173. 
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dismisses his discovery of the Ratnerians' use of 'notation by sixty', Billy replies 
wearily 'Let's have the gory details' and, two paragraphs later, 'I think I feel sick' 
(p. 272). As Rob's Logicon project progresses, Billy shows telling signs of 
psychological strain and imitates Endor, by seeking an enclosed space in which to 
hide, building a 'canvas roof over his cubicle and becoming 'the enclosed area's 
concealed zone's secluded figure'. In seclusion, Billy replicates Endor's attempts to 
reconnect with the body. Like Gary, in End Zone, Billy endures a fever that 
symbolises his rapprochement with organic matter. In this context, the fever has the 
advantage of leaving him 'luxuriating in the unprecedented smell of his sweat' and 
causing him to enjoy the 'pleasantly disgusting' sight of 'watching his own spit hit the 
dust' (p. 363). Like Endor, Billy appreciates that alienation from the somatic leads to a 
'false-self system' he must now deconstruct (Laing, p. 73). In an enigmatic fragment 
entitled 'I AM NOT JUST THIS', which is apparently written in the first person by 
Billy and which explores the protagonist's shifting awareness of his subjectivity, Billy 
contends that 'I am different from this. I am not just this but more', 'Just outside my 
reach there is something else that belongs to the rest of me' (P. 370). Having dispensed 
with his disembodied, hyper-conscious self, which, in Laingian terms, is 'by its 
detachment precluded from a full experience of realness and aliveness', Billy is ready 
to embrace new definitions of selfhood (Laing, p. 82). He is in search of what Laing 
calls 'identity'. As Laing puts it, 'An "I" has not ceased to exist', but 'it lacks the 
quality of realness, and it has no identity, it has no "me" to go with it' (p. 172). Like 
the protagonists of DeLillo's two previous novels, Billy acknowledges the reality of 
experience that remains impervious to representation. Yet, Billy's difficulty lies not in 
the relation of mind to language, but in discovering parts of selfhood beyond rational 
thought. In the absence of encouragement from his mentors, he explores these alone, 
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undertaking what Laing would call aj ourney into 'inner space and time' (Pglitics, 
p. 105). Accordingly, the section ends with the assertion that 'There is something in 
the space between what I know and what I am and what fills this space is what I know 
there are no words for' (p. 370). 
Although Little is right to insist that DeLillo offers no 'unironized' route to the 
sacred, the parallel between Billy's 'unknown self and the Kabbalistic notion of the 
sen-sof or 'hidden god' that DeLillo explores in the text suggests that this 'unknown 
self may contain a divine element. Like Pythagorean mathematics, Kabbalism 
reminds Billy of the mythical and mystical properties sometimes attributed to 
numbers. As the Hebrew scholar Gershom Scholem remarks, in Kabbalistic doctrine, 
'the ten primordial numbers are called Sefiroth', or emanations of God, and are each 
'associated with a particular category of creation'. 27 When the distinguished scientist 
and Kabbalist Ratner visits the think tank, he proposes the creationist hypothesis that 
this hidden divinity, or 'en-sof , contracted to make room for the 'point of pure energy 
that created the universe' (p. 217). In spite of the apparently bizarre nature of this 
belief, DeLillo presents at least its judicious consideration as essential to Billy's task 
of unifying the hemispheres. When Ratner realises Billy is omitting the mystical 
elements of his speech, he tells him to 'Give the whole picture' and 'repeat both sides' 
(p. 220), an inclusive philosophy which, when he accepts it, causes Billy to augment 
his selfhood immeasurably. Although tentative and exploratory, this shift in Billy's 
subjectivity feeds back productively into intellectual activity. It immediately prompts 
the crucial intuition that he should seek Endor's old room, where he happens upon the 
stopped clock that provides the clue to the mysterious radio message. The clock's 
27 Gershom Scholem, The Origins of the Kabbalah, ed. by R. I. Zwi Werblowsky and trans. by Allan 
Arkush (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 26-27. 
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paralysis alerts Billy to the 'Ratnerians" attempt to communicate the time of a total 
eclipse of the sun: 'Fourteen hours, twenty-eight minutes, fifty-seven seconds' 
(pp. 384-5). 
DeLillo also portrays the scientist Edna Lown's dismantling of her own 'false- 
self system; her appreciation that 'It was a mistake really, what she'd always taken 
her life to be. That was someone else's life' (Ratner's, p. 426). As with Billy, 
realisation comes via recognition of the severe limits of the rational intellect. Where 
once she enjoyed work 'shaved of the dangers of intuitive reckoning' (p. 329), she 
now perceives this approach as self-destructive. When reflecting on her past evasions 
of full subjectivity, she exclaims, in astonishment, 'To barely know the person not 
known to those who know me. To be in this sense a witness to my own adventure'. In 
Edna's case, it is partly through meditation on language that her selfhood is enlarged. 
She compiles notes on the subject, which she calls 'devices of the punchy brain inside 
her' (p. 426). Like Bucky, in Great Jones Street, she affirms the ontological status of 
illiterate, or even infant, consciousness, claiming of Geometry, for example, that 'The 
child knows these things before it knows words' (p. 366). She goes further than Bucky 
in her theorisation of babbling, broaching the possibility that infantile speech contains 
the codes to language and forms a sophisticated 'meta-language' on speech (p. 365). 
Appropriately, then, Edna concludes one section of notes, by implying that the 
ineffable parts of the mind deserve as much analysis as the more articulate. DeLillo 
wittily has her parody Wittgenstein, in her assertion that 'This leaves unexamined 
what has remained unsaid', a remark that affirms the substance of mind and self, 
regardless of language or objective analysis (p. 383). 
Although Rob Softly experiences similar intuitions of a larger ontology, he 
flees from them. Like Billy, he felt that 'there was something between or beyond, 
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something he couldn't account for between himself and the idea of himself. Rob 
distinguishes between his notion of self as pure mentation, which DeLillo calls the 
snegative mental invention', and a larger experience of selfhood that is 'inexpressible' 
and 'had the effect of imposing a silence'. Because he fears this train of thought 'That 
was as far as his thinking went on the subject. There was nowhere else for it to go, he 
believed' (p. 361). Rob's distaste for the somatic condemns him to maintain his false, 
bodiless self. Soon after these musings, we learn that 'Softly had never set eyes on his 
own semen' (p. 367). More telling is that these anxious ontological speculations are 
catalysed by thoughts of 'Death', which he would normally shun. Although, with 
characteristic objectivity, he dismisses mortality as a 'logical conclusion', he 
concludes these speculations with evident relief that enables him to feel 'better about 
the site he'd chosen for his life and thought' (p. 361). Rob's psychological 
disintegration dominates the novel's final pages and can be traced to this failure to 
deconstruct his false self. The solar eclipse confirms Billy's intuitions and renders 
obsolete Rob's purely rational model of self. Rob's wish to 'hide himself more 
fundamentally than was possible in the antrum' is caused by shame at the obvious 
limitations of his consciousness, as well as anguish at his failure to solve the code 
(p. 43 5). With its talk of the scientific quest for 'painlesss nonexistence', DeLillo's 
long peroration, which precedes Rob's disappearance, prefigures and explains his 
reluctance to reject his fragile, artificial model of consciousness. In his stubborn wish 
for interment, Rob resembles the Laingian schizophrenic, who, as Laing suggests, 
&really wants to be dead and hidden in a place where nothing can touch him and drag 
him back' (p. 167). To achieve this, he crawls far enough underground to enter 'the 
hole's hole' (p. 437), aiming, in Laing's terms, 'to be nothing, to be nobody' (Laing, 
p. 153). 
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The novel's conclusion involves a figurative eruption of past, ancient time into 
the approximately contemporaneous moment of the text. History, according to the 
Ratnerians, is not a pattern of linear evolution, but cyclical, with peaks of civilisation 
separated by vast troughs of decadent nullity. Given the somewhat phenomenological 
struggle of many DeLillo characters to articulate subjective human experience, it is 
notable that DeLillo's treatment of time is strikingly close to that of Martin 
Heidegger. The emergence of past time, with the solar eclipse, is very much like the 
'Bringing forth' into 'unconcealment' Heidegger envisages as the process by which 
technological inventions, with their roots in the Scientific Revolution of the 
Renaissance, have burst 'into bloom' in modernity. 28 Billy's relation to death is also 
closely comparable with that of the Heideggerian subject. In Being and Time, 
Heidegger asserts that 'Anticipatory resoluteness' towards death has the effect of 
unifying past and future for Dasein, allowing it to 'come toward itself futurally in 
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such a way that it comes back'. Similarly, Billy's 'resolute' overcoming of anxiety 
concerning physicality and death directly precedes his intuitive solving of the code 
and provokes the eruption of ancient time into postmodernity. 
The mood of the conclusion is balanced between dramatic culmination and the 
fears of incipient enervation that solar eclipses traditionally arouse. This implicit 
tension is heightened by the realisation that contemporary civilization may not be 
destined to expand and evolve but, rather, to decline and vanish like that of the 
notional 'Ratnerians'. For Rob, this is a fearful prospect, arousing the quasi-primitive 
'need to chew the fleshy leaves of aloe plants' (p. 435). To communicate Rob's 
28 Martin Heidegger, The Question of Technology and other Essays, trans. by William W. Lovitt (New 
York: Harper Torchbooks, 1997), p. 11. 
29 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2000), pp. 372-73. 
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intense fear in these seemingly irrational circumstances, DeLillo uses free indirect 
style for the first time in relation to this character, remarking that 'Something here 
made no sense' and referring to the encroaching 'deviant night of total solar eclipse' 
(p. 433). The prose style also becomes more elliptical than that hitherto employed to 
depict Rob. Noun phrases are combined without connectives or resolution, for 
example, 'a sense of violated space, the air itself fused with this infrared surprise', to 
suggest the utterly unfamiliar and terrifying uncertainty the think tank leader 
experiences, as he attempts to understand this astonishing event (p. 436). DeLillo 
emphasises Rob's unease at the unification of consciousness implied in these events, 
as well as their near mystical implications, which are apparent in 'a sense of 
interlocking opposites. The paradox, the comedy, the fool's rule of total radiance' 
(p. 43 8). Meanwhile, DeLillo presents 'a boy' in 'jacket and tie', unnamed but likely 
to be Billy, 'madly pedalling' a tricycle (p. 438) and, hence, returning symbolically to 
the childhood or 'wild child's dream', of which his obsessive intellectual life has so 
far deprived him (p. 195). In the final lines, the focus returns to this adolescent figure 
and ends, rather pessimistically, with a familiar trope in DeLillo's work, the American 
alienated from his interior experience, engaging in quasi-behaviourist self-analysis. 
He rings the tricycle bell, but hears nothing, 'producing as he was this noise 
resembling laughter, expressing vocally what appeared to be a compelling emotion'. 
If the child is Billy, the disjunction between inner and outer experience in this last 
paragraph does not seem consonant with the ontological insights he has gained. 
DeLillo may therefore be suggesting that Billy cannot sustain his new understanding, 
when confronted by the shock of the eclipse, which causes him to emit 'involuntary 
shrieks'. Whatever the child's identity, however, its behaviourism emphasises the 
alienation scientism has brought many characters in Ratner's Star, while the 
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'reproductive dust of existence' 'bouncing in the air around him' is a luminous 
symbol of the fertile physical world from which they have withdrawn (p. 438). 
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Chapter Fou 
'Players' and 'Running Dolf: Mind as Machine 
In the Menippean satire of Ratner's Star (1976), DeLillo examines the severe 
ontological restrictions that result when the rational mind is treated as the sole 
component of subjectivity. 1 Among the 'false-self systems DeLillo describes is the 
hypothetical one Billy considers forming by a fusion of mind and digital computer, 
but rejects, before exploring ideas of selfhood that are not restricted to intellect. 
DeLillo's subsequent two novels, Players (1977) and Running Dog (1978), elaborate 
upon the possibilities of this relationship between human and computer cognition and 
explore the possible consequences of the fusion that Billy reftises. 2 In these novels, 
DeLillo portrays characters that welcome the extreme mental restrictions of an arid, 
unyielding mode of thought, which appears modelled on the action of the computers 
and other technologies with which they work. The last decade has witnessed a steady 
flow of literary novels exploring the question of Artificial Intelligence. Richard 
Powers' Galatea 2.2 (1995) imagines the construction of a computer called 'Helen', 
designed to emulate human thought, but which recognises its inability to emote and 
opts to 'Shut herself down'. 3 David Lodge's more recent Thinks (2001) is 
comparable, both in its campus location and portrayal of a protagonist, Ralph 
Messenger, who aspires to create genuine computational intelligence. 4 Although 
authors of the 1960s and 1970s took considerable interest in the nature of 
consciousness, they produced few literary treatments of Artificial Intelligence. Joseph 
1 Don DeLillo, Ratner's Star (London: Vintage, 1991) 
2 Don DeLiflo, Players (London: Vintage, 1991) and Running Dog (London: Vintage, 1992) 
3 Richard Powers, Galatea 2.2 (New York: Harper Collins, 1995), p. 326. 
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McElroy's novel Plus provides an astonishingly detailed phenomenological account 
of a mind's formation and growth in controlled conditions, but its interests do not 
extend to the wholly man made. 5 Of DeLillo's contemporaries, only Thomas 
Pynchon, who, in his first novel V (1963), repeatedly implies that the postmodern 
world has, disastrously, taken robotic thought as its model, appears to have been 
drawn to the relation between mind and machine. 6 Like Pynchon, DeLillo portrays a 
world 'run more and more fond of the inanimate' (p. 290). In doing so, he pursues his 
perennial interest in the relationship between postmodern epistemologies and the 
ontological conditions they create. Yet, if some of his characters become what Donna 
J. Haraway would call a 'hybrid of machine and organism', DeLillo does not see in 
this transformation the potential for the ontological emancipation that Haraway insists 
upon, in her influential Simians, Cyborg and Women. 7 Haraway speculates that the 
cyborg may be the 'telos of the "West's" escalating dominations of abstract 
individuation, an ultimate self untied at last from all dependency, a man in space' 
(pp. 150-5 1). On the contrary, DeLillo suggests the reduction of mind to calculation, a 
balance of input and outputs, produces less a self than an anti-self, a sterile negation 
of human ontology stripped of emotion, autonomy, or creativity and profoundly 
alienated from the body. The contrast between Haraway's idealised view and 
DeLillo's grim portrait is cruelly surnmarised by a scene from Players, in which the 
Stock Exchange employee Lyle Wynant yearns for a drink that is transcendently 
'outer-space-like', only to receive a cocktail, aptly named the 'zombie' (p. 72). 
4 David Lodge, Thinks (London: Penguin, 200 1) 
5 Joseph McElroy, Plus (New York: Carroll and Graf Publications, 1987) 
6 Thomas Pynchon, V (London: Picador, 1978) 
7 Donna J. Haraway, Simians. Cyborjzs. and Women: the Reinvention of Nature (London: Free 
Association Books, 199 1), p. 149. 
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Critics have observed what David Cowart calls the 'dislocation of 
consciousness' in Players, but have had difficulty explaining the nature of this 
8 displacement. Several have followed Tom LeClair in accepting that the novel's 
conceptual scheme is divided between the abstractions of high finance and what he 
calls the 'human body as organism', 'fearing its own death, repressing its own 
physical complexity'. 9 Although the characters are indeed haunted by death-anxiety, 
this view neglects the absolute abstraction and complete freedom from concrete 
reality, somatic and economic, that DeLillo's characters aim to discover in a 
computational mindset. For DeLillo, this desire to think 'like' a computer entails 
something like the insular epistemology John R. Searle believes is characteristic of 
computation, in which signifiers act as isolated counters that refer to neither referent 
nor signified. 10 In Searle's view, the computer merely manipulates such symbols 
without appreciating their meaning or the fact that its programmer takes them to 
'refer' to objects in the world. Cowart notes DeLillo's tendency to foreground 
signifier over signified and referent in Players, but concludes that DeLillo views 
postmodern Manhattan as a mere 'play of simulacra' (p. 5 1). Cowart's Baudrillardian 
view implies a lack of any original reality. Yet, DeLillo's characters are acutely 
conscious of physical reality, but find it threatening and distasteful and seek to limit 
contact with it, by stripping language of its referential function. The protagonists' 
identification with the computer is therefore exemplary of Curtis Yehnert's remark 
that DeLillo's characters are not alienated by the technologies in their environment 
8 David Cowart, The Physics of Language (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2002), p. 52. 
9 Tom LeClair, In The Loop: Don DeLillo and the Systems Novel (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois 
Press, 1987), p. 147. 
10 John R. Searle, 'Minds, Brains, Programs', in The Mind's 1: Fantasies and Reflections on Self and 
Soul composed and arranged by Douglas R. Hofstadter and Daniel C. Dennett (Frome, Somerset: 
Penguin, 1981), pp. 353-73 (p. 371). 
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but, rather, seek to use 'their mediated environment to flee their own inwardness'. 11 
As we will see, their attempts to replace this 'inwardness' with emotionless, machine- 
like formalism result in severe mental and emotional enervation. 
DeLillo himself has remarked on the mental and emotional restrictions these 
characters embrace. When discussing 'games' in his fiction, he points out that 'In 
Players, the rules become almost metaphysical. They involve inner restrictions. 
Tbere's some of that in Running Dog as well'. 12 DeLillo implies that there is a ludic 
element to New York's financial district, where Players is set, calling it 'a test 
environment for extreme states of mind', an opportunity for experiment of which Lyle 
and Pammy Wynant, the protagonists and 'players' of the title, take full advantage 
(p. 27). The unpleasant ontological consequences of the epistemological 'games' in 
which they indulge confirms DeLillo's own observation that, in his fiction, the search 
for reassurance in the disciplined structure of games 'sometimes turns out to be a 
cruel delusion' (Anything, p. 8 1). The 'metaphysical' quality DeLillo attributes to the 
characters' 'inner restrictions' manifests in the near eschatological finality that attends 
their decisions. Having embraced the notion of mind as computer, Lyle cannot regain 
his human qualities. In the final scene, Lyle's human characteristics dissolve in a 
'blaze' of light that alludes ironically to notions of paradise. Lyle sheds 'capabilities 
and traits by the second', a dissolution that DeLillo calls a moment of 'luminous 
cleansing', which suggests his protagonist's self-destructive identification with 
technology is motivated by desire for a secular form of transcendence (p. 212). 
11 Curtis Yehnert, "'Like Some Endless Sky Waking Inside": Subjectivity in Don DeLillo', Critique: 
Studies in Contemporary Fiction 42 (2001), 357-66 (p. 359). 
12 Tom LeClair and Larry McCaffery, eds. AnZhing Can Ha22en: Interviews with Contempora 
American Novelists (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1983), p. 81. 
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By presenting characters that believe that their mind can become machine, 
DeLillo touches on the controversial question of the relative ontology of mind and 
computer. In particular, he raises two unresolved and inextricable issues: whether the 
mind is susceptible to electronic simulation and, if so, whether it is identical with or 
analogous to a machine. DeLillo's interests, at this time, have moved in parallel to 
those of mainstream philosophy. The late 1970s, when these novels were published, 
witnessed a considerable intensification in the philosophical discussion surrounding 
what John R. Searle has called 'Strong Al', or the belief that the computer will 
eventually simulate all functions of the human brain. 13 Daniel Dennett emerged at the 
forefront of those who support 'strong AF, asserting that human awareness is without 
function and that the computer, which lacks such awareness, can therefore substitute 
adequately for it. 14 Dennett's faith in artificial intelligence thus relies strongly on the 
behaviourist exclusion of first-person experience, or what Searle calls the 'first-person 
ontology' of consciousness, which I argue DeLillo satirises in Americana. Dennett's 
use of behaviourist methodology to provide a foundation for 'strong AI' demonstrates 
the continuing influence of behaviourism in American philosophy and makes clear the 
underlying theoretical link between Americana. published in 1971, and the two novels 
presently under discussion. 
'Strong AI' has generated considerable and ongoing theoretical debate 
throughout postmodernity. Its opponents insist that emotion is crucial in producing 
characteristically human thought and is impossible to simulate mechanically. Roger 
Penrose, for example, has attempted to prove mathematically that human thought is 
13 John R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), p. 21. 
14 Daniel C. Dennett, Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psycholo (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1978a), p. 192. 
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trion-computational' and that, given the emotional content of their thought processes, 
human beings will remain capable of 'flashes of insight' unknown to computers. 
15 In 
Penrose's words, the work of a computer 'expresses nothing because the computer 
itself feels nothing' (p. 400). This emphasis on thought's emotional content recalls 
DeLillo's insistence on this quality of cognition in Ratner's Star. Indeed, Penrose's 
use of Poincard's phrase 'flashes of insight', which DeLillo employs in Ratner's Star 
to refer to the intuitive component in any mathematical discovery, indicates the 
similarity of their outlook. Emotion and the intuitive thought it promotes are again 
central to DeLillo's concerns in Players and Running Dog. In both novels, he suggests 
that the psychological retreat from the body implied by a computational model of 
consciousness helps destroy intuition and creative thought. This connection of the 
'computational' with mind-body dualism finds considerable support among theorists 
such as Elizabeth A. Wilson, who contends that thought, as imagined by cognitivism 
or 'Strong Al', 'is realized via the constraining and expulsion of flesh'. 
16 Searle, 
meanwhile, demonstrates convincingly that 'conceptual dualism' follows logically 
from the notion of mind as computer. For him, the analogy between brain and 
computer implies unavoidably that the mind 'runs programs'. This, in turn, suggests 
the clearly incorrect conclusion that the mind's 'programs' or 'thoughts' are separable 
from the physical 'stuff' of the brain and that mind might withdraw at will from the 
matter in which it is lodged (Rediscovery. p. 26). 
In the context of this retreat from physicality, it is notable that the novels' 
protagonists work for aggressively capitalist enterprises, whose habitual abstraction of 
15 Roger Penrose, Shadows of the Mind (London: Vintage, 1995), p. 205. 
16 Elizabeth A. Wilson, 'Loving the Computer: Cognition, Embodiment and the Influencing Machine' 
in The Body and PsychqLogy, ed. by Henderikus J. Starn (London: Sage Publications, 1998), pp. 71-93 
(p. 77). 
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exchange value from commodities and labour may convince them that emotion and 
the body can be similarly sublimated to pure information. Running Dog depicts a 
corrupt, profiteering wing of the U. S. intelligence service, while Players presents 
Stock Exchange employee Lyle Wynant and his wife Pammy, who works in the 
World Trade Centre for the austerely named 'Grief Management Council' (p. 18). A 
manic interior monologue makes clear Lyle's intense desire to replace the physical 
matter of mind and body with pure digital abstraction. When viewing an 'Attractive 
woman standing behind the bulletproof glass' at the Exchange, Lyle notes that 
'Numbers clicked onto the enunciator board', before declaiming inwardly 'Eat, eat. 
Shit, eat shit. Feed her to us in decimals' (p. 64). The surreal notion of cannibalising 
and excreting his colleague in digital form indicates Lyle's desire for a noetic level of 
physical and mental experience, which parallels the abstraction of exchange value 
from the use value of goods in the Stock Exchange. His preservation of 'teleprinter 
slips' 'for days', driven by the fantasy that they 'contained nerve impulses' seems 
metonymic of a wish to merge with the computer, especially given his pleasure at the 
'impression of reality disconnected from his own senses' that these documents offer 
him (p. 70). Lyle's fear of the somatic is exacerbated by the murder of his colleague, 
George Sedbauer, by the terrorists Lyle laterjoins (p. 28). But, DeLillo shows such 
wholesale rejection of the body to be an arduous task and suggests it provokes 
disturbing spectral returns of repressed matter. One particularly traumatic experience 
occurs after work in the business district. Lyle becomes acutely aware of his physical 
presence, perceiving himself to be 'present in Lhin s' and imagining the city 'never 
visited' 'and how buildings such as these would seem to hold untouchable matter, 
enormous codifications of organic decay' (p. 49). The timing of the revelation, only 
twenty-four hours before his first meeting with the terrorists' representative, 
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Rosemary, suggests the incident disturbs him sufficiently that it catalyses his 
defection. Like Marx's bourgeoisie, after attempting to transcend 'All that is solid', 
Lyle is presented with the opportunity to 'face with sober senses his real conditions of 
life'. 17 Yet, his death-anxiety is such that, rather than confront organic matter and 
face these 'real conditions', Lyle flees this unwelcome vision by deepening his 
identification with the computer and fabricating an alternative identity as a 
revolutionary. 
The ill-defined nature of his tasks distances Lyle further from concrete reality 
and prevents him, or the reader, perceiving coherent meaning in his work. It also 
emphasises his culture's failure to afford him a sense of belonging, what Heidegger 
calls the 'autochthony' or 'rootedness' that he believes is absent in industrialised 
postmodernity, and adds further credibility to Lyle's alienation and his decision to 
become a violent anti-capitalist. 18 As DeLillo remarks, Lyle's society leaves him 
'spiritually undernourished', which increases his susceptibility to the abstract, even 
noumenous, quality of computer systems and the superficial glamour of terrorism 
(Anythin rom being politically motivated, Lyle views criminality in g, p. 82). Far f 
terms of its potential to afford his mental experience greater abstraction. It is the 
logical extension of a computational model of consciousness and the psychological 
equivalent of his Spartan physical habits and sterile social life, which is driven by a 
'desire to compile' he and Pammy have long since lost (p. 15). The ennui and 
enervation that these children of postmodern capital suffer indicates that their drive 
towards abstraction quickly becomes dreary nihilism, bearing out Marshall Berman's 
view that, in capitalism, 'everything nonmarketable gets repressed or withers away for 
17 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (London: Penguin, 1988), p. 83. 
18 Martin Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking trans. by J. Anderson (New York: Harper and Row, 
1966), p. 49. 
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lack of use. 19 Lyle's treatment of his body provides a potent symbol of this drive 
towards transcendence. He keeps it ascetically 'devoid of excess' (p. 27) and, during 
sex with Pammy, treats it more or less as a machine, useful only in so far as it can 
'perform... and "'service... his wife (p. 35). 
Once Lyle adopts computational thought and flees the physical and emotional 
attachments that he despises, he loses any substantial sense of self In particular, he 
foregoes all autonomy, responding to the instructions of his commander Kinnear with 
a subservient 'Starting whenT (p. 159) and proving incapable of terminating a mission 
without specific instructions (p. 212). He claims he will 'pack and leave' after 
counting to a hundred, but counts again, first to 'fifty', then 'twenty-five', a numerical 
reduction metonymic of his diminishing capacities (p. 212). Lyle's disintegration is 
exacerbated by his disorientating role as an FBI double agent, an agency DeLillo 
presents as irredeemably brutal and lawless, in accordance with the testimony of 
former agents such as M. Wesley Swearingen, who asserts that 'corruption' 
'permeated' the Bureau. 20 Lyle's dual function debilitates him, inducing such 
helpless paranoia that he is driven to ask a fellow agent, 'Don't you have my phone 
plugged into the computer that runs the worldT (p. 15 3). Yet, his ambivalent and 
liminal position draws attention to the similarity between his terrorist colleagues' 
abstract, insubstantial model of self and the one frequently adopted by Exchange 
operatives. J. Kinnear is exculpated of blame for being a double agent because he is 
regarded as lacking substantial subjectivity. It is said of him that his 'disclosure of 
information' 'merely confirmed the material existence of the space he'd chosen to 
19 Marshall Berman, All That Is Solid Melts Into Air: The Experience of Modemily (New York: Free 
Association Books, 2003), p. 191. 
20 M. Wesley Swearingen, FBI Secrets: An Agents Exposg (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1995), p. 45. 
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occupy, the complex geography, points of confluence and danger' (p. 145). By 
reducing selfhood to such abstract ideation, the Marxist terrorists seek liberation from 
moral responsibility, but only reproduce the logic of the highly abstract system they 
oppose. This involuntary repetition bears out the difficulty that Fredric Jameson sees 
for anti-capitalist movements in transcending the pernicious 'philosophical and 
linguistic' abstractions of capitalist ideology, which are themselves 'a by-product of 
exchange' .21 In particular, he suggests that the 
'freedom' and 'equality' for which 
revolutionaries strive are the ideological products of capitalism and therefore 
unattainable. In Jameson's view, these notions 'cannot be realized' and, consequently, 
'The only thing that can happen to them is for the system that generates them to 
disappear, thereby abolishing the 'ideals' along with the reality itself (pp. 262-63). 
Parallel to this ontological enervation, Lyle constructs a second, secret self, 
which, like the computer, depends on instruction and remains detached from the 
world. In his first meetings with his clandestine revolutionary gang, we learn, Lyle 
finds that 'The pleasure here was inward-tending, an accumulation of self (p. 75). The 
search for a more discrete identity arises partly from anxiety that the fluid abstractions 
of the Exchange's financial system might dissolve the boundaries of selthood. He 
seems to sense that disruptive power of capitalism of which Marx speaks, when he 
declares that 'All fixed, fast-frozen relations' 'are swept away' (Manifesto, p. 83). 
Lyle worries paranoically that 'everyone knew his thoughts' and imagines 'the 
message in greenish cipher' on the electronic board might rapidly become 'the read- 
outs of Lyle Wynant' (p. 22). To render his new secret 'self impermeable, Lyle 
cultivates a quality of 'apartness' and 'self-command' (p. 72). Pammy is similarly 
21 Frederic Jameson, Postmodernism or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (London: Verso, 1993), 
p. 233. 
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fearful that mind might transcend the limits of subjectivity and is unnerved by the talk 
of strangers being 'a little universal', 'giving the impression they were 
communicating out to her from some unbounded secret place' (P. 5 1). DeLillo 
conveys this sense of destabilisation, by structuring much of the early part of the 
novel using a quasi-cinematic form of montage, which allows the reader phenomenal 
experience of the instability the protagonists fear (p. 63). Early scenes, in which Lyle 
and Pammy are situated in their work environments, merge into one another without 
explanation or indication of the occurrence. From Pammy's repetition of the word 
'Maine', for example, the text lurches into a scene at the Exchange with only the 
understated link that 'Lyle saw his number on the enunciator board' (p. 2 1). 
Lyle's creation of an insular, computational self annihilates all humane 
emotion. He refuses even to lunch with his friend, McKechnie, who wishes to share 
concerns about his 'hearing-impaired son' and dying wife (p. 66). Such heartless 
behaviour suggests that, as with Ratner's Star's academics, alienation from the body 
has a deleterious effect on emotional life, affirming the fact that, in neuroscientist 
Antonio Damasio's words, the 'mind is grounded in the body'. 22 Damasio shares 
R. D. Laing's view of the body's importance to mental and emotional function, 
suggesting that the 'body is the main stage for emotions' and that this emotion 
'probably assists reasoning, especially when it comes to personal and social matters, 
involving risk and conflict'. 23 Given Lyle's increasingly reckless pursuit of violence, 
the point is apposite. Yet, Lyle derives little satisfaction from his defection and his 
bewildered response to his new lifestyle is indicated by a daydream in which he 
22 Antonio Damasio, Looking for Spinoza: Joy. Sorrow and the Feeling Brain (Orlando: Harcourt 
Books, 2003), p. 191. 
23 Antonio Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of 
Consciousness (London: Heinemann, 1999), p. 287. 
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imagines an 'astronaut', adrift in outer space, who speaks 'movingly of 
weightlessness as a poetic form of anxiety' (p. 108). This suggests that, as in DeLillo's 
previous novel, each increase in psychological or intellectual abstraction brings 
further alienation from a recognisably human identity. 
Lyle's new comrades are well aware that the noetic economic and social codes 
of the Exchange enabled him to flee the exigencies of physicality. Lyle could ignore 
the 'madness and squalor' around him (p. 27), by working with the rarefied economic 
charts that are typical of what James G. Carrier calls the 'virtualism' of contemporary 
economics. 24 For Carrier, this term refers to postmodern economic thought in which 
'models of economic abstraction are taken to be the fundamental reality that underlies 
and shapes the world', implying a widespread alienation from concrete economic 
activity that Jameson calls the loss of the 'literal' (Jameson, p. 270). Lyle's comrade 
Marina refers to the electronic data he studies as 'Currents of invisible life' that 
constitute the 'system that we believe is their secret power' (p. 107). Her scathing 
remarks, which she intends as a critique of the capitalist reduction of use value to 
numerical abstraction, are similar, in their emphasis on progressively greater 
intangibility, to Marx's analysis of the conversion of commodities into money, which 
he calls a 'transubstantiation'. 25 Yet, Marina moves beyond Marx by observing that, 
in postmodernity, money itself undergoes a ftirther 'transubstantiation', being 
subjected to a quasi-mystical 'paring away of money's accidental properties, of 
money's touch', a process metonymic of the fear of organic matter pervading 
American capitalist culture (p. I 10). Marina's paramilitaries are clearly influenced by 
24 Virtualism: A New Political EconoMy, ed. by James G. Carrier and Danie Miller (Oxford: Berg, 
1998), p. 2. 
25 Karl Marx, Capital ed. by David McLellan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 68. 
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Marxism and use terms like 'revolution' and 'The people' with the assurance of 
experienced militants (p. 107). Their aggressive class-consciousness suggests DeLillo 
may be borrowing fiorn contemporary European terrorism and basing the group on 
the anti-capitalist Baader-Meinhoff gang, whose reign of terror climaxed in the early 
1970s and who were indicted in 1974, three years before Players was published. It is a 
view supported by their use of terms such as 'pig justice', which closely resemble the 
vocabulary of Baader-Meinhoff members (p. 146). As Jillian Becker points out in 
Hitler's Children, the 'standard form of address' of the Baader-Meinhoffs, when 
conducting a raid, was 'Open up, YOU Pigs! % 26 Notably, DeLillo's 2002 story 
'Baader-Meinhoff suggests that his interest in the group continues to the present day. 
27 
The topic of terrorist violence may strike the reader as more appropriate to a 
'thriller' than a conventional literary novel. Indeed, according to the criteria Tzvetan 
Todorov outlines for the 'thriller' genre, the committal of a mysterious crime early in 
the diegetic narrative, so that 'the narrative coincides with the action' marks out both 
texts as at least related to that category. 28 The pared down prose DeLillo employs 
throughout accentuates this generic quality and proves remarkably appropriate to the 
limited cognitive and emotional responses of many characters. However, as John 
Johnston points out, in DeLillo's early novels, he tends to cross the conventions of the 
genre in which he writes, with 'at least one other kind of content', causing 'normal or 
conventional expectations to be short-circuited and attention directed elsewhere'. 29 In 
PlUers, the implication of fusion between mind and computer introduces an element 
26 Karl Marx, Capital ed. by David McLellan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 68. 
27 Don DeLillo, 'Baader Meinhoff, in The New Yorker I' April 2002, pp. 78-82. 
28 Tzvetan Todorov, The Poetics of Prose trans. by Richard Howard (Oxford: Blackwell, 1977), p. 47. 
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of science fiction, while Lyle's role as FBI double agent alludes to the 'spy thriller'. 
Since the 'thriller' and 'spy thriller' demand characters who form clear ideas and take 
decisive action, the tropes DeLillo borrows from these genres permit him to parody 
their conventions and accentuate the decline of his characters' personal capacities. As 
Michael Denning remarks, the spy thriller's protagonist performs the ideological 
function of appearing to return 'human agency' to an 'incomprehensible social order', 
'which seems less and less the product of human action'. 30 Players gently satirises 
these generic conventions, stubbornly refusing to show 'human agency', whether of 
Exchange dealer or terrorist, as effective against the complex capitalist systems of 
Wall Street, with the consequence that, by generic standards, the text limps to a tame 
and anti-climactic conclusion. 
Without referring to Plqyers or Running Dog, Joseph Tabbi makes the 
pertinent observation that many 'contemporary fictions' present 'figurations of 
technology as an outward embodiment of thought' .31 DeLillo's presentation of 
'Strong Al' suggests these novels might appropriately be placed in this category, with 
the qualification that, in both, the perception of the machine as an 'outward 
embodiment' is merely a precursor to the characters' internalisation of computational 
principles. Of the prevalence of such 'outward' embodiments of thought in 
postmodernism, Tabbi remarks that they 'would seem to have moved narrative away 
from romantic and modernist preoccupations with order, autonomy, or organic models 
of wholeness' (p. 2 1). Tabbi's statement can be usefully applied to the austere 
asceticism of DeLillo's aesthetic throughout Players, as well as the appalling fate that 
29 John Johnston, 'Generic Difficulties in the Novels of Don DeLillo', in Critique: Studies in 
Contemporary Fiction, 30 (1989), 261-275 (p. 262). 
30 Michael Denning, Cover Stories: Narrative and Tdeology in the British Spy Thriller (London: 
Routledge, 1987), p. 14. 
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befalls many of his characters. The correlation is apparent in DeLillo's elliptical prose 
style in Players and the gradual reduction of interior monologue and indirect 
discourse, which parallels the reduction of interiority, 'autonomy', and experience of 
'wholeness' that afflicts several characters, but is particularly marked in the treatment 
of Lyle. Although these techniques are common in modernism and postmodemism, 
DeLillo's variation of their use to convey a character's withdrawal from, or embrace 
of, subjective experience is characteristic of his work. In Part Two, after Lyle 
becomes a terrorist, DeLillo emphasises his determined exclusion of subjective 
experience. When Lyle imagines himself an astronaut being interviewed about his 
experience of 'weightlessness as a poetic form of anxiety', DeLillo presents the 
episode entirely in the third person, without formal acknowledgement that it is 'a long 
conversation with himself, internal' (p. 108). Similarly, in the novel's final scene, 
DeLillo describes Lyle as a 'propped figure' and feigns ignorance of the character, 
claiming to 'know nothing else about him' (p. 212). 
Players opens with a dense and opaque chapter-length prologue, entitled 'The 
Movie' (p. 3). This is set on an aircraft and revolves around an in-flight film, watched 
by the seven passengers, which shows the 'lush slaughter' of bourgeois golfers (P. 9). 
The gruesome subject matter foreshadows Lyle's yearning for terrorist violence, 
while the mockingly upbeat piano accompaniment, described as 'a typical score for a 
silent film', indicates the brutality of the cinematic aesthetic DeLillo associates with 
computational thought throughout Players (p. 4). The prologue presents what DeLillo 
calls 'the major characters', 'embryonically, not yet named or defined'. 32 He suggests 
31 Joseph Tabbi, Postmodern Sublime: Technology and American Writing from Mailer to Cyberpunk 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), p. 21. 
32 Adam Begley, 'Don DeLillo: The Art of Fiction CXXXV', in Paris Review 28 (1993), 275-306 (p. 
286). 
138 
that the passage represents 'the novel in miniature' and, indeed, it gives numerous 
indications of DeLillo's concerns in the novel (p. 286). The omission of names is one 
of many initial hints at the dehumanising effects of their lifestyle and introduces an 
aesthetic more and than anything DeLillo has previously employed. The characters 
interact by becoming 'gradually aware of each other's code of recognition', 
suggesting a machine-like formalisation of mind and emotion (p. 3). The prose is 
dense and elliptical, with few connectives, and parallels the sensory deprivation the 
main characters embrace. A man and woman are said to be 'clearly together, a couple, 
wearing each other' (p. 4), while the evocation of mood in a film soundtrack is 
described as 'More Bass chords. Accumulating Doom' (p. 7). The self-conscious 
minimalisin of this style draws attention to the signifier at the expense of signified or 
referent. It is the formal equivalent of the computer's inability to comprehend the 
referential function of language and prefigures the characters' embrace of this 
computational fetishisation of the signifier. 
The title 'The Movie' suggests DeLillo may be comparing his own narrative 
gaze to a camera eye, an idea supported by his reference to the seven passengers as 
existing in a 'frame of arrested motion' (p. 3). DeLillo is certainly concerned with the 
relation between human and camera eyes, but shows more concerted interest in what 
he suggests is the contemporary identification with the camera as a seductively 
disembodied and emotionless form of vision and cognition. In line with his frequent 
use of form as allegorical of thematics in his novels, when DeLillo's narration 
imitates the camera, it indicates the detachment of a particular character's thought 
process or aesthetic. In analysing the movie, he remarks on the passengers' sense of 
'the special consciousness implicit in a long lens' (p. 7), hinting at their desire to 
escape subjectivity and become their idealised notion of the camera, what Geoffrey 
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O'Brien calls 'the mechanical, invulnerable eye passing disembodied through space'. 
33 The 'camera eye' narration John Dos Passos employed in his USA trilogy was, as 
Donald Pizer points out, 'a symbol of impersonal and "objective" depiction'; 
effectively a variant of modernist impersonality. 34 DeLillo's postmodern interest in 
the 'camera eye' arises from a more disturbing sense that contemporary Americans 
wish to identify with the camera to radically excise their internal experience. In 
Players, as Lyle's interest in the Stock Exchange computers intensifies and his 
involvement with terrorism deepens, his gaze grows correspondingly to resemble the 
4camera eye'. DeLillo describes 'the neutral way his eyes recorded an audience' 
(p. 64) and mentions his cultivation, at the Exchange, of the explicitly camera-like 
habit of 'swiveling toward a face and beaming an anemic look right past it' (P. 72). 
The detachment of this 'anemic look' derives from the desire for an abstract mode of 
consciousness, which, though influenced and encouraged by capitalism, is apolitical 
in intent. DeLillo associates it with Lyle's involvement with revolutionary Marxism, 
but later links it with the inhumanity of fascism. When Pammy has sex with her friend 
Jack, for example, she envisages his 'Muscled body against the sky' as a 'Soft-core 
fascist image', a response whose stark cinematic objectivity DeLillo emphasises with 
the acerbic remark, 'But what the hell, folks, it's fun to mythologize' (p. 165). 
This cinematic narrative mode is first introduced in the prologue. It is often 
distinguished by a quasi-behaviourist aesthetic, which focuses solely on external dress 
and gesture to indicate a character's ruthless exclusion of interiority. It is the parodic 
counterpart of the behaviourist epistemology DeLillo repeatedly satirises and forces 
33 Geoffrey O'Brien, The Phantom Empire: Movies in the Mind of the 200'Centuly (New York: W. W. 
Norton and Company, 1993), p. 9. 
34 John Dos Passos, USA (New York: Library of America, 1996) and Donald Pizer, Dos Passos' USA 
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1988), p. 56. 
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the reader, like a behaviourist, to analyse unelaborated data and connect 'effects' with 
whatever 'cause' might appear plausible. One woman is said to be 'in her early 
forties, indifferently dressed. We know nothing else about her' (p. 4). A young woman 
is shown yawning compulsively in the presence of machinery: 'planes', the 'roller 
coaster' and the 'phone', as though suffering 'a mild attack of something'. Her 
response may be anxiety or unconscious imitation of their mechanical action; the 
reader receives no guidance and is forced to choose (p. 4). DeLillo's simulation of 
ignorance parallels Lyle's cultivation of vacancy, in his acquisition of habits that 
'required no conscious planning yet reassured him' (p. 26). DeLillo also implies that 
imitation of the 'camera eye' exacerbates mechanical thought and action. During the 
silent film, a man 'boots' a woman 'lightly in the rear' with 'a stylized jerkiness that's 
appropriately Chaplinesque in nature', a reference that foreshadows DeLillo's analogy 
between Charlie Chaplin's comic persona and the CIA agent, Glen SeIvy, in Running 
Dog (p. 5). Although seemingly light hearted, it suggests the cinematic gaze might 
eventually reduce both parties to objects of vaudevillian ridicule. As Andrd Bazin 
points out, in Chaplin's films, such farcical mechanical behaviour usually precedes 
disaster. 35 Indeed, Bazin claims that 'I am confident that in all Charlie's pictures 
there is not one where this mechanised movement does not end badly for him (p. 15 1). 
In Players, mechanised thought also 'ends badly' for those involved, diminishing 
intellect and autonomy to the point where individuals become parodies of their former 
selves. 
One interpretation of the young woman's automatic 'yawning' is that it 
indicates a desire to acquire the insensitivity of the machine (p. 5). Given that the 
woman is probably Pammy, who later emulates her husband's computational mind- 
35 Andrd Bazin, What is Cinema?, trans. by Hugh Gray (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
1968) 
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set, the view is highly plausible. The unnamed female character is the only woman in 
the prologue who, like Pammy, is one half of a couple. Moreover, DeLillo also hints 
at her identity, by remarking later on Pammy's habit of yawning while phoning her 
father (p. 55). Paradoxically, Pammy expresses extreme disapproval of the influence 
of behaviourism and Al, which suggests her embrace of computational thought may 
be largely unconscious. As DeLillo remarks, Pammy is 'more humane' than Lyle, but 
also 'more prone to be affected by the shallow ideas drifting through her world' and 
may succumb easily to the cognition favoured by friends and colleagues (Anzhing, 
p. 82). Early on, she expresses horror at simulation of mind, exclaiming 'it's so stupid. 
It's so modem-stupid. It's this thing that people are robots that scares me' (pp. 42-3). 
Like Dennett, she connects Artificial Intelligence with behaviourist methodology, 
which she finds in her sterile work environment at the 'Grief Management Council', 
for whom she writes bloodless brochures with the rather mechanistic aim of helping 
clients 'assimilate' grief (p. 18). Her distaste for this leads her to speculate that 'teams 
of behaviourists' created the company and 'assembled in the sewers and conceived a 
brand of futurism based on filing procedures' (p. 19). Despite resenting the 
behaviourism of postmodern U. S. culture, she cannot extricate herself from the 
shallow cynicism it breeds. Her belief that her clients 'crave the means to codify their 
emotions' recalls Lyle's wish for flesh transformed to 'decimals' and inspires little 
faith in her wish to engage with their subjective experience, or her own (pp. 18-19). 
Her behaviour towards the end of the novel suggests even more clearly an intense 
wish to escape the 'first-person ontology' of consciousness (Rediscovery, p. 17). After 
the death of her friend Jack, Pammy is able to experience grief only when 
accompanied by a 'near obliteration of self-awareness'. Appropriately, the 'near 
obliteration' is supplied by technology, in this case television, on which she finds an 
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'inept and boring' movie that offers a 'choppy sobbing release' from her pent-up 
emotion (p. 205). DeLillo's contemptuous description of the movie emphasises that 
liberation bought at the price of 'self-awareness' is partial at best. Ironically, her 
desire to annihilate 'self-awareness' finds significant theoretical support in the work 
of the behaviourists she professes to despise. As we saw, Dennett argues that first- 
person experience of mind is functionally irrelevant. He brusquely dismisses the view 
that experiences like 'pain' cannot be simulated, by drawing an astonishing analogy 
with the simulation of hurricanes. To 'the skeptic' who 'might reply that it is a 
simulation at best only of pain behaviour', he suggests that they 'consider hurricane 
simulation: what else is there to simulate but the hurricane's behaviourT 
(Brainstorms, p. 192). In this context, Pammy's momentary escape into the 
comfortingly abstract 'celestial energy' of television constitutes a significant moral 
and ontological defeat, since it is acquired at the price of contradicting her previous 
denunciations of behaviourism and lending support to the Dennettian view of 
consciousness as purposeless. 
In addition to radically reducing self-awareness, Lyle and Pammy seek to 
alleviate their suffering by divorcing mind from world, by stripping signifiers of 
referential function. By splitting signifier from signified and referent and thereby 
refusing to name objects or experiences, they seek freedom from the more disturbing 
aspects of reality, particularly death. They aspire to something like the insular 
epistemology John R. Searle considers characteristic of the computer. Searle asserts 
that the computer does not do 'information processing', rather 
What it does is to manipulate formal symbols. The fact that the 
programmer and the interpreter of the computer output use the 
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symbols to stand for objects in the world is totally beyond the 
scope of the computer. The computer, to repeat, has a syntax 
but no semantics. Thus, if you type into the computer '2 plus 2 
equals? It will type out W. But it has no idea that W means 4 
or that it means anything at all. (Minds, Brains, Programs, 
p. 371) 
Searle argues that the computer has no concept of 'meaning' because it has no notion 
of the existence of a world in which meaning is produced. It is a blissful state of 
ignorance that DeLillo's co-protagonists desperately envy (p. 70). Lyle adores his 
'teleprinter slips' for their hermetic quality, or what he calls their 'artful reduction of 
the world to printed output, the machine's coded model of exactitude', a radical 
transformation of matter that frees him to imagine himself entirely free of physicality 
(p. 70). So intensely does he desire the cancellation of linguistic reference that this 
limited epistemology defines the spaces he inhabits. In Players' final paragraph, we 
learn that in Lyle's motel room even 'Spaces and what they contain no longer 
account for, mean, serve as examples of, or represent' (p. 212). 
Pammy encounters a similar hostility to reference at the 'Grief Management 
Council'. DeLillo mentions the 'patch of pure white hair' belonging to Pammy's 
friend Jack and refers mockingly to their colleagues' opinion of it as 'the mark, the 
label, the sign, the emblem of something mysterious', employing numerous 
synonyms to indicate its true status as a simple 'genetic misconjecture' (p. 19). Jack's 
first reported act in the novel is to tell his partner Ethan that he yearns to live in 
'Maine', even though, as Ethan remarks, it is only a 'word' to him, since 'he's never 
been there'. Nevertheless, such is Pammy's willingness to accord with her 
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contemporaries' privileging of signifier over signified and referent that she fatuously 
agrees Maine is 'a good word', 'You feel it's the sort of core, the moral core' (p. 20). 
By the novel's conclusion, Pammy finds, like Lyle, that avoiding conventional 
signification effectively distances her from discomfort and trauma. After Jack's 
horrific suicide, prompted by his sexual infidelity with Pammy, and in which he 
incinerates himself 'down to nerves, blood vessels, bones' (p. 198), she calms herself 
by abandoning the naming of objects. DeLillo states that 'She'd declared everything 
nameless. Everything was compressed into a block. She fought the tendency to 
supply properties to this block. That would lead to names' (p. 199). 
DeLillo suggests that the restriction of mind to computational cognition causes 
the intellect to atrophy. As Penrose points out, computation lacks reflexivity, the 
ability to analyse its own operations, and cannot break free of 'loops' or resolve 
contradictions (Shadows, p. 196). The consequence is that Lyle and Pammy become 
steadily more robotic, subjecting themselves to what Slavoj 2ilek, with reference to 
Lacan, calls the 'automatism of the signifier', which constructs the 'symbolic network 
in which the subjects are caught'. 36 The notion of language as a chain without 
substantial content is paralleled by the recurrence of motifs of circularity. After losing 
a bottle of wine, Pammy suggests to Jack that 'We'll hail a cab, Jack. Our bottle of 
wine will be in the back seat. It will complete the circle. I believe in circles' (p. 44). 
The connection between the first and last scene also creates a Uroboran, autotelic 
37 structure, which recalls the high modernism of texts like Finnegans Wake. In the 
novel's first line, Lyle remarks on the desirability of 'Motels. I like motels. I wish I 
owned a chain' ( p. 3), while the final scene makes cruel, ironic reference to this 
36 Slavoj 2ilek, The Sublime Ob*ect of Ideology (London: Verso, 1989), p. 36. 
37 James Joyce, Finnegans Wake (London: Faber, 1975) 
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aspiration, by locating the eventual dissolution of Lyle's subjective autonomy in the 
comfortless sterility of a motel room (p. 212). By the end of Players, Pammy also 
takes on this 'automatism', becoming progressively more suggestible and less 
intellectually responsive. Her decision to have sex with Jack is determined by a litany 
of liberal mantras such as 'Follow your instincts, be yourself, act out your fantasies', 
which she adopts without apparent independent thought (p. 143). Her evasion of 
reference gradually undermines her ability to connect signifier with signified or 
referent. Her last act in the novel is to stare without comprehension at a word on a 
street sign. It is 'Transients', which is highly suggestive, given Pammy's sense of 
anomie and her efforts to detach herself from subjectivity. As DeLillo pus it, she finds 
that 'It took on an abstract tone', 'subsisting in her mind as language units that had 
mysteriously evaded the responsibilities of content' (p. 207). As we have seen, the 
damage to Lyle's intellectual and emotional life is at least equally severe. 
Nevertheless, the epilogue reveals that Lyle retains unsuspected nostalgia for the 
mind-body unity he has discarded and even remains able, at the 'imperceptible 
urging' of his partner, to 'descend' and 'occupy his body' (p. 189). In his final scene 
with Rosemary, he frankly admires her ability to achieve apparent harmony between 
mind and body. While watching her asleep, he witnesses 'a mode of wholeness, an 
immanence and unit truth that his feelings aren't equal to' (p. 209). This idealisation of 
his female partner accords with Tabbi's view that in postmodem fiction's portrayal of 
technology, 'a detached, male ego' often 'tries to gain embodiment through a 
materrial other, whose reproductive force is conceived in opposition to the 
technological absolute' (p. 4). DeLillo portrays Lyle with exactly this longing for the 
abstractions of the 'technological absolute', while also seeking comfort in the 
idealised 'mode of wholeness' he attributes to Rosemary. Yet, DeLillo presents Lyle's 
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view of Rosemary's supposed 'immanence' with acute awareness of its fantastic 
nature. Indeed, he emphasises Rosemary's drive to escape biology, which nearly 
equals that of Lyle, especially in her use of 'a plastic phallus harnessed to her body' 
(p. 197). Lyle therefore knows intimately what DeLillo calls Rosemary's 'limits', 'the 
unvarying sands of her being', because they are also his own (p. 210). In any case, he 
is well aware that his yearning for her female 'unit truth' is already mere nostalgia, 
since he is no longer capable of such organic experience. Far from being on the brink 
of rebirth through contact with her female 'immanence', DeLillo assures us that 
Lyle's yearnings for abstraction have wreaked such physical and emotional damage 
that he is 'barely recognizable as male' (p. 212). 
Runniniz Doiz: The Mechanics of Totalitarianism 
Where Players portrays its protagonists' adoption of a computational mode of 
thought and the depletion of emotion and intellect that follows, in Running Doiz, 
DeLillo presents an environment in which the robotic mind-set of its central character, 
the intelligence agent Glen Selvy, appears long established and taken for granted. 
Consequently, the text focuses largely on the political causes and consequences of this 
form of cognition, paying particular attention to the institutional manipulation Selvy 
suffers and the totalitarian subordination of his will to CIA directives, which is made 
possible by his computational model of mind. DeLillo's portrayal of the CIA in 
Running Dog accords with what Frances Stonor Saunders calls their 'reputation as a 
ruthlessly interventionist and frighteningly unaccountable instrument of American 
Cold War power', yet focuses less on political influence per se than on the potential 
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for capitalist self-enrichment it creates. " Selvy's mental limitations render him the 
ideal tool for his unit, 'Radial Matrix', the illegal offshoot of a CIA funding 
mechanism. This entity is the creation of brutal Vietnam veteran Earl Mudger, a 
manipulative and dictatorial leader who DeLillo repeatedly compares to Hitler and 
who refers to his intelligence work as 'just one slam-bang corporate venture' (P. 139). 
Few characters escape some form of involvement in his aggressive pursuit of profit. 
The plot is driven by his avarice, being largely organised around the search for a 
movie of 'Hitler's' last days in the Berlin bunker, which is rumoured to be 
pornographic and, therefore, of immense commercial value. In the event, the movie 
portrays only 'Hitler's' pastiche of Charlie Chaplin's famous 'tramp' persona, a 
revelation that serves as a metaphor for the emptiness of the acquisitive quests that 
propel the novel and the totalitarian power that feeds off such and capitalist 
'ventures'. 
Mudger's experience in Vietnam is portrayed as critical in distorting his 
personality and forging his cupidity and disregard for law. In this sense, Running Dog 
is part of a considerable post-war American tradition of films, novels, and television 
programs that study the way that foreign wars have wounded the American psyche. 
One notable forerunner is the feature film The Manchurian Candidate, whose subject 
is the Korean War of the early 1950s and a covert communist threat to America in its 
aftermath. 39 In a striking parallel to the computerised automatism adopted by CIA 
agent Selvy, in the wake of Vietnam, while in Korea, Staff Seargent Raymond Shaw 
is hypnotised by enemy forces and employed as an assassin, whose subsequent 
killings in the U. S. are designed to lead to a communist coup. Rather like Selvy, and 
38 Frances Stonor Saunders, 'Who Paid the Piper? ': The CIA and The Cultural Cold War (London: 
Granta, 1999), p. 3. 
39 The Manchurian Candidate. Dir. John Frankenheimer. UA/MC. 2000. 
148 
many Vietnam veterans, Shaw's colleagues are tormented by nightmares that their 
actions were neither moral nor heroic. But, in the movie, the danger, in the form of 
overseas communism, is finally presented as reassuringly external and is forestalled, 
at the last moment, by a reawakened Shaw. DeLillo's novel, more darkly, portrays the 
pathological consequence of Vietnam as the triumph and intensification of a well- 
established domestic capitalism, its corruption of the organs of government, and its 
fin-ther dehumanisation of the American citizenry. Its pessimism about the 
consequences of imperialism recalls the Vietnam veteran Tim O'Brien's remark that 
4you can tell a true war story by the way it never seems to end'. 40 
The cinematic parallel is apposite because, in Running Dog, DeLillo, again, 
pursues the association between computation and the brutality of the cinematic gaze 
that pervades Players. Indeed, if anything, the aesthetics of cinema are more 
thoroughly embedded in the sensibility of Running Dog. DeLillo indicates this 
formally by the increased frequency of seemingly arbitrary changes of scene, which 
resemble 'jump cuts', while, thematically, it is exemplified by the centrality of the 
quest for the 'Hitler' movie, a film that foregrounds the connection between 
totalitarianism and the text's cinematic aesthetic. DeLillo also notes the increased 
importance of film in postmodernity for organisations that attempt to impose 
totalitarian control, referring to the contemporary network of surveillance 
technologies, which includes 'Spy satellites, weather balloons, U-2 aircraft' that, as 
Lightborne avers, are 'Putting the whole world on film' (p. 15 0). Critics note the 
oppressive power of these appliances, which are capable of creating what Mark 
Osteen calls 'omnipresent cinematic surveillance' or a 'superpanopticon', but ignore 
Radial Matrix's deliberate cultivation of exaggerated fear of technology and 
40 Tim O'Brien, The Things They Carried (London: Collins, 1990), p. 88. 
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dependence upon it to advance its acquisitive schemes. 41 DeLillo suggests Mudger is 
well aware that anxiety about death and the body render agents like Selvy vulnerable 
to the notion of technology as substitute religion, with the power to protect and 
punish, and uses his own comparative fearlessness to maintain and enhance his power. 
In portraying these malevolent practices, DeLillo implies that paranoia about 
technology, which, as Mudger puts it, is 'enough to make us feel like criminals', may 
be as damaging to the psyche as the oppression such devices facilitate (P. 93). 
Critics often mention the close connection between Players and Running Dog, 
especially noting the continuity between the novels' main protagonists, Lyle Wynant 
and Glen Selvy. Yet, they fail to observe their common imitation of limited, 
mechanical thought. Tom LeClair suggests the novels are 'companion pieces' (P. 146), 
while Bill Mullen asserts, more expansively, that 'Running Dog is the second half of 
Players, but its obverse and very different half'. 42 Keesey remarks on the relation 
between Lyle and Selvy, pointing out shrewdly that 'Glen Selvy could be described as 
taking up where Lyle left off (p. 10 1). 1 concur with Keesey's assessment; in 
particular, Selvy appears to have achieved more thoroughly the mental and emotional 
nullity for which Lyle strives. He is untroubled by any conflict between his will and 
that of his masters, like the one Lyle experiences in Players. Selvy's desires have 
become indistinguishable from those of the people that have programmed, or, as his 
trainer Arthur Lomax aptly puts it, 'run' him (p. 14 1). Similarly, in Selvy's case, even 
41 Mark Osteen, 'Marketing Obsession: The Fascinations of Running Dog" in Critical Essays on Don 
DeLillo, ed. by H. Ruppersburg and T. Engles (New York: G. K. Hall and Co., 2000), pp. 135-156 
(p. 13 5). 
42 Bill Mullen, 'No There There: Cultural Criticism as Lost Object in Don DeLillo's Players and 
Running Dog' in Powerless Fictions?: Ethics, Cultural Critique. and American Fiction in the Age o 
Postmodernism ed. by Ricardo Miguel Alfonso (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1996), pp. 1 13-139 (p. 129). 
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the vestigial sense of self that Lyle retains has been expunged by his cognitive 
limitations. 'Who are you Selvy? ', the question asked by his lover, the journalist Moll 
Robbins, produces only a dismissive gesture, by which he 'appeared to be dissociating 
himself from whatever significance the question by its nature ascribed to him' 
(p. I 10). It is a telling moment, mirrored by a later episode, when Mudger reveals 
ignorance of his most loyal agent, by responding 'Who's Selvy? ' to a report about his 
commitment to the CIA (p. 14 1). The correlation reveals Mudger's callous inhumanity 
and suggests that Selvy's abnegation of self has been encouraged by Mudger's regime 
at 'Radial Matrix'. 
The analogies, in Running Dog, between Selvy and the computer systems at 
his workplace are, if anything, more explicit than in Players. Often, they contain a hint 
of anthropomorphism, implying humorously that the machines recognise Selvy as 
their ontological kin. During the rigours of training, 'They liked his style in the 
interviews. The computers approved' (p. 184), while Selvy is chosen to infiltrate 
Senator Percival's office because his 'name popped out of the computer' (p. 156). The 
stem inhumanity that this association suggests is reaffirmed by Selvy's identification 
with the camera, which extends into his most intimate moments. There is a telling 
'edge of detachment' about his 'voice and manner' (p. 17) and, when he is eventually 
murdered, it is with a 'Strong sense of something being played out. Memory, a film' 
(p. 239). In his treatment of Selvy's limited cognition and emotion, DeLillo again 
employs an ascetically pared down prose and gives little indication of interior life 
through indirect discourse or interior monologue, so that Selvy's eventual violent 
death provokes little response in the reader. What might, for another character, be 
interior monologue becomes an alienated, stilted second-person mode of address, 
indicating the complete enervation of selfhood. In the course of self-satisfied 
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reflections on his professional abilities, Selvy asserts that 'The routine was how your 
mind had come to work; which areas you avoided, the person you'd become' (P. 8 1). 
Stuart Johnson remarks of DeLillo's and aesthetic in Runniniz Doiz that it excludes 
'speculation that transcends immediately given contexts', a rigour he regards as 
analogous to that of Wittgensteinian positivism. 43 Rather than rejection of 'general 
principles', I argue that Selvy practices the same exclusion of reference as Lyle and 
Pammy in Players. DeLillo alerts the reader to this continuity, by echoing vocabulary 
from the earlier novel. For example, Selvy calls 'shaving' 'an emblem of rigor' 
(p. 8 1), recalling Pammy's fatuous view of Jack's patch of white hair as 'the sign, the 
emblem of something mysterious' (p. 19). 
DeLillo stresses the self-imposed nature of Selvy's cognitive limitations. 
Some of these resemble what, in computer studies, are called heuristics. According to 
Margaret A. Boden, the term 'heuristics' refers to programming techniques employed 
to save time and increase efficiency, by instructing the computer to select relevant 
lines of enquiry, while ignoring others. 44 She asserts that they 'prune the search tree. 
That is they save the problem-solver from visiting every choice-point on the tree, by 
selectively ignoring parts of it' (pp. 78-79). As DeLillo says of Selvy, 
His routine was a mind set, all those mechanically performed 
operations of the mind that accompanied this line of work. 
You made connection-A but allowed connection-B to elude 
43 Stuart Johnson, 'Extraphilosophical Instigations in Don DeLillo's Runnning Dog', in Contemporary 
Literature, 26 1985,74-90 (p. 75). 
44 Margaret A. Boden, The Creative Mind: M)Ihs and Mechanisms (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1990), pp. 78-79. 
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you. You felt free to question phase- I of a given operation but 
deadened yourself to the implications of phase-2. (p. 8 1) 
This computational 'routine' permits Selvy to relate to himself in the second person, 
avoiding the troubling emotions of subjectivity, particularly death-anxiety. When 
Mudger threatens Selvy's life, this evasion of affect becomes comically explicit. 
DeLillo remarks of Selvy's mental discipline that 'It wasn't within Selvy's purview to 
meditate on additional links, even when they might pertain to his ultimate sustenance. 
Especially then. This was why the routine existed' (p. 82). Like Lyle in Players Selvy 
compensates for his self-abnegation by imagining himself able to construct a 'second 
self' (p. 83), by careful study of cybernetics. On occasion, DeLillo implies Selvy is 
working systematically to replace his flesh with mechanical alternatives. When he 
refuses to consider Mudger's plainly homicidal intent, DeLillo notes that 'Where the 
routine prevented S elvy from seeking human links', it 'prompted him to study the 
interactions within mechanisms' (p. 83). 
The enervation of Selvy's subjectivity causes severe intellectual decline, 
rendering him incapable of intelligent debate and denying him the capacity to alter his 
viewpoint. It is an incapacity he shares with the computer, which, as Joseph F. 
Rychlak explains, is designed to operate 'entirely in terms of demonstrative 
reasoning' and lacks the Socratic or dialectical reason that would allow for discussion 
or simultaneous consideration of antithetical ideas. 45 Selvy's limitations, in this 
regard, again, become particularly apparent after Mudger's attempt to assassinate him. 
When he narrowly escapes death, his lover, the journalist Moll Robbins, asks 'What 
`5 Joseph F. Rychlak, In Defence of Human Consciousness (Washington D. C: American Psychological 
Association, 1997), p. 195. 
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would you do differently, knowing what you know nowT, only to receive the 
perplexingly blank response 'What do I know nowT (p. I 10). Once SeIvy has deimed 
Mudger trustworthy, his one-dimensional cognitive process prevents him altering his 
assessment in the light of new information. Selvy's mind is caught in a 'loop' of 
'demonstrative' computational thought (Defence, p. 195). As Penrose remarks, 'a truly 
intelligent system must have some way of breaking out of such loops' (P. 196). If we 
accept this view, we must conclude that Selvy has ceased to be 'truly intelligent'. 
Selvy's incapacity exemplifies the impotence endured, in Running Dog, by 
those who accept the mythologies of totalitarian regimes. DeLillo's use of Grail 
legend helps suggest the extent to which Mudger generates a seductive, obfuscatory 
mythology, which produces exactly these enervating effects. In combination with the 
prosaic conventions of the 'spy thriller', the weight of Arthurian mythology can strike 
the reader as incongruous, even bathetic. Yet, it serves a number of thematic 
functions, including questioning the fundamental value of the quests that underlie 
both the 'spy thriller' and the capitalist system that creates demand for the 'Hitler' 
film. As Moll remarks, in pursuing such chimeras, 'People came up against 
themselves in the end. Nothing but themselves' (p. 224). Moll's sex, her profession, 
and her left-wing politics, which distance her somewhat from the corruption around 
her, added to the late stage at which her statement is delivered, all lend her verdict 
gravitas. Notably, the character who experiences something resembling contentment 
is Levi Blackwater, Selvy's former CIA colleague and meditation instructor, who 
eschews external quests for exactly this confrontation with mind and 'self. He tells 
Selvy that, through strict spiritual discipline, he might apprehend his mind's Gnostic 
capacities and expand his notion of subjectivity. As Levi phrases it, Selvy should limit 
himself 'to the narrowest subject' in order to realise that 'you already know much 
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more than you imagined' (p. 23 1). Given his serenity and his efforts to disseminate 
this state, in Grail mythology, Levi fits the traditional role of 'Healer', the one person 
able to assist the Fisher King, and who, according to Jesse L. Weston, is the 'Grail 
winner' . 
46 Most significantly, in the context of Grail legend, the mystic occupies 'the 
barest stretch of desert', which recalls the 'Waste Land' of Arthurian myth, and 
renders it magically fertile with his restorative powers (p. 230). Part of Levi's healing 
ability arises from something like the 'realist' view of consciousness that Dr Oh 
adopts in Americana. As in that text, this entails an augmented faith in perception, 
which DeLillo suggests by the heightened state of existence that objects attain, in 
proximity to Levi. In his vicinity, we learn, 'The power of storms to burnish and 
renew' 'had never been more clearly evident. The sky was flawless. Things existed. 
The day was scaled to the pure tones of being and sense' (p. 244). 
DeLillo makes explicit his use of Grail legend, by including well-known 
details of the genre. He makes ironic use of Arthurian names, whose inappropriate or 
grandiose nature indicates the widespread displacement of power from its legitimate 
agents that is apparent in Running Dog. One of Mudger's corrupt lieutenants is named 
Arthur Lomax, and Percival, although a Senator and named after a righteous questing 
knight, proves powerless when confronted by Mudger's ruthlessness. His attempts to 
investigate Radial Matrix's financial status are stymied, first with threats of sexual 
blackmail (p. 92) and later by intimidation of magazine editor Grace Delaney, to 
whom Percival intends to leak incriminating information (p. 134). Similarly, Osteen 
uses Selvy's association with birds, a characteristic of the mythical Perceval, to 
identify him as a postmodern. version of the questing knight (p. 26). Notably, to 
46 Jesse L. Weston, From Ritual to Romance (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor books, 
1957), pp. 106-8. 
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consider Selvy in the context of Grail legend vastly increases the significance of his 
unquestioning computational 'routine'. As Weston observes, in many Grail legends, it 
is the knight's failure to enquire about the nature of the Grail that renders it elusive 
and the 'Waste Land' infertile. In such tales, 'the failure of the predestined hero to ask 
concerning the office of the Grail is alone responsible for the illness of the King and 
the misfortunes of the country' (p. 16). Selvy's quiescent mechanical mind-set may 
therefore be interpreted as pivotal in permitting the brutal profiteering that pervades 
the text, in which case, the unredeemed 'Waste Land' can only be the venal 
government agencies he serves and the capitalism that encourages their corruption. 
DeLillo appears to suggest that the excesses of capitalism are abetted by the docility 
of its victims. 
As the novel's most influential character, Mudger may therefore represent a 
profoundly dark rendering of the 'Fisher King'. If so, his sicknesses are those of late 
capitalism: the propensity to fall 'in love with profits' (p. 75) and a fascistic insistence 
on what Ernest Mandel calls 'a "regimented" society in which everyone has and 
keeps his place-). 47 The novel traces his sickness to Vietnam, where Mudger honed his 
skill in financial exploitation, establishing 'a feudal barony complete with loyal 
ARVN soldiers', as well as 'pimps and black marketeers' (P. 84). DeLillo's treatment 
of the consequences of Vietnam is strikingly ambivalent. He makes quite clear that 
that conflict's lawlessness contributes to Mudger's corruption. Nevertheless, by 
witnessing destruction and employing the names of weapons as an apotropaic 
6counterjargon to death', what O'Brien calls 'a hard vocabulary to contain the terrible 
softness' (p. 32), Mudger overcomes the debilitating death-anxiety that DeLillo often 
suggests is deeply embedded in American culture (p. 209). As O'Brien remarks of his 
Ernest Mandel, Late Capitalism, trans. by Joris De Bres (London: NLB, 1972), p. 500. 
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own combat experience, 'proximity to death brings with it a corresponding life' 
(p. 92). Moreover, by exploiting the local population, Mudger avoids what Tobey C. 
Herzog calls the 'treadmill-like existence' of Vietnam, which rendered recruits 
'incapable of acting independently'. 48 In the context of a preponderance of Vietnam 
novels that portray 'soldiers as agents of a government's political, social, and 
economic problems', Mudger cuts an amoral, romantic figure, whose combat 
experience augments his strength and autonomy (p. 6). By contrast, Selvy, who did not 
serve, remains comparatively weak and naive. As Cowart remarks, he 'retains an 
innocence that makes him the pawn of those who learned the war's dark lessons' 
(p. 59). In this respect, the novel's cinematic counterpart is Francis Ford Coppola's 
Apocalypse Now, which was released in the same year. 49 The film is a version of 
Joseph Conrad's Heart of Darkness, set in the context of Vietnam. It portrays 
Conrad's Kurtz as a commander who has become psychopathic and who, like 
Mudger, accrues considerable personal power and acts in defiance of orders. 
Mudger's disdain for the average 'grunt' is paralleled by Kurtz's murderous treatment 
of dissenters and his contempt for his assassin Captain Willard, who he describes as 
no 'soldier', but a 'clerk' sent 'to collect a bill'. In spite of his 'sickness', therefore, 
Mudger's grim experience may contain an embryonic strategy for overcoming the 
lurking morbidity DeLillo perceives in U. S. culture, yet one that Mudger fails to 
capitalise upon, being more concerned to exploit the death-anxiety of others. Only 
Levi makes anything positive of his Vietnam experience, discovering an unsuspected 
strength and tranquility within his mind, which enables him to respond to torture 
(p. 224) with gratitude for the opportunity to endure 'confinement, the machinery of 
self' (p. 23 1). Unlike Selvy, Levi never fetishises mental or physical 'confinement', 
Tobey C. Herzog, Vietnam War Stories (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 39. 
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but uses them to explore, through meditation, the full range of his mental capacities. 
The ability Levi develops as instructor and 'Healer' suggests that this meditative 
mode of thought enables him to forge a substantial subjectivity, which eschews both 
Selvy's subservience and Mudger's ravenous expropriation. He alone accepts that the 
quests in which these two participate demonstrate what Moll calls 'a meagerness of 
spirit' (p. 224). 
Yet, because Levi's qualities remain unremarked by all but Selvy, who is 
unable to respond to Levi's advice, it is the menace Mudger generates to assist his 
capitalist enterprises that informs the tone of the text. From the opening scene, in 
which Ludecke, the Hitler film's owner, is murdered by Mudger's agents for his 
refusal to part with the tape, DeLillo connects Mudger's operations with the 
totalitarianism of the Third Reich and what DeLillo hints is its inhumane cinematic 
aesthetic. The first line addresses the reader and creates a sinister, collusive tone 
typical of the cinema voiceover, asserting 'You won't find ordinary people here'. 'It's 
why you're here, obviously' (p. 3). Like Selvy's second-person discourse, this 
narrative mode is totalitarian in its presumption of agreement, effectively 
compromising or interpellating' the reader, as Louis Althusser argues is the case with 
the 'ideological apparatuses' of the state. 50 The fascistic overtones are apposite, in 
view of Mudger's ruthless violence and Ludecke's recollections of Nazism prior to 
death. The scrawled graffiti 'Alles nach Gottes Willen', or 'All as God Wills it', 
recalls his childhood, when he observed the identical message 'engraved on a 
ceremonial halberd' (pp. 3-4). The connection of this pious platitude with weaponry 
and death introduces a factitious 'religious' aesthetic that DeLillo suggests underpins 
49 Apocalyse Now. Dir. Francis Ford Coppola. Miramax Film Corporation. 1978. 
50 Louis Althusser, 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses', in Lenin and Philosophy and other 
Essgys trans. by Ben Brewster (London: New Left Books, 1977), pp. 121-173 (p. 161). 
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fascist and proto-fascist organisations like the Nazi party and Radial Matrix, serving 
to disguise the brutul exercise of power, by the dissemination of mystifying ideologies 
like 'fate' and 'destiny'. In his decadent mental state, Selvy is convinced by such 
pseudo-religious notions and, like the faithful 'running dog' of the title, believes 
himself fated to return to his training camp at 'Marathon Mines', where, as he 
predicts, he is murdered. When he tells Levi portentously that 'You know how it 
ends', Levi urges him against such self-destructive limitation of his thought, begging 
him not to imagine that 'you're about to arrive at some final truth'. 'Truth is a 
disappointment' (p. 233). Ludecke's death parallels Selvy's, both being connected 
with factitious religious fervour and executed by Mudger's lieutenants with gruesome 
but comical kitsch. Cinema theorist Saul Friedlander considers this blend of kitsch 
and death typical of fascist thought, arguing that it 'represents the foundation of a 
certain religious aesthetic, and, in my opinion, the bedrock of Nazi aesthetics'. 51 
Selvy's death is brought about by his facile illusions about 'destiny' and his imagined 
spiritual progress, while Ludecke succumbs during a seedy evening cruising a 
deserted dock land, dressed in drag and worshipping the illusory 'God of Lipstick and 
Silk' (p. 4). The resemblance between the killings is emphasised by the fact that they 
frame the narrative like bookends, suggesting Mudger's suffocating effect on the 
postmodem world of Running Dog. In spite of the ludicrous circumstances of these 
murders, Ludecke's response to Mudger's scrawled message in German betrays the 
sinister nature of the Radial Matrix ideology. His feeling that the words were 'familiar 
somehow, burning a hole in time' imply a direct connection between Mudger's 
methods and those of the Third Reich, suggesting that such CIA and government 
51 Saul Friedlander, Reflections of Nazism: An Essay on Kitsch and Death (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 1993), p. 27. 
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corruption may presage a Heideggerian recrudescence, or coming 'into bloom', of 
totalitarianism in contemporary America (p. 4). 52 
Mudger's use of religious aesthetics is most striking in his inculcation of 
subservience to technology among his employees. The strategy is exemplified by his 
reminder to Selvy, after Selvy disconnects a bugging device, that the 'feeling in this 
unit concerning devices of any kind is close to religious', a 'feeling' Mudger seeks to 
maintain by ordering the errant agent's assassination (p. 105). For agents afflicted by 
death-anxiety, Mudger's infusion of technology with the spiritual offers spurious 
reassurance identical to that provided by Nazi ideology. In Selvy's addled mind, for 
example, technics become 'an inventory of personal worth' (p. 82). Yet, Mudger's 
coolly analytical approach to machinery and contempt for Selvy's commitment to 
Radial Matrix demonstrates that his interest in the subject extends only to 
manipulating the awe it inspires in his subordinates. In response to the assertion that 
SeIvy 'believes', meaning that he is dedicated to intelligence 'life', Mudger asks 
blankly 'Believes what? I (p. 14 1), while, in conversation with Moll, he observes 
cynically 'Devices make us pliant'; 'When technology reaches a certain level, people 
begin to feel like criminals' (p. 93). He understands instinctively that, in late 
capitalism, as Mandel puts it, 'Belief in the omnipotence of technology is the specific 
form of bouraeois ideology' (p. 50 1), a dogma Mudger's expertise in 'production flow 
systems and automation' equips him to exploit (p. 75). Mandel also remarks on the 
'hybrid and bastardized combination of organization and anarchy' to which this 
ideology leads in contemporary society, a formulation highly appropriate to the blend 
of military precision and contempt for legality that characterises Mudger's work 
(p. 502). Like DeLillo, Mandel believes late capitalist technocracy creates propitious 
52 Martin Heidegger, The Question of Technology and other Essays, trans. by William W. Lovitt (New 
York: Harper Torchbooks, 1997), p. 11. 
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circumstances for totalitarianism, asserting that such 'mechanical submission to 
"technological authority... creates 'perilous preconditions for semi-fascist acceptance 
of inhuman order' (p. 505). Mudger's encouragement of agents to identify with 
technology makes this metaphor of 'mechanical submission' disturbingly literal. To 
consolidate his hierarchical order, he pursues the thesis that 'Personal relations work 
like machinery', noting particularly the reduction in solidarity and moral inhibition 
that technology effects (p. 168). As he tells Moll, 'There's a neat correlation between 
the complexity of the hardware and the lack of genuine attachments. Devices make 
everyone pliant' (p. 9 1). Zygmunt Bauman observes the same phenomenon in Nazism, 
remarking that 'The technical-administrative success of the Holocaust was due in part 
to the skilful utilization of "moral sleeping pills" made available by modem 
technology'. 53 In pursuit of the 'Hitler' movie, Mudger increasingly resembles the 
fascists whose history he seeks to exploit. 
Robert Stone's Dog Soldiers presents the Vietnam War as similarly corrupting 
of human relationships. 54 It portrays two Veterans, Hicks and his relatively fragile 
counterpart Converse, who, unlike Selvy, challenges his subordinate position by 
mounting a raid on Hicks' supply of illegal drugs. Like Mudger, Hicks finds that his 
transcendence of death-anxiety permits him to manipulate subordinates and the 
physical world. He was 'at home in the world of objects. He believed that his close 
and respectful study of Japanese culture had enabled him to manipulate matter in a 
simple disciplined manner. ' 'He believed it was all in your head' (p. 77). In the same 
way, Mudger's manipulation of agents is made plain by the enviably sensual, creative 
relationship with technology he enjoys in private. DeLillo places particular emphasis 
53 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernijy and the Holocaust (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p. 26. 
54 Robert Stone, Dog Soldiers (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1974) 
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on the physical pleasure it affords him, suggesting that comfort with the body is 
crucial in maintaining autonomy in his relationship with technology. Conversely, 
Selvy's anxious, fetishistic relation to the machine is associated with a pathologically 
ascetic, dualistic retreat from the body. The CIA agent has a Spartan tendency to 
inhabit 'severely underfurnished' rooms (p. 24) and uses his body in purely 
instrumental fashion, 'with a curious efficiency', as a way of denying its perishable, 
organic nature (p. 35). By contrast, Mudger finds the process of sharpening his 
'cutting edge with a coarse hone' 'mysteriously pleasing' (p. 118), all the while, 
radiating a calm confidence DeLillo indicates by long repetitive sentences and 
soporific lists of implements (p. 119, p. 129). We read of the 'satisfactions of cutting 
along pencil lines, of measuring to the sheer edge of something and coming out right, 
of allowing for slight variations and coming out right, of mixing fluids and seeing the 
colours blend, a surface texture materializing out of brush striations' (P. 1 19). Mudger 
enjoys the approach to machinery that Heidegger calls 'releasement towards things', 
or the refusal to be influenced by technology in one's 'real core' (p. 54). In addition to 
its association with serenity and wealth, DeLillo suggests, less attractively, that this 
mindset may be compatible with the promulgation or tolerance of fascism, something 
true of Mudger and which proved to be the case in Heidegger's own life. Lightborne, 
the erotic art dealer who informs Mudger of the 'Hitler' movie's existence, is 
similarly unperturbed by both the somatic and the mechanical and evinces a 
nonchalant unconcern regarding the brutality of the Nazis and Radial Matrix. His 
calm response to the disrepair of his 'right shoe' and that of his gallery, where the 
'end table leaned a little' (p. 13), suggests an untroubled, if somewhat vapid, 
relationship with technology, while the sensuality that is the corollary of this 
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unruffled reaction is suggested partly by his interest in erotica, but also by several 
moments of unembarrassed carnal pleasure, including his consumption of the soaking 
'brown ooze' of a dunked biscuit (p. 19). He makes no moral judgement on Nazism, 
describing himself simply as a 'student of the period' and engaging in urbane analysis 
of the 'essential' value to the Nazis of films such as Leni Riefenstahl's 'The Triumph 
of the Will', which he believes lay in the creation of 'Myth, dreams, memory' (p. 52). 
It is notable, then, that when he finally views the 'Hitler' footage, he is shocked to 
appreciate that 'It was all so real' 'Objects were what they seemed to be. History was 
true', raising the possibility that his placidity, hitherto, has not derived from 
indifference or amorality, but a near autistic withdrawal from reality (p. 18 8). 
DeLillo uses the contrast between SeIvy's dualism and limited, computational 
cognition and Mudger's comparatively fertile thought and unified experience of mind 
and body to explore the psychological dynamics of fascism. Their relationship is lent 
a mediated, characteristically postmodem, quality by the fact they never actually meet 
and Mudger is unaware of Selvy's existence. Nevertheless, their predominant mode of 
'interaction' is a form of reciprocal imitation. In a move that parallels his 
encouragement of his agents to identify with technology, Mudger exploits his 
employees' intellectual enervation, by systematically mimicking their behaviour and 
seeking, by this means, to coerce them into a reciprocal identification with him. Like 
Freud's father of pre-history, who, as Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen argues, inspires his sons 
with the sense that their mind and subjectivity are 'abyssal', Mudger undermines his 
agents' intellect and self-confidence, to the point where they believe they require an 
'absolute Narcissus' with whom to identify. 55 Mudger's dissemination of attitudes to 
55 Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, The Freudian Subject. trans. by Catherine Porter (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1988), p. 239. 
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technology that he does not share indicates a wish to anticipate and manipulate his 
subordinates' most intimate desires. DeLillo suggests that this is Mudger's habitual 
tactic, noting Moll's experience that she 'had noticed during their first meeting how 
he tried to establish prior rights to convictions and views he assumed she held' 
(p. 170). It is striking, therefore, that 'Hitler's' behaviour in the sought after movie is 
closely comparable to Mudger's. Indeed, it may be read as an allegory of Mudger's 
habitual mimicry, implying that such tactics are typical of totalitarian leadership. 
'Hitler' impersonates Charlie Chaplin's famous 'tramp' persona, wearing 
Chaplinesque 'Baggy pants' and adopting a 'screwy mechanical walk' (pp. 234-5). 
The reference to Chaplin recalls the vacuous mechanical imitation with which his 
films are associated in Players and suggests that the same identification with 
technology underlies the totalitarian culture of Running Dog. Paul A. Cantor suggests 
that, in this scene, DeLillo intends the reader to conclude that 'Hitler' is imitating 
Chaplin's impersonation of him in The Great Dictator. 56 Yet, this is to miss the 
crucial parallel DeLillo draws between 'Hitler' and Mudger. DeLillo deliberately 
shows 'Hitler' imitating Chaplin's established routine, the 'tramp', just as Mudger 
consolidates power by mimicking views his interlocutors and employees already hold. 
Significantly, DeLillo draws attention to the high quality of 'Hitler's' imitations, 
implying that, as totalitarian leader, such mimicry has become habitual to him. 
Lightborne asserts that Hitler was 'a gifted mimic' and DeLillo confirms that the 
tepicene, guilty little smile' the dictator borrows from Chaplin is 'An accurate 
reproduction' (p. 236). It is an interpretation of Hitler's leadership borne out by Ian 
56 Paul A. Cantor, 'Adolf, We Hardly Knew You', in New Essays on White Noise, ed. by Frank 
Lentricchia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 199 1), pp. 39-62 (p. 56). 
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Kershaw's analysis of the marketing of the real life Nazi dictator. 57 According to 
Kershaw, Hitler built his popularity on appearing to embody the aspirations of the 
Germans, of claiming that he 'came as destiny from the inner essence of a people'. In 
doing so, Kershaw suggests Hitler promoted 'pseudo-democratic notions of a 
relationship between leader and "following"', in which the leader represented in an 
authoritative way the will of the people without standing above and outside it' (p. 19). 
In Running Dog, 'Hitler's' impersonation of Chaplin allegorises the way that dictators 
like Mudger promote such 'pseudo-democratic notions', by pre-empting the 
'convictions and views' of others. DeLillo suggests that, to sustain the illusion of 
representative government, totalitarian regimes must study their 'following' with 
considerable care, a view that implies a disturbingly close relation between 
dictatorship and the strategies of contemporary democratic governments. 
Selvy's continuing aspiration to embody the ethos of Radial Matrix confirms 
the success of Mudger's reciprocal imitation. With her usual perspicacity, Moll bears 
witness to Selvy's willing occupation of this secondary role. Significantly, she 
remarks upon it after watching Chaplin's The Great Dictator, a movie whose concern 
with fascism and mimicry foreshadows 'Hitler's' later impersonation of Chaplin 
(p. 61). Famously, The Great Dictator is Chaplin's satire of Hitler and concludes with 
an impersonation of the eponymous 'dictator' by a young barber, after the genuine 
leader has disappeared, having gone 'duck hunting' and 'fallen out of his boat' (p. 61). 
Both characters are played by Chaplin and are sufficiently ill suited to their position 
that they might be interpreted as engaged in mere imitation of their roles. 
Consequently, Moll's pointed remark that 'you're engraved on the moviegoing part of 
my brain. You and Charlie forever linked' might suggest that he resembles either 
57 Ian Kershaw, The Hitler M3qh: Image and Realijy in the Third Reich (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1989) 
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character or both. Given Selvy's inferior status, however, Moll is more likely to 
conceive of him as resembling the young barber, whose speech DeLillo calls 'A 
burlesque, an impersonation of the absent dictator (p. 61). Whatever her intention, her 
parallel between Selvy's identification with Mudger and the Chaplinesque mimicry on 
screen affirms that the mechanistic imitation of Players has, in Running Dog, been 
revealed as essential to the technocratic totalitarian politics of postmodernity. 
In the novel's final scenes, it is clear that, although Selvy aspires to a larger 
experience of mind that includes its intuitive and spiritual capacities, his self-imposed 
cognitive restrictions have caused permanent damage, rendering irreversible his self- 
destructive identification with the machine and his totalitarian master. DeLillo 
emphasises the continuing mechanical and cinematic quality of Selvy's mental 
process, by juxtaposing these climactic scenes with Lightborne's screening of the 
'Hitler' movie and remarking of Selvy's anticipation of death that he 'saw it as 
memory, as playback' (p. 229). Selvy clearly yearns for spiritual experience, but 
consistently mistakes the narrow restrictions, or 'heuristics', of his computational 
mind-set for religious discipline. He misunderstands Levi's suggestion that he 'limit 
himself to the narrowest subject' in order to fully apprehend his mental abilities, 
believing mistakenly that the 'Tighter and tighter limits' he already employs fulfil his 
teacher's instruction (p. 23 1). Selvy lacks the intellectual flexibility to consider 
objectivity as a mere epistemological tool and fixes upon it dogmatically as an 
ontological principle. Like many modem materialist philosophers, he jumps to the 
unwarranted conclusion that 'reality itself is objective' (Lzediscovery, p. 10). Rather 
comically, Selvy also comes to the unfounded conclusion that the Japanese are 
particularly spiritual, insisting that they communicate 'secretly, by inbom means'. 
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Yet, his use of the term 'apartness' to describe their 'challenging sense of calm' 
(p. 187) is disturbing because it recalls the same word applied to Lyle's alienated state 
in Players, suggesting an inability to distinguish spirituality from affectless 
withdrawal (Players, p. 72). Like Selvy's earlier use of the term 'emblem', it is a 
telling moment of intertextuality that indicates his wish to maintain the emotional 
desensitisation computational thought has brought him (p. 8 1). Stone presents spiritual 
study as, at least, creating an opportunity to acquire worldly influence: he depicts the 
dominant Hicks as 'a student of Zen', with an informed knowledge of 'Japanese 
culture', who 'endeavored to maintain a spiritual life' (Loldiers, p. 75). But, DeLillo's 
depiction of Selvy suggests a darker vision of American postmodernity, in which, for 
the victims of unbridled capitalism, the spiritual is a dubious consolation, sometimes 
sought out of a stifling sense of powerlessness. In Selvy's final scene, he vows 
adherence to Levi's spiritual doctrines, agreeing that 'Dying is an art in the East', yet 
articulates his supposed spiritual preparedness in the vocabulary of sterile machine 
action, which implies a wholly objective, third-person relation to his mind (p. 233). 
'I'm primed, Levi', he insists, 'I'm tuned, I'm ready' (p. 232). Such repeated 
misunderstanding of Levi's advice eventually dulls the reader's sympathy with 
Selvy's spiritual quest and causes his death to come as something of a relief. After his 
murder by Mudger's agent, 'Augie the Mouse, Selvy is decapitated, parodying the 
dualistic treatment of mind and body that has accompanied his computational thought 
throughout. Since this mind-body split was first prompted by his dread of mortality, it 
seems highly appropriate that in death it becomes irrevocable. 
167 
Chapter 5 
'The Art of Human Consciousness': the Construction of Selfhood in 'The Names' and 
'White Noise' 
PlUers (1977) and Running Dog (1978) focus on a highly abstract form of 
cognition that is based on computation and the severely attenuated model of self to 
which it leads. 1 In The Names (1982) and White Noise (1984), DeLillo continues his 
examination of noetic modes of thought, particularly objectivist materialism and 
linguistic formalism, and the difficulty of forging an adequate subjectivity that is 
invariably their correlative in DeLillo's oeuvre. 2 In their varying ways, these texts 
address the difficulty, present in DeLillo's work since Americana (1971), of creating a 
sustainable sense of self in the midst of what Leonard Wilcox calls the 'decentering 
forces' of postmodern culture. 3A number of DeLillo critics, including Wilcox, have 
suggested that the demise of modernist notions of subjectivity make this project 
impracticable. Yet, in both of these novels DeLillo portrays protagonists who come to 
reject the modernist idea of the self as stable and self-identical and to feel the need for 
a subjectivity that partakes of what Diane Elam has called postmodernism's 'concern 
with the persistence of excess'. 4 For DeLillo's characters, this abundance manifests 
primarily as an increased respect for the ontological status of their mind and 
subjectivity, a belief that these categories exist in excess of the dazzling polyphony of 
signification, in The Names, and, in White Noise, the looming threat of mortality. 
1 Don DeLillo, Players (London: Vintage, 1991) and Running Dog (London: Vintage, 1992) 
2 Don DeLillo, The Names (London: Picador, 1989) and White Noise (London: Picador, 1989) 
3 Don DeLillo, Americana (London: Penguin, 1990) and Leonard Wilcox, 'Baudrillard, DeLillo's 
White Noise and the End of Heroic Narrative' in Don DeLillo's White Noise, ed. by Harold Bloom 
(Philadelphia, PA: Chelsea House Publishers, 2003), pp. 97-115 (p. 99). 
4 Diane Elam, Romancing the Postmodern (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 2. 
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DeLillo told Adam Begley that, beginning with The Names, he 'tried to find a deeper 
level of seriousness' in his work, a search for greater depth that, in these two novels, 
5 
manifests in a closer examination of themes long implicit in his oeuvre. In White 
Noise, this takes the form of an extended treatment of the death-anxiety that pervades 
his work, in which DeLillo portrays a university lecturer Jack Gladney, his wife 
Babette, and their numerous children. The novel presents a far more detailed and 
elaborate exploration of this fear than earlier DeLillo novels such as Americana, 
concentrating particularly on the various means by which Jack and Babette seek to 
conquer their terror. DeLillo suggests that they eventually achieve a qualified 
rapprochement with mortality, first, by adopting a Buddhist notion of the self as 
equivalent to the nothingness of death and then by discovering in a psychological 
merger of self and death a model of mind and subjectivity in excess of its innate 
mortality. 
In The Names, there is less focus on death and DeLillo's more extended 
treatment of recurrent themes is apparent in his most detailed analysis so far of the 
exigencies of creating a sense of self. As in White Noise, this process depends upon 
attributing ontological worth to mind and subjectivity. Yet, because the novel's 
primary theme is the relation between mind and language it engages with various 
forms of signification, including the languages of Greece, the Middle East, and India, 
where the novel's action takes place. It rejects the notion that language constrains the 
mind, taking John Dewey's position that 'language is not thought', and adopting a 
view similar to that of Walter B enj amin that mind exists in excess of the language that 
5 Adam Begley, 'Don DeLillo: The Art of Fiction CXXXVI, in PaLis -Review, 
28 (1993), 275-306 (p. 
284). 
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conveys its 'mental content'. 6 Nevertheless, critics of The Names have seldom 
emphasised DeLillo's concern with mind and self, often preferring to treat his concern 
with language in isolation. Dennis A. Foster, for instance, argues that DeLillo presents 
language as paradigmatic of 'civilized systems' that produce 'terror, ecstasy, and 
death', while Paula Bryant depicts the novel as a 'labyrinthine trek through language 
itself'. 7 Others have argued that the theme of language underpins an exploration of 
political issues. Matthew J. Morris suggests language 'serves' the theme of 'political 
and sexual oppression'. 8 Mark Osteen makes the related point that the protagonist 
James Axton recognises language as 'the necessary ligature of filial and communal 
bonds' and argues that it is a necessary part of his journey 'towards commitment and 
community'. 9 Osteen regards James' primary difficulty as his uneasy, near 
xenophobic, reaction to Greek culture. Yet, he does not remark on the awkward 
imperialist situation in which James lives, which presents moral difficulties, but more 
importantly, as we will see, an outmoded modernist model of subjectivity that 
discourages him from forming a sense of self. 
The novel is set in the characteristically postmodern milieu of an American 
expatriate community, many of whose members work in finance and intelligence and 
are motivated by the movements of what Fredric Jameson calls 'multi-national 
6 John Dewey, How We Think (New York: Prometheus books, 1991), p. 170 and Walter Benjamin, 'On 
Language as Such and on the Language of Man, in Selected Writings, Vol. 11: 1913-26, trans. by 
Edmund Jephcott and ed. by Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1996), pp. 62-74 (p. 64). 
7 Dennis A. Foster, "'Alphabetic Pleasures": The Names', in Introducing Don DeLillo, ed. by Frank 
Lentricchia (Durham: Duke University Press 199 1), pp. 1 57-173 (p. 172) and Paula Bryant, 'Discussing 
the Untellable: Don DeLillo's The Names', in Critigue: Studies in Contempora! y Fiction, 29 (1987), 
16-29 (p. 16). 
8 Matthew J. Morris, 'Murdering Words: Language in Action in The Names', in Contempora 
Literature, 30 (1989), 113-127 (pI 13). 
9 Mark Osteen, American Magic and Dread: Don DeLillo's DialoRue with Culture (Philadelphia, PA: 
University of Philadelphia Press, 2000), p. 1 18. 
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capital'. 10 These characters, based largely in Athens, belong to an itinerant, wealthy 
group that Zygmunt Bauman would call 'globetroffers' or 'supra-national traders', 
whose existence is made possible by globalised capitalist-imperialism and Western 
military power. 11 The Names therefore pays close attention to postmodem 
manifestations of imperialism, especially those that emanate from the U. S., and 
studies their effects on oppressor and victim alike. For the latter, the most obvious 
consequence is the enervation of national identity. As Andreas Eliades, the Greek 
lover of diplomat's wife Ann Maitland, points out, 'The occupiers fail to see the 
people they control' (p. 237). To serve U. S. Cold War strategy, Greece is treated as an 
adjunct of the Middle East, exploited for its strategic position, but always ranked 
second to 'the Turks', whose help is required in strengthening NATO and 
consolidating U. S. influence in the Middle East (p. 59). On the Western side, the 
power and, to some degree, sense of responsibility of the imperialists, leads them to 
adopt an anachronistic subjectivity, based on modernist notions of self-identity, or 
what the archaeologist Owen Brademas calls the 'ideal balance' of the self (P. 307). 
DeLillo implies that its logical accompaniment is the supposed equivalence of 
signifier and signified characteristic of modernist naturalism. This relationship 
between naturalism and imperialist 'balance' is comparable to what Walter Benn 
Michaels calls 'the logic of naturalism', which, he argues, prevailed in early 
twentieth-century literature and was the correlative of the 'gold standard'. 12 Michaels 
writes that in naturalist fiction characters were expected to prove their self-identity, to 
be 'equal' to their 'face value' and therefore, metaphorically, 'to become gold' (p. 22). 
10 Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism. or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (London: Verso, 1993), 
p. 49. 
11 Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Love (Cambridge: The Polity Press, 2003), p. 142. 
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To convey the outmoded naturalism for which his characters strive, DeLillo employs 
the most naturalistic, seemingly transparent prose of his career thus far; an approach 
that contrasts strikingly with the mannered, elliptical style of his two previous novels. 
True to this naturalism, DeLillo demonstrates a concern for the accurate 
representation of nature, dwelling on what he calls the 'elemental landscapes' that 
impressed him while living in Greece in the late 1970s (Begley, p. 284). As in End 
Zone and Ratner's Star, where the thinness of characters indicates the unreal quality 
of their perceptions, in DeLillo, form is often allegorical of thematics. In The Names 
the supposed transparency of naturalism is appropriate to the Americans' simplistic 
assumptions of superiority, exemplified by their arrogant importation of what James 
calls 'our own model of democratic calm' (p. 96). It combines with what DeLillo calls 
'idealized cafd dialogue' (Begley, p. 285) to help convey the claustrophobia and moral 
enervation that afflicts the Western community, which result in numerous adulteries 
and deceptions and the decadent ennui of characters like Del Nearing, lover of film 
director Frank Volterra, who spends time 'writing a postcard to her cat' (P. 202). 
DeLillo reinforces these connections to modernism by providing clear parallels with 
the treatment of colonial peoples in the early twentieth-century novel. Del's remark 
that the Greek soldiers are 'no different from the Arabs and Turks. They're sloppy- 
looking aren't they? ' (p. 145) recalls numerous crude racist statements in modernist 
fiction, for example, Ronny Heaslop's in E. M. Forster's A Passage To India that 
Indians are 'Incredible, aren't they, even the best of themT, they 'all forget their back 
collar studs sooner or later'. 13 Similarly, the English Peter Maitland's absurdly 
12 Walter Benn Michaels, The Gold Standard and the Logic of Naturalism: American Literature at the 
Turn of the Centu (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987) 
13 E. M. Forster, A Passage to India (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974), p. 93. 
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arrogant aside that the Middle East is 'second-rate' (p. 163) and the 'curious 
outdatedness' of Peter's face suggests DeLillo is satirising the English colonial novel, 
in particular, and America's failure to outgrow its prejudices (p. 165). The convivial 
but vapid atmosphere apparent of these exchanges is undermined by the characters' 
bigoted suspicion of the atavism of Greek and Middle Eastern culture, expressed in a 
sinister yet seductive tone reminiscent of Conrad. James wonders, for example, 
whether a Greek friendship he observes is determined by 'A blood recollection, a 
shared past' (p. 64) and remarks portentously on his 'fear of things that come from the 
sea' in Greece and the equal terror of the 'silent inland presence' (P. 73). 
Their existential uniformity denies the novel's Western characters the self- 
reflexivity of postmodem selfhood, particularly its capacity for intelligent self- 
criticism. It also creates a local perception of Westerners as equivalent and 
interchangeable, something demonstrated by the repeated confusion of James with the 
banker David Keller, a mistake that eventually threatens his life, when local terrorists 
seek to assassinate the financier (pp. 325-9). Keller is closely involved with the IMF 
and the U. S. Government and, on first meeting, Andreas lectures James on these 
subjects, only to be robbed of his 'moral force' on discovering his error (p. 59). These 
moments of confusion convey the difficulty that the Westerners' anachronistic 
subjectivity creates for the oppressed in locating agency and responsibility within 
capitalist-imperialism. As we will see, the attempted assassination has particular 
significance for James' view of ontology: the fear it inspires helps convince him to 
embrace a more contemporary mode of subjectivity. 
In the meantime, repelled by imperialist subjectivity and fearful of confronting 
his emotional life, James fails to forge anything he can recognise as a selL His belief 
that 'being a husband and father is a form of Hitlerism' (p. 16) prevents him fulfilling 
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his familial responsibilities. In an imperialist context, the choice of the term 
'Hitlerism' is highly charged and implies that James' failure to create an adequate 
subjectivity arises from a reluctance to be implicated in quasi-fascist U. S. aggression. 
DeLillo uses James' avoidance of the Parthenon as a metaphor for these anxieties. 
Osteen interprets this as James shunning 'involvement in Greek culture' (p. 119). 1 
suggest that James is 'daunted' by the temple's 'dignity, order and proportion' (p. 3) 
partly because it contrasts with his own vacuity or 'inadequacy', but also because it 
symbolises imperialist subjectivity (p. 5). Vincent J. Bruno remarks on the 'sheer 
intelligence and strength of the architectonic system' at work in the temple, which 
suggests the intimidating effect its impressive structure might have on James. 14 More 
significantly, Thomas R. Martin mentions that the Parthenon's construction coincided 
with the apogee of Athenian imperial might, having being built to honour Athena as 
'the divine champion of Athenian military power'; the temple is therefore an 
archetypal representation of the imperialist model of selfhood that repels him. 15 This 
explains why James 'stayed away from the Acropolis' for most of the novel and why 
his eventual decision to visit is sufficiently significant that DeLillo chooses it to 
conclude the diegetic narrative (p. 3). James' courage in making the trip indicates his 
growing self-assurance, a radical alteration in his approach to language, and the 
resolution of his relation to imperialism (p. 330). Nevertheless, in the meantime, his 
distrust of interior experience causes him to adopt a rather wan parody of his peers' 
modernist subjectivity. According to the list of '27 depravities', which he writes and 
presents as an account of his archaeologist wife Kathryn's complaints about him, he 
14 The Parthenon. ed. by Vincent J. Bruno (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1996), p. 67. 
15 Thomas R. Martin, Ancient Greece: From Prehistoric to Hellenistic Times (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1996), p. 119. 
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imitates the 'balanced' self by becoming 'politically neuter', pretending 'to be even- 
tempered', and denying himself 'the full pleasure of things' (pp. 16-17). This leaves 
him infuriated by his own vacuity. He admits to becoming reliant on his wife's 
'rigorous choices and fixed beliefs' (p. 55) and asks, in anguish, 'What are my 
qualities? ' (p. 49). This despairing question implies a direct reference to Robert 
Musil's The Man Without Qualities and its protagonist's fruitless quest for selfhood. 
16 By recalling this classic of modernist literature, DeLillo not only emphasises 
James' sense of hopelessness but emphasises the persistently enervating effect of 
outmoded modernist ideas in the novel's postmodern milieu. 
For long periods, James is supported in his evasion of selfhood by his friend 
Owen Brademas, the leader of his wife's archaeological dig, who, in James' words, 
flees subjectivity because he has known the painful 'consequences of self discovery' 
(p. 36). James expresses a wish to 'conceal' himself 'in Owen's unprotected pain' 
(p. 205), an apotropaic use of a more powerful personality that foreshadows Jack 
Gladney's use of Hitler in White Noise to ameliorate his death-anxiety. Owen and 
James achieve their and goal through the fetishisation of rationality. They pursue a 
formalism that is comparable to the computational epistemology adopted by Lyle and 
Pammy in Players, which excludes reference altogether and therefore the painful 
'signified' of emotion. 17 James treated his previous work as a freelance writer as a 
purely formal exercise. He emphasised his lack of creativity and autonomy by calling 
himself a ghostwriter and admits that he recalls a book he produced on military 
strategy only as 'grammar and syntax' (p. 242). Now, in Greece, he has foregone 
16 Robert Musil, The Man Without Oualities trans. by Sophie Wilkins and Burton Pike (London: 
Picador, 1997) 
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whatever small degree of fecundity his previous work offered. He earns money by 
analysing the risks of Middle Eastern terrorism for The Northeast Group; a job that 
'doesn't involve writing anything but reports and memos' (p. 197). The task depresses 
him and, according to Kathryn, makes him 'afraid' of the burgeoning creative talent 
of his son Tap, who is writing a novel about Owen's early life (p. 127). Appropriately, 
the 'coded jargon' that Kathryn and Tap use to exclude James is known as 'Ob', a 
prefix signifying restriction or impediment and implying a wry reference to the 
emotional limitations implicit in James' intellectual austerity (p. 10). Owen follows a 
similarly structuralist trajectory, gradually losing interest in 'earlier cultures' and 
analysing signifiers in isolation from their referents. By fetishistically perceiving a 
6mysterious importance in the letters as such, the blocks of characters', Owen reduces 
his profession to playful observation of lexical coincidence (p. 35). For example, he 
perceives unwarranted significance in the location of a site between 'Zarqa' and 
'Azraq' (p. 76), which are anagrams of one another. It is an approach whose 
shallowness is literalised in the pointed assertion of his colleague Anand Dass that 
Owen is 'the worst field director in my experience'. 'He digs like an amateur' (p. 255). 
Owen's 'unsettling mental force' (p. 17) and his enthusiasm for what he calls the 
'mind's little infinite' (p. 76) suggests that his fear of emotion causes him to 
emphasise mind at the expense of subjectivity. Indeed, Owen later admits that 'I only 
feel safe from myself', with an 'accidental pattern to observe in the physical world' 
(p. 172). Owen's carefully limited cognition is shared by numerous Westerners in the 
novel and exemplified by Ann Maitland's son Peter, who visits Greece halfway 
through the novel and who practices 'Pure Mathematics', the discipline that DeLillo 
17 John R. Searle, 'Minds, Brains, Programs', in The Mind's 1: Fantasies and Reflections on Self and 
Soul, composed and arranged by Douglas R. Hofstadter and Daniel C. Dennett (Frome, Somerset: 
Penguin, 1981), pp. 353-73 (p. 371). 
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satirises in Ratner's Star for its excessive concentration on rational thought. Like 
Owen and James, the young man obsessively avoids reference. He speaks with a 'self- 
referring note of complaint' (p. 165) and, like Ratner's Star's scientists, produces 'no 
analogies from the real world that might help him explain' his academic work (p. 163). 
This concern with the signifier leads to a modernist scepticism of selfhood and 
intuitive thought, comparable to that of C. S. Peirce. Peirce's contention that all 
thought is cognized 'in signs', which are arbitrary means that he sees each thought as 
'determined by a previous one', which, by its nature, must be equally contingent. 18 
He concludes that 'a special intuitive faculty' is therefore unlikely to exist and what 
he terms 'Self-consciousness', or 'the recognition of my private self' (P. 43) is merely 
a single 'sign' among many and of dubious validity (p. 67). More than James, who 
eventually rejects such notions, Owen is seduced by the possibility of escaping what 
he calls the confrontation with 'death and oneself (p. 284). Until his death, he 
maintains that the self is an intellectual fiction and that he is 'No one' (P. 292) or, in 
Peirce's terms, that 'man and the external sign are identical' and 'Thus my language 
is the sum total of myself-, for the man is the thought' (p. 84). 
James' professional and personal position is replete with irony. Given his 
suspicion of empire, the incongruity of his working as a risk analyst seeking to 
safeguard the interests of a multi-national American corporation is painfully apparent 
and results in his evident alienation from the job. Moreover, despite rejecting the one- 
to-one correspondence of the self-identical imperial self, his abstract formalism 
enmeshes him in an abstruse, polyphonic textuality, which, rather than freeing him 
from linguistic reference, as he hopes, compels him to and examination of reference 
between signifiers. Given his role as representative of American empire, his 
" Charles Sanders Peirce, Peirce on Signs: Writings on Serniotic (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 199 1), pp. 49-50. 
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structuralism means that he risks replicating what Edward Said calls the 'textual' 
attitude that Western culture has taken to the East, constructing it as a mysterious 
document to be decoded. 19 Said argues that this view of the East has, for its 
translators, manifested as 'a set of constraints upon and limitations of thought' (P. 42) 
that have meant 'rising above immediacy, beyond self, into the foreign and distant' 
(p. 32). The description aptly characterises James and Owen's evasions of subjectivity 
through linguistic formalism and the striking callousness that their intellectual 
position often entails. At one point, Owen admits to being impressed by a story of the 
explorer Rawlinson who forced a Kurdish boy to inch 'across a rock mass' to help 
'decipher cuneiform writing'. On relating the tale, he remarks wonderingly on 'how 
far men will go to satisfy a pattern' and ignores the possibility that, in Kathryn's 
words, the story might be interpreted as 'a political allegory' (p. 80). Owen sees the 
aggression implicit in the type of 'textual' attitude that Said questions but dismisses it 
as a consequence of writing's primary function of inscribing and constructing a self. 
He remarks on the double meaning of the term 'character' as both self and symbol 
and points out the harsh nature of its etymological roots in a 'Greek word' that means 
"to brand or sharpen... (p. 10). Owen's discomforting view of writing recalls the 
hyperbolic assessment of Claude Ldvi-Strauss that 'the primary function of written 
communication is to facilitate slavery', as well as the more measured remarks of 
poststructuralist philosophers such as Jacques Derrida, who speaks of 'the original 
violence of discourse'. 20 It suggests Owen's flight from subjectivity, like James', is 
partly due to distaste for its inherent 'violence', especially in an imperialist context, 
19 Edward Said, Orientalism (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991), p. 80. 
20 Claude Ldvi-Strauss, Tristes Tropique trans. by John and Doreen Weightman (London: Jonathan 
Cape, 1973), p. 299 and Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference trans. by Alan Bass (London: 
Routledge, 2003), p. 166. 
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where selfhood is often formed in aggressive opposition to a demonic, mysterious 
other. Coming from Owen, this reticence is particularly significant because, as an 
archaeologist, he is part of the intellectual apparatus Said would argue has created 
Orientalism as a 'Western style for dominating' and 'restructuring' the Orient (Said, 
p. 3). Seen in this light, his incompetence as 'field director' may be a symptom of his 
declining enthusiasm for the imperialist project and signal a general desire among the 
colonisers to abandon their modernist interpretative hubris for a more self-critical 
methodology. He may recognise that, as M. Faruk Zein asserts, 'The academic 
interest of the West in the Orient has often been a prelude to practical application for 
the purpose of power and control over the Orient'. 21 As Kathryn notes archly, 
'Subdue and codify'. 'How many times have we seen itT (p. 80). The novel certainly 
takes seriously this nexus of power and knowledge: DeLillo depicts close contact 
between Western academics, business people, and intelligence agents, who subsist in 
an insular environment with little direct knowledge of their host culture. The 
academics' linguistic formalism has its close correlate in the noetic, even mechanical, 
thought pursued by corporate and intelligence personnel, while they engage in the 
'construction' of 'oil' facilities (p. 70) and research for the CIA. The intelligence 
operative George Rowser, for instance, is said to think according to the computational 
principle of 'On-off, one zero', a further example of the robotic nature of 
contemporary American cognition that DeLillo portrays in Players and Running Dog 
(p. 97). Like those texts, The Names employs some of the conventions of the 'spy 
thriller' and associates intelligence work with self-abnegation and the loss of what 
Michael Denning calls 'human agency'. 22 Late in the novel, DeLillo reveals that 
21 M. Faruk Zein, Christianijy. Islam and Orientalism London: Saqi, 2003), p. 165. 
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James' risk analyses for The Northeast Group has been passed to the CIA without his 
knowledge or consent (p. 315). One is left to conclude that the abstract formalism of 
the American imperialist project leaves its participants with little more autonomy than 
its victims. 
James' rejection of this limited mindset is catalysed by a series of killings 
committed by a mysterious cult. Initially, the victims appear to be selected for their 
mental or physical weakness, but Owen and James begin to suspect that they contain 
'Pattern, order, some sort of unifying light'. As Owen puts it, 'The letters matched' 
(p. 169). The organisation matches the victim's initials with those of the place in 
which they are murdered and inscribes them on the hammer or knife used to kill them. 
For example, 'Michaelis Kalliambetsos' is attacked in 'Mikro Kamini', and so on 
(p. 168). Paula Bryant has seen this deadly lexical game as an attempt to bind 'symbol 
and object into one-to-one correspondence' (p. 19). Yet, no meaningful relation is 
established between 'symbol' and 'object' and the killings seem irrelevant to such a 
purpose. It therefore seems more likely that the murders are calculated to demonstrate 
the unnecessary violence inherent in such literalism. In particular, they parody the 
correspondence of signifier and signified inherent in the 'balanced' naturalism of their 
Western masters and their 'textual' approach to the Orient. The empty but endlessly 
interpretable semiotic of the murders replicates and subverts the vacuous structures of 
imperialism and is, in Gayatri Spivak terms, an attempt at 'reversing, displacing and 
seizing the apparatus of value-coding'. 23 As Owen claims dispiritedly at the climax of 
the novel, 'These killings mock us. They mock our need to structure and classify, to 
22 Michael Denning, Cover Stories: Narrative and Ideology in the British Spy Thriller (London: 
Routledge, 1987), p. 14. 
23 Gayatri Spivak, 'Postcoloniality and Value' in Literary Theory Today, ed. by P. Collier and H. Gaya- 
Ryan (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), pp. 219-44 (p. 228). 
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build a system against the terror in our souls' (p. 308). By voiding meaning, the cult 
seeks to do what Homi K. Bhaba calls 'speak "outside the sentence... and replace it 
with the 'affective language of metaphor and the body'. 24 In Derridean terms, the cult 
fashions a text that 'exceeds the logos (of meaning, lordship, presence etc. )', in which 
its imperialist masters have so much invested (Derrida, p. 338). 
The cult's satiric intent extends to the ruthless practices of Western capitalism. 
By sacrificing only unproductive members of society, the 'feeble-minded' (P. 75) or 
'crippled' (p. 87), who exist 'outside the accepted social structure' (p. 171), the cult 
ironically mimics capitalist modernity, which, as Bauman notes, turns out 'huge 
volumes of human waste' (p. 123). In the process of sacrifice, they may also seek to 
symbolically redeem their victim from what George Bataille calls the imprisonment 
of 'individual separateness' that capitalist-imperialism imposes and return them to 
'continuity with all being'. 25 But, as Andreas tells James, 'power is blind in both 
eyes' (p. 237) and the American protagonists' first reaction is to assume that the 
murders are motivated by the 'denial of our base reality' that, in DeLillo's work, 
motivates much of American abstract thought. James appeals to the idea of thought as 
computation, calling it 'A death by system, by machine-intellect' (p. 175) Owen takes 
the same austere approach, missing the cult's parodic intention and insisting that, as in 
John R. Searle's account of computational epistemology, there is 'Nothing signified, 
nothing meant' (p. 216). Their view of the cult as devotees of Western abstraction is 
briefly encouraged by the killers' apparent willingness to collaborate on a film version 
of their exploits with Frank Volterra, which he plans as an abstract 'essay on film, on 
what film is' (p. 199). Volterra arrogantly assumes that because they are 'educated' 
24 Homi K. Bhaba, 'Postcolonial Authority and Postmodern Guilt', in Cultural Studies, ed. by 
Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson, and Paula Treichler (New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 56-68 (p. 63). 
25 Georges Bataille, Eroticism, trans. by Mary Dalwood (London: Marion Boyars, 1998), p. 90. 
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and 'reasonable' the cult will accept that 'what they do' is 'natural to film' (p. 200), 
but their curt rejection of the offer suggests they never shared his cinematic sensibility 
and considered a movie only as a possible means of self-publicity. The cult's distrust 
of imperialism leads to what Volterra's contact Andahl calls a wish to 'define things' 
independently and, consequently, their approach to technology is highly detached and 
analytical. They conclude that, while a book 'throws a shadow', 'a film is a shadow', 
implying that Western film technology renders diffuse and insubstantial whatever it 
represents (p. 212). As Jean Baudrillard notes of contemporary Islamist terrorism, their 
feat is to 'have adapted to the global network and technical protocols' but maintained 
their 'complicity "unto death"'. 26 
James reacts to the killings by experiencing an unexpected expansion of mind 
and self: he feels 'A terrible elation. A knowledge bounded by emptiness and fear' 
(p. 170). This Gnostic sense of wordless understanding is generally left unremarked by 
critics but it manifests an awareness of the excess of mind over the parodic 
signification and (non) meaning implicit in the cult murders. The cult's logic of 
excess inspires James to discover an analogous abundance in his experience of mind 
and self, giving him a revitalised and lasting sense of the ontological status of mind. 
When walking through the village used by the cult, the observation that 'All the 
buildings joined', forming 'one structure', causes him to speculate that the group's 
action may be the manifestation of a powerful unified mind, or what he calls 'One 
mind, one madness' (p. 196). It is in this sense that I interpret DeLillo's remark to 
27 Maria Moss that the cult acts from an 'impetus of pure mind'. The cult means to 
26 Jean Baudrillard, The Spirit of Terrorism and Requiem for the Twin Towers, trans. by Chris Turner 
(London: Verso, 2002), p. 22. 
27 Maria Moss, "'Writing as a Deeper Form of Concentration": An Interview with Don DeLillo', in 
Sources, 6 (1989), 82-97 (p. 90). 
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overcome the wholly abstract Western view of consciousness and enlarge their 
oppressors' sense of mind to include intuitive and unconscious thought. Andahl tells 
James that they are 'working at a preverbal level', seeking a 'method' that 'finds a 
home in your unconscious mind' (p. 208). Notably, the gnosis that the cult induces 
also causes an enlargement of James' sense of self. He wonders whether people 'make 
things to define the boundaries of the self? ', implying a fresh sense of subjectivity as 
abundantly large and potentially excessive (p. 133). James begins to separate agency 
and observation, in a way that implies abandonment of modernist self-identity. 
Significantly, the cult members' village catalyses this shift. Walking there, he feels 
'strangely, self-consciously alone' and remarks that 'This place was returning to me a 
sense of my own motion through it' (p. 196). 
The impact of sacrificial murder on James' model of mind and self recalls the 
effect that this form of death has upon Abraham's sense of self in Soren's 
Kierkegaard's Fear and Tremblin . 
28 In agreeing to the seemingly meaningless 
murder of his son Isaac, he gains 'an absolute relation to the absolute' (P. 72). As 
Derrida argues, the call for sacrifice resonates in the 'absolute "me" or "self ": 'that 
structure of invisible interiority that is called, in Kierkegaard's sense, subjectivity 2' 
Sacrifice inescapably calls attention to the selfhood of the victim and selfhood as 
such. It is therefore a useful tool for the disruption of what Baudrillard, with reference 
to the terrorist tactics of Al-Qaeda, calls the Western 'system of generalised 
exchange' (p. 9). For B audrillard, the tactic of 'symbolic and sacrificial' death (p. 17), 
their own or that of others, enables the terrorist to introduce an 'irreducible 
28 Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembliniz and The Sickness Unto Death. trans. by Walter Lourie 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1954). 
29 Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death, trans. by David Wills (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1996), p. 109. 
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singularity' (p. 9). In this way, the cult inspires James to examine his internal 
experience. Like Abraham, whose knowledge of the absolute 'cannot be mediated' by 
ordinary ethics and who therefore 'cannot talk' (p. 70), James withholds the cult's 
secrets from Frank and discovers that the knowledge 'confers a culthood of its own' 
(p. 247). When the killings are publicised, Owen experiences a sudden awareness of 
what James calls an 'absoluteness' in the landscape, which, significantly, directs his 
attention inwards, towards questions of subjectivity: Owen calls it a 'mysterious 
absolute' that is 'tied up with self-perception' (p. 1 13). This 'absolute' recalls the 
'eternity' and 'infinity' that, in A Passage to India, the deluded Miss Quested 
discovers in the portentous "boum" of the Marabar caves (pp. 147-48). In both 
novels, the 'absolute' or 'infinite' symbolises the vacuity of the colonial project and 
the protagonist's subjectivity. Unlike Forster's modernist protagonist, however, who 
is incapable of critical reflection, Owen's self-reflexive Derridean insight that the 
'absolute' is related to 'self-perception' (p. 113) suggests that the cult has inspired 
Owen and James to begin the transition to postmodem ideas of selfhood. 
This impression is confirmed by James' growing dissatisfaction with linguistic 
formalism. With his increased interest in interiority comes an interest in the signified, 
a desire to 'know the names of things' (p. 13 8), rather than the love of 'letters as such' 
that Owen helped engender (p. 35). Perceiving mind and subjectivity as in excess of 
language and meaning, he no longer sees signification as harbouring the threat of an 
unwanted subjectivity. He even abandons any notion of a unitary self and begins 'to 
perceive solitude as a collection of things rather than an absence' (p. 162). The 
corollary is a new pleasure in his son's fiction writing (p. 31 1) and a craving to return 
for the relative creativity of his freelance work, which he wryly terms a 'higher 
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typing' (p. 318). The discovery that The Northeast Group has used his risk analysis 
reports in a 'back-channel dialogue with the CIA' affirms and accelerates his rejection 
of formalism (p. 315). He understands that his evasion of personal autonomy has 
rendered him liable to 'blind involvement' in the 'designs' of others and feels that this 
reality proves 'retroactively correct' every 'bitter grievance' of Kathryn's concerning 
his passivity and emotional detachment. As James remarks shrewdly, it shone 'a 
second light on anything and everything' (p. 317). It causes one to re-examine earlier 
incidents; for example, his discovery that there is 'an Arabic letter called jLM' (P. 144) 
and Andahl's wry reference to him as 'Axstone' rather than Axton (p. 212). Given the 
manipulation to which he has been subjected, these reveal themselves as metaphors 
for his own formalist reduction to an instrument of imperial power, in which role his 
subjectivity was little more than that of an alphabetic character or tool that carves the 
inscriPtions of others. 
In the final stages of the novel, James makes further strides towards 
combining his burgeoning subjectivity, which he calls 'private forms, outlines for a 
human figure', with a view of language as subservient to his mind and self (P. 320). 
His former fetishisation of the signifier led him to accept the Heideggerian view that 
&our speaking merely follows language constantly' and that language can 'transform 
us into itself . 
30 Now, he adopts Walter Ben amin's position that the human subject 
'communicates his own mental being' 'by naming all other things', with the clear 
implication that 'mental being' exists in excess of any name employed to 
communicate its content (p. 64). Tap's fiction writing plays a significant role in this 
transformation: while reading a draft of his novel 'The Prairie', James takes 
30 Martin Heidegger, On the Way to Language, trans. by Peter D. Hertz (New York: Harper and Row, 
1971), pp. 73-4, p. 75. 
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unexpected pleasure in Tap's 'spirited misspellings', savouring their restoration of 
human agency to language. Of these erroneous signifiers, James remarks that 'He'd 
made them new again, made me see how they worked'. 'They were ancient things, 
secret, reshapable' (p. 313). Soon after reading these passages, James is inspired to 
resign his job and contemplates a more creative use of language in a 'return to the 
freelance life' (p. 318). This expansive gesture prefigures the considerable sense of 
ownership he begins to demonstrate with regard to the Word, which is exemplified 
when, during his eventual visit to the Parthenon, he asserts boldly that 'Our offering is 
language' (p. 330). DeLillo affirms the importance of Tap's writing by concluding The 
Names with a few pages of his work in progress. These follow James' climactic and 
cathartic visit to the Parthenon, which would have constituted a more conventional 
modernist ending to the novel. By doing so, DeLillo provides a distinctly 
postmodernist conclusion, which, in its seemingly excessive extension of the text, 
offers a formal parallel to the excess inherent in James' model of consciousness. 
By contrast with James' embrace of postmodernist excess, the subject of Tap's 
writings, Owen finds it unbearable to contemplate the demise of his modernist 
formalism, which remains his sole bulwark against the otherwise 'unprotected pain' 
(p. 205) of 'self discovery' (p. 36). He misinterprets the cult as fellow formalists, 
telling James, with regard to the killings, that 'Nothing applies' (p. 168) and 'I 
wouldn't look for meaning' (p. 170). His affinity for the organisation becomes 
obsession: he is 'gravitationally bound' to it (p. 286). He pursues its members to India, 
where James visits his friend and finds him 'a little more than weary' (p. 275). Owen 
is on the verge of death, a demise that appears to symbolise the failure of his 
structuralist epistemology. To acknowledge James' notion of the signifier as 
subordinate to the 'mental content' it conveys is anathema to Owen. However, like his 
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friend, he now feels a powerful impulse 'to learn the names of things' and construct a 
self. The difference is that, in Owen's case, the feeling is involuntary. It induces a 
morbid depression and a belief that 'the mystery of alphabets' leads inevitably to 
terrifying contact with what he calls 'death and oneself, one's other self' (p. 284). 
Moreover, this desire for selfhood is juxtaposed menacingly with a flashback to his 
mother's unsympathetic instruction 'to be more impressive', which hints at the 
humiliation with which he associates the imperative to construct a self (p. 286). Tap's 
concluding narrative contains similar traumatic recollections of Owen's youth, which 
go some way towards explaining his horror of excessive or unbalanced states of 
subjectivity. The story concerns a Pentecostal preacher, who demands of the youthful 
Owen that he participate in glossolalia. As he tells James, Owen's unease about the 
practice arises from his perception of it as 'a coming out of stasis' that disrupts the 
'ideal balance' (p. 307) of modernist selfhood. As Stephen H. Webb asserts, 
glossolalia involves 'an abundant divestiture of self that is reckless in its disregard for 
custom or calculation'. 31 'Tongue speaking' also exemplifies the excessive 'meaning' 
that Owen seeks assiduously to avoid; its practitioners speak a stream of apparent 
gibberish that provides scope for infinite interpretation. Yet, Tap's reference to 
glossolalia as 'Childs play' recalls the quasi-mystical status attributed to infant 
consciousness in Great Jones Street and Ratner's Star (p. 335) and suggests that 
engagement with glossolalia might persuade Owen to attribute a more elevated status 
to mental content. Although keen to 'yeeld totally', as Tap puts it, the young Owen is 
paralysed by anxiety at the pressure placed upon him by the preacher (p. 336). He flees 
the claustrophobia of the church, only to confront the 'nightmare of real things, the 
31 Stephen H. Webb, Blessed Excess: Religion and the Hyperbolic Imagination (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1993), p. 60. 
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fallen wonder of the world' (p. 339). This horrified reference to 'real things' aptly 
captures Owen's terror of the 'content' of signification, which has long impelled him 
to seek protection in formalism. Owen's failure to overcome this childish fear result in 
a melancholy conclusion to his life, sitting 'Motionless' (p. 308) and 'owl-eyed' in 
apparent despondency (p. 309). James' reflection after their meeting that 'Whatever 
he'd lost in life-strength, this is what I'd won' seems less a carnivorous appropriation 
than an objective analysis of his ability to overcome the anxieties that still paralyse his 
friend (p. 309). Accordingly, on his return to Greece, James evinces an ever more 
vigorous sense of self and claims to enjoy a 'second life', in which he is able 'to 
know' his friends 'in memory and language' and 'Through them myself (p. 329). This 
declaration articulates a sense of reciprocity of which self-identical modernist 
subjectivity would be incapable. Having overcome any sense of obligation to cultivate 
such a self, James becomes able to provide a more subtle analysis of the Parthenon: 
the dread imperialist structure he has avoided. Where he previously saw threatening 
'order' and 'proportion' (p. 3), architecture 'intact in its Doric order', his new 
postmodern perspective allows him to perceive the factitious nature of such outward 
harmony. Consequently, on his approach to the Acropolis, he is no longer awe-struck, 
but feels empathy for the 'mauled stones', which utter 'a cry for pity' in a 'voice we 
know as our own' (p. 330). 
White Noise 
Like The Names, DeLillo's subsequent novel White Noise tackles difficulties 
implicit in his previous work, being concerned primarily with the crisis that attends 
the subjectivity of its male protagonist, the academic Jack Gladney, and, to a lesser 
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extent, that of his wife Babette, a teacher of posture and movement. Jack, like the 
Western imperialists in The Names, remains attached to modernist notions of the 
subject as self-identical and initially resists postmodem ideas of subjectivity that 
emphasise the notion of excess. However, as DeLillo remarks, this novel contains 
'less language and more human dread' (Begley, p. 286). Rather than the relationship 
between language and subjectivity that preoccupies its predecessor, uniquely in 
DeLillo's oeuvre, White Noise undertakes a sustained and explicit examination of the 
death-anxiety that haunts the whole of his fiction. Rather than language or meaning, 
therefore, the text takes mortality as the category against which subjectivity is to be 
measured, confronting Jack and Babette with the challenge of accepting what 
Heidegger calls 'Being-towards-death'. The novel is guided by this Heideggerian 
view that Being is inseparable from the 'anticipation of death' (p. 307) or, in the words 
of Jack's colleague, the neurochemist Winnie Richards, that death is 'the boundary we 
need', providing a 'precious texture to life', 'a sense of definition' (p. 228). 32 Jack 
flees the confrontation with mortality, for much of the novel and, therefore, denies 
himself a sense of self that might be capable of withstanding the cultural changes of 
postmodernity. As we will see, like many DeLillo characters, he evades subjective 
'definition' and attendant thoughts of death, by the paradoxical combination of 
adopting highly abstract modes of thought and a resolutely materialist view of mind. 
Together, these provide what Tolstoy, with reference to the terror-stricken Ivan Ilyich, 
calls 'a mental screen' that 'kept death out of sight'. 33 
32 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2000), p. 295. 
33 Leo Tolstoy, 'The Death of Ivan Ilyich', in The Death of Ivan Ilyich/The Cossacks/Happy Ever 
After, trans. by Rosemary Edmonds (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987), pp. 99-161 (p. 138) 
189 
It is technology that forces Jack into facing his mortality; paradoxically, since 
he is presented as a technophobe. His exposure to a potentially lethal 'Airborne Toxic 
Event', caused by a chemical spill, and Babette's desperation to acquire the illegal 
drug Dylar, which she believes capable of curing death-anxiety, obliges Jack to 
reassess his longstanding repression of his fear (p. 107). He appropriates a Buddhist 
belief that the nothingness of self is identical to the emptiness of mortality and can be 
merged with it, banishing terror through self-annihilation. Jack is inspired to this 
appropriation of Eastern epistemology by the eccentric visiting lecturer Murray Jay 
Siskind, who compares technologies of the postmodem supermarket with the rituals 
of The Tibetan Book of the Dead and speculates that contemporary shopping, with its 
'code words and ceremonial phrases', 'recharges us spiritually' (pp. 37-38). Jack 
begins by seeing in this Buddhist equivalence of self and death a one-to-one 
correspondence, which resembles the balanced, self-identical quality of modernist 
subjectivity. Over time, however, his quasi-Buddhist encounters with death augment 
his belief in mind and self and persuade him of a postmodem view of consciousness 
as inherently in excess of death. His suggestion that consciousness may be 'stronger 
than death' (p. 268) and can 'leap free of everyday dying' (p. 267), is close to that of 
W. Y. Evans-Wetz, who asserts that 'intellect', if 'rightly trained and rightly directed', 
is capable of 'mentally transcending' 'bodily suffering and infirmities'. 34 
White Noise is often described as DeLillo's most popular novel and has 
attracted greater critical attention than his other works. Several critics have attempted 
to theorise the protagonists' death-anxiety. William G. Little, for example, 
characterises it as the ascetic desire to 'eliminate the virtual wastefulness of death's 
34 W. Y. Evans-Wetz, ed. The Tibetan Book of the Dead: Or The After-Death Experiences on the Bardo 
. Plane trans. by Lama Kazi Dawa Samdup (London: Oxford University Press, 1971-2), p. xv. 
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absent meaning'. 35 The theme of 'human dread' pervades the text, sometimes 
explicitly, at other moments in the form of comic one-liners, which employ depth as a 
metaphor for the protagonists' unease. Jack notes wryly that his house lies 'in what 
was once a wooded area with deep ravines', indicating the precipitous horror 
underlying his existence, literally and metaphorically (p. 4). He also confesses, 
deadpan, that 'We believed something lived in the basement' (p. 27), which recalls 
Bachelard's assertion that cellars and basements are 'the dark entity of the house, the 
one that partakes of subterranean forces'. 36 Beneath this black humour lurks a 
vertiginous terror, which imparts an 'inbred desolation' to Jack's son Wilder, who 
sometimes weeps for hours without apparent cause (p. 78). Critics rarely remark it, but 
Jack's fears often demonstrate a modernist nostalgia for a relation to death that is 
more coherently conceptualised and grounded in communal ritual. When a fire at the 
local insane asylum claims casualties, Jack complains that the fumes from synthetic 
6polystyrene' insulation compromise the 'ancient, spacious and terrible drama' of 
mortality, replacing 'real' death with a contemporary 'synthetic' form. Those who 
fight the lethal blaze are said to embody 'a labor that seemed as old and lost as 
cathedral building' (p. 240). By contrast, Jack sees those who discover and distribute 
Dylar as sinister in their postmodern determination to artificially 'engineer us out of 
our fear'. He envisages such men with a highly diffuse, and disgusting, postmodem 
(non) identity and pronounces them 'A little like extra terrestrials' 'selfless, sexless', 
'blending' and 'fusing' with one another (p. 24 1). 
Many critics concentrate on the shallow image-culture that fuels the factitious 
consumer society of White Noise. Cowart remarks on its 'vacuousness', while Osteen 
35 William G. Little, The Waste Fix: Seizures of the Sacred from Upton Sinclair to The Sopranos (New 
York: New York University Press, 2002), p. 95. 
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argues that the novel revolves around forms of synthetic packaging, whether 
'intellectual', 'commercial' or 'linguistic' (p. 167). 37 Generally, these phenomena are 
analysed without noting their connection to what DeLillo suggests is a disintegration 
of faith in the status of mind in postmodemity, which creates favourable conditions 
for the dissemination of simulacra through contemporary media. DeLillo presents 
contempt for mind as both cause and effect of this prevalence of simulation and 
implies that the media, by weakening the audience's faltering sense of a dependable 
reality, deepen their own hegemony and that of capitalism. Mark Conroy emphasises 
the instability of parental authority in White Noise, for which he blames various 
'acids of modernity', but overlooks the crisis in subjectivity that underlies these 
familial difficulties. 38 In the first scene, Jack's fragile subjectivity contrasts with the 
confidence generated among his students' relatives by 'massive insurance coverage' 
and ownership of consumer 'objects' (p. 3). With wry detachment, DeLillo describes 
this mainly Protestant crowd as a 'collection of the like-minded and the spiritually 
akin, a people, a nation' (p. 4), a formulation that recalls his Catholic-Italian roots, 
which, he has remarked, give him 'an idea of what it's like to be an outsider in this 
society'. 39 The college chancellor's brutal remark on Jack's 'tendency to make a 
feeble presentation of self' confirms his difficulty in forging a strong subjectivity. 
Jack himself confesses the failure of his attempt to ... grow out... into' the 
'significance' and 'prestige' of his role as department head and remains unconvinced 
36 Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, trans. by Maria Jolas (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1994), 
P. 18. 
37 David Cowart, The Physics of Language (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2002), p. 76. 
39 Mark Conroy, 'From Tombstone to Tabloid; Authority Figured in White Noise', in Critique, 35 
(1994), 96-110 (p. 98). 
39 Anthony De Curtis, "'An Outsider in This Society": An Interview with Don DeLillo', in 
Introducing Don DeLillo ed. by Frank Lentricchia (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), pp. 43-66 
(P-50). 
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of his own ontological worth (p. 17). He overeats to gain 'an air of unhealthy excess', 
before donning a 'black' 'medieval robe' and dark glasses (p. 9) but, in his own eyes, 
remains only 'the false character that follows the name around' (p. 17). The line 
paraphrases William Gaddis' description of the artist, 'when the work's done', as 'the 
human shambles that follows it around', an allusion to authorship that makes clear the 
degree of autonomy and creativity of which DeLillo believes his protagonist and, by 
extension, the human subject, to be capable . 
40 Few critics focus directly on the 
questions of mind and selfhood that preoccupy Jack. Leonard Wilcox is an exception, 
remarking on the incongruity of Jack's search for 'authentic selfhood' (p. 100) in a 
postmodern text concerned with the 'pure, empty seriality' of an 'information society' 
(p. 99). Wilcox rightly suggests Jack's difficulties are exacerbated by the collapse of 
modernist notions of selfhood as self-identical, but is pessimistic about the possibility 
of a postmodem subjectivity, claiming that the 'dissolution of a modernist subjectivity 
in the mire of contemporary media' (p. 99) destroys 'creative forms of consciousness' 
(p. 99) and 'authentic selfliood' (p. 100). By contrast, I suggest that, rather than 
accepting this lamentable selfless state as inevitable, Jack struggles courageously to 
construct something that resembles subjectivity within a typically postmodern 
American milieu. The high degree of self-awareness that Jack demonstrates, including 
the characteristically postmodem capacity to recognise his fictional status, something 
Wilcox might indeed count as a 'creative form of consciousness' suggests that he 
might be capable of this feat (p. 99). This metafictional element is surprising, since as 
Noel King notes, White Noise is 'a quite traditional novel', being a linear narrative 
with a single first-person narrator, whose sententiousness and limited self-knowledge 
40 William Gaddis, The RecojznitioD-S (New York: Penguin, 1983), p. 96. 
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sometimes recall the eighteenth century narrators of Sterne and Goldsmith . 
41 Yet, 
Jack's unexpected declaration to his class that 'All plots tend to move deathward' 
(p. 26) indicates a dim unease that, as a character, he might become involved in such a 
destructive narrative movement. His stated love of 'aimless days' and corresponding 
fear of 'some deft acceleration' seems a wry reference to authorial omnipotence in 
plot construction (p. 18). This is no gratuitous demonstration of technique but a further 
example of the, often, allegorical relation between form and thematics in DeLillo: 
Jack's fear of authorial manipulation is a metaphor for his habitual lack of autonomy 
experiences but also a portent of the characteristically postmodern subjectivity he will 
later create. It is therefore significant that, once Jack accepts the benefits of plotting 
for his personal autonomy, he responds enthusiastically. As so often, Murray 
persuades Jack of postmodern ideas, pointing out a connection between plotting and 
the construction of subjectivity. He asserts that 'To plot is to affirm life, to seek shape 
and control'. 'This is how we advance the art of human consciousness' (p. 292). Jack 
welcomes the idea of enhancing his 'consciousness' by his wresting control of White 
Noise. Indeed, Murray's insistence on the benefits of being a 'killer' rather than a 
'dier' (p. 292) persuades him to plot to kill Willie Mink, Babette's Dylar distributor, 
with whom she sleeps in exchange for the drug (p. 31 1). Before shooting Mink, Jack 
emphasises the deliberate act of self-construction it implies, asking 'What was I here 
for if not to define, fix in my sights, take aim atT (p. 306). As we will see, in spite of 
its traumatic violence, the shooting offers Jack an incipient sense of self, the feeling 
that 'I knew who I was in the network of meanings' (p. 312). 
DeLillo situates Jack's academic life in America's influential Protestant 
tradition. He created and runs the department of 'Hitler Studies', at the local 'College- 
41 Noel King, 'Reading White Noise: Floating Remarks', in Critical OuarteLly, 33 (1991), 66-83 (p. 68). 
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on-the-Hill' (p. 4), a title that paraphrases seventeenth-century Puritan John Winthrop, 
who asserted that his community must consider itself 'as a Citty vpon a Hill', for 'the 
eies of all people are vppon us'. 42 The reference to the foundation of the U. S. 
suggests the college represents all of American culture. This quotation is also apposite 
to the novel's concern with death-anxiety. As David E. Stannard explains, although 
orthodox theology dictated that mortality be regarded as a 'relief for the earth-bound 
soul' 'the Puritans were gripped individually and collectively by an intense and 
unremitting fear of death'. 43 Puritanism is also appropriate to the text's concern with 
subjectivity: the doctrine of predestination necessitated a personal relationship with 
God, which demanded obsessive self-cultivation. In Americana, DeLillo expands 
upon Max Weber's association of Puritanism with an ascetic work ethic by linking 
such diligence with imperialistic, even fascistic, tendencies in U. S. culture. 44 It may 
therefore be significant that 'College-on-the-Hill' serves as the fictional birthplace of 
'Hitler studies' (p. 4), especially given the typically Puritan fear of death that 
motivates Jack's Hitler obsession. Hitler attracts him because he is 'larger than death' 
(p. 287) and the symbol of that 'whole huge nameless thing' (p. 288), an 
unrepresentable real, in which he can 'conceal' himself (p. 287). This submerging of 
identity in that of an iconic figure is another example of the Rankian 'double' as a 
protective 'symbol of eternal life', which recurs throughout DeLillo's oeuvre . 
45 As in 
Americana, identification is focussed on images of the subject, a selection of which 
42 John Winthrop, 'A Modell of Christian Charity', in The Winthrop Papers 1623-1630 Vol. 11 [n. p. ]: 
Plimpton Press, 193 1), p. 295. 
43 David E. Stannard, The Puritan Way of Death: A Study in Religion. Culture and Social Change 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 79. 
44 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Caritalism trans. by Talcott Parsons (London: 
George Allen and Unwin, 1978), p. 169. 
45 Otto Rank, Beyond Psycholog (New York: Dover Publications, 1958), p. 76. 
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Jack edits into an 'impressionistic documentary', which he screens every semester 
(p. 25) 
DeLillo makes clear that Jack's interests are resolutely modernist. The name 
'College-on the-Hill' suggests determined resistance to contemporary culture, while 
its hometown 'Blacksmith', connotes an early modernist preference for manual over 
automated production. Jack's research emphasises the first half of the twentieth 
century, while his teaching methods emphasise cinema at the expense of the more 
postmodern form of television documentary: his screenings of 'background footage' 
for 'Advanced Nazism' consist entirely of Nazi 'propaganda films' (p. 25). Jack also 
evinces maidenly shock at Murray's rather commonplace postmodemist views. At 
'THE MOST PHOTOGRAPHED BARN IN AMERICA', when Murray asserts that 
6collective perception' has replaced individual experience, to the extent that 'No one 
sees the bam' but feels only the 'nameless energies' of mass experience, Jack's 
'extended silence' suggests an ambivalent reaction (p. 12). Murray's views sometimes 
resemble a parody of the postmodem objectivism DeLillo distrusts: Murray even 
questions whether death-anxiety can even be confronted, since 'modem death' has 
developed 'a life independent of us' (p. 15 0). Murray's celebratory postmodernist 
attitude to television arouses Jack's passionate opposition. Where Murray calls the 
medium 'A great and humbling experience' (p. 5 1), Jack discourages his children from 
watching, organising 'one night a week' of communal viewing to 'de-glamorize the 
medium in their eyes' (p. 16). He refers to its 'eerie diseased brain-sucking power', 
implying that its sterile vampirism contributes to distrust of consciousness in 
postmodernity (p. 16). DeLillo appears sympathetic to this view, but, as in Americana 
wrestles with the paradox that television promotes what he has called 'third-person' 
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'consciousness' (American , p. 271) by, in McLuhan's words, demanding subjective 
'participation'. 'It engages you. You have to be with its. 46 As Murray observes, it's 
'like something we know in a dream-like and preconscious way' (P. 51). DeLillo 
sometimes presents this oneiric quality as insidious: he satirises its infiltration of the 
unconscious, when Jack's youngest daughter Steffie enunciates the words 'Toyota 
Celica' in her sleep, as though they were 'a verbal spell or ecstatic chant' (p. 15 5). In 
interview, DeLillo calls this phrase an example of 'computer mysticism', 'words that 
are computer generated' for their supposed aesthetic value and for which 
manufacturers have then to 'find an objects: in this case, a Japanese car (Begley, 
p. 291). The scene therefore extends DeLillo's exploration of the impact of 
computerisation on contemporary consciousness and suggests television promotes this 
pernicious influence. But television also permeates waking life in White Noise, giving 
rise to random advertising slogans such as 'Mastercard, Visa, American Express', 
which appear in the text unannounced and unexplained (p. 100). Such moments imply 
that, like the 'white noise' of the title, which is a blend of 'all the different frequencies 
of sound', television may reduce public consciousness to banal homogeneity. 47 Like 
'white noise', which is designed to 'mask other sounds' (howstuffworks. com), it also 
obscures what Susan Sontag calls 'the injuries of class, race, and sex', which 'a 
culture based on images' can help to 'anesthetize' (p. 161). Television's entropic 
influence on the mind recurs in DeLillo's next major work, the play The Day Room. 48 
'Me stage directions for Act Two state that 'an actor in a straitjacket functions as the 
46 Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 340. 
47 'white noise'. <http: fl www. home. howstuffworks. com>, last accessed 76July 2004. 
48 Don DeLillo, The Day Room (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1989) 
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TV set', a nightmarish fusion of mind and machine that surpasses even White Noise 
in its depiction of consciousness debased by the cathode ray tube (P. 58). 
Jack's developing relation to this most contemporary medium proves 
exemplary of his gradual shift towards appreciation of postmodem technology, 
culture, and subjectivity. His tendency to displace death-anxiety onto contemporary 
technologies is clear from his melodramatic reference to them as 'the daily seeping 
false-hearted death' and his eventual reconciliation to their pervasive role in 
American culture occurs only after he appreciates their capacity to ameliorate this 
mortal terror (p. 22). The first hint of technology's cathartic properties comes with 
Babette's appearance on a minor television channel. Her televised image calms his 
fear by allowing him to envisage her as immortal: 'a walker in the mists of the dead', 
projecting an electronic image of her 'spirit' or 'secret self' (p. 104). Afterwards, 
Jack's viewing increases noticeably, particularly of programs containing injury and 
death. With Heinrich, he observes a report of 'two bodies' found in a backyard, with 
the expectation of 'twenty' or 'thirty' to come. When none emerge, rather than relief, 
the 'dream-like' experience of television immunises him to horror and he feels 
'dejection, a sorry gloom' (p. 222). 
Within the Gladney household, the tension between modernist and 
postmodernist ideas often emerges in debates with his son Heinrich about human 
consciousness, which are often prompted by contemporary developments in 
philosophy and neuroscience. Jack is concerned by postmodernity's apparent 
contempt for perception and emotional response, but Heinrich is sceptical of their 
value. Asked whether it is raining, Heinrich pedantically refuses to say, since 'Our 
senses are wrong a lot more often than they're right. This has been proved in the 
laboratory'. Asked for his subjective view, he holds to a rigid objectivism, demanding 
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'What good is my truth? My truth means nothing' (p. 23). Like Daniel Dennett, he 
justifies his scepticism about consciousness by appealing to the heterogeneity of 
subjective perceptions . 
49 What, wonders Heinrich, would a truthful reply entail were 
his interlocutor 'traveling at almost the speed of light' or were 'in orbit around a 
neutron starT (p. 23). Similarly, Dennett remarks acerbically on the 'long-standing 
philosophical tradition' that 'we all agree on what we find when we look inside' 
(p. 66), before committing himself to a 'Heterophenomenology', which assumes that 
fundamental differences exist between the mental experience of individuals (P. 72). By 
deft sophistry, Dennett uses these differences to justify his position that human 
subjects are mere 'creators of fiction' (p. 94). As he puts it, they are 'not authoritative 
about what is happening in' them, 'but only about what seems to be happening', 
contending, by implication, that a third-person observer would attain privileged access 
to the 'truth' of consciousness (p. 96). DeLillo never dismisses scientific thought, but 
always appears sceptical of objectivist philosophy. It is therefore no surprise that 
these statements are lent an air of immaturity by their attribution to a neurotic 
adolescent, who Jack, elsewhere, calls 'evasive' (p. 22) and a 'teeth grinding and 
erratic sleeper' (p. 147). DeLillo also suggests Heinrich's objectivism may imply a 
dangerous moral relativism. Heinrich uses neurochernistry to justify the actions of 
Tommy Roy Foster, a multiple murderer with whom he plays a notably postmodem 
game of chess, which takes place entirely by post. Heinrich, rather comically, justifies 
Tommy's murder of five strangers by his being 'under pressure' (p. 44) and answers 
Jack's bewilderment concerning Foster's motive, by dismissing motivation as simply 
'brain chemistry, signals going back and forth' (p. 45). Given the novel's 
preoccupation with consumer culture and postmodem technology, the introduction of 
49 Daniel C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (London: Penguin, 1992), pp. 66-72. 
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a serial killer is particularly apposite. As Mark Seltzer remarks, the 'seriality' of 
multiple killings replicates the 'styles of production and reproduction that make up 
machine culture' and the tendency towards 'collection' that is 'conspicuous in 
consumer society' . 
50 Although Heinrich's friendship with Foster demonstrates his 
humanity, it also associates Heinrich's objectivism with Foster's violent 'seriality' 
and hints that both are the alienated product of 'machine culture'. Nevertheless, Jack 
finds comfort in the possibility that objectivism may be a philosophically respectable 
strategy. After listening to Heinrich, he visits a cash machine and becomes convinced 
that the bland abstraction of 'The figure on the screen' is an affirmation of his 
subjectivity. For the brief moment of the transaction, he feels that 'something of deep 
personal value' 'had been authenticated and confirmed'. 'The system had blessed my 
life' (p. 46). 
Ontological insecurity persuades other family members, especially Babette, to 
accept Heinrich's views. In spite of being blessed with what Betty G. Farrell calls the 
'intimate relationships' that are increasingly necessary 'against the backdrop of the 
impersonal, bureaucratized world of modem society', the Gladneys remain riven by 
anxiety. 51 Jack's daughter Denise emulates her father's sartorial strategy, by 
compulsively sporting 'a green visor' in order to experience 'wholeness and identity' 
(p. 37). Babette's death-anxiety causes her to embrace a certain scientism. She seeks to 
banish terror with the rationalistic belief that 'everything is correctible' once reduced 
to 'its simplest parts', to 'charts and graphs' (p. 19 1). Jack is disturbed by this and tells 
Babette half-seriously that he 'can't forgive her' for not being 'the woman I believed 
so Mark Seltzer 'Serial Killers (1)', in Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 5 (1993), 
92-128 (p. 92, p. 94). 
51 Betty G. Farrell, Family: The Making of an Idea. an Institution. and a Controversy in American 
Culture (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), p. 3. 
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you were' (p. 197). This extreme reaction is best explained by his need for a partner 
who counteracts his own excessively abstract cognition. His previous wives were 
'high-strung', like himself, 'with ties to the intelligence community', which, in 
DeLillo's work, is always metonymic of sterile objectivism (p. 6). Because Babette is 
'ample' 'disheveled and lacking in 'guile' he believed she would ground him in the 
material world, which terrifies him (p. 5). His disappointment has enormous 
ramifications: it reveals to Jack that he must construct a self, without assistance, that 
is capable of confronting death. 
Jack adopts numerous strategies to this end, but repeatedly encounters the 
obstacle of his ingrained modernist ideas. Initially, he attempts to embrace 
postmodem consumer culture, discovering a 'fullness of being' in the 'sheer 
plenitude' of his 'crowded bags' (p. 20), what Celia Lury describes as the 
contemporary tendency to experience possessions as necessary 'aspects of the self. 52 
Indeed, while Christmas shopping, Jack believes he has grown 'in value and self- 
regard' and 'found new aspects of myself (p. 84), a factitious experience that may be 
read as a consequence of what Grant McCracken calls the contemporary North 
American practice of leaving 'a great deal of the individual undefined'. 53 On this 
expedition, Jack senses something of the excessive selfhood he will later embrace, 
declaring ecstatically of his lavish spending that 'I was bigger than these sums', they 
'poured off my skin like rain' (p. 84). Yet, the success of this strategy is short-lived. 
As the frequency and intensity of his confrontations with death increase, Jack's 
modernist association of selfhood with mortality causes him to connect the 
possessions that bolster his subjectivity with its ultimate annihilation. Consequently, 
52 Celia Lury, Consumer Culture (Cambridge: The Polity Press, 1997), p. 7. 
53 Grant McCracken, Culture and Consumption: New Approaches to the Symbolic Character o 
Consumer Goods and Activities (Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press, 1988), p. 88. 
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he painstakingly undoes his joyous accumulation, discarding possessions that 
represent to him 'an overburdening weight, a connection, a mortality' (p. 262) and that 
have 'dragged me down, made escape impossible' (p. 295). 
Jack also seeks to forge his subjectivity through identification with powerful 
leaders like Hitler and Attila the Hun, a strategy that seems anachronistically 
modernist because it recalls the fascist veneration of heroic individuals. He repeatedly 
compares himself to Attila (p. 100, p. 17 1), hoping, as with his attempt to 'conceal' 
himself in Hitler, that imagining himself 'the Scourge of God' will Prove an effective 
defence against intolerable fear (p. 100). Jack speculates on the possible nobility of 
Attila's death, idealising him as a man with the courage to 'accept death as an 
experience that flows naturally from life' (p. 100), but the historical record suggests 
that DeLillo may be engaging in irony at Jack's expense. Attila actually died 
ingloriously in bed, having 'bled heavily through the nose' and 'been suffocated in his 
sleep', a fact Jack never discovers, but which suggests that the iconoclastic nature of 
postmodernity has made such naive identification with heroic figures increasingly 
difficult to sustain. 54 Notably, in part three, 'Dylarama', Jack abandons hero worship 
in favour of doppelgangers, or second selves, a concern that seems postmodem in its 
self-reflexivity and concern with the doubling of identity. The first of these is 
Heinrich's friend Orest Mercator, whose willingness to 'sit in a cage full of deadly 
snakes' for a world record time suggests an immunity from death-anxiety that inspires 
and impresses Jack (p. 207). The young man's name indicates his significance. It is 
likely to be short for Orestes, which connotes Greek Tragedy; but, more importantly, 
it is directly related to Jack's interest in Attila the Hun. E. A. Thompson describes an 
historical Orestes, who was Roman and became one of 'Attila's most trusted 
54 E. A. Thompson, A History of Attila and the Huns (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948), p. 149. 
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lieutenants', before being appointed a 'patrician'. 55 DeLillo appears to make wry 
reference to this Roman connection, when Jack remarks on Orest's attempt to build 
can imperial self out of some tabloid aspiration' (p. 268). Jack's identification with 
Attila suggests that the Hun's lieutenant Orestes might serve as confidant and second 
self, an entity that, in his study of the device, C. F. Keppler calls an 'instrument of 
self-exploration'. 56 Certainly, the apparently involuntary passion of Jack's 
declaration to Orest that the snakes 'will bite you and you will die', an assertion he 
claims to have 'found myself making, indicates that the boy's efforts may call to 
mind Jack's own fear (p. 208). 
Jack's admiration for Orest's 'purpose' increases rapidly, borne of a sense that 
his direct confrontation with death permits him to construct a self inherently in excess 
of mortality. Jack believes that Orest is able to 'occupy the self more fully', that such 
people, in 'building toward a danger', 'escape it in some deeper sense' and 'dwell in 
some angelic scan, able to leap free of every day dying' (p. 267). In Jack's view, Orest 
gains what Evans-Wetz calls 'the power to control consciously the process of death 
and regeneration' (p. xiv). Indeed, to overcome death-anxiety, Orest advocates what 
Tibetan Buddhist Gouinda calls 'a knowing in which the knower is one with the 
known' (Lxii); 'Be a snake', asserts Orest 'and you'll know the stillness of a snake' 
(p. 267). Throughout the novel, Jack demonstrates an embryonic interest in this 
Buddhist search for unity in object relations, responding to Wilder's 'Ululation' of 
'inbred desolation', by attempting to fall 'into it, letting it enfold and cover me' 
(p. 78). Early on, he strains to hear Murray's monologue about The Tibetan Book of 
55 E. A. Thompson, Romans and Barbarians: The Decline of the Western Empire (Madison: University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1982), p. 6 1. 
56 C. F. Keppler, The Literature of the Second Self (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 1972), 
p. 208. 
203 
the Dead (p. 38) and, later, longs to believe in a comforting vision of death as 'just 
another surface one inhabits for a time', 'A zoom down Bright Angel Trail' (P. 243). 
His interest in Buddhism is doubly significant: it will help to ameliorate his death- 
anxiety, but also discourage him from accepting objectivist or materialist accounts of 
the world, with which he instinctively disagrees. As Evans-Wetz observes, 'The 
Buddhist universe is alive through and through; it has no room for inert matter and 
mere mechanism' (Lvii). 
Yet, the notion of merging 'knower' with 'known' presents Jack with a 
problem: it suggests that the self must become death, a notion that appears to defeat 
his wish to 'leap free of everyday dying' (p. 267). As Jack asks himself, 'If the self is 
death, how can it also be stronger than death? ' (p. 268). Such an exact equation of 
'knower' with 'known' too closely resembles the outmoded self-identity of modernist 
subjectivity and may forestall creation of the excessive postmodern subjectivity that 
Jack seeks. Paradoxically, given his former techno-phobia, the difficulty is resolved 
pragmatically, through encounters with technologies that are intimately related to 
mortality. These allow Jack to experience what Lacan calls the 'subjective bringing to 
realization of being-for-death', a traumatic but cathartic union with mortality that 
convinces him of the relative strength of mind and selfhood. 57 The most dramatic and 
literal of these confrontations entails Jack's contamination by the 'airborne toxic 
event' (p. 117), a leak of 'Nyodene Derivative' that produces a 'black billowing cloud' 
(p. 113), permanently planting what Jack calls 'a death in my body' (p. 150). Before 
evacuating his family, Jack prevaricates comically, protesting that such catastrophes 
ought to affect only 'the poor and the uneducated' (p. 114), clearly demonstrating the 
57 Jacques Lacan, 'The Function of Language in Psychoanalysis', trans. by Anthony Wilden, in The 
Language of the Self, ed. by Anthony Wilden (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), pp. 3- 
87 (p. 42). 
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point made by Pierre Bourdieu that 'Economic power is first and foremost a power to 
keep economic necessity at arm's length' . 
58 Notably, this subjective experience of 
'death' persuades him of the importance of first-person experience and leads to an 
outright rejection of objectivism. When examined by a formidable array of medical 
technologies, he finds an 'alien logic' in their graphic readouts (p. 142), seeming to 
feel that their supposedly authoritative objectivity robs him of the subjective 
experience of death; the 'ownmost possibility' of Dasein (Being, p. 304). As Jack 
remarks dolefully, 'a network of symbols has been introduced' and 'it makes you feel 
like a stranger in your own dying' (p. 142). As so frequently happens in DeLillo, the 
rejection of objectivist thought after a productive encounter with mortality leads 
immediately to the emergence of more intuitive modes of cognition; in this case, those 
that question the linear 'nature of time' (p. 116). As in Ratner's Star, rapprochement 
with mortality catalyses a dramatic quasi-Heideggerian collapse in the distinction 
between past and future . 
59 First, the deadly Nyodene arouses a sense of 'ddja vu' in 
the whole family (p. 126), an example of what Heidegger calls Dasein coming 'toward 
itself futurally', which occurs as the result of 'anticipatory resoluteness' towards death 
(Being, pp. 372-3). Conversely, Jack imagines the disaster as the re-emergence into 
present time of the primeval 'Mesozoic' period (p. 118) or medieval 'Norse legend' 
(p. 127), a temporal movement comparable to the 'Bringing forth' into 
'unconcealment' by which Heidegger argues that the inventions of the Scientific 
Revolution have burst 'into bloom' in modernity. 60 
58 Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critigue of the Judgement of Taste, trans. by Richard Nice 
(London: Routledge, 1984), p. 55. 
59 Don DeLillo, &atner's Star (London: Vintage, 1991) 
60 Martin Heidegger, The Question of Technology and other Essays, trans. by William W. Lovitt (New 
York: Harper Torchbooks, 1997), p. 11. 
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In the novel's final stages, Jack's dealings with technology escalate in risk and 
intensity. First, he acquires a handgun from his father-in-law Vernon Dickie, a 
'German' 'Zumwalt automatic', which, in Jack's eyes, like all things Teutonic, 
possesses a decisive power over death (p. 253). He then uses the weapon to confront 
and shoot Willie Mink, supplier of the sophisticated drug Dylar, and concludes what 
DeLillo calls the 'trite adultery plot' that dominates part three of the novel (Begley, 
p. 298). Like his contamination with Nyodene, Jack's acquisition of the gun is a 
moment of cathartic fusion with mortality. DeLillo presents the gun's original owner, 
Vernon, as a Hadean messenger, a role DeLillo introduces with grim humour, when 
Jack mistakes him at dawn for 'Death' or 'Death's errand-runner' (p. 243). Although 
Jack's paranoia is clearly being mocked here, the dramatic effect of Vernon's visit 
upon him suggests that his father-in-law is indeed functioning as a messenger of 
'Death' and that part of DeLillo's irony is aimed at his own use of the archaic device 
of personification. Vernon's handing over of the weapon is treated with comic heavy- 
handedness, which nonetheless makes clear the plutonic transformation Jack is 
undergoing. The gun changes hands in 'the dark car', while Jack wonders whether his 
father-in-law was 'Death's dark messenger after all' (p. 253). 
Jack feels that this psychic merger with death lends 'shapeliness' and 'fresh 
design' (p. 253) to his existence, which help him to construct the sense of self he lacks. 
He calls the weapon 'a spell' and, significantly, 'a plot' (p. 254), something he and 
Murray have agreed is essential to autonomy and selfbood, or what Murray names the 
'art of human consciousness' (p. 292). Jack's decision to follow Murray's advice and 
become a 'killer' (p. 292) both reinforces his new sense of autonomy and reaffirms his 
embryonic rapprochement with death, by transforming him into what DeLillo earlier 
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called 'Death's errand runner' (p. 292). The result is a rapturous and cathartic 
confrontation during which he experiences an epiphanic unification of subjective 
perception and objective materialist thought. His subjective experience intensifies, 
allowing him to see rain as 'elongated orbs' of water, while his objective knowledge 
is augmented by his sudden comprehension of 'the neurochemistry of my brain' 
(p. 3 10). This combination of abilities permits a true merger of 'knower' and known, 
which allows him to escape Heinrich's objectivism by appreciating 'what rain really 
was' (p. 3 10) and to know 'red', not only as an immediate perception but also 'in 
terms of dominant wavelength, luminance, purity' (p. 312). The fusion of subjective 
and objective thought clearly enhances Jack's sense of subjectivity, something he 
implies by stating, though somewhat maniacally, that he continued to 'advance in 
consciousness' (p. 3 10). Indeed, the preternatural clarity of perception and intensity of 
emotion Jack experiences in this melodramatic scene embodies exactly the excessive 
model of mind and subjectivity to which he aspires. Mink appears to be another, less 
attractive, doppleganger for Jack, representing the information-saturated form of 
postmodem consciousness that he despises and fears adopting, but which, in the 
words of The Tibetan Book of the Dead, he must learn to 'recognize' as among 'the 
reflections of his 'own consciousness' (p. 103). When Jack encounters Mink in his 
motel room, his adversary is watching 'TV without the sound' (p. 306), while 
ludicrously repeating remembered sound bites out of context such as 'I will thicken 
the paint on my palette' (p. 309). The impression that Mink is a second self of Jack's is 
reinforced by Mink's modernist epistemology, which emphasises the kind of naYve 
one-to-one correspondence Jack has begun to distrust. Where Jack insists ecstatically 
that 'I saw beyond words' (p. 312), large doses of Dylar have induced in Mink an 
extreme form of naturalism, indicated by his repeated use of the word 'literally' 
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(p. 308, p. 315) and his conflation of signifiers such as "Hail of bullets" with an actual 
lethal attack (p. 31 1). Jack's compassion for Mink after they are both shot is a further 
indication of the close connection between them. Moreover, Mink appears uncannily 
capable of predicting his assailant's emotional reaction. After Jack receives a wound 
to the wrist, Mink voices the hilariously appropriate sound bite 'And this could 
represent the leading edge of some warmer air', moments before Jack begins to feel 
'Compassion, remorse, mercy' for his opponent (p. 313). Throughout the scene, 
DeLillo frequently repeats phrases like 'blast him three times' and 'maximum 
efficiency of pain', a technique that is reminiscent of Gertrude Stein and other 
modernists and helps emphasise, for the informed reader, the battle between 
modernist and postmodernist ideas in which Jack is engaged (P. 307). Notably, 
however, rather than Stein's depiction of static modernist character types, at the end 
of White Noise, these repetitions are employed to represent a characteristically 
postmodern psychological process: they convey the intense, even maniacal, state of 
mind that makes possible Jack's considerable psychological transformation. 
In spite of the assistance Jack derives from religious, particularly Buddhist, 
ideas in his effort to create a postmodern subjectivity, he finds that they are unable to 
offer him reliable truths or the immortality he craves. The realisation is confirmed in a 
much remarked scene, which takes place after Jack has taken pity on Mink and driven 
him to a clinic, staffed partly by nuns. Jack engages in conversation with Sister 
Hermann Marie, who, to his astonishment, hotly denies holding any religious belief 
and indignantly informs Jack that her life is an elaborate 'pretense', staged to reassure 
the faithless that there will 'always be believers' (p. 319). Critics have argued that the 
scene is dispiriting and robs Jack of any remaining hope of overcoming death-anxiety. 
Yet, I suggest that religious ideas, in the form of Buddhist epistemology, have already 
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helped Jack to achieve a qualified rapprochement with mortality and his conversation 
with the Sister merely confirms his own sceptical view of the truth-value of religion. 
Certainly, the elegiac tone of the text's final lines, which paraphrase Joyce in referring 
to 'The cults of the famous and the dead' that fill the supermarket tabloids, suggest 
that, in spite of his increased courage, Jack is unwilling to deceive himself with 
factitious religious notions (p. 326). The final chapter is replete with indications of 
Jack's renewed stoicism and respect for subjective experience and selfbood. This 
ontological shift is exemplified by his uncharacteristic assertion that he and the crowd 
who watch the Nyodene-enhanced sunsets at the local overpass are able to return 
afterwards to 'our separate and defensible selves'. Although Jack has not wholly 
overcome his fear of death, he now utterly eschews the 'computerized pulse' of the 
'imaging block' and the purely objective nature of what it 'knows about me' (p. 325). 
The novel's final chapter opens with Wilder's riding his tricycle onto the 
6expressway', an incident symbolic of the significantly altered atmosphere in the 
Gladney household (p. 322). The extreme daring of the escapade is the converse of the 
'inbred desolation' that afflicts the toddler earlier in the novel and may therefore be 
read as metonymic of his stepfather's burgeoning courage (p. 78). Like Ratner's Star, 
the novel concludes with a child peddling maniacally, an emblem of the possibility of 
reconciliation with mortality. The 'murky shallows' of the 'embankment' into which 
Wilder careens before being rescued by a 'passing motorist' recall the hole to which 
think tank leader Rob Softly flees in panic. In light of this, Wilder's glorious escape 
from the ditch, held 'aloft for the clamoring elders to see', may symbolise the 
Gladneys' rejection of the objectivist thought that Rob embraces (P. 324). 
Nevertheless, in contrast to the consoling 'cry' with which The Names concludes, the 
child 'profoundly howling' in the 'mud and water' remains a haunting, near Blakean, 
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image and a powerful reminder of the 'human dread' with which the protagonists 
have struggled (p. 325). 
210 
Chapter 6 
The Capitalist Schizophrenic- Postmodem Consciousness in 'Libra', 'Mao 11', and 
'Underworld' 
In The Names (1982) and White Noise (1984), DeLillo examines the difficulty 
of defining and constructing a form of selfhood that is appropriate to a postmodern 
milieu. 2 In his three subsequent novels, Libra (19 8 8), Mao II (199 1), and Underworld 
(1997), he examines cultural forces that have caused radical shifts in the forms of 
consciousness and subjectivity that prevail in postmodern culture. 2 Libra is a fictional 
account of the assassination of John F. Kennedy, an event surrounded by such 
uncertainty that DeLillo calls it a 'natural disaster in the heartland of the real' and 
suggests it alerted Americans to the difficulty of locating a reliable sense of reality 
within postmodernity. 3 Consequently, the novel is informed by a concern with the 
nature of this 'real' in American postmodernity, both in the culture at large and in the 
construction of a functioning mind and self. Lee Harvey Oswald, the text's main 
protagonist, is portrayed in a manner comparable to that of the characters in Ratner's 
Star, adopting a series of schizophrenic 'false selves' that render him subordinate to 
the highly abstract systems of thought that prevail in his environment. Yet, in Libra 
this psychosis is not the outcome of obsessive death-anxiety but extreme sensitivity to 
the demands of capitalism, which creates severe difficulties for Oswald in forging a 
sustainable subjectivity and provokes him to the self-destructive, schizophrenic desire 
to merge with the forces of history. 
2 Don DeLillo, The Names (London: Picador, 1989) and White Noise (London: Picador, 1989) 
2 Don DeLillo, Libra (London: Penguin, 1989), Mao 11 (London: Vintage, 1992), and Underworld 
(London: Picador, 1997) 
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Mao II examines a later phase of postmodernity, in which the influence of 
such schizophrenic disorientation has grown considerably, and focuses on the last 
months in the life of a reclusive novelist named Bill Gray. The novel examines the 
unifying psychological forces of postmodern culture and contains DeLillo's most 
explicit examination of the challenge this milieu, with its emergent notion of a unified 
mind, poses to the construction of a discrete, autonomous modernist subjectivity. In 
particular, it explores the reluctance to relinquish modernism that underlies Bill 
Gray's difficulties in this area. In his aesthetic and personal lives, Bill Gray strives 
unsuccessfully to sustain his attraction to characteristically modernist modes of 
selfhood and novelistic form, which increasingly fail to satisfy him. Simultaneously, 
he finds himself attracted to the postmodem schizophrenia of his assistants Karen and 
Scott, whose engagement with postmodernist culture alerts him to the fact that the 
postmodernism he loathes has emerged from the internal logic of the modernism he 
prizes. In Underworld, DeLillo's largest and most highly praised novel, he takes the 
notion of the unifying psychological forces at work in postmodernity and makes it the 
thematic and aesthetic organising principle of the text. In particular, the novel is 
concerned with the way that a model of consciousness unconstrained by individual 
selfhood might ease the racial tension endemic to American society and promote ideas 
of cultural and psychological unity in its place. Yet, such equilibrium is not gained 
easily: it emerges from a vast, dialectical struggle between what DeLillo suggests is 
the entrenched paranoia of modernist subjectivity and a more communal postmodern 
mode of thought, which brings with it the perceptual disorientation and psychological 
instability of schizophrenia. 
3 Don DeLillo, 'American Blood: A Journey Through the Labyrinth of Dallas and JFK', in Rollin 
Stone Magazine 8' December 1983, pp. 21-22, p. 24, pp. 27-28 and p. 74 (p. 22). 
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Many historians and j ournalists argue that important evidence in the 
assassination of President Kennedy was ignored or manipulated, most of them 
suggesting that such maleficence was practiced for political reasons, often the CIA's 
wish to justify a second American invasion of Cuba, after the abortive 'Bay of Pigs' 
attempt in 1961. Howard Roffman is typical of these indignant authors, claiming that, 
after 22nd November 1963, 'the Warren Commission' 'engaged in a cover-up of the 
4 
truth'. By misrepresenting 'almost every relevant fact about the crime' (p. 9), 
Roffman asserts, the commission 'falsified history' (P. 40). In his ninth novel, Libra 
rather than merely providing a fictional analysis of the mysteries that remain 
concerning this controversial occurrence, DeLillo examines the postmodern models of 
consciousness and selfhood that may have given rise to a killing that, DeLillo told De 
5 
Curtis, robbed Americans of 'a manageable sense of reality'. It is a sense of 
unreality also articulated by some among his literary contemporaries, for example, 
J. G. Ballard, who has a character remark that he is planning to 'kill Kennedy again' 
but this time 'in a way that makes sense'. 6 By examining such a dramatic dislocation 
of reality, DeLillo produces an historical novel that David Cowart would classify as a 
'Turning Point' text, one that seeks, in his words, to locate 'the precise historical 
moment when the modern age or some prominent feature of it came into existence'. 7 
In treating the question of reality in postmodernity through a fictionalized historical 
narrative, DeLillo unavoidably raises the question of whether any historical discourse 
and, in particular, a fictionalized narrative can connect with its supposed 'real' object 
4 Howard Roffman, Presumed Guilly (South Brunswick, NJ: A. S. Barnes and Co., 1976), p. 9. 
5 Anthony De Curtis, "'An Outsider in This Society": An Interview with Don DeLillo', in Introducing 
Don DeLillo ed. by Frank Lentricchia (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), pp. 43-66 (p. 48). 
6 J. G. Ballard, The Atrocijy Exhibition (San Fransisco: V/Search, 1990), p. 34. 
7 David Cowart, History and the Contemporary Novel (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 
1989), p. 8. 
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of enquiry. In postmodernity, historical writing is required to answer the accusation of 
thinkers like Roland Barthes that, although history 'claims to let the referent speak for 
itself', 'historical narration' now concerns 'not so much the real as the intelligible'. 
8 
As we have seen, in the context of the Kennedy assassination, DeLillo is as sceptical 
as Barthes about the possibility of rediscovering the historical 'real'. Indeed, he 
admits to experiencing even the imperative to provide intelligibility as something of a 
burden, informing De Curtis that, in writing Libra, the pressure of the 'official record' 
forced him to try 'harder to connect motivation with action' (P. 62). DeLillo's 
difficulty in conforming to a record of real events arises from his habit of depicting 
characters who are unsure of the ontological status of their mind and subjectivity and 
therefore uncertain of their own motives. Yet, in Libra, DeLillo partially ameliorates 
this problem by exploring the historical genesis of the postmodem sense of unreality 
with which his novels are so frequently concerned, allowing him to forego any full- 
blown realist representation of mind or self. In doing so, he, again, concerns himself 
with characters whose sense of personal motivation is confused or compromised by 
the sense that their perception and selfhood are largely illusory. Nevertheless, DeLillo 
remains confronted by the difficulty that all discourse that deals with history demands 
a certain attempt, however problematic, to match one's narrative with 'reality'. As 
Hayden White argues, such attempts are fraught with epistemological questions 
concerning the relation between human systems of meaning and the nature of 'real' 
events. White suggests that, in the production of historical writing, 'the system of 
meaning production peculiar to a certain culture' 'is tested against the capacity of any 
set of "real" events to yield to such systems' and, consequently, that 'any narrative 
8 Roland Barthes, 'The Discourse of History', in The Rustle of Language. trans. by Richard Howard 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989), pp. 12740 (p. 132, p. 138). 
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account is always a figurative account, an allegory'. 9 In Libra, the 'system' in 
question is not conventional history but fictionalized historical narrative, a form 
whose capacity to convey the historical 'real' might be regarded with even greater 
scepticism than that of traditional history. However, one might take John F. Kennedy 
and Lee Harvey Oswald's production of such narrative accounts of their own lives, 
what White would call 'figural accounts' and 'allegories', which exercised 
considerable influence on their thoughts and actions, as justification for DeLillo's 
fictional account. Indeed, their obsession with storytelling may make it the most 
appropriate means of representing their lives. Jacqueline Kennedy spoke of 'the 
narrative impulse that drove her husband's self-presentation' and the 'myth' and 
'legend', particularly that of Camelot, which obsessed him. 10 Lee Harvey Oswald 
demonstrated a similar interest in narrative, both as author and subject. He expressed 
an interest in writing stories about 'contemporary American life' (p. 160), a form that 
DeLillo suggests Oswald saw as 'the only way to imagine' his acquaintances' 
experience (p. 37). Oswald also kept an 'Historic Diary', in which, at least in 
DeLillo's account, he imagines himself as a legendary figure like Trotsky, who would 
wait for 'history' to 'surge through the walls' (p. 34). Therefore, the 'system of 
meaning production' that DeLillo employs is similar to the one that inspired and 
motivated his real-life subjects, a fact that must enhance his chances of producing a 
narrative that, if not accurate in every detail, is well suited to capturing the spirit of 
their lives. 
9 Hayden White, The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representatio 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), p. 44, p. 48. 
10 John Heilman, The Kennedy Obsession (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), p. ix. 
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Critics often focus on the questions of postmodern selfhood and media 
representation that pervade Libra. Frank Lentricchia remarks on the replacement of 
the 'social environment' of naturalism by the 'charismatic environment of the image' 
and asserts that subjectivity is obliterated by the 'determinative power' of the 
4 system'. 11 Similarly, Paul Civello sees in Libra a world 'in which there is no 
distinction between subject and object', while Joseph Kronick notes what he sees as 
Oswald's discovery that he cannot exchange a 'fictional self for 'an actual self. 
12 
The power of American capitalism is indeed acutely apparent in Libra, yet critics have 
overlooked the persistent anxiety that it creates regarding the veracity of thought and 
perception, as well as the effect of this perceptual disorientation on the characters' 
ability to create a tolerable subjectivity. It gives rise, in Oswald's case, to a near 
psychotic loss of individual identity, exemplified by his numerous aliases and 
desperate desire to 'merge' with 'history' to escape 'the dark night of the isolated self 
(p. 101). Much of the 'religious dimension' Cowart finds in the novel and what Glen 
Thomas calls the 'transcendental unity or oneness' craved by Oswald is DeLillo's 
representation of Oswald's schizophrenic delusions, which lead him to believe he has 
been appointed by history or destiny to a messianic role. 13 In this context, it is notable 
that DeLillo compares Libra to Ratner's Star 'because it attempts to provide a hint of 
order in the midst of all the randomness' (De Curtis, p. 56). The comparison is 
especially apt because in the obsessive quest for order in that text is also associated 
with a schizophrenic sense of unreality. In Ratner's Star, DeLillo portrays rationalistic 
11 Frank Lentricchia, 'Libra as Postmodern Critique', in Introducing Don DeLillo, ed. by Frank 
Lentricchia (Durham: Duke University Press, 199 1), pp. 193 -215 (p. 195, p. 202). 
12 Paul Civello, 'Undoing the Naturalistic Novel: Don DeLillo's Libra', in Arizona Quarterly. 48 
(1992), 33-56 (p. 48) and Joseph Kronick, 'Libra and the Assassin; tion-of JFK: A Textbook Operation', 
in Arizona QuarteLIL 50 (1994), 109-32 (p. 1 13). 
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scientists and mathematicians constructing 'false selves', which exclude the body and 
cause psychological and emotional disorientation. In Libra, the object of DeLillo's 
critique is more often capitalism's ceaseless and irrational demands for production 
and consumption. These give rise to what, in their analysis of capitalist pathology, 
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari call 'schizophrenia', or 'the process of the 
production of desire and desiring machines', which they argue is characteristic of the 
capitalist subject and which they insist is the 'product of the capitalist machine. 14 As 
the young Oswald remarks, ' First you produce profits for the system that exploits 
you', before adding 'Then they're always trying to sell you something ... If you can't 
buy what they're selling, you're a zero in the system' (p. 40). Although DeLillo, does 
not suggest that Oswald's personality is wholly determined by capitalism, in 
conjunction with the neglect and bullying that he suffers as a 'fatherless boy' and a 
Southerner transplanted to New York, the system's contradictions help cause the 
severe dislocation of selfhood that he experiences (p. 4). Early in the novel, DeLillo 
hints at Oswald's schizophrenic tendencies, quoting Oswald's 'social worker', who 
reports his feeling that 'there is a veil between him and other people through which 
they cannot reach him' (p. 12). It is an indication reinforced by Gerald Posner's 
explicit reference to a psychiatrist's view that Oswald possessed 'schizoid features 
and passive-aggressive tendencies'. 15 Other postmodem thinkers such as Baudrillard 
have seen contemporary schizophrenia purely as the result of 'over-proximity' to 
reality, yet, Deleuze and Guattari see such a capitalist subject as paradoxically 'cut off 
13 David Cowart, The Physics of Language (Athens GA: University of Georgia Press, 2002), p. 92 and Glen Thomas, 'History, Biography and Narrative in Don DeLillo's Libra', in Twentieth Cenl= 
Literature, 43 (1999), 107-24 (p. 113). 
14 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia trans. by Robert 
Hurley, Mark Seers, and Helen R. Lane (London: Athlone Press, 1984), p. 24, p. 33. 
15 Gerald Posner, Case Closed: Lee Harvey Oswald and the Assassination of JFK (New York: Random 
House, 1993), p. 13. 
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from reality' (p. 23), while also merging with the world and becoming one with 'the 
process of production' (p. 13). 16 Indeed, they argue that this fusion means 'the self 
and the non-self, the outside and the inside no longer have any meaning whatsoever' 
(p. 2). This dynamic closely resembles Oswald's characteristically 'Libran' oscillation 
between his neurotic and isolated fantasy life, what he calls the 'real life' that his 
family 'did not touch' (p. 3 7) and the sense of being able to 'climb out of your own 
skin' into history that he finds so inspiring (p. 10 1). It is a sense of psychological 
discontinuity that DeLillo conveys by what he calls 'a kind of abrupt, broken rhythm 
that I equate with Oswald's inner life'. 17 In treating Oswald, DeLillo represents his 
rejection of the logical sequences of capitalism by a prose thatjuxtaposes 
unconnected information, in which statements such as 'An Italian was murdered in a 
candy store' are followed immediately by the fact that 'His mother sold stockings in 
Manhattan' (p. 12). The effect is to suggest that Oswald lacks any settled identity that 
might assist in organizing his thoughts and that his subjectivity is laid open to 
contemporary capitalist history, which, as Cowart asserts, 'unfolds with the queer 
2a, p. 2). jumpiness' of 'early newsreels' (HLsto 
DeLillo's emphasis on a remark attributed to an acquaintance of Oswald that 
he was 'an actor in real life' is typical of DeLillo's presentation of Oswald as 
burdened by his fragmented subjectivity and disorientated by a sense of his 
perceptions as unreal (De Curtis, p. 5 1). In Libra, Oswald's craving for a credible 
reality is emphasized repeatedly. Like Deleuze and Guattari's schizophrenic, who 
imagines themselves to be 'a body without organs' (p. 8), Oswald feels removed from 
16 Jean Baudrillard, The Ecstasy of Communication, trans. by Bernard and Caroline Schutze (New 
York: Sernitotext (e), 1988), p. 27. 
17 Ann Arensberg, "'Seven Seconds": An Interview with Don DeLillo', in Vogue (NewYork), August 
1988, pp. 337-39, p. 390 (p. 339). 
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his physicality. In the opening pages, his determination to 'absorb' the 'noise' of the 
subway car as 'a personal test' suggests a desire to confirm, and reify, his own 
physical existence (p. 3), while his later exuberance at meeting John Wayne is the 
result of his feeling that Wayne's faithful repetition of his 'screen laugh' makes him 
'doubly real' (p. 93). Wayne's conformity with the supposed 'reality' of his screen self 
seems miraculous to Oswald who, like the schizophrenic, has 'long since ceased to 
believe' in the 'ego' and is always 'somewhere else, beyond or behind or below these 
problems' (Anti-Oedipus, p. 23). This dislocation of self prompts him to adopt 
numerous aliases, for example, the name of his fellow marine 'Hidell', which he 
believes will assist him in living 'forever in history, outside ego and id' (p. 101). It is 
the suspicion that his self and the world may be artificial entities that, in Libra, make 
him particularly vulnerable to a CIA plot, organized by a veteran of the 'Bay of Pigs' 
debacle named Win Everett, which aims to manufacture a fictional assassin for their 
own purposes. As Everett phrases it, they intend to 'put someone together', around 
whom they will 'build an identity, a skein of persuasion and habit, ever so subtle' 
(p. 78). Similarly, the attack on Kennedy that this 'someone' will carry out is 
originally designed as a simulation, with the gunman intended to perform 'a 
spectacular miss' (p. 5 1) and then to be revealed as a Castro sympathizer, something 
the conspirators believe will provoke a retaliatory U. S. invasion of Cuba. In this 
scheme, Oswald is useful strictly as a cipher, to provide the conspirators with 'a 
name, a face, a bodily frame they might use to extend their fiction into the world' 
(p. 50). DeLillo makes clear that the conspirators have long experience of such 
factitious activity, having served in the CIA-inspired coup in Guatemala, the 'false 
battle reports' and 'meaningless codes' of which had been 'like a class project in the 
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structure of reality' (p. 125). Their painstaking construction of a notional assassin 
resembles the strict formalism practiced by James and Owen in The Names and 
reaffirms DeLillo's connection of intelligence work with strictly noetic forms of 
thought. Like Owen, Everett reduces identity to an interrelation of signifiers, 
suggesting that they 'script a person or persons out of ordinary pocket litter', 'Mail- 
order forms, change of address cards, photographs'. Similarly, Everett's self- 
congratulatory assertion that 'I know what scientists mean when they talk about 
elegant solutions', once more, links intelligence work with Ratner's Star's 
mathematicians and suggests the two disciplines share a desperate, pathological quest 
for order (p. 28). 
DeLillo suggests that, being dyslexic, Oswald is particularly ill equipped to 
deal with this emphasis on pure symbols. In contrast to Norman Mailer, who 
throughout Oswald's Tale: An American My= corrects his subject's spelling, 'in 
fairness to Oswald's ideas', DeLillo stresses Oswald's learning difficulty because of 
the light it sheds on his inability to cope with the noetic strategies of the American 
establishment. 18 In spite of Oswald's story-telling ambitions, DeLillo shows he is 
hampered by his inability to 'find order in the field of little symbols' and that, 
consequently, 'Things slipped through his perception. He could not get a grip on the 
runaway world' (p. 21 1). DeLillo emphasizes the abstract cognition that perplexes 
Oswald by framing the scenes that present the CIA plot as a product of the computer- 
based research of Nicholas Branch, a CIA man hired to write the history of the 
assassination. It is Branch's entry of the date '17 th April 1963' into his 'home 
computer' (p. 15) that apparently conjures into life 'Walter Everett Jr. ' and fellow 
conspirators and Bay of Pigs veterans such as Laurence Parmenter and T. J. Mackey, 
18 Norman Mailer, Oswald's Tale: An American Mystery (London: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), 
p. xxiii in 'Notes'. 
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suggesting the proximity of their thought to the limited mechanical cognition DeLillo 
portrays in Players and Running Dog. In DeLillo's version, this formalism renders the 
case insoluble, persuading Branch he cannot conclude his investigation because 'It is 
impossible to stop assembling data' (p. 59), a difficulty that recalls Ldvi-Strauss's 
remark that the attempt to write 'a truly total history, like that of Branch, must simply 
'cancel itself out'. 19 As the novel goes on, Branch begins to suffer the erosion of 
identity that DeLillo associates with such abstract formalism and asks himself, 'Is he 
one of them nowT, 'self-watching' and 'looking for a means of connection', having 
suffered the 'mind-spatter' of examining 'lives muddied and dripping in language', 
during his interminable research (p. 18 1). DeLillo suggests that Everett's manipulative 
activities stem from a schizophrenic fear that reality might overwhelm him, a sense of 
the 'outside world' as 'eerie and real' (p. 17), that prompts what R. D. Laing would call 
'a denial of being in order to preserve being' . 
20 This 'denial' manifests in a refusal to 
attribute meaningful status to mind or subjectivity, which is particularly apparent in 
his insistence that Oswald is a mere 'fiction' and in persistent anxiety concerning the 
veracity of his own existence (p. 50). His obsession with the formal aspects of plotting 
resembles Deleuze and Guattari's description of the capitalist schizophrenic's 'ability 
to rearrange fragments continually in new and different patterns and configurations'. 
They argue that this leads to a relative 'indifference toward the act of producing' and 
tover-all result to be achieved', something that manifests in Everett's eventual 
willingness to cede authority over his plans to T. J. Mackey (p. 7). In the past, this 
sceptical formalist approach to selfhood has manifested in Everett's life as a 
19 Claude Ldvi-Strauss, The Savage Mind (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), p. 257. 
20 R. D. Laing, The Divided Self. An Existential Study in Sanijy and Madneis (London: Penguin, 
1990), p. 150. 
221 
pathological withdrawal from reality, 'motivational exhaustion' (p. 17), and eventual 
dnervous collapse' (p. 30). Notably, while stressing Everett's catastrophic dissolution 
of subjectivity, DeLillo omits even to mention the 'nervous breakdown' that Oswald 
suffered 'while on guard duty' in Japan, suggesting that he may wish to imply that the 
schizophrenic Oswald possesses no sense of identity to be shattered in this way (Case 
Closed, p. 32). By contrast, DeLillo presents Everett as psychologically devastated, 
being left with a pathological need for secret plans, like the one involving Oswald, to 
assure himself of his own existence. As Everett puts it, such intrigues are a 'way of 
arresting motion, stopping the world so we can see ourselves in it' (p. 26). Oswald is 
therefore represented as a pathological miffor image of the intelligence and corporate 
establishment, which conspires remorselessly against him. Indeed, just as he does in 
The Names, DeLillo stresses that intelligence agencies and American capitalism form 
a single system and work to enhance one another's power. Laurence Parmenter 
remarks on the 'natural kinship between business and intelligence work', even 
claiming that he finds it difficult to perceive precisely 'where the Agency left off and 
the corporations began' (p. 126). Consequently, DeLillo shows that, although 
apparently unconnected, Oswald's victimization by American intelligence is 
ultimately inseparable from the bewildering effect of the postmodern capitalist system 
on his mind. 
The similarity in the pathology of Oswald and the CIA conspirators is made 
particularly apparent in the religious attitude they share towards power and the 
conspiracies connected to it. Although Deleuze and Guattari are clear that the 
schizophrenic 'is not God', they argue that 'the energy that sweeps through it is 
divine, when it attracts to itself the whole process of production and serves as its 
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miraculate, enchanted surface' (p. 13). Branch senses this 'divine' energy in the 
information he surveys, remarking early on 'a strangeness' 'that is almost holy' 
(p. 15). In Oswald's case, this religious sense focuses upon his projected historical role 
in what he repeatedly calls the 'world inside the world' (p. 47), the historical real he 
regards as coextensive with the 'true life inside him' (p. 46). As Deleuze and Guattari 
argue, 'No one has ever been as deeply involved in history as the schizo', comparing 
him or her to the 'Nietzschean subject who passes through a series of states and 
identifies these states with the names of history' (p. 2 1). Among these 'states' of mind 
may be counted his belief that he is President Kennedy's double. This notion, which 
he bases upon slender coincidences such as their both having 'brothers named Robert' 
and 'wives pregnant at the same time', grows throughout the novel and helps 
convince him that he is destined to assassinate the President. CIA agents such as 
David Ferrie encourage his grandiose delusions, instructing him that his inner life has 
'an effect on independent events' and that he 'can make things happen' (P. 330). As in 
some earlier novels, DeLillo appears to make a connection between the pathologies of 
capitalism and the Puritan religious fervour of right-wing American culture. By the 
time of the assassination, Oswald has begun comparing his life to episodes from the 
New Testament, reflecting, for example, that 'Three times he had asked' his wife 'to 
live with him in Dallas. Three times she'd said no' (p. 390), while even those watching 
on television, like Laurence Parmenter's wife Beryl, sense something Christ-like in 
his eventual murder by Jack Ruby, feeling that he 'knew who we are and how we 
feel' and, consequently, 'he has made us part of his dying' (p. 447). By contrast, the 
intelligence agents direct their spiritual urges towards the upper echelons of power, 
particularly the presidency, an office that, in their eagerness to protect their political 
masters from unnecessary knowledge, they mystically term 'a summit of unknowing' 
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(p. 22), while referring to themselves as the 'ungodly' (p. 24). This elevation of their 
superiors resembles the factitious religious aesthetic adopted by the CIA hierarchy in 
Running Dog and entails a comparable, absolutist disregard for the lives of its 
operatives. Indeed, when Oswald seeks to become a Soviet citizen, he is referred to by 
a KGB officer, Kirilenko, as 'a Chaplinesque figure, skating along the edges of vast 
and dangerous events', a reference that connects Oswald directly to Glen Selvy in that 
novel, as a similarly powerless, disorientated character and hapless victim of CIA 
conspiracy (p. 124). Notably, Sydney Verba suggests that this religious quality is 
typical of Americans' relation to their President and, in particular, of their reaction to 
the assassination of Kennedy, a view that indicates the widespread dissemination of 
21 the establishment's religious approach to power and history in U. S. culture. Verba 
notes, for example, that many responded to Kennedy's death with 'prayer or 
attendance at special church services' and concludes that the event 'illustrates the 
close meshing of the sacred and secular in the top institutions of a political system' 
(p. 352). 
In spite of the quasi-religious satisfaction Oswald gains from his schizophrenic 
sense of a direct relation to the historical real, again, as the 'Libra' of DeLillo's title, 
he oscillates between such feelings of plentitude and a dim realization that they may 
be mere illusion. Indeed, on occasion, he reflects that he and his family may in reality 
represent 'a zero in the system' (p. 40) and be 'locked into a process' by a capitalist 
economy that 'diminished their human worth every day, as if by scientific law' (PA 1). 
In light of this, DeLillo presents Oswald's attempt to gain Soviet citizenship, which 
he pursues after his discharge from the marines, as an effort to discover a more stable, 
21 Sydney Verba, 'The Kennedy Assassination and the Nature of Political Commitment', in The 
Kennedy Assassination and the American Public- Social Communication in Crisis ed. by BTadley S. 
Greenberg and Edwin B. Parker (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1965), pp. 348-360. 
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egalitarian reality, one where he can be 'a man in history' (p. 149), but escape the 
unpredictable 'desiring machine' of capitalism (Anti-Oedipus, p. 9). Oswald envisages 
the comparative reliability of the Soviet system as something like the one-to-one 
correspondence of modernist naturalism that is craved by James in The Names. The 
KGB officer, Kirilenko, who he encounters in Moscow, meets his expectations 
precisely. He informs him that 'We are here to clarify the themes of your life' (p. 162) 
and discourses with Oswald about the naturalist author Ernest Hemingway, whose 
rstyle', claims Kirilenko, always arouses his 'appetite'. Significantly, the mention of 
Hemingway inspires Oswald to communicate his ambition to 'write short stories on 
contemporary American life', when he is 'settled here and studying', an admission 
that indicates his association of the Soviet Union with naturalism and escape from 
postmodernity's threatening ambiguities (p. 160). Although superficially welcoming, 
Kirilenko shrewdly recognises the shallowness of Oswald's attachment to the Soviet 
Union. He sees that the young American is psychologically unstable, remarking that 
'This boy played Ping-Pong in his head' (p. 167) and deduces that his defection is 
prompted by a craving for a 'second and safer identity', which Kirilenko calls a desire 
to 'live' 'as someone else' (p166). Being accustomed to the anarchic energies of 
capitalism, Oswald experiences difficulty in adopting the more straightforward 
naturalistic relation to reality that he craves. This is symbolized by his failure to learn 
Russian, and hence to master Soviet reality, his rating on his 'foreign-language 
qualification test' being T for poor throughout' (p. 163). He also resents the personal 
equivalence to which naturalism often appears to lead. At the passport office, he notes 
that 'No one could distinguish him from anyone else' (p. 15 1) and expresses 
dissatisfaction that 'Everything is the same. Everything tastes the same' (P. 198). 
Consequently, he relapses into his compulsive capitalist-schizophrenic 'production' of 
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reality (Anti-Oedipus, p. 4), adopting new aliases in a way that resembles what 
Deleuze and Guattari call the attempt to scramble 'all the codes', 'never invoking the 
same genealogy' 'from one day to the next' (p. 15). He adopts his KGB interrogator's 
name, 'Alek', an act that prefigures the quasi-religious desire for contact with the 
representatives of state power that prompts his later paranoid belief that Jack Kennedy 
is his double (p. 199). The sense that he misses the distinctively religious quality that 
attaches to power and history in American culture is reaffirmed by his response to the 
Soviet capture of the U-2 spy pilot, Francis Gary Powers, which eventually catalyzes 
Oswald's desire to return to the U. S. He considers the downing of the plane a 'heart- 
shaking event' for its historical significance and its bearing on American state secrecy 
and power (p. 190). During service in the marines, Oswald worked with U-2 planes as 
a radar operator and, consequently, the Russian authorities question him concerning 
the plane and its mission. Although he cannot offer them reliable information, during 
interrogation, he becomes intoxicated with the place Powers has achieved in the 
historical imaginary, through contact with the fantastic plans of the State. As he notes, 
foreshadowing his own fame as Lee Harvey Oswald, 'Once you did something 
notorious, they tagged you with an extra name, a middle name that was never 
ordinarily used'; 'it already sounded historic'. With obvious envy, he remarks that 
Powers is 'officially marked, a chapter in the imagination of the state', a formulation 
that indicates Oswald's willingness to surrender autonomy for a role as one of this 
state's quasi-religious fictions (p. 198). 
After leaving Russia, in the second half of the novel, Oswald reengages with 
the schizophrenic 'divine' energy of the American religious aesthetic and comes to 
understand that its obverse lies in its disturbing obsession with death. As Jean 
Baudrillard argues, for capitalist societies, this concern is a return of the repressed, 
226 
since such cultures institute a 'prohibition on death and the dead' as 'the primary 
source of social control'. 22 Indeed, for Baudrillard, all the 'abstractions of political 
economy', by which he means capitalism, (p. 130) are based on the artificial 
'separation of life and death', which determines that life is designated as 'a positive 
value' and death is relegated to the status of an 'ever-present phantasm' (p. 133). In 
this context, one might view Oswald's eventual assassination of Kennedy as an 
attempt symbolically to undo this sequestration of mortality and permit the free flow 
of what Baudrillard calls the 'circuit of life and death' (p. 132). Yet, in spite of what I 
will suggest may be the radical impact of Oswald's action, in agreeing to the killing, 
he also serves the tendency to manipulate the death-anxiety of the population that is 
inherent within the capitalist establishment and which is represented by Everett's 
more aggressive colleague T. J. Mackey. In DeLillo's conceptual scheme, Mackey and 
Everett represent opposite and complementary poles of the American political and 
cultural system and together form a pattern familiar from the relationship between 
Mudger and Selvy in Running Dog. Everett is the purveyor of noetic cognition, whose 
ability to 'think economically' causes an inability to form a functioning subjectivity, 
while Mackey epitomizes the frequently homicidal use of widespread death-phobia 
and concomitant pursuit of political dominance that are firmly repressed by the 
American establishment, but which remain integral to its efficient function (p. 219). 
When T. J. Mackey takes over the mission, he dispenses with what he considers 
Everett's 'anxious, self-absorbed' formalism, instituting an alternate course of action 
that carries what he calls the 'full heat of feeling' and which will end in President 
Kennedy's death (p. 219). As in his portrayal of Mudger, DeLillo stresses Mackey's 
independence and sense of self, as well as his tendency toward violence, referring 
22 Jean Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange and Death, trans. by lain Hamilton Grant (London: SAGE 
Publications, 1995), p. 130. 
227 
repeatedly to his unwillingness to 'trust' colleagues such as Guy Banister and Wayne 
Elko (p. 225). In functioning as obverse sides of a single unit, Mackey and Everett 
possess intuitive understanding of one another's methods. Mackey gives Everett's 
plan 'every credit', even as he rejects it, noting appreciatively that it is 'original, spare 
and clean' (p. 219). Similarly, Everett understands subconsciously that, in Mackey's 
hands, his plot will 'move toward death'. As DeLillo puts it, 'he had a foreboding that 
the plan would move to a limit, develop a logical end', an instinctive realization 
which suggests that Kennedy's murder may always have been implicit in Everett's 
plan (p. 221). Consequently, although, by killing the President, Oswald exceeds the 
limitations of the 'spare and clean' formalism that DeLillo often sees in capitalist 
thought, the system has allowed for this 'excess' and therefore, paradoxically, Oswald 
acts on behalf of a more threatening, sinister branch of the system; what one might 
call its unconscious. As the capitalist schizophrenic, Oswald discovers what Deleuze 
and Guattari call 'the very limit of capitalism: he is its very inherent tendency brought 
to fulfillment, its surplus product, its proletariat, and its exterminating angel' (p. 35). 
This sense of the assassination as exploring the limits of capitalist thought and 
aesthetics is strikingly shared by Fredric Jameson, who suggests that the murder and, 
in particular, its television coverage were 'a prodigious new display of synchronicity', 
which 'amounted to a dialectical leap over anything hitherto suspected'. 23 
Consequently, he believes, Kennedy's death offered America a 'Utopian 
glimpse into some collective communicational "festival" whose ultimate logic and 
promise is incompatible with our mode of production' (p. 355). Where DeLillo sees 
the killing as ultimately contained within a capitalist system that has foreseen such 
murderous acts as part of its own internal logic, Jameson envisages the 'collective 
23 Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism. or the Cultural Logic of Capitalism (London: Verso, 1991), p. 355. 
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experience of reception' that marked the assassination as a revolutionary event that 
may presage capitalism's ultimate demise. 
DeLillo makes the American obsession with the 'ever-present phantasm' of 
death central to the novel's form. To some degree, this is unavoidable, since Libra is 
necessarily defined by the eventual deaths of President Kennedy and Lee Harvey 
Oswald. Hence, what Everett calls the 'tendency of plots to move toward death' 
(p. 221) and Peter Brooks names the 'logic of the discourse of mortality' that is 
inherent in any 'plot' is inevitably heightened. 24 More than in most texts, one 
therefore reads in anticipation of a cataclysmic conclusion, conscious of the truth of 
Walter Benjamin's remark that 'Death is the sanction of everything that the storyteller 
can tell. He has borrowed his authority from death'. 25 Nevertheless, DeLillo adopts 
strategies that intensify the reader's sense of foreboding. By alternating episodes of 
Oswald's life, such as 'In The Bronx' (p. 3) or 'In Moscow (p. 149), with chapters 
detailing the progress of the CIA plot in the months prior to 22 nd November 1963, 
DeLillo creates a near deterministic sense that Oswald's life led ineluctably to what 
DeLillo calls the 'seven seconds that broke the back of the American century' (p. 18 1). 
DeLillo repeatedly interrupts the narrative with proleptic renderings of the deaths of 
CIA conspirators in the years following the assassination (p. 58, p. 183, p. 378). These 
reports often follow scenes in which the deceased agent plays a major role, creating a 
sense of approaching mortality, even at more tranquil moments. Likewise, the thought 
and speech of Oswald's mother Marguerite often appear in the form of transcribed 
judicial testimony, a mode that calls to mind Oswald's eventual crimes and violent 
24 Peter Brooks, Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in Narrative (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1984), p. 22. 
25 Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, trans. by Harry Zohn (London: Fontana Press, 1992), p. 93. 
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death and her subsequent defence of him before the Presidential enquiry. As DeLillo 
points out, he does not translate 'spoken speech as much as the printed speech of the 
people who testified before the Warren Commission' (De Curtis, p. 62). Early in the 
novel, for example, Marguerite speaks comparatively little to Oswald but is quoted 
telling an unnamed judge that 'He is advanced, your honor. I have said from early 
childhood he liked histories and maps' (p. 10), protestations that prefigure her eventual 
testimony to Earl Warren after Kennedy's death that 'This boy bought gifts for his 
mother. He was lonesome to read' (p. 455). 
Although Libra is organized around his eventual death, John Kennedy makes 
only one appearance in the novel. This is partly because, for many of the novel's 
characters, Kennedy functions as an imaginary object of desire that resembles the 
Lacanian objet 12etit a, a role that depends on his remaining aloof, even somewhat 
occult. 26 As Norman Mailer puts it, America sees in Kennedy a 'romantic dream of 
itself, 'the image in the mirror of its unconscious'. 27 The strategy also has a more 
pragmatic motive, since, as Cowart points out, in the historical novel, 'the good 
novelist is careful not to put major historical figures at the center of the historical 
stage' for fear that they will 'overwhelm the novelist's art' (-H Lstory, p. 120). Certainly, 
numerous real life sources bear witness to Kennedy possessing personal charisma that 
might dominate a fictional text. Mailer was moved to remark that 'I knew if he 
became President, it would be an existential event: he would touch depths in the 
American psyche which were uncharted' (Presidential, p. 26). In DeLillo's depiction 
of Kennedy's appearance in Dallas, he lives up to this extraordinary billing, 
embodying a transcendent quality that recalls the CIA's view of him as the religious 
26 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, trans. by Alan Sheridan (New 
York: W. W. Norton Company, 1998), p. 62. 
27 Norman Mailer, The Presidential Papers (New York: G. P. Putnam and Sons, 1963), p. 59. 
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6real' or 'summit of unknowing'. Yet, DeLillo suggests that the charisma he projects 
is largely reliant on the simulations of postmodern image culture, noting that much of 
the effect is achieved simply because 'He looked like himself, like photographs, 
adding wryly that he smiled 'famously into the wall of open mouths' 'white teeth 
shining' (p. 392). The moment recalls Oswald's meeting with the 'doubly real' John 
Wayne and reaffirms that many postmodern Americans share Oswald's schizophrenic 
anxiety about the reality of perceptions and subjectivity and his eagerness to bolster 
his subjectivity by identification with celebrities. 
The Kennedy DeLillo portrays in Libra is another of the iconic, apparently 
immortal figures who, throughout DeLillo's oeuvre, serve as apotropaic Rankian 
doubles in the struggle to ward off death. As Mailer again points out, Kennedy's 
credentials as a war hero lend him a symbolic status in American culture as a 
conqueror of mortality, an image as 'a man who senses death within him and gambles 
that he can cure it by risking his life' (Presidential, p. 48). The logical correlative of 
this protective role is that the icon becomes irremediably associated with death and, 
indeed, in Libra, DeLillo has Kennedy represent the American repression of mortality 
and also the ultimate return of this repressed matter. DeLillo emphasizes the secrecy 
around Kennedy's 'degenerating discs' and his 'Addison's disease', which threatened 
his life, as well as his youthful image (p. 392), facts that bear out Baudrillard's view 
that, under capitalism, 'the price we pay' for our high valuation of life is the 
systematic exclusion of death (p. 133). By contrasting Kennedy's role as 
representative of youthful immortality with the reality of his chronic illnesses and 
eventual violent death, DeLillo hints that his killing may emerge from a collective 
return of the repressed in the American psyche. In line with this, he often presents the 
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conspirators' motives as darkly irrational. One of Mackey's marksmen, Frank 
Vasquez admits that 'Something in his heart longed for this murder, even though he 
knew it was a sin' (p. 298), while Mackey wonders idly whether Kennedy was 'just 
too pretty to live' (p. 365). Oswald himself is swayed by David Ferrie's contention 
that, rather than relations of 'cause and effect', he is driven to kill by elements of his 
unconscious mind, what Ferrie calls 'the deepest levels of the self' with 'no history 
we can recognize or understand' (p. 339). Ultimately, therefore, Oswald undertakes 
the task without a coherent conscious motive, exemplifying Baudrillard's view that, in 
a capitalist system founded upon the 'need to survive at any cos ', 'death becomes a 
useless luxury, and the only alternative' (p. 15 6). Yet, as we have seen, the 
assassination is ultimately productive, serving symbolically to question what Deleuze 
and Guattari call the 'limit' of 'capitalism', in particular, its rigid division between 
life and death and to suggest its replacement with the 'symbolic reality of exchange' 
between the categories (Baudrillard, p. 132). For Baudrillard, the public deaths of 
powerful figures like Kennedy, especially, may be seen as sacrificial, because they 
maintain 'within the group's reciprocal movements' qualities such as 'wealth' or 
'status' that might otherwise 'accumulate and become fixed on the King's person' 
(p. 13 8). Indeed, he argues that a 'totally undeserved' death, like Kennedy's, 
effectively undermines the division between life and death because 'the officiating 
priest or 'criminal' is expected to die in return, according to the rules of a symbolic 
exchange' (p. 165). 
As this symbolic 'priest', Oswald dies at the hand of nightclub owner Jack 
Ruby, who shoots him in police custody two days after Kennedy's assassination, yet, 
in the intervening time, he appears to gain in self-esteem from having played this 
crucial social and historical role. Indeed, DeLillo portrays Oswald, in his prison cell, 
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as beginning to forge the kind of robust subjectivity that eluded him in American 
society, remarking that 'There was strength for him here'. 'He didn't fear a thing'. 
Having achieved the symbolic victories over capitalism implicit in the (non) logic of 
the assassination, Oswald grows in confidence, even regaining his self-image as anti- 
capitalist hero and planning to instruct the police that the assassination was executed 
'to advance the Marxist cause into the heart of the American Empire' (P. 426). His 
final act in the novel is to glance 'at the camera', in the moments 'before he was shot', 
a moment that critics often interpret as symbolic of Oswald's impotent entrapment 
within postmodern media life. Yet, Beryl Parmenter remarks on his intriguingly 
gnomic appearance in this shot, suggesting that he seems to know 'who we are and 
how we feel' (p. 447). Oswald's insight may be borne of his understanding that the 
assassination succeeded in revealing part of the capitalist unconscious and creating, 
momentarily, what Jameson calls a subversive 'communicational 'festival". By 
participating in an event of this magnitude, Oswald gains fresh understanding of his 
environment and his compatriots, which enables him, in Beryl's words, to bring 'our 
interpretations and perceptions into his sense of the crime' and to remain, in some 
sense, 'outside the moment, watching with the rest of us' (p. 447). 
Mao Il 
In Mao 11, DeLillo explores the effect of the schizophrenic postmodern sense 
of unreality on religious and aesthetic life in the U. S, concentrating particularly on 
reclusive novelist Bill Gray and one of his assistants, a former member of the 
Unification Church named Karen. DeLillo continues to present this perceptual 
disorientation as largely the effect of contemporary capitalism and its media outlets, 
whose influence Guy Debord famously, if somewhat expansively, described as having 
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reduced 'All that was directly lived' to 'mere representation'. 28 In Mao II. however, 
the influence of this mode of thought spreads beyond the intelligence services and 
alienated revolutionaries, to be confronted by all sections of society, from influential 
artists to the young and middle class, of which Karen and her lover Scott are 
representative. DeLillo's portrayal of the erstwhile Moonie offers a sustained 
examination of the religious life of the capitalist schizophrenic, which, in this novel, 
entails an uncanny intuitive relationship with postmodem technologies and an 
obsession with isolated objects or signifiers as metonymic symbols of an incipient 
unity of mind. By contrast, Bill Gray functions as the novel's chief proponent of a 
view close to that of Debord and, like Jack in White Noise, begins with a fierce 
rejection of postmodernism and an anachronistically modernist view of subjectivity as 
discrete and autonomous. Although Bill is, aesthetically, a modernist and, politically, 
a democratic individualist, he feels increasingly drawn to postmodern culture, 
particularly its more collective model of consciousness and its concomitant 
concentration on visual images and global politics. He appears persuaded by the 
postmodern world that 'The future belongs to crowds' and even comes to 
acknowledge contemporary postmodernisin as the logical outgrowth of his modernist 
viewpoint (p. 16). This shift is indicated partly through involvement in contemporary 
culture, through a concerted attempt to free a Swiss writer abducted in Beirut, but also 
by his eventual exchange of fiction for writing that directly addresses contemporary 
politics. 
The theme of a burgeoning mass or global consciousness in postmodemity is 
alluded to periodically by the insertion of set pieces taken from contemporary events 
(p. 1, p. 32, p. 176, p. 18 8). These involve large crowds intoxicated and sometimes 
29 Guy Debord, The Sociejy of the Spectacle ew York: Zone Books, 2002), p. 12. 
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destroyed by the awesome forces of what Freud called the 'primitive mental activity' 
of the 'horde', which he believes is unleashed by individuals giving up their 'ego 
ideal' and replacing it with the 'group ideal' . 
29 The groups DeLillo chooses, which 
range from participants in a mass wedding to murdered democracy activists in 
Beijing's Tiannenmen square, tend to be the object of our horror or pity, a fact that 
forcibly conveys Bill's revulsion for mass consciousness and the threat he perceives 
to individualized mind and subjectivity from media representations of such events. 
Yet, DeLillo also presents each episode as either seen or experienced by Karen, who 
represents the unreality of postmodern schizophrenia, but also the possible benefits of 
the globally unified consciousness DeLillo hints may be latent in postmodern culture. 
Such doubled mediation of these episodes renders the novel what DeLillo calls an 
'argument about the future', 30 offering Bill's view of contemporary mind and 
subjectivity in conjunction with Karen's, apparently, diametrically opposed position. 
Bill's initial view of selfhood as autonomous and unitary is inextricable from 
his traditional approach to the novel and practice as a novelist, which, in the manner 
of Hemingway, is both modernist and naturalist. DeLillo hints at this relation to 
Hemingway, by repeated imitation of the novelist's well-known repetitive use of the 
word 'and', but the resemblance is particularly striking in the sections purportedly 
written by Bill about the experience of the Swiss poet in Beirut. In an extended 
passage, which begins part two of the novel, Bill writes: 
they would take him to a secret place and recite their 
29 Sigmund Freud, 'Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Individual Ego', in Vol. xviii: 1920-22, 
ed. by Lytton Strachey with Anna Freud (London: The Hogarth Press, 1957), pp. 67-144 (p. 122, p. 129). 
30 Adam Begley, 'Don DeLillo: The Art of Fiction CXXXVI, in Paris Revie 28(1993), 275-306(p. 
296). 
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questions in the same voice he heard on the instruction 
tape and he would impress the authorities with his recall 
of detail and his analysis of facets and aspects and they 
would quickly determine the location of the building and 
the identity of the group that held him (p. 108) 
This sentence typifies what DeLillo told David Remnick is 'what makes Hemingway', 
'the simple connective -- the word "and" that strings together the segments of a long 
Hemingway sentence' (Remnick, p. 47). The style is allegorical of Bill's comfort with 
modernist, and romantic, ideas, particularly the sense that characters may be partially 
autonomous, and a concomitant refusal of the self-consciousness of modem and 
postmodern authorship. Bill tells the Maoist academic George Haddard that he 
appreciates the novel form partly because 'characters deny my efforts to own them 
completely' and because, he contends, any 'desperado' can 'find his voice' and write 
6a great novel' (p. 159). Bill extends this preference for, at least relative, autonomy in 
subjectivity to the consumers of mass media culture, expressing disquiet at the 
opportunity television news affords terrorists to 'make raids on human consciousness' 
and reduce the viewers' intellectual independence. In particular, he resents the fact 
that violent political groups have usurped the role formerly occupied by novelists as 
shapers of the mind and self, diminishing their ability 'to alter the inner life of the 
culture' (p. 41). 
Some elements of Bill's view of fiction writing, in particular, its intimate 
relation to the author's selfhood, are close to those articulated by DcLillo, making it 
difficult to avoid reading Mao II as, in part, an exploration of DeLillo's own anxieties 
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about the place of the author in postmodem society. Bill's feeling that 'The language 
of my books has shaped me as a man' (p. 48) echoes DeLillo's sense that 'it's possible 
for a writer to shape himself as a human being through the language he uses'. 31 
DeLillo's public letter to Jonathan Franzen demonstrates that he also shares Bill's 
belief that the novel counteracts the corrosive effects of mass culture. According to 
DeLillo, the form 'frees us from' 'mass identity' and, moreover, is inextricable from 
'the thing we're talking about when we use the word "identity"'. 32 It is a view of 
fiction writing that DeLillo has indicated had a strong bearing on his production of 
Mao II. He told Gordon Burn that Ayatollah Khomeini's Fatwa against Salman 
Rushdie 'accelerated my way into what became Mao IF and inspired him to write 
about 'the novelist as a rigorous champion of the self-, as a defender of the self. 33 
Indeed, the description of the mass Unification Church wedding, with which the novel 
begins, contains a reply to the question Rushdie poses at the beginning of The Satanic 
Verses: 'How does newness come into the world? How is it born?. 34 DeLillo notes 
that the Moonies 'take a time-honoured event and repeat it, repeat it, repeat it, until 
something new enters the world' (p. 4), implying that, in the late capitalist 
environment Mark Seltzer calls 'machine-culture, originality is generated only 
through mysteriously productive forms of repetition. 35 This allusion to Rushdie raises 
the question that plagues Bill, of whether the 'compulsive seriality' of postmodem 
31 Tom LeClair and Larry McCaffery, eds. AnZhing Can Happen: Interviews with Contempora 
American Novelists (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1983), p. 82. 
32 David Remnick, 'Exile on Main Street: Don DeLillo's Undisclosed Underworld', in 'The New 
Yorker', 15'h September 1997, pp. 4248 (p. 48). 
33 
1Z th Gordon Burn, 'Wired Up and Whacked Out', in The Sunday Times Maazine, 25 August1991, 
pp. 36-39 (p. 39). 
34 Salman Rushdie, The Satanic Verses (London: Viking, 1988), p. 8 
35 Mark Seltzer, Serial Killers- Death and Life in America's Wound Culture (New York: Routledge, 
1998), p. 62. 
237 
culture renders individual creativity unattainable and the novelist superfluous (Seltzer, 
p. 70). DeLillo pursues these issues but also goes on to examine whether this 
mechanized and media-dominated postmodern culture creates the 'apocalyptic sense 
of things' (Remnick, p. 4 8) and schizophrenic craving for order and' the end of human 
history' that afflict a number of the novel's central characters (Mao II, p. 6). 
DeLillo's interest in notions of repetition and originality has persuaded many 
critics to emphasize the issue of the status of the postmodern novelist in Mao II. 
Richard Levesque comments on the 'loss or de-centering' of the writer's 'authority', 
while Mark Osteen regards the novel as heralding the final triumph of 'spectacular 
discourse' over literary culture. 36 Bill is indeed concerned with the diminishing 
prestige of the author, which he attributes to writers being 'incorporated' (p. 41) and 
their work increasingly commodified in 'mass-market' bookstores, which present 
texts in 'lacquered and gilded' covers (p. 19). Bill's paralyzing anxiety on this subject 
is symbolized by his inability to complete his current novel after twenty-three years 
(p. 41). Indicative of his declining status is his assistants' frequent use of the phrase 
'Quoting Bill', which, particularly when used in his company, seems less respectful 
than an acknowledgement of his dissolution as a substantial historical presence and 
his emergence as one of numerous iterable media texts (p. 72, p. 80, p. 224). Other 
critics have examined the question of subjectivity in more general terms. Laura 
Barrell argues that the 'unfamiliar territory' of postmodern culture 'compromises 
notions of subjectivity' and that the former 'Moonie' Karen is the 'quintessential 
36 Richard Levesque, 'Telling Postmodern Tales: Absent Authority in Didion's Democracy and 
DeLillo's Mao 11', in Arizona Quartedy, 54 (1998), 69-87 (p. 71) and Mark Osteen American Magic 
and Dread: Don DeLillo's Dialogue with Culture (Philadelphia, PA: University of Philadelphia Press, 
2000), p. 193. 
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decentred subject' of this disorientating milieu. 37 Adam Begley, by contrast, argues 
that Karen is 'the vital center of the novel', who, by surrendering her ego to religious 
belief, paradoxically, 'absorbs and transcends threats to selfhood' that she encounters 
in contemporary culture. 38 The novel's central, but largely ignored, concern is 
DeLillo's exploration of the schizophrenic sense of unreality pervading postmodern 
culture and its influence on U. S. aesthetics and religion. In particular, DeLillo focuses 
on the power of these cultural manifestations of schizophrenic consciousness to 
disrupt discrete and unitary models of selthood, which it threatens to displace with a 
form of subjectivity that is at once more fragmentary, yet unified on a mass or even 
global scale. This theme is introduced during the mass wedding portrayed in the 
novel's prologue, which occurs in Yankee Stadium and is organized by 'Reverend 
Moon', to whom Karen refers by various respectful titles, including 'true father' and 
'Master' (p. 6). Karen's immediate appearance in the text emphasizes the thematic 
significance of her schizophrenic reaction to American capitalism, while also delaying 
Bill's arrival until the second chapter, a deferral that helps establish him as the 
sequestered and semi-mythical figure he has become. DeLillo conveys Karen's 
rapturous schizophrenia by a free indirect style he describes as a 'non-sequitur 
ramble' (Begley, p. 294), in which statements are linked by vague association rather 
than the sequentiality of capitalist machine-culture. For example, the fact that 
'Reverend Moon' is of 'chunky build' directly precedes his unrelated sighting of 
'Jesus on a mountainside' (p. 6). This prose is mimetic of Karen's exceptionally 
intuitive thought-process, which, as with Oswald, is combined with a dangerous 
37 Laura Barrell, "'Here But Also There": Subjectivity and Postmodern Space in Mao 11', in Modem 
Fiction Studies, 45 (1999), 788-8 10 (p. 789). 
38 Adam Begley, 'Don DeLillo: Americana, Mao 11, and Underworld', in South West Review 82 
(1997), 478-505 (p. 493, p. 496). 
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credulity in pursuit of the religious real. As Scott, Bill's senior assistant, puts it, she is 
'thin-boundaried', 'She took it all in, she believed it all' (P. 119). She also possesses 
Oswald's mania for contact with history, at one point, talking excitedly of 'Reverend 
Moon's' 'power to alter history' (p. 172). In her state of spiritual longing, she believes 
herself to possess preternatural insight. In a way comparable to the temporarily 
unbalanced Jack at the climax of White Noise, she believes she knows Moon 'at 
molecular level. He lives in them like chains of matter that determine who they are' 
(p. 6). Such fervid concentration on the microscopic is congruent with Deleuze and 
Guattari's view of the capitalist schizophrenic. In contrast to 'the paranoiac, like 
Moon, who 'engineers masses' and controls the 'large molar aggregates', 
characteristic of capitalist organization (p. 279), Deleuze and Guattari argue that the 
schizophrenic focuses on the 'molecular order' (p. 286), the realm of 'microphysics, of 
molecules insofar as they no longer obey the statistical laws' (p. 280). Karen's 
religious mania leads her to believe she has direct access to the constituent parts of 
her own and others', including 'Reverend Moon's', physical and spiritual being. 
Unlike Oswald's temporary escape to the Soviet Union, Karen's flight from 
mainstream American culture merely exposes her to more of the capitalist pressures 
that have conditioned her as a Deleuzian 'desiring-machine'. The 'Moonies' 
determinedly pursue funds, 'chanting their monetary goal' and repeating the 
unsettlingly materialistic mantra 'We're the greatest there's no doubt; heavenly father, 
we'll sell out' (p. 13). As Eileen Barker notes, in spite of his youthful poverty and 
message of universal equality and love, the real life Reverend Moon embraced the 
inequalities of Western capitalism, living 'in splendour, while his followers lived in 
forced penury'. 39 DeLillo also emphasizes the Moonies' maniacal quest for order, 
39 Eileen Barker, The Making of a Moonie: Choice or Brainwashing (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), p. 121. 
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portraying a cult that sees the world as chaotic and, like Ratner's Star's, craves the 
comfort of reliable intellectual structure. Karen speaks of a 'World in pieces' (P. 9) as 
the result of a 'consciousness' become 'corrupt' (p. 16). In a conference address, 
Moon articulated his sense that the modem world is wracked by a 'confusion and 
contradiction' of different philosophies and 'epistemologies' in need of unification 
into an orderly 'absolute truth' . 
40 As David G. Bromley and Anson D. Shupe, Jr. 
point out, this aspiration is evident in the personal relationships that the Unification 
Church encourages, which are restricted to those that can 'be handled in highly 
ritualized (i. e. impersonal) ways', including marriage to partners carefully selected by 
Moon. 41 Such weddings demonstrate what Deleuze and Guattari call the 
schizophrenic's rejection of the 'existing social code' (p. 14), including the 
conventional genealogy of 'daddy-mommy' (p. 92), something they argue is pursued 
with the intention of claiming defiantly that 'I am not your kind, I belong eternally to 
the inferior race' (p. 277). This alienation from normative familial structures is 
consistent with Karen's apparent lack of a 'last name' (hiao II, p. 166) and her 
contemptuous observation that 'our true father is a foreigner and nonwhite. How they 
silently despise' (p. 9). Karen's emphasis on the destructive and transformative power 
of the Word is also consonant with Freud's view of schizophrenia, which emphasizes 
the psychotic's concentration on individual words, and creates a fear of linguistic 
reference comparable to Win Everett's schizophrenic formalism in Libra. 42 She 
mentions things Moon must 'leave unsaid, words whose planetary impact no one 
40 Sun Myung Moon, Science and Absolute Values: 10 Addresses by Sun My1ing Moon (New York: 
International Cultural Foundation Press, 1982), p. 46. 
41 David G. Bromley and Anson D. Shupe, Jr., Moonies in America: Cult. Church. and Crusade 
(Beverley Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1979), p. 183. 
42 Sigmund Freud, 'The Unconscious', in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works 
of Sigmund Freud, ed. by James Strachey with Anna Freud, Vol. xiv: 1914-1916, (London: The 
Hogarth Press, 1957). pp. 159-215. 
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could bear' (p. 7) and chants for 'one word, for the time when names are lost' (P. 16). 
Karen's desire accords with Freud's view that the schizophrenic emphasizes the 
'abstract' over the 'concrete' (p. 204) and seeks to alight on a 'single word', which 'on 
account of its numerous connections, takes over the representation of a whole train of 
human thought' (p. 199). Such reduction to an isolated signifier resembles the process 
of 'condensation' that Freud describes in The Interpretation of Dreams and may hint 
at the specifically oneiric quality of the unreality Karen experiences. 43 It is a 
metonymic tendency to mistake part for whole that recurs in Karen's behaviour, when 
she detaches 'a food-crusted spoon' (p. 173) from an art exhibit, which she 
fetishistically considers symbolic of the mental unity she craves, insisting irrationally 
that 'the spoon and food were one' (p. 179). Overall, the scene in the ballpark is 
notable for the overt emotionalism of the participants, depicted as 'happy', after 
giving up 'independent thought' (p. 7), a portrayal that again recalls Freud's work on 
'Group Psychology. Freud remarks on the 'dwindling of the conscious individual 
personality' and 'the predominance of the affective side of the mind and of 
unconscious psychical life' among group members with strong libidinal ties (P. 122). 
Freud's analysis is directly replicated in the techniques the Moonies employ to assist 
group integration, the primary aim of which, as Bromley and Anson make clear, is to 
encourage new members not to 'react on the cognitive but on the affective level' 
(p. 183). 
Although DeLillo presents Karen's response to contemporary culture as 
bordering on the pathological, it is never condemned or dismissed. Indeed, the 
Moonies' ideas persist powerfully throughout the novel and are often reproduced in 
43 Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, trans. and ed. by James Strachey (New York: Avon, 
1965), p. 313. 
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inverted form, by mainstream society. This phenomenon resembles what 2ilek calls 
the 'mutual misrecognition' that allows one to 'receive from the other' one's 'own 
message in the inverse form', implying that the Moonies' supposedly alien 
schizophrenic logic may be latent in the unconscious of the culture. 44 Bill's responses 
seem the mirror image of the Moonies' emphasis on collectivity and universal love 
and to be motivated by a similar distrust of the fractured selfhood created by the 
postmodern media. Bill's caustic remark that 'News of disaster' has become a 
psychological necessity and 'the last addiction before-what? ' (p. 42) is comparable to 
Moon's view of contemporary consciousness as 'confused' or 'corrupt'. Moreover, 
his admission that his retreat into isolation has 'a powerful inner logic' that is 
comparable to 'the way religion takes over a life' (p. 45) indicates a sense of 'kinship' 
with Karen, like the one DeLillo has admitted to feeling himself (Begley, p. 294). 
When Karen's father kidnaps her from the Moonies, the so-called deprogramming 
techniques he inflicts on her are indistinguishable from the religious ritual she has 
escaped, involving mantras about the Unification Church's supposed brainwashing 
such as 'Made me a drone, made me a drone' (p. 82). By choosing to view his first 
photo-shoot in decades as the 'announcement of my dying', (p. 43) Bill also imitates 
what he takes to be the Moonies' belief that an 'image-bound' culture is 'more 
anxious' and 'prone to hurrying its own transformation' (p. 80). The statement appears 
melodramatic, but, in fact, precedes a fundamental self-transformation that entails a 
profound reengagement with media and political culture and his eventual death, while 
travelling to Beirut (p. 43). 
Recurrent in the novel is the notion that the Moonie ideals of what Chun Hwan 
Kwak, in his introduction to Moon's lectures, calls a 'revolution of human 
44 Slavoj 2ilek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso, 1989), p. 62. 
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consciousness', involving something resembling global unity of mind may be 
achievable, partly through the use of electronic technologies (Lcience, p. vii). The 
theme recalls the semi-mystical notion of creating a 'single planetary mind', which 
pervades Ratner's Star as an intriguing but unresolved possibility (p. 65). The Maoist 
academic George Haddard also advocates this idea, telling Bill that, in postmodemity, 
'thought' 'bleeds out into the world'; 'there's no longer a moral or spatial distinction 
between thinking and acting' (p. 132). After meeting Karen at Bill's rural house, the 
photographer Brita Nilsson becomes similarly enthused by this notion. When she 
describes a 'man and woman' walking the 'Great Wall of China' in opposite 
directions and how 'Every time I think of them, I see them from above' (P. 70), she 
prompts Scott's striking response that technology provides ways of 'seeing people 
new', as if 'from space, where gender or features don't matter'. 'As if from the moon, 
even. We're all Moonies, or should learn to be', a remark notable for its indication 
that he aspires to Karen's postmodern schizophrenia, but remains trapped by the same 
defunct modernism as his literary hero, Bill (p. 89). Although Brita initially dismisses 
this idealism, she herself later explores the idea of a unified global consciousness. 
Significantly, she considers such matters while utilizing a characteristically 
postmodern technology: the jet airliner. After musing that recently 'everything that 
came into her mind' 'seemed at once to enter the culture', whether as 'a painting or a 
photograph' (p. 165), she concludes, that, although she was 'five miles aloft', 'the 
world was so intimate that she was everywhere in it' (p. 167). 
This association of the proliferation of technologies in postmodernity with the 
Moonie notion of collective consciousness is exemplified by Karen's intuitive 
relationship with technology. Her uncanny prophetic abilities in this area are 
frequently filtered through Bill's pragmatic modernist consciousness, who treats 
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Karen's abilities as confirmation of her comfort with communal notions of 
consciousness and, therefore, of his thesis that she comes 'from the future' (p. 85). He 
remarks incredulously on her eerie habit of watching television and knowing 'what 
people are going to say next. Not only gets it right but does the voices' 'with a 
trueness that's startling' (pp. 65-6). His mediation accentuates Karen's role as a 
mysterious, nournenous being, but also alerts the reader to Bill's growing interest in 
her schizophrenic outlook. In conjunction with the revelation of their sexual 
relationship, his curiosity about these matters suggests she may even be his second 
self, as Orest is Jack's in White Noise (pp. 84-6). When Scott first meets Karen, 
DeLillo hints that Karen's schizophrenic thought process may be latent in Bill's 
aesthetic practice. DeLillo notes Karen's appearance near a 'sign', which 'jutted from 
the front of the general store with a mysterious word on it', recalling Karen's 
schizophrenic attachment to isolated signifiers in the prologue (P. 76). Scott 
emphasizes this 'mysterious' word, insisting that 'the whole picture' 'flows into the 
strange word on that sign' (p. 83) and connecting Karen's word fetishism to Bill's 
thought, asserting that the single mysterious 'word' was a 'Bill Gray touch' (P. 83). In 
spite of these apparently intimate physical and intellectual connections, Karen's ease 
with popular culture causes Bill to remain ambivalent about her sensibility. In 
particular, since he regards TV as the medium via which totalitarian groups make 
'raids on human consciousness' (p. 41), her uncanny intimacy with it intensifies his 
feeling that the obverse of her attachment to 'Moon's' 'single family' may be her 
Korean master's disturbingly absolutist 'single vision' (p. 193). George Gilder has 
argued that 'television is at its heart a totalitarian medium', originating from 'a single 
station' and being 'delivered top-down to the masses' and that this is the reason 
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'tyrants everywhere push TV sets onto their people'. 45 Bill expresses a similar feeling 
that TV provides an absolutist view of the world, telling Brita that news is now 'the 
only narrative people need' (p. 42). His view of the postmodern mass media and the 
subjectivity it creates is notably close to that of Niklas Luhmann, who asserts that the 
media 'generate a transcendental illusion', which cancels reference to reality and 
gives rise to a disorientated, quasi-religious state of mind. 46 Bill tells Scott that the 
television news has replaced the novel as the 'secular transcendence' of its time, 
eradicating the need for real events with 'reports and predictions and warnings' that 
satisfy the millenarian 'desperation' of 'our search for meaning' (p. 72). 
Pop art, particularly the views and aesthetic of Andy Warhol, becomes 
similarly symbolic in Mao II of the threat to traditional notions of selfliood and 
creativity that Bill perceives in postmodern culture. Throughout the novel, Warhol's 
work is presented as exemplary of the image-obsessed culture that Bill argues 
undermines his role as a modernist literary craftsman; what he calls 4a sentence 
maker, like a donut-maker only slower' (p. 162). As Stephen Koch notes, Warhol had 
gone true idea', which is the 'visual power' the image is 'capable of exerting over the 
47 mind'. Although this is DeLillo's first treatment of Warhol, he has long pursued an 
interest in the 'power of images' that is parallel to Warhol's and which suggests a 
perverse form of artistic kinship between them (Anything, p. 85). Unlike Warhol, 
though, but like Bill, he seems ambivalent about the impact of image-culture, 
remarking in interview that 'There's something in the image that seems to collide 
with the very idea of individual identity', a view that suggests he sees rational 
45 George Gilder, Life After Television: The Coming Transformation of Media and American Life 
(New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1994), p. 46. 
46 Niklas Luhmann, The Realily of the Mass Media, trans. by Kathleen Cross (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2000), p. 4. 
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grounds for Bill's anxieties on the subject. 48 Nevertheless, Mao II implicitly 
acknowledges the centrality of images to postmodernity, offering several photographs 
scattered through the text, including a mass wedding, dying Liverpool fans at the 
Hillsborough soccer disaster, and the funeral of Ayatollah Khomeini (p. 1, p. 17, 
p. 105). Notably, it is Karen who introduces a Warhol print into the house, the 
'reproduction of a pencil drawing called Mao IF, which gives the novel its title, 
ftirther confirming her alignment with the postmodem media culture Bill fears (p. 62). 
Likewise, Scott's visit to a Warhol retrospective in New York before meeting Brita 
indicates his sympathy for the pop art that scandalizes Bill's modernist sensibility. 
Indeed, although some critics argue that Scott relentlessly emphasizes commerce, his 
advice that Bill forego 'a king's whatever, multimillions' (p. 52) and refuse to publish 
because 'the withheld work of art is the only eloquence left' indicates enthusiasm for 
a postmodem conceptual aesthetic, at the expense of financial considerations (p. 67). 
Given that Mao II is structured largely as an intellectual 'argument about the 
future', Warhol's importance in the text may be due partly to his well-known views 
on the media and the creative process, which conflict dramatically with Bill's. His 
blithe statements that television anaesthetized him to the point where people's 
'problems' 'didn't really affect me anymore' and his conclusion that 'existence itself 
is nothing' (p. 15) support Bill's opinion that the 'transcendental illusion' of the 
postmodem media corrodes respect for the individual. 49 Warhol's view that 'every 
painting should be the same size and the same colour so they're all interchangeable' 
also demonstrates his contempt for the kind of inspired, even romantic, individual 
47 Stephen Koch, Stargazer: The Life. World and Films of Andy Warhol (London: Marion Boyars, 
1991), P. Xii. 
48 Maria Nadotti, 'An Interview with Don DeLillo', in Salmagundi, 100 (1993), 86-97 (p. 88). 
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creativity Bill espouses (pl34). Indeed, Warhol rejects the notion of artistic originality 
as outdated to the extent that he believes 'everybody should be a "machine' ,. 50 As 
well as uncongenial to Bill, this view is unlikely to satisfy DeLillo, who has stated his 
opinion that the writer should be considered the 'champion of the self' and always 
treats the notion of mind and self as machine as an object of some anxiety. Bill is also 
unlikely to approve of the disconnection from history that characterizes Warhol's 
work. As an artist who wishes to alter the 'inner life of the culture' (P. 41), Bill would 
regard as anathema Warhol's 'silk screens' of Mao Zedong, in which the image, as 
Scott puts it, by 'floating nearly free of its photographic source' appears to become 
'unwitting of history' (p. 21). By contrast, Bill affirms his attraction to the 
'photographic source', opting to seek publicity through photography, which emerged 
in modernity, rather than taking the more postmodern option of 'talking' 'on TV' that 
Karen humorously suggests (p. 71). Photography is indeed highly apposite as a vehicle 
for Bill's public emergence, being the visual equivalent of the modernist naturalism 
he practices. As Barthes argues, the photograph conveys the sense of a perfect 
'denotation' of its object that makes its image the 'perfect analogon' of reality, 
rendering it less susceptible to assimilation into the sensational media 'narrative' Bill 
abhors. 51 Consequently, the violence of Bill's response to Scott's Warholian 
suggestion that he use the absence of a book 'to define an idea, a principle' may be 
provoked by the ineluctable association of such ideas with Warhol's well-known 
nihilism and anti-historicism (p. 67). So angry is he that he reaches for 'the butter dish, 
backhanding it across the table' (p. 74), while protesting unconvincingly that 'The 
49 Andy Warhol, The Philosophy of Andy Warhol: From A to B and Back Again (London: Picador, 
1979), p. 30, p. 32. 
50 Patrick S. Smith, Andy Warhol's Art and Films (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Research 
Press, 1986), p. 107. 
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book appears'. 'Sooner than anyone thinks' (p. 73). Yet, paradoxically, as in the case 
of his unspoken sympathy with Karen's postmodern schizophrenia, in spite of 
apparent hostility to conceptual art, Bill's behaviour demonstrates notable affinities 
with Warhol's opinions and persona, which hint at the implicit presence of 
postmodernist, even Warholian, ideas within Bill's apparently modernist stance. Like 
Warhol, whose studio 'The Factory' became highly fashionable in New York during 
the 1960s, Bill has benefited from a shallow postmodern cult of personality that 
allowed him to acquire 'celebrity by doing nothing' in the twenty-three years since he 
has published (p. 52). Similarly, his voluntary 'concealment' or 'seclusion' (P. 45) 
resembles the postmodernist schizophrenia of what Smith calls Warhol's 'conscious 
identification' with 'self-absorbed consciousness' (Smith, p. 11). Moreover, Koch 
argues that Warhol's use of ready-made images represents 'a new immediacy' that 
'renewed for our time' 'the romantic tradition', an assessment that suggests that his 
aesthetic mayjustifiably be placed in historical continuity with Bill's emphasis on 
originality and individualism (Koch, p. iv-v). 
Bill's increasing sympathy with Karen's postmodern worldview is further 
demonstrated by the degeneration of his working life into a schizophrenic formalism, 
like that which informs Win Everett's plot-making in Libra. Like Everett's 
intelligence work, Bill's writing process fits Deleuze and Guattari's description of the 
capitalist schizophrenic's rearrangement of 'fragments continually in new and 
different patterns and configurations' and concomitant 'indifference toward the act of 
producing' (p. 7). He labours obsessively on his work in progress; as Scott says, he 
'picks it up, smells it, weighs it, rewrites it' (p. 5 1) but, after two decades, remains 
reluctant to accept Scott's assertion that 'the book is finished' (p. 72). In spite of his 
51 Roland Barthes, Image Music Text, trans. by Stephen Heath (London: Fontana, 1990), pp. 17-18. 
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burgeoning attraction to postmodern culture, he refuses to adapt to what he sees as the 
contemporary commodification of writers and the consequent diminution of their 
status. As he tells Brita, 'the more books they publish, the weaker we become' (p. 47), 
a situation he resists by refusing to produce a finished product, while claiming 
unconvincingly to a prospective publisher that 'I'm fixing the punctuation' (p. 127). 
Rather than a finished work of art, therefore, Bill produces a vault full of 'old 
handwritten manuscripts, printer's typescripts' and 'master galleys', which Scott 
tends and shows to the occasional visitor. As with Everett, this vapid formalism is 
related to a profound crisis of subjectivity, a feeling that he needs a 'saint' to cure 'the 
whole man, body, soul and self (p. 168), which, in his work, manifests as the 
realization that 'I no longer see myself in the language' (p. 48). It is this despair that 
eventually prompts his departure for the Middle East, with the aim of constructing a 
less discrete self, through participation in international politics. Yet, the trip leads 
eventually to his death from injuries sustained in a car accident. Like Owen in The 
Names, his apparent decision to accept death, rather than seek medical attention, 
arises from an inability to adapt to postmodemity and a concomitant wish to escape an 
outmoded modernist subjectivity, which he experiences as a 'cosmology of pain' 
(p. 45). His physical decline is also accompanied, like Owen's, by the analeptic return 
of forbidding childhood memories, particularly of his father, who is quoted informing 
him darkly that 'We need to have a confab junior' and complaining that 'I keep telling 
you and telling you and telling you' (p. 216). Bill's flight from his loveless childhood 
is emphasized by Scott's discovery that, seeking to eradicate this paternal influence, 
Bill changed his name from William Skansey Jr. (p. 144). This eschewal of his father's 
name is comparable to Karen's schizophrenic wish to reject 'daddy-mommy' (p. 92), 
in favour of her 'true father' and provides another hint that schizophrenic 
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disorientation like hers is latent within Bill's modernism. Similarly, the absence of 
Bill's birth certificate, with a note that a 'record of birth' exists in a 'state office' in 
'Des Moines', demonstrates Bill's use of schizophrenic formalism, to evade the 
difficulties of striving for autonomous selfhood (p. 144). Scott actively encourages this 
formalism, motivated by a desire to emulate Karen's schizophrenia and escape his 
own frustratingly discrete subjectivity. DeLillo notes that Scott himself takes 
$pleasure in lists', finding in them 'a form of contentment' and 'a way of working 
toward a new reality' (p. 13 9), hinting that these bureaucratic tasks help him escape 
his identity as 'a luckless boy' (p. 58). When Bill disappears, Scott's first anxious 
response is to suggest that they 'need to do lists', indicating the psychological comfort 
he gains from these administrative duties (p. 118). Similarly, while helping Bill to 
obscure his former identity, his feeling that it would 'sustain and expand' him to 
'keep absolutely silent' suggests a vicarious satisfaction, which arises from a powerful 
desire to transform his own subjectivity (p. 18 5). 
It may be fear of losing such opportunities that causes Scott to dread Brita's 
arrival. Although, given their sympathy with contemporary media culture, it is ironic 
that Karen and Scott should perceive Brita's publicity photos as threatening, Bill's 
willingness to be photographed strikes them as a symbolic 'fissure', an indication that 
he is willing to disturb his 'carefully balanced' life (p. 57). Bill takes a more dour view 
of the photographs' symbolism, asserting half-seriously that they are the 
'announcement of my dying' (p. 43), before explaining that he views image- 
production as 'a morbid business' that creates 'a sentimental past' for the viewer 
(p. 42). Notably, this viewpoint is the obverse of DeLillo's familiar Rankian 
interpretation of contemporary images as apotropaia against death-anxiety, hinting 
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that Bill may prefer death to the difficulties of adapting to postmodernity. 52 Pierre 
Bourdieu accounts for photography's popularity by its ability to produce an 
apparently ... faithful reproduction", which will fulfil the expectations of popular 
naturalism'. 53 Although Bill does not view photography as wholly naturalistic, 
remarking, for example, on the subtle ways in which being photographed is 'changing 
me' (p. 43), by comparison with the distortions of mass market television, it is 
sympathetic to his Hemingwayesque project of a modernist naturalist aesthetic. In 
Brita, he appears to find a partner for this endeavour, a woman of comparable age 
who values literature sufficiently to spend her life photographing 'Only writers' (p. 25) 
and bitterly resents the erection of postmodem 'towers' to replace the 'brownish 
tones' of old New York (p. 39). Yet, their fellowship develops in an unexpected 
direction, as their covert sympathy with the schizophrenic culture of postmodernity 
becomes increasingly apparent. Like him, she develops an unlikely affinity with 
Karen, which extends to entrusting 'her home, her work, her wine and her cat' (p. 167) 
to her, while she travels to 'take pictures of writers' (p. 147). Elements of her 
behaviour also resemble that of Karen. In particular, she experiences a productive and 
dynamic psychical relationship with technologies, which DeLillo conveys by 
remarking on the 'pure will that the camera uncovered in her, the will to see deeply' 
(p. 37). The formulation notably recalls Susan Sontag's view that the use of the 
camera as 4a tool of power' and 'a predatory weapon' is widespread in contemporary 
America and prefigures the analogy DeLillo draws between photography and gunfire 
at the end of the novel. 54 By the end of the text, her trajectory becomes synchronous 
52 Otto Rank, Beyond Psycholog (New York: Dover Publications, 1958), p. 76. 
S3 Pierre Bourdieu, 'The Social Definition of Photography', in Photography: A Middle Brow Art 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), pp. 73-98 (pp. 78-79). 
54 Susan Sontag, On Photography (London: Penguin, 2002), p. 8, p. 14. 
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with Bill's. She undergoes the same partial conversion to postmodernism and mirrors 
his abandonment of fiction by bringing her project of photographing writers to 'a 
quiet end' (p. 230). Then, finally, like her subject, she travels to Beirut to confront the 
terrorists that he believes dominate contemporary culture (P. 230). 
Bill's inability to forsake his Heminwayesque modernism entirely is 
accentuated by the resemblance between his death and that of the protagonist of 
55 Hemingway's tale The Snows of KilimapiLro. The parallel not only reaffirms the 
lasting intensity of Bill's feelings for modernism, but hints that his residual passion 
for the exhausted movement is hastening his death. Hemingway's central character is 
a similarly disillusioned writer, who allows himself to die from a minor wound that 
could have been salved with iodine (p. 13). After Bill leaves Scott and Karen and flies 
to London, in his attempt to free the Swiss poet, he is hit by a car and suffers a 
'Lacerated liver', for which he, like Hemingway's depressive writer, refuses to seek 
medical treatment (p. 208). In a comical restaurant scene, Bill quizzes Veterinarians 
about the injury, under the guise of seeking material for a book. They advise him that 
it would be 'Completely and totally implausible' (p. 209) for his 'character' (p. 207) to 
undertake the 'ocean voyage' to Beirut that Bill is considering (p. 209). Bill's 
disregard of their advice concerning this notional fictional character indicates a desire 
to dispose of literature and make direct contact with historical reality, in the way 
craved by Oswald and Karen. His writing about the hostage serves similar purposes. 
He is driven by increasing suspicion of the 'pure game of making up' (P. 46) and 
intrigued by a form of writing that will involve him in contemporary political culture 
and which might permit him to embrace a more collective form of consciousness. 
55 Ernest Hemingway, 'The Snows of Kilimanjaro', in The Snows of Kilimaniaro and Other Stories 
(New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 196 1), pp. 3-29. 
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This literary task constitutes an attempt to provide an authentic, and realistic, counter- 
narrative to the 'plots and fictions' of terrorists, which he believes seek, in totalitarian 
fashion, to erect 'a separate mental state' and 'empty the world of meaning' (P. 200). 
Yet, his involvement with Middle Eastern politics, which extends to offering to take 
the hostage's place, is finally subverted by his inability to shed an attachment to 
modernist notions of mind and self as discrete, foreclosing any possibility of merging 
with history or playing a meaningful political role. Even in his political writing, Bill 
clings to his modernist dogma that subjectivity can be created through the writing 
process, declaring that, for the hostage, 'The only way to be in the world was to write 
himself there' (p. 204). 
Bill's oscillation between emphasizing individual selfhood and objective 
historical forces is remarkably apposite to his search for Maoist terrorists in Beirut. As 
Stuart Schram observes, although nominally a Marxist and a student of 'the 
productive forces', Mao laid 'consistent stress on the importance of conscious 
activity, subjective forces and the superstructure', which has provoked considerable 
criticism in China since his death. 56 Indeed, before Bill's journey, George Haddard 
insists that his individualistic philosophy resembles Maoism and that, like Mao's 
totalitarian adherents, Bill 'would have seen the need for an absolute being' like Mao 
Tse-Tung (p. 163). DeLillo extends the analogy between Mao and Bill by having Scott 
compare Bill's use of photographs to that of the Chinese communist leader, who 
periodically staged 'messianic returns', which were heralded by fresh images (P. 14 1). 
DeLillo may have been aware that in 1988, the year before he began Mao IT, 'graven 
images' of Mao were destroyed in China, which suggests that the postmodern cult of 
personality that created Bill's celebrity may be passing into history (Thought, p. 201). 
56 Stuart Schram, The Thought of Mao Tse-Tung (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 5. 
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Later, Scott sings a 'bit of old Beatles, a line about carrying pictures of Chairman 
Mao' (p. 223). Although the song, 'Revolution V, with its advice to 'free your mind 
instead', might seem to support Bill's resolute opposition to totalitarianism of Mao's 
kind, the numerous connections do raise the question, half-seriouslY, of whether Bill 
might be the 'Mao IF of the title. 57 Yet, far from having the sense of self to run a 
revolution or emulate what Schram calls Mao's cultivation of the 'cult of his own 
personality' (p. 202), Bill ultimately lacks even the will to live. After his death, a 
looter gives his passport to 'militia in Beirut', symbolically transferring his identity to 
the forces he holds responsible for diminishing his artistic influence (p. 217). His death 
at sea, while halfway to Beiruit, symbolizes his ambivalent response to the media 
culture of postmodernity and his ultimate inability to adapt to it. Although political 
writing offers him the excitement of 'something at stake' (p. 167) and, perhaps, as he 
suggests of the hostage, 'words' that could once again 'tell him who he was', (P. 204) 
the difficulty of transforming his private 'cosmology of pain' (P. 45) into a more 
postmodern subjectivity proves too great. 
Unlike the great majority of DeLillo's previous novels, Mao II does not 
conclude by focusing on the crisis of subjectivity endured by its male protagonist. 
Rather, in an epilogue entitled 'In Beirut', it follows Brita on her less dramatic but 
equally paradoxical journey to Lebanon, where she meets and photographs the Maoist 
terrorist chief Abu Rashid, for whom Bill was searching when he died. The section 
provides further examples of postmodernist culture's tendency to undermine 
traditional notions of individual identity. It focuses in particular on Rashid's child 
acolytes, many of whom wear Rashid's 'picture on their shirts' (p. 232) or 'a long 
57 <ht! x. //w-ww. musicsonglyrics. com/B/Beaties43eattesý/ý20-ý/ýRevolutioný/ý201*/ý2011yr>, last 
accessed 6/9/2004. 
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hood' (p. 233) to demonstrate their allegiance to this Maoist 'absolute being' (P. 163). 
Like Bill, Brita ends caught between individual and communal modes of being, 
assailed equally by her burgeoning sense that the solipsism of the writers she 
photographed has become outmoded and her horror at the austerely impersonal 
'identity' and 'purpose' of Rashid's followers. Her 'crazy idea' that the 'intensely 
red' signs for 'a new soft drink Coke IF resemble communist flags and may 'herald 
the presence of the Maoist group' in Beirut reverses the Warholian reduction of 
politics to pop art and demonstrates her yearning for contact with historical reality 
(p. 230). On the other hand, her impulsive decision, during the photo-shoot, to walk 
cover to the boy at the door' and remove 'his hood' (p. 236) indicates a latent hostility 
to contemporary mass consciousness and a fundamental disagreement with Mao's 
58 
view that events attain 'significance' 'only collectively'. Although this tension is 
left unresolved, it is ameliorated by a momentary epiphany, when Brita witnesses a 
symbol of collective military strength employed for personal fulfillment. From her 
balcony, she sees a 'Soviet T-34' tank (p. 239) serving as transport for a wedding 
party, a fusion of the communal and individual with such redemptive power that she 
feels she might 'walk along in her pajama shirt and panties all the way to heaven' 
(p. 240). It is followed immediately by a similar moment, when she mistakes the 'flash 
unit' of a camera across the city for 'automatic weapons fire' (p. 24 1). The error 
recalls the latent violence of the 'pure will' photography arouses in her. This 'Will' 
implies a fierce individualism, which is qualified and ameliorated seconds later, when 
the novel ends with her recognition that the 'bursts of relentless light' are the work of 
a fellow photographer, reminding her of the paradox that, in her work at least, she 
belongs to a global community of individualists like herself. 
58 Mao-Tse-Tung, The Poetry of Mao-Tse-Tung, trans. by Hua-ling Wieh Engle and Paul Engle 
(London: Wildwood House, 1973), p. 10. 
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Underworld: 'The Deep Mind of the Culture' 
In his eleventh novel Underworld (1997), DeLillo employs the notion of a 
unified collective mind as the thematic and aesthetic organising principle of his text. 
He explores the ethical possibilities of a model of mind that is vastly expanded and 
unrestricted by space or the limitations of individual subjectivity, particularly the 
opportunity it may provide of ameliorating the racial strife that dogs American 
society. DeLillo also delineates the formidable challenge such schizophrenic mental 
synthesis confronts in what Patrick O'Donnell aptly terms the 'cultural paranoia' 
embedded in the U. S. psyche, which DeLillo often associates with a defunct 
modernism. 59 Throughout the novel, the schizophrenic drive towards psychological 
unity is in conflict with this isolating and deeply ingrained paranoia and DeLillo often 
presents American culture as existing in a disorientating state of oscillation between 
these two troubling alternatives. Yet, in spite of the seemingly widespread isolation 
paranoia causes, DeLillo is persuaded of the existence of what, in 'The Power of 
History', published concurrently with Underworld, he calls 'the deep mind of the 
culture', a notion that is one important implication of the novel's polysemous title. 60 
In Underworld, DeLillo often approaches this 'deep mind' through close examination 
of the complex technologies of the post-war world, particularly the Internet and the 
atomic bomb, and interprets these systems as causal factors in, and a series of 
metaphors for, its rapid development. In his emphasis on the myriad interconnections 
59 Patrick O'Donnell, Latent Destinies: Cultural Paranoia and Contemporacy U, S. Narrative (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2000) 
60 Don DeLillo, 'The Power of History' in The New York Times, 7h September 1997, pp. 60-63 (p. 62). 
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of technological systems, far too complex for any individual to design or envisage, 
DeLillo investigates the implication of the notion that, in the words of James 
Surowiecki, 'our collective intelligence is often excellent' because 'the crowd is 
holding a nearly complete picture of the world in its collective brain'. 61 DeLillo's use 
of the phrase 'deep mind' arises in a discussion of postmodern technology as a 
phenomenon that subsists within, or 'flows through' communal consciousness, 
confirming one's impression that it denotes a specifically contemporary form of 
collective thought, which relies on sophisticated technologies for its existence (p. 62). 
The expression recurs in the novel, in its 1970s section Tocksucker Blues'. When 
conceptual artist Klara Sax attends the first public showing of the Zapruder film of the 
Kennedy assassination, she speculates on whether this murder had emerged from the 
'streamy debris of the deep mind'. Klara also suggests that such technologies bear the 
spectral imprint of the consciousness it records and are therefore capable of 
disseminating a model of mind throughout American culture. For Klara, the infamous 
tape seemed to contain 'some trick of film emulsion that showed the ghost of 
consciousness', thus enabling it to represent and transmit 'some crude living likeness 
of the mind's own technology' (p. 496). In the numerous expositions of collective 
technological experience that punctuate Underworld, DeLillo often employs a 
generalised second person 'you', which alludes to the more communal model of mind 
they help to generate. When Matt views footage of the so-called 'Texas Highway 
Killer' shooting a victim, DeLillo uses numerous such locutions, as in the statement 
'There's something here that speaks to you directly', to imply technology's ability to 
provoke a collective reaction among seemingly isolated individuals (p. 157). DeLillo's 
61 James Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds: Why The Many Are Smarter Than The Few And How 
Collective Wisdom Shapes Economies. Societies. And Nations (New York: Doubleday, 2004), p. xiv, 
P. 1 1. 
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claim that, in video footage, 'serial murder has found its medium, or vice versa-an act 
of shadow technology' confirms that, as in Mao II, technology acts as a conduit for 
the expansion of all mental experience, even the blatantly pathological, into an 
increasingly collective public sphere (p. 159). 
The novel is structured around the search for the baseball with which Bobby 
Thomson hit his famous 'homer' at the World Series play-off between the New York 
Giants and the Brooklyn Dodgers, on 3 rd October 195 1, and the more difficult task of 
finding the ball's original owner. Waste managers Brian Glassic and Nick Shay, the 
novel's protagonist and the only character to narrate parts of the text in the first 
person, undertake the first part of this quest and eventually purchase the ball, many 
years after the game. Meanwhile, the collector from whom they acquire it, Marvin 
Lundy, labours obsessively to carry out the second. To reflect this, the novel becomes 
a journey into the past, with parts one to six describing a retroactive movement from 
1992 to 195 1, the year of the original game. As Marvin observes, he is 'compiling a 
record of the object's recent forward motion while simultaneously tracking it 
backwards to the distant past', a paradoxical union of past and future which recalls the 
Heideggerian treatment of time apparent in some of DeLillo's earlier novels (P. 318). 
62 Considerable debate has therefore focused on the meaning of the baseball in 
question. Jesse Kavadlo has called it 'a kind of American Holy Grail' and the 
4primary expression of the restless religious impulse evident in Mao IF (Balance. 
p. 102). Timothy L. Parrish argues that for Nick, who buys it many years after the 
game, the ball functions as the symbol of an antediluvian, peaceful age, so that 
'Recovering the ball becomes a way of refusing both history and one's involvement in 
62 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2000), pp. 372-73. 
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itq. 63 Parrish's argument is based partly on the fact that the game represents a 
traumatic shift in Nick's life: it closely precedes his, apparently unintentional, 
shooting of his friend George Manza, of whose manslaughter he is convicted. As Nick 
says, the ball represents 'Bad luck', 'The moment that makes the life' (p. 132). In his 
connection of baseball with the idea of American culture as characterised by unity and 
simplicity, what, in Mao II, he calls the game's 'sense of shared heart and 
untranslatable lore', DeLillo follows in a considerable tradition of literary thought 
(p. 9). Walt Whitman remarked that the game was 'the emblem and enactment of 
straightforwardness' and, according to Ed Folsom, 'came to see baseball as an 
essential metaphor for America'. 64 In Philip Roth's American Pastoral, baseball is 
played by the legend of Newark, 'Swede Levov, whose athletic performances 
provide a 'delusionary kind of sustenance' and 'a repository of all their hopes', for 
those enduring the absence of loved ones in World War Two. 65 Similarly, John 
Cheever, in his journals, appears to view baseball as a panacea for all anxiety and 
complexity, ending an angst-ridden meditation on the 'labyrinthine' difficulties of his 
closeted homosexuality with the declaration 'Play a little baseball and the Gordian 
knot crumbles into dust'. 66 Cheever may have influenced DeLillo in his connection of 
the baseball crowd with the notion of a unified 'deep mind'. While writing 
Underworld, DeLillo gave an interview, in which he quoted Cheever speaking of the 
4migratory vastness' of the baseball crowd (Nadotti, p. 88). 67 In DeLillo's words, 
63 Timothy L. Parrish, 'From Hoover's FBI to Eisenstein's Unterwelt: DeLillo Directs the Postmodern 
Novel', in Modern Fiction Studies, 45 (1999), 696-723 (p. 70 1). 
64 The Gathering of the Forces, ed. by Cleveland Rodgers and John Black (New York: Putnam, 1920), 
p. 51 and Wait Whitman's Native Representations, ed. by Ed Folsom (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), p. 35. 
65 Philip Roth, American Pastoral (London: Vintage, 1998), p. 4. 
66 John Cheever, The Journals (London: Jonathan Cape, 1991), p. 8. 
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Cheever asserts that 'the job of the writer' is to understand the 'forty people trying to 
get the baseball', after a home run, and 'the other ten or twenty thousand who leave 
the stadium when the game is over' (p. 88). This view seems likely to have inspired 
the prologue of Underworld, in which DeLillo describes the psychological dynamic of 
the 'assembling crowd' (p. 11) and the African American Cotter Martin's successful 
capture of the baseball from a belligerent crowd with his 'ladling hand' (p. 48). 
DeLillo uses the baseball simultaneously to question the mythical unity of American 
culture and affirm the existence of the emergent unified 'deep mind' of 
postmodernity. He emphasizes the absence of the original African American owners 
of the ball from Marvin's records, which symbolises the systematic oppression and 
exclusion suffered by American non-whites. Yet, by reconstructing the ball's journey, 
DeLillo shows that, in Nick's words, the baseball goes 'back awhile, connecting many 
things' (p. 13 1). Rather than the ball symbolising the 'antediluvian' or a flight from 
history, the growing unity of the contemporary 'deep mind' is aptly represented by an 
object cherished by numerous owners, both black and white. 
Where critics examine Underworld's concern with unity, it is usually in the 
context of DeLillo's presentation of multiple interconnections within economic and 
technological systems and language, rather than his concern with mind. Kavadlo 
argues that DeLillo rescues the linguistic, playing the role of 'waste manager', and 
creusing, reappropriating', 'and ultimately redeeming language'. 68 Parrish remarks on 
DeLillo's 'engagement with the interconnected systems of meaning-making that 
define the postmodern era', while Robert McMinn unravels the complex 
interconnections between the novel's 'multiple plot threads' and concludes shrewdly 
67 The quotation that DeLillo paraphrases here can be found on p. 185 of Cheever's journals. 
f's Jesse Kavadlo, 'Recycling Authority: Don DeLillo's Waste Management', in Critigue: Studies in 
Contempora! a Fiction, 42 (2001), 384-401, (p. 385). 
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that Underworld is about 'connection more than it is about anything else'. 69 In 
addressing the 'connections' that form the 'deep mind' of his nation, DeLillo's 
subject is nothing less than the entire post-war culture of the U. S., from the early 
1950s to an unspecified point in the mid 1990s. Indeed, much criticism of Underworld 
stresses the book's immense scope, both in the context of DeLillo's oeuvre and 
American postmodernity. Kavadlo remarks that, in this novel, 'the overarching 
themes of DeLillo's corpus coalesce', acknowledging that Underworld attempts to 
examine the entire cultural milieu in which his fiction is embedded. 70 Consequently, 
Underworld is a large book, both in terms of its 827 pages, and its extraordinary 
historical range and detail, which may be unparalleled in post-war American 
literature. Like Libra, Underworld is a historical novel and contains numerous non- 
fictional characters, including DeLillo's portrayals of J. Edgar Hoover, Frank Sinatra, 
and Lenny Bruce. This blend of historical and invented characters recalls E. L 
Doctorow's classic novel Ragtime, whose influence DeLillo comes close to 
acknowledging in 'The Power of History', when he remarks that, in Doctorow's 
novel, 'history and mock history' 'form a kind of syncopated reality'. 71 Libra is, to 
employ Cowart's vocabulary, a 'Turning Point' text: it examines the genealogy of a 
historical phenomenon, the pervasive sense of unreality that afflicts American 
postmodernity. Underworld, on the other hand, is not restricted by a single set of 
events, or by focusing on a narrowly defined period. It can therefore cover a wide 
range of historical subject matter and contains significant elements of the 'Way It 
69 Timothy L. Parrish, 'Pynchon and DeLillo', in Underwords: Perspectives on Don DeLillo's 
Underworld, ed. by Jospeh Dewey et at (Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 2002), pp. 79-92 
(p. 79) and Robert McMinn, 'Underworld: Sin and Atonement', in Underwords: Perspectives on Don 
DeLillo's Underworld, ed. by Jospeh Dewey et at (Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 2002), 
pp. 37-49 (p. 37). 
70 Jesse Kavadlo, Don DeLillo: Balance at the Edae of Belief (New York: Peter Lang, 2004), p. 102. 
262 
Was' novel, which emphasises 'historical verisimilitude' (Histo p. 8). DeLillo 
strives mightily to portray the atmosphere of post-war urban America, often through 
extensive use of the 'jostling argot of the street' (p. 107). This is particularly so in the 
sections set in his native Bronx, which provide a powerful sense of the atmosphere of 
Italian American culture, especially that of the 1950s, by dwelling on the intricate 
connotations of expressions like 'See what you're gonna do' and 'Who's better than 
me? ' (p. 700). Yet, DeLillo does not merely seek accurate reproduction, but insight 
into the process by which postmodern American culture produces an increasingly 
unified model of mind. Rather than the concentrated attention on the early 1960s that 
the plot of Libra necessitates, Underworld allows DeLillo to range over much of 
postmodernity: more than forty years of U. S. history. 
In Underworld, postmodernity appears to become nascent in the years 
immediately after World War Two, an event that, in Perry Anderson's words, marked 
a critical 'caesura', after which 'With all the historical forces that had spurred it gone, 
the elan of modernism gave out'. 72 The novel begins on 3rd October 195 1, with the 
conjunction of the famous and dramatic World Series play-off between the New York 
Giants and the Brooklyn Dodgers and the news of the Soviet Union's second atomic 
test. Brian Glassic insists on the date's pivotal nature, remarking that the match's 
historical importance lies in its narrowly predating the full onset of postmodemity and 
belonging to an era before events were 'replayed and worn out and run down and used 
up before midnight of the first day' (p. 98). Nevertheless, after World War Two, as 
Anderson points out, 'modernist energies were not subject to sudden cancellation, but 
still glowed intermittently here and there' (p. 82). It seems appropriate, therefore, that 
several characters, such as the protagonist Nick and the schoolteacher and nun Sister 
71 E. L. Doctorow, Ragtime (New York: Random House, 1975) 
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Edgar move slowly from the psychological withdrawal of modernist paranoia to a 
more communal, postmodern mode of thought. This tension between modernism and 
postmodernism is also present in the form of the novel. Indeed, as Phillip Nel argues 
shrewdly, it is a novel that 'complicates traditional distinctions between modernism 
and postmodernism'. 73 DeLillo's appropriation of numerous cultural texts, from TV, 
film, and music, of which he gives numerous detailed accounts, seems 
characteristically postmodern, as does his use of cinematic techniques such as 
montage. Yet, paradoxically, montage is a technique firmly associated with modernist 
cinema and the complex, insular web of plot connections that DeLillo constructs in 
Underworld also seems modernist in its production of the text as a closed, autotelic 
system. Indeed, in spite of DeLillo's reputation as a postmodernist, the importance of 
modernist technique is sufficiently great in Underworld that the author himself has 
suggested 'Maybe it's the last modernist gasp'. 74 
DeLillo use of cinematic technique, especially montage-like juxtapositions, 
assists him in exploring the postmodern 'deep mind', by allowing him to hint at the 
unacknowledged interdependence or hidden similarities between groups or 
individuals profoundly alienated from one another. In Part 5, 'Better Things For 
Better Living Through Chemistry', which consists of short, dated scenes from the 
1950s and 1960s, DeLillo follows the activities of African American civil rights 
campaigners with those of suburban 1950s white Americans, who are likely to 
consider themselves their antithesis (p. 521). For much of the section, scenes from the 
72 Perry Anderson, The Origins of Postmoderni (London: Vcrso, 1998), p. 82. 
73 Phillip Nei, "'A Small Incisive Shock": Modern Forms, Postmodern Politics, And the Role of the 
Avant-Garde in Underworld', in Modern Fiction Studies, 45 (1999), 724-52, (p. 725). 
74 Richard Williams, 'Everything Under the Bomb', in The Guardian IOh January 1998 at 
<http: //reports. 2uardian. co. uk/ apers/199801109-34. htm 
,. 
12 1>. p. 9 of 9, last accessed 15'h February 2005. 
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1950s alternate with those from the later decade, as though to emphasise the halting 
rate of progress achieved by civil rights campaigners across the period. Elsewhere, 
DeLillo uses montage to remark eloquently on 'high culture's' tendency to dismiss its 
'low' equivalent as waste, while remaining inextricably linked and indebted to it. He 
pointedly embeds a monologue by legendary subway graffiti artist, 'Moonman 157' 
within an account of a public showing of a fictional Eisenstein film Unterwelt, which 
is attended by many of the New York intelligentsia (p. 433). In depicting crowds, 
DeLillo's narrative gaze appropriates the range and speed of the movie camera, to 
present the experience of numerous individuals, within a short time. This camera-eye 
mode is employed with particular frequency in the novella-length prologue, 'The 
Triumph of Death', which contains the novel's largest crowd, gathered for the World 
Series play-off game. The section is structured around the highly cinematic 
juxtaposition of the Soviet Union's second atomic test (p. 23), news of which reaches 
J. Edgar Hoover during the match, and the ecstatic response to Bobby Thomson's 
ninth innings home run, which gave the Giants victory. DeLillo maintains the 
connection between the two synchronous occurrences throughout the novel, 
suggesting that, to different sections of the public, both become known as 'the Shot 
Heard Around the World' (p. 669). In interview, he has revealed that his discovery of 
the concurrence of the two events made him feel the 'power of history' and inspired 
him to write the novel (Everything, p. 4). The two 'Shots' are connected by the Lhin 
competition and possibility of defeat that characterise both baseball and the Cold War 
and the analogy DeLillo draws between them may imply a view of U. S. culture as 
inherently, and pathologically adversarial. 
DeLillo switches focus between apparently disparate characters to indicate the 
unsuspected links between them. From Hoover, who is watching the game with Frank 
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Sinatra, among others, he moves to Cotter Martin, an African American truant who 
escapes with the match ball at the end of the game, and then to an anonymous 
'sixteen-year-old in the Bronx' listening to the game, who we later understand to be 
Nick Shay (pp. 30-32). As the novel goes on, the reader appreciates that Hoover and 
Nick are connected by profound isolation and paranoia, which, in both men, is 
symbolised by an obsessive concern with waste, in its myriad forms, and a 
concomitant difficulty in disposing of it. As Nick says, waste always seems 'to tell us 
something about ourselves' (p. 104). Hoover's paranoia manifests in perpetual terror 
of unclean 'unseeable life forms' and the equally insidious left-wing political 
activists, by whom he believes the nation is threatened (p. 18). Nick's, on the other 
hand, is made plain by his fixed belief that his father, who deserted the family, was 
murdered by the local Mafia or 'underworld', another connotation of the novel's title, 
who, he claims, in self-consciously clichdd terms, which may hint at unexpressed 
doubts on the subject, took him 'where the lagoon lies silent' and 'gave it to him 
good' (p. 91). As Deleuze and Guattari suggest, paranoia carries 4an energy of 
disjunction' that isolates the human subject (p. 13). Both men are presented as 
solitaries. Nick carries an enduring feeling that he is, like the modernist Bill in Mao II, 
&a country of one', characterised by 'a measured separation' (p. 275), while the isolate 
Hoover dreams of towels never 'used by anyone else' and is described as a 'self- 
perfected American' (p. 32). Their obsession with waste disposal symbolizes what 
Freud interprets as the paranoiac's need to rid themselves of repressed libido, after 
having, in his words, 'withdrawn from the people in his environment and from the 
external world generally'. 75 Such is Nick's interest in waste disposal that he becomes 
75 Sigmund Freud, 'Psycho-analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Case of Paranoia', in The Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Siamund Freud Vol. MIT (1911-1913), trans. by 
James Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press, 1957), pp. 3-82 (p. 70). 
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a professional waste manager and, later, an 'executive emeritus' of waste (P. 804). He 
is pathologically compulsive in his repeated references to his method of discarding 
'yard waste' (p. 103), informing the reader on several occasions that 'We bundled the 
newspapers but did not tie them in twine' (p. 103, p. 89, p. 804, p. 807). Similarly, U. 
Edgar Hoover' is depicted as comically obsessive in his efforts to avoid having his 
private waste inspected, in half-digested form, by revolutionary 'urban guerillas'. The 
group, led by Nick's future colleague Jesse Detwiler, plans a 'garbage raid' on 
Hoover's home in Washington D. C., in 1966, to which the F. B. I. boss responds as 
though it is 'the end of the world in triplicate' (p. 557). Their paranoid mind-set arises 
from trauma and profound unhappiness. Hoover possesses a 'stop-cocked soul' 
(p. 28), while Nick's emotional life is constructed around the rigorous exclusion of 
several disturbing events that have caused him to repress any hope of achieving what 
Freud calls 'libidinal cathexis' (paranoia, p. 72). As Michael Thompson argues, waste 
must always remain 'covert' and, accordingly, Nick's experiences remain secret, even 
from his wife, until the end of the novel. 76 Waste is, by definition, beyond linguistic 
expression; it is, as Slavoj 2i2ek puts it, the 'remnants' of signification and Nick's 
past is similarly resistant to articulation (Sublime, p. 167). He never speaks of the 
'strange shaded grief he feels for the foetus his girlfriend Amy had aborted in 1959 
(p. 589). His father's abandonment of his family is considered so heinous by the Italian 
American community that, as Matt remarks, 'They don't even have a name for this' 
(p. 204). Likewise, Nick finds himself unable to describe in detail his shooting of his 
friend George (p. 132). When it is finally narrated, it is in the third person and in a 
halting, repetitive style reminiscent of Gertrude Stein, which conveys the immense 
shock the incident inflicts on him (pp. 780-8 1). 
76 Michael Thompson, The Creation and Destruction of Value (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1979), p. 20. 
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In spite of its ineffability, in Underworld, waste plays a dynamic role in the 
construction of culture and the forms of consciousness attendant upon it. Like A. R. 
Ammons, in his poem Garbage, published in 1992 during the writing of Underworld, 
DeLillo portrays garbage as 'the catalyst of going and becoming'. 77 He suggests that 
waste exists in a dialectical relationship with culture: Nick's colleague, former 
garbage 'guerrilla', Jesse Detwiler argues civilization did not produce garbage as 'a 
noisome offshoot', but 'garbage rose first, inciting people to build a civilization in 
response' (p. 287). Garbage's potency and resistance to articulation causes DeLillo, 
like Ammons, to attribute 'spiritual' qualities to it (Garbage, p. 18). Nick declares that 
the 'whisper of mystical contemplation' is 'totally appropriate' to 'the subject of 
waste' (p. 282). But the power of supposed waste becomes most apparent in the 
paranoid treatment of human beings as refuse, a fate that, in Underworld, is often 
visited upon non-whites, whose contribution to the cultural 'deep mind' is frequently 
repressed by whites and dismissed as dirt. This is first apparent in the prologue, in 
DeLillo's portrayal of Cotter Martin. Where Hoover and Nick are connected by a 
shared paranoia, the African American Cotter's main connection to Nick and Hoover 
is a common nationality. DeLillo emphasises this from the novel's first line, which 
declares of Cotter 'He speaks in your voice, American, and there's a shine in his eye 
that's halfway hopeful' (p. 11). Critics overlook the importance of race and racial 
disharmony in Underworld, but DeLillo's early assertion of Cotter's unity with other 
Americans makes clear the centrality of these issues. DeLillo suggests that white 
America sustains a sense of unity, by defining non-whites as a meaningless 
excrescence, reducing them to what Thompon calls the 'cultural category 'rubbish", 
which exists to eliminate 'intrusive and dangerous elements' (p. 90). As Mary Douglas 
77 A. R. Ammons, Garbage: A Poem (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2002), p. 32 
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remarks, 'rituals of purity and impurity create unity in experience' and, in 
Underworld, the dominant white culture seeks internal unity, by categorising non- 
whites as, to use Douglas' terms, 'non-being' to their 'being' and 'formlessness' to 
their 'form'. 78 Critics have been attentive to DeLillo's concern with waste as an 
abstract concept and a metaphor for paranoid fears, but have ignored its application to 
racial group consciousness and the culture's 'deep mind'. Ruth Helyer remarks that 
DeLillo explores the 'dividing line between what is considered waste and what is not' 
and focuses her perceptive analysis on Nick's struggle to digest the trauma of his 
father's desertion and his seemingly inadvertent shooting of his friend George Manza. 
79 Like Oswald, black 1950s characters like Cotter are desperate to fuse with the 
unifying, historical forces of nascent postmodernity, from which they feel excluded. 
DeLillo makes this disjunction clear on the first page, when he contrasts the notion 
that 'Longing on a large scale is what makes history', with Cotter's status as 'just a 
kid with a local yearning'. Yet, significantly, DeLillo also counteracts his solitude by 
adding that the boy is 'part of an assembling crowd' (p. 11). It is a suggestive phrase, 
typical of DeLillo's hints that, with the post-war emergence of postmodernity, far 
greater psychological union between black and white culture has become possible. In 
his discussion of the relation between Underworld and The Waste Land, Paul Gleason 
argues that DeLillo prescribes art as the 'means by which the individual can reinvent 
and redeem the waste that defines America in the second half of the twentieth 
century'. 80 Whether or not this is DeLillo's 'prescription, within the gigantic work of 
78 Mary Douglas, Puri1y and Danger An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (London: 
Routledge, 2001), p. 2, p. 6. 
79 Ruth Helyer, "'Refuse Heaped Many Stories High": DeLillo, Dirt, and Disorder', in Modem Fiction 
Studies 45 (1999), 987-1006 (p. 987). 
80 Paul Gleason, 'Don DeLillo, T. S. Eliot, and the Redemption of America's Atomic Wasteland, in 
Underwords: Perspectives on Don DeLillo's Underworld, ed. by Joseph Dewey et al (Cranbury, NJ: 
Associated University Presses, 2002), pp. 130-43 (p. 130). 
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art that Underworld is, DeLillo suggests the existence of a veritable psychical 
'underworld', in which numerous connections are formed that promote psychological 
unity and reduce the paranoid urge to dismiss fellow human subjects as excremental. 
In the scenes following the baseball game, DeLillo emphasises the 
determination of African Americans to gain recognition as part of the American 'deep 
mind' and the contempt and fear with which American Whites regard them. Cotter's 
aggressive appropriation of a symbol of American unity, the baseball struck by Bobby 
Thomson, indicates his desperate, perhaps unconscious, wish for inclusion in 
American culture and refers ironically to its systematic rejection of him and his fellow 
blacks. The terror with which whites regard the latent power of the African American 
community they have discarded is made clear when Cotter flees into Harlem with the 
ball. Aware that the area is a ghetto, to which the supposedly 'intrusive and 
dangerous' African American community is consigned, Cotter's erstwhile companion 
and competitor for the ball, the white Bill, is afraid to follow him (p. 57). Cotter is 
aware of the suspicion with which he is regarded and refuses to run with the ball, for 
fear that he will be apprehended as a thief, for being a 'black kid running in a mainly 
white crowd' (p. 52). His cultural alienation is reaffirmed by the fact that his poverty 
soon robs him of even this dubious symbol of belonging. In three sections, which 
appear at regular intervals, the reader encounters the chronicle of Cotter's father 
Manx, who steals the ball and sells it to white advertising executive Charles 
Wainwright, for only thirty-two dollars and change (p. 652). Paradoxically, these 
interludes keep Cotter's marginality present at the centre of the novel, implying that, 
in spite of paranoid white hostility, he does constitute part of the communal 
consciousness DeLillo describes. Nevertheless, DeLillo implies that, poignantly, his 
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artistic reconstruction of events remains the only narrative of Cotter and Manx's 
actions. Because the collector Marvin Lundy is unable to trace the baseball's passage 
back beyond Wainwright, Cotter and Manx's existence is undiscovered and their 
stewardship of the ball, and the American culture it symbolizes, is excluded from the 
official record (p. 18 1). For the purposes of formal history, therefore, Cotter and Manx 
remain that which, as 2ilek remarks of the mythical Jew, is 'excluded from the 
symbolic order', but 'returns in the Real as a paranoid construction' and is portrayed 
as a menace to society (Sublime, p. 127). 
This habitual American treatment of non-whites as disposable and invisible is 
repeatedly emphasised in Underworld. Nick's African American colleague Big Sims 
compares the fate of a black player Donnie Moore to that of the Dodgers' pitcher 
Ralph Branca. According to Sims, both 'gave up a crucial home run in a play-off 
game' (p. 98) but, unlike his white colleague, Donnie 'was not allowed to outlive his 
failure' and his life ended in tragedy when he 'ended up shooting his wife'. As Sims 
concludes, 'you can survive and endure', 'But you have to be white before they let 
you' (p. 98). Sometimes, non-white invisibility manifests literally, as when Klara 
pursues the New York subway graffiti artist Ismael Muhoz, who signs himself 
'Moonman 157'. Klara sees Ismael's art as 'the romance of the ego, poor kids playing 
out a fantasy of meretricious fame' (p. 394). Her approach indicates an understanding 
of Ismael's desperation to acquire a recognised cultural identity (p. 394), a desire 
Stephen Powers suggests is common among graffiti writers and summarises in the 
phrase 'Graffiti, Ergo SUM,. 81 Yet, in spite of Klara's wish to introduce Ismael's 
work into mainstream culture, she 'never found the young man himself' (p. 395). Like 
81 Stephen Powers, The Art of Getting Over: Graffiti at the Millenium (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1999), p. 39. 
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Cotter, he remains among what 2ilek calls the 'scraps' of the culture, the 'excess 
which escapes the process of symbolization' and which 'causes a series of failures', 
like those in Donnie Moore's or Cotter Martin's life (pp. 169-70). As Thompson notes, 
waste is 'always covert' and people 'strive to deny its existence' (p. 20), a view also 
articulated by Jesse Detwiler, who calls it the 'best kept secret in the world' (P. 281). 
Big Sims argues that the U. S. government systematically categorises blacks as 
extraneous matter, excluding ten million of them from official records, 'underplaying 
the true number' (p. 3 34) by 'forty percent', for fear that 'white people' will feel 
'menaced' (p. 336). 
This association of black skin with waste products has a long, if 
undistinguished, philosophical history. According to Mark Larrimore, it is traceable at 
least to Kant's view 'of the (non-white) races as an unsalvageable waste, a mistake'. 
82 This disturbing psychological association of blackness with garbage is similarly 
apparent in a widespread eighteenth-century view, also held by Kant, concerning the 
'demonstrable excellence' of black skin 'in ridding the body of the dangerous 
phlogiston of the African climate' (p. 107). Sims believes the U. S. government makes 
a similar connection and suggests that U. S. foreign policy makes the link disturbingly 
literal. When discussing toxic atomic waste, Sims points out that the U. S. routinely 
rids itself of 'terrible substances' by paying a 'less developed country', or what he 
provocatively calls 'little dark-skinned countries', to accept it (P. 278). Read more 
subtly, this association of blackness with atomic power might imply 
acknowledgement of the power latent in black anger, something like the passion that 
Langston Hughes articulates in his comparison of the rage inside a 'Jim Crow car' 
92 Mark Larrimore, 'Sublime Waste: Kant on the Destiny of the Races, in Civilization and Oppression 
ed. by Catherine Wilson (Calgary, Alta: University of Calgary Press, 1999), pp. 99-125 (p. 107). 
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with the force of 'an atom bomb'. 83 Sims does not make this connection, but his 
critique of U. S. foreign policy resonates powerfully with African American concerns 
about their government's policy on the dumping of waste, which has favoured 
affluent whites at the expense of poor and predominantly non-white neighbourhoods. 
As Robert D. Bullard points out, 'toxic dumping' by industry and government in 
America has had a disproportionate effect on 'poor, powerless, black communities'. 84 
Indeed, like Sims, Bullard believes that African Americans, 'regardless of their class 
status', have been treated as 'throwaway communities' (p. xvi). 
Nevertheless, DeLillo provides strong hints that, in contemporary culture, such 
apparent waste may be recuperated and assimilated into a larger social and mental 
unity, or 'deep mind'. At times, he even implies that its rejection infuses it with 
chthonic force, that, in Douglas' words, 'To have been in the margins', is 'to have 
been at a source of power' (p. 98). As Nick affirms late in the novel, rejected matter 
returns, replete with what he calls 'redemptive qualities' to repair a divided psyche 
and socius. 'Look how they come back to us, alight with a kind of brave aging' 
(p. 809), he declares of our many discarded items, echoing the tone and structure of 
T. S. Eliot's assertion of spiritual unity 'We are born with the dead: / See, they return, 
85 and bring us with them'. Notably, the neglected, undiscovered Ismael Mufloz shows 
faith in the possibility of recycling seemingly irrecoverable junk, spending his later 
years rescuing 'abandoned cars', 'hoodless, doorless and rust-ulcered' machines, to 
sell for scrap (p. 241). DeLillo also implies an underlying unity between Ismael's non- 
83 Langston Hughes, 'Lunch in a Jim Crow Car', in Selected Poems of Langston Hughes (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1959), p. 280. 
94 Robert D. Bullard, Dumping in Dixie: Race. Class. and Environmental Qualfty (Boulder, CO: 
Westview, 2000), pp. 34. 
85 T. S. Eliot, 'Little Gidding', in Collected Poems 1909-1962 (London: Faber and Faber, 1990) pp. 214- 
23 (p. 222). 
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white 'low' culture and the white 'high' culture, by which it is often dismissed. This 
point is made by his insertion of a dynamic and dernotic diatribe by Ismael in the 
interval of Eisenstein's Unterwelt, at the 'Radio City Music Hall' (p. 424). 
Appropriately, DeLillo's use of montage mimics Sergei Eisenstein's own modernist 
aesthetic and its effect is consistent with the director's view that 'any two pieces of 
film stuck together inevitably combine to create a new concept': in this case, unity 
between high and low and black and white cultures. 86 In describing Unterwel , 
DeLillo wryly draws attention to his adaptation of modernist cinematic technique, 
remarking on the 'undeniable power of the montage' in another, genuine, Eisenstein 
film Ivan the Terrible (p. 425). Juxtaposing Eisenstein's work with Ismael's 
underground graffiti suggests that the latter's work may be of greater importance than 
his detractors suspect. Its direct involvement with what Peter Burger calls the 'praxis 
of life' implies a characteristically avant-garde critique of art's 'autonomy' 'in 
bourgeois society'. 87 Such revolutionary willingness to extend the limits of artistic 
legitimacy implies an affinity between his aesthetic and that of well known avant- 
garde artists, notably the celebrated Klara Sax, known as the 'Bag Lady' for her use 
of 'castoffs', such as obsolete B-52 bombers (p. 70). Ismael makes his artistic 
aspirations explicit, drawing a parallel between his supposedly unsophisticated 
'wildstyle' graffiti (p. 433) and the cinema enjoyed by the white middle-class audience 
in the hall, asserting defiantly that his work 'climbs across your eyeballs' 'like I'm 
your movie motherfucker' (p. 441). His subterranean location symbolises his role as a 
profoundly repressed element of his culture's 'deep mind'. It also creates another 
86 Sergei Eisenstein, Notes of a Film Director (New York: Dover Publications, 1970), p. 63. 
87 Peter Burger, Theo[y of the Avant-Garde, trans. by Michael Shaw (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002), p. 22. 
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parallel with Unterwelt, in which victims of atomic experiments are hidden far 
underground. The prisoners are hideously deformed; one resembles 'A cyclops', a 
detail that may allude to Dr Cyclops, a 1940 horror film about radioactivity. 88 Like 
that of Ismael, their presence underground is metaphoric of their status as 'an 
inconvenient secret of the society around them' (p. 443) and like his subversive 
graffiti, Eisenstein's film contains 'camp elements' that 'resemble sneak attacks on 
the dominant culture' (p. 444). The conceptual and psychological unity implied by 
DeLillo's montage is confirmed by Unterwelt's hopeful ending. The prisoners escape, 
climb 'to the surface' (p. 444), and return to mainstream society, while the camera 
focuses on a man who 'sheds his marks and scars and seems to grow younger' 
(p. 445). Although 'mawkish', as DeLillo puts it, the conclusion is also 'wonderful' 
and provides images of miraculous healing, which suggest that the underlying mental 
unity implied by the juxtaposition of high and low and black and white cultures may 
one day become manifest in a social and political context (p. 445). 
Yet, even these intimations of unity are not easily won in Underworld, but 
emerge from, often ferocious, dialectical struggle, during which the interdependence 
or interconnectedness of apparent combatants is revealed. Rather than view his 
communist enemies as radically alien, DeLillo's Hoover believes the antithetical 
political systems 'bring each other to deep completion' (p. 5 1). He even suggests that 
the two nations enjoy a mental and physiological connection, speaking of 'Us and 
Them' and wondering 'how many bundled links do we find in the neural labyrinth? ', 
which he envisages at the conjunction of the Superpowers (p. 5 1). Throughout the 
novel, apparent polarities collapse to form unexpected and liberating wholes. Like the 
88 Spencer R. Weart, Nuclear Fear: A History of Images (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1988), p. 63. 
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U. S. and U. S. S. R in 'deep completion', Branca and Thomson, the losing pitcher and 
victorious batter in the World Series play-off, become 'the longest-running act in 
show business', appearing together at 'sports dinners' (p. 98) and on 'the White House 
lawn' (p. 100). The principle applies to concepts as much as individuals or nations. 
Hoover sees 'fame' and 'secrecy' as 'the high and low ends of the same fascination' 
(p. 17), while his alter ego, the schoolteacher and nun Sister Edgar pursues 'death' 
(p. 249), for the paradoxical therapeutic goal of curing 'the linger of destruction inside 
of her' (p. 248). As 2ilek argues, arrival at a final 'truth' often requires conflict, or a 
process of mutual 'misrecognition', 'where each subject receives from the other its 
own message in the inverse form' (Lublime, p. 59, p. 63). In its concentration on 
technological interconnections, criticism omits DeLillo's use of technologies, like that 
of vast garbage disposal systems, as metaphors for the nation's emergent 'deep mind'. 
While visiting the 'Fresh Kills' 'landfill on Staten Island', the waste manager Brian 
Glassic, Nick's colleague and friend, suggests the site's true function is to produce 
psychical and physical equilibrium in New York. Brian asserts that the material 
evidence of New York's 'habits and impulses' forms a 'mass metabolism' (P. 184) 
that is in 'poetic balance' with Manhattan's 'World Trade Center'. In the section's 
final paragraph, DeLillo makes the landfill's symbolism more explicit. He describes 
'a hundred' 'gulls', 'positioned on a slope', as being 'joined in consciousness' 
(p. 186), an avian psychological union that represents the burgeoning of a human 
equivalent among those served by 'Fresh Kills' (p. 184). 
The atomic bomb also symbolizes DeLillo's unified 'deep mind', particularly 
in his portrayal of the nun and ex-schoolteacher Sister Edgar, whose intense interest in 
the weapon becomes 'the faith that replaces God with radioactivity' (P. 25 1). Nuclear 
weapons inspire Edgar to adopt a recognisably schizophrenic epistemology, which 
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causes her radically to doubt her perceptions and embrace the 'the faith of suspicion 
and unreality', instead of her erstwhile Catholicism. DeLillo's reference to her quasi- 
mystical belief in 'the power of alpha particles and the all-knowing systems that shape 
them' resembles the interconnectedness Karen pursues in Mao II and suggests that the 
bomb may lie behind the Deleuze and Guattarian schizophrenia that Sister Edgar 
manifests. Like schizophrenia, which Deleuze and Guattari argue 'scrambles all the 
codes', the bomb is inimical to signification and may therefore provide a convincing 
aetiology for the suddenly visionary quality of Edgar's outlook (Anti-OediDus, p. 15). 
As Klara notes, the bomb 'eludes naming' (p. 77). Consequently, it achieves the 
paradoxical status of divinity and waste, or, as the bomb's inventor J. Robert 
Oppenheimer puts it, 'shit'; as Weart shows, metaphors of ... sewage... and 
'excrement' have been frequently applied to the bomb and nuclear power generally 
(p. 298). Yet, in the 1950s section 'Arrangement in Grey and Black', Edgar is 
persistently associated with paranoia and isolation. As Delueze and Guattari argue, 
'paranoia and schizophrenia can be presented as the two extreme oscillations' of 
capitalist culture and, like Nick, Edgar shifts, over time, from one to the other (p. 28 1). 
As a 1950s schoolteacher, she enjoys the Cold War culture of fear. She is portrayed 
'Alone in her room' reading 'The Raven', by her 'namesake poet' Edgar Allen Poe 
(p. 775) and subjecting pupils to the unexpected anxiety of a 'Duck and cover' nuclear 
drill (p. 727). Her eventual rejection of this mind-set, in the second and final 1990s 
section of the novel 'Das Kapital', is made more striking by what critics agree is her 
status as the second self of the resolutely paranoid head of the FBI J. Edgar Hoover. 
The contrast between her radical psychological shift and the painful stasis of his 
paranoia suggests that, in the later phase of the novel's timeframe, she lives out 
Hoover's unconscious desires and perhaps those of the nation he helped govern. 
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Besides sharing his ghoulish fascination with powerful weaponry, she has a similarly 
harsh, stubborn personality, a 'raven's heart, small and obdurate' (p. 249), and the 
same passionate interest in mortality. While watching the baseball game between the 
Dodgers and the Giants that dominates the prologue, 'Hoover' is showered by 
fragments of Life Magazine that include Pieter Bruegel's painting The Triumph of 
Death, which Hoover apparently 'loves' (p. 50). The incident recalls William Gaddis' 
The Reco gnitions, in which the young forger Wyatt Gwyon finds inspiration in 'the 
horror of the Breughel copy in his father's study' . 
89 Gaddis' debut novel is noted for 
its critique of the parodic and derivative nature of post-war culture. DeLillo's 
reference, to a novel that he has elsewhere called 'tremendous', may therefore 
reaffirm that the baseball game marks, not only an intensification of the Cold War, but 
the full instantiation of the posimodernity Gaddis satirizes. 90 Decades later, Edgar 
finds herself similarly transfixed in a 'Capuchin church' by 'skeletons' that convey to 
her the idea of 'death, yes, triumphant' (p. 249). While Edgar becomes immersed in 
the schizophrenic unreality of America's emergent 'deep mind, DeLillo's Hoover 
remains paralysed by his twin fears, which DeLillo implies are, for Hoover, 
inextricably connected: leftist political activity and the prospect of inhabiting an 'all- 
pervading medium of pathogens' (p. 19). As DeLillo may know, biographical records 
show that this pathological connection is detectable in the FRI director's real life use 
of language. For instance, Hoover described communism as 'a condition akin to a 
89 William Gaddis, The RecognitioDIS (New York: Penguin, 1983), p. 35. 
90 Don DeLillo, 'On William Gaddis, in Coniunctions, 41 (2003), at 
<http: //www. conjunctions. com/archives/C4] -dd. htm>, last accessed P April 2005. 
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disease that spreads like an epidemic and like an epidemic a quarantine is necessary to 
keep it from infecting the nation'. 91 
In the novel's final scene, the relation Edgar detects between contemporary 
technologies and the postmodern drive towards mental unity is made explicit. These 
technologies are present in the form of the bomb, but also 'cyberspace', in which, 
against her orthodox Catholic expectations, Edgar finds herself after death (p. 824). 
DeLillo treats the web as radically unifying, if somewhat homogenising, suggesting 
that here 'all conflict' is 'programmed out' and 'difference itself' is erased (p. 826). 
Indeed, the Web's unifying power is apparently such that it can fuse doubles like 
Hoover and Edgar into a single being: after Edgar's arrival, a 'coupling' takes place, 
as she 'joins the other Edgar', 'a kindred spirit' and 'her male half, dead these many 
years' (p. 824). DeLillo therefore implies that the Internet is emblematic of the 'deep 
mind' and that, as J. Macgregor Wise puts it, it offers people the 'affect and 
community that are so absent in their lives'. 92 Nevertheless, DeLillo indicates that, 
even here, American culture oscillates between modernist paranoia and a more 
collective postmodern consciousness. When Edgar views a virtual nuclear explosion 
on a nearby Web site, DeLillo teases the reader with the mystical notion that 'The 
jewels roll out of her eyes and she sees God', before admitting it is a 'Soviet Bomb 
she sees' and retreating wryly into paranoid, numerological speculation: 'fifty-eight 
megatons -- add the digits and you get thirteen' (p. 826). He remarks darkly on the 
'paranoia of the web' that Edgar senses (p. 825), what in interview he has called the 
91 Richard Gid Powers, Secrecy and Power: The Life ofIL-Edgar floover (London: Hutchinson, 1987), 
p. 289. 
92 j. Macgregor Wise, 'Community, Affect, and the Virtual: The Politics of Cyberspace', in Virtual 
Publics: Policy and Community in an Electronic Age, ed. by Beth E. Kolko (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2003), pp. 1 12-33 (p. 1 19). 
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'paranoid spaces of the computer net', to which he suggests the uncritical 'worship of 
technology' may lead. 93 
As with the Web, in addressing the question of atomic weapons directly, 
DeLillo emphasises the unifying psychological forces it can unleash. He uses the 
metaphor of 'atoms forcibly combined' within 'fusion bombs' to symbolise its 
dramatic effect on the collective psyche (p. 826). As usual in Underworld, however, 
harmony only emerges dialectically, from immense struggle. It takes the 'thermal 
pulse' of a vast nuclear device to provoke the longing for tranquillity with which the 
novel closes (p. 825): the single, concluding word 'Peace' emerges out of a computer- 
generated mushroom cloud (p. 827). The finale is preceded by a substantial passage 
outlining the word's connotations and 'ancestral roots', the latter part of which is a 
paragraph-long sentence of twenty-four lines. This daring strategy conveys the 
rapturous desire, or 'sunlit ardor', that DeLillo suggests the word 'Peace' can 
provoke. The half-page epiphany promises no easy resolution; DeLillo insists that 'all 
it can do is make you pensive' (p. 827). Nevertheless, among the etymologies listed 
are 'Fasten, fit closely, bind together' (p. 827), which hints that, despite the lack of 
reassuring closure, U. S. culture retains a powerful desire to uncover the potential for 
unity in the 'overarching presence' of technological systems (Strangeness, p. 5). 
Throughout Underworld, the movement from opposition to unity manifests as 
a shift from paranoia to a schizophrenic drive towards psychological unity, states of 
mind, which, for Deleuze and Guattari', are 'the two extreme oscillations' of 
capitalism (p. 28 1). Critics often assume that DeLillo's notion of paranoia matches 
93 Gerald Howard ... The American Strangeness": An Interview with Don DeLillo', in Hun= Mind: 
an Independent Book Review at 
<http: //web. archive. oriz. web/19990129081431/http: //www. bookwire. coni/hmr/hmrinter>, p. 5 of 
9 ... 6/10/2004. 
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that of Thomas Pynchon. Tony Tanner's claim that in Underworld DeLillo is 
'engaged in a prolonged and repetitious quoting' 'of Pynchon' is typical of critics' 
willingness to conflate their views. 94 O'Donnell takes a similar line in asserting that 
'DeLillo posits paranoia as the ideal condition of knowing in the moment when 
identity has become multiple, virtual, and open to all of the available connections' 
(p. 159). But DeLillo and Pynchon's treatments of this complex issue are not identical. 
In Gravity's Rainbow, Pynchon defines paranoia as 'the leading edge of the discovery 
that eveWhing is connected ', which, may be frightening, but is also reassuring in its 
inclusion of the paranoid, and opposes it to anti-paranoia, in which connections are 
frustratingly absent and the contemporary subject suffers anomie. 95 In DeLillo, 
Pynchon's 'paranoid' sense that 'ever3lhing is connected, which he paraphrases 
several times (p. 408, p. 465, p. 808, p. 826), is reinterpreted as a sign of the 
schizophrenic interconnectedness that heralds the unified 'deep mind' of 
postmodernity. DeLillo's paranoia, meanwhile, combines a sinister, largely fictitious 
series of connections in the world with the complete isolation of the perceiving human 
subject. DeLillo frequently suggests that paranoia is pathological and related to the 
effects of personal trauma. Nick's cultivation of 'remoteness' and his faith in 
implausible theories of his father's death is traceable to his abandonment, as a child, 
and sense of responsibility for George's death (p. 275). Similarly, in Marvin's case, it 
is his wife's demise that precipitates a series of bizarre beliefs, including the 
conviction that Mikhail Gorbachev's birthmark represents 'the map of Latvia', which 
symbolises 'the total collapse of the Soviet system' (p. 173). Marvin suffers the same 
difficulties with waste as Nick and Hoover, experiencing 'violent' bowel movements 
94 Tony Tanner, The American Mystery: American Literature from Emerson to Don DeLillo 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 2 10. 
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that struck him as 'deeply personal' and seemed to 'say something awful about the 
bearer' (p. 3 10). As with the other two, this problem is symbolic of a return of the 
repressed, consequent upon his paranoid treatment of groups or individuals as 'a 
threat to good order', to be 'vigorously brushed away' (Rurity, p. 16 1). Like Hoover, 
Marvin shamelessly promotes the benefits of Cold War rivalry, informing Nick that 
without 'the power and intimidation' of the state directed at the U. S. S. R (p. 170), he 
would be 'the lost man of history' (p. 182). 
Yet, Marvin also shows considerable signs of a schizophrenic connection to 
culture's 'deep mind', which bear out Deleuze and Guattari's sense of an 'oscillation' 
between paranoia and schizophrenia in capitalism and Freud's assertion that, even in a 
case that first manifests as paranoia, 'paranoid and schizophrenic phenomena may be 
combined in any proportion' (p. 77). Marvin finds traces of this 'deep mind' among 
baseball aficionados and uses a metaphor that combines depth and mental awareness 
to describe this phenomenon, when he remarks the 'fraternity of missing men' 
(p. 182), who share 'an ESP of baseball, an underground what, a consciousness, and 
I'm hearing it in my sleep' (p. 179). Indeed, DeLillo suggests that, in early 
postmodernity, a schizophrenic sense of unreality even seeped into baseball culture. 
He refers to numerous, supposedly live, matches that the commentator Russ Hodges 
described from a studio, having to 'create the weather' and 'flesh out the players' 
from a 'paper filled with letters and numbers' (p. 25). It is a factitious element in post- 
war American sport that is explored at greater length in Robert Coover's The 
Universal Baseball Association. Inc., J. Henry Wauah, PrQp, in which Coover's 
protagonist Henry Waugh creates a baseball game with paper and dice and comes to 
95 Thomas Pynchon, Gravity's Rainbow (London: Picador, 1975), p. 703 
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believe unquestioningly in its reality. 96 Marvin displays a similar credulity borne of 
the schizophrenic's interest in the interconnectedness of cultural artefacts and 
systems, attributing occult significance to the fact that 'they make the radioactive 
core' of the bomb 'the exact same size as a baseball' (p. 172). Indeed, his response to 
postmodern capitalism converges remarkably closely with that of Deleuze and 
Guattari's account of capitalist schizophrenia. When travelling in Europe, he reflects 
that capitalist marketing of sex reduces the human subject to 'Floating zones of 
desire' and causes the 'dismantling of desire into a thousand subspecialities' (p. 319), 
recalling the 'deterritorialized flows of desire' that Deleuze and Guattari argue are 
characteristic of the capitalist schizophrenic (p. 277). Marvin's near mystical view of 
technology is also consonant with the 'miraculate, enchanted surface' Deleuze and 
Guattari attribute to the schizophrenic's 'body without organs' (P. 13). His use of high- 
tech photographic analysis in searching for the baseball convinces him that 'all 
knowledge is available if you analyze the dots' (p. 174) and that technology 'makes 
reality come true' (p. 177). Like the schizophenic Oswald, whose dyslexia symbolises 
the disorientation capitalism causes him, Marvin is verbally incoherent, often seeking 
unsuccessfully for the appropriate signifier, the 'what-do-you-call' (p. 308), as in his 
comical confusion over 'the word for the thing that's not ultimate but next to ultimate' 
(p. 315). As 2ilek remarks of the schizophrenic, Marvin, like Oswald, maintains 'a 
kind of distance from the symbolic order', and pursues his arcane interests without 
being 'caught in the signifying network' (p. 165). 
DeLillo never treats the schizophrenic impulse towards unity as 
straightforwardly Utopian or wholly beneficial. In fact, the threat of violence 
96 Robert Coover, The Universal Baseball Association. Inc.. J, Henjy Waugh. Er_op_ (New York: Plume, 
1968) 
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schizophrenic consciousness often carries in Libra and Mao 11 is made alarmingly 
explicit, in the figure of the Texas Highway Killer Richard Henry Gilkey. DeLillo 
portrays Gilkey as utterly affectless and typical of what Mark Seltzer calls the 
'absence of a sense of self' that afflicts serial killers (Serial, p. 7). As such, he is the 
dangerous obverse of the self-abnegation that drives Karen towards communal mental 
experience. Like Oswald, to use Seltzer's vocabulary, Gilkey longs to 'become part of 
the history of others' and does so through the extreme expedient of terminating their 
lives (p. 266). Gilkey's vacuity is apparent in robotic behaviour that DeLillo conveys 
by an accumulation of curt, denotative phrases such as 'He spread mayonnaise on the 
bread. Then he slapped the lunch meat down' (p. 262). He endures the sense that mind 
and subjectivity are unreal that afflicts other schizophrenics in DeLillo's work, 
suffering what Seltzer, like R. D. Laing, calls a 'False Self Syndrome' (p. 18), which, 
Seltzer argues, entails 'a complete failure of distinction between self and others' 
(p. 20). This syndrome is made acutely apparent by his need to watch and converse 
with television news anchor Sue Ann Corcoran, just to experience 'taking shape as 
himself (p. 269). Such is Gilkey's pathology that only 'eye contact with the TV' can 
provide him 'with the knowledge that he was real' (p. 270). 
At times, the disorientation occasioned by postmodern schizophrenia even 
precipitates a determined retreat into paranoia. As O'Donnell argues, 'paranoia can be 
viewed as the reaction-formation par excellence to the schizophrenias of post-modem 
identity, economy, and aesthetics' (p. 11). This tendency is most evident in the 
behaviour of Nick Shay, who defiantly resists the postmodern idea of the 'business of 
life as a fiction', declaring his modernist belief that history is knowable as 'A single 
narrative sweep' (p. 82). Like Mao 11's Bill, he retreats from postmodernity and 
cultivates a discrete modernist subjectivity, which he describes as 'handmade', like 'a 
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sturdy Roman wall' (p. 275). Yet, despite rejecting the 'ten thousand wisps of 
disinformation' that characterise paranoia (p. 82), his 'remoteness' (P. 275) derives 
from a paranoid anxiety that causes him, like David Bell in Americana, to admit to 
4spying on himself, as what he calls a 'third person' who continually watches the 
'first person' (p. 119). As we saw, Nick's emotional history suggests a possible 
Freudian basis to his paranoia. One might read his father's desertion as leading to the 
repression of 'homosexual libido' (Zaranoia, p. 43), formerly directed towards his 
male parent, and its replacement with unconscious, internalized rage that manifests as 
what Freud calls 'Delusions of persecutio ' (p. 63). This reading assists in interpreting 
Nick's killing of George Manza. As the psychologist in juvenile correction implies, in 
pulling the trigger, Nick gave vent to longstanding anger at his father, who, in her 
words, was 'the third person in the room' on the day he shot George (p. 512). 
As with Bill in Mao II, Nick's retreat into paranoia and a fossilized modernism 
is the displacement of a desire for self-annihilation. His first remarks in the novel 
indicate a longing for the extinction of mind and ego in the affectless serenity of 
computational thought, like that pursued by Lyle in Players. His wistful reference to 
his Texus' having been 'assembled in a work area that's completely free of human 
presence', constructed by 'programmed drudges that do not dream of family dead' 
indicates a wish to emulate their immunity from emotional discomfort (p. 63). His 
habit of running while listening to 'Sufl chanting' on a 'wireless headphone' (P. 89) 
suggests a similar desperation to destroy the self-, as Ian Richard Netton notes, Sufism 
is an Islamic sect that advises the 'total nullification of ego consciousness. 97 Over 
time, Nick's attraction to self-dissolution prompts his embrace of schizophrenic 
thought, with its fragmentation of the unitary subject and notion of psychological 
97 Ian Richard Netton, Sufi Ritual: The Parallel Universe (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 2000), p. 177. 
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union. His pursuit of isolated signifiers as routes to religious truth, while imprisoned, 
resembles that of Karen in Mao 11 and may be an initial sign of this schizophrenia. He 
adheres to the advice of The Cloud of Unknowing and seeks to create a 'naked intent' 
towards God by using a 'single word of a single syllable' (p. 295) or, as The Cloud's 
author puts it, had his 'intention wrapped and unfolded in one word'. 98 By the time 
Nick meets his former lover Klara Sax in 1992, for the first time in forty years, his 
paranoid wish for isolation has begun to dissolve, allowing him to assert that 
postmodern technology 'expands your self-esteem and connects you' 'to the things 
that slip through the world otherwise unperceived' (p. 89). Indeed, as with Bill's 
meeting with Brita in Mao II, his encounter with Klara may accelerate this movement 
toward postmodem consciousness. He encounters in her the obverse of his rejection 
of postmodernity, a woman untroubled by admitting that contemporary life 'took an 
unreal turn at some point' (p. 73) and who, perhaps as a consequence, feels little need 
of overt self-assertion, or what she calls any 'brilliant jack-off gesture that asserts an 
independence' (p. 377). Klara may therefore function for Nick as one of the 
characteristically postmodern second selves that populate DeLillo's later fiction. 
Whether or not her influence is decisive, it is noticeable that, by the time of the 
epilogue, Das Kapital, a few years after this meeting, Nick's shift away from paranoia 
is complete. He expresses exhilaration at the psychological unity of contemporary 
computer culture, declaring 'The real miracle is the web, the net, where everybody is 
everywhere at once' (p. 808). He finally accepts that his father's disappearance was 
voluntary, that he had simply 'wanted to go under' (p. 809), a refusal of selfhood and 
responsibility that again demonstrates the less palatable side of the collective 
98 Anonymous, The Cloud of Unknowing and Other Works, trans. by A. C. Spearing (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 2001) 
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postmodem 'deep mind', which may have helped give Underworld its title. In this 
respect, Nick's experience of identity seems continuous with that of his father. His 
schizophrenia extends to the kind of formalism practiced Libra's Win Everett, who 
dismisses selfhood as utterly factitious. After Nick discovers his wife Marian's affair 
with Brian, he concludes that they 'could keep the two houses, all the cars' and 'both 
wives'. 'None of it ever belonged to me except in the sense that I filled out the forms' 
(p. 796). 
Nick's visceral approach to life is in contrast to the comparatively cool 
rationality of his brother Matt. Rather than involvement in gang life, which leads 
indirectly to Nick's imprisonment, Matt channels anger at their father's departure into 
esoteric pursuits. As a child, he takes up chess, which offers the sublimated pleasure 
of 'hearing the loser declare himself dead' (p. 707), while, in adulthood, his careful 
repression of rage is suggested by his job constructing 'safing mechanisms' for 
nuclear weapons (p. 452). His qualities are manifestly the obverse of Nick's and, to a 
large extent, DeLillo portrays him as another of his brother's doppelgangers, who 
lives the civilized, intellectual life Nick eschews. His freedom from paranoid anxiety 
enables him to adjust quickly to the schizophrenia and myriad technological systems 
of postmodernity. Indeed, he is a detached critic of his brother's paranoid psyche, 
which, in his view, uses the 'one plot' of their father's supposed death to avoid the 
more 'general distrust' to which it is prone (p. 454). Matt evades the isolation of 
paranoia by immersing himself in the complexity of postmodern weapons systems 
production, in which 'Everything connected at some undisclosed point' and many 
workers 'didn't know where their work ended up' (p. 408). It is a method of 
construction DeLillo may have adapted from the actual practices of The Manhattan 
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Project, in which, as Weart remarks, 'tens of thousands of workers had no idea of 
what they were making' (hLuclear, p. 120). Matt therefore dismisses paranoia as a 
'superficial state' (p. 422). He prefers analytical observation of contemporary 
schizophrenia, particularly the dazzling interconnectedness of postmodern capitalism 
that renders moral judgements difficult, or even irrelevant. As he remarks, 'everything 
connects in the end' and it becomes difficult to distinguish between 'a soup can and a 
car bomb, because they are made by the same people in the same way and ultimately 
refer to the same thing' (p. 465). 
Matt's ability to assess paranoiac and schizophrenic culture with a measure of 
objectivity makes his consciousness the ideal tool for DeLillo in his theorisation of 
contemporary culture, particularly the influence of the atomic bomb. More than once, 
Matt serves as the filter for ruminations on the relation between technology and 
consciousness in postmodemity, in which the reader is addressed by DeLillo's 
generalised 'you', which implies their membership of the communal consciousness 
Underworld adumbrates (pp. 15 5-160, p. 402, p. 413). Matt speculates on nuclear 
weapons' effect on the psyche, with special emphasis on the religious and mystical 
ideas connected with the bomb. Notably, a number of his mystical references are 
drawn from Hinduism, a religion known for its assertion of the fundamental unity of 
creation. The Bhagavad Gita insists on perceiving 'the various states of being as 
existing in the one, and extending from that alone'. 99 The suggestion that the Hindu 
gods 'Kali and Shiva' might be summoned by 'the visionary flash of light' produced 
by the atomic bomb may therefore refer to the unifying psychological forces atomic 
weapons unleash (p. 458). DeLillo suggests that this effect is due partly to the bomb's 
ability to expand human imagination and create an enlarged, more collective model of 
99 The Bhagavad Gita, trans. by W. J. Johnson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 59. 
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consciousness. Because, as Klara puts it, the weapon has 'out-imagined the mind' 
(p. 76), it proves able, in Matt's words, to 'redefine the limits of human perception and 
dread' (p. 422). The Cold War period, in DeLillo's reading, is therefore characterised 
by an emergent sense of mind as unlimited by space or individual subjectivity. As he 
told Peter Henning, 'In Underworld', 'I wanted to broaden consciousness, open it up'. 
100 He remarks, for instance, on the U. S. goverment's decision to test supposed 
psychics, on the basis that 'psychic commandos' might transmit thought over long 
distances to 'read the intentions' of ministers, or 'jam the enemy's computer networks 
and weapons or systems'. The images with which Matt expounds his experience of 
nuclear weapon production often lay similar emphasis on mind as vastly enlarged and 
publicly observable. Matt suggests that the 'interplay of terrain and weapons' is 'a 
kind of neural process remapped in the world, a hollow sort of craving lifted out of 
the brain stem', only to appear in the 'diamondback desert' (p. 45 1). This notion of an 
immense 'neural process' 'remapped' in a gargantuan communal space captures the 
radical transformation of consciousness taking place under the influence of 
technological systems that informs the entire novel. It asserts unequivocally the power 
of the revolutionary weapon that harnesses the 'sun's own heat' to bring the formerly 
private, fragmented 'underworld' of consciousness into dazzling, unified visibility 
(p. 24). 
100 Peter Henning, 'An Interview with Don DcLillo', 20"'November 2003, in Frankfurter Rundschau 
trans. by Julie Apitzsch, at <http: //www. perival. coin/delillo/ddinterview henning-htmi , last accessed 2 nd April 2005. 
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Cha]2ter Seven 
Matter as Mind: 'Root Identity' in 'The Body Artist' and 'Cosmol2olis' 
DeLillo's two most recent novels, The Body Artist (2001) and Cosmopolis 
(2003) examine the possibility of the quest for the fundamental nature of 
consciousness, or what DeLillo refers to as 'root identity'. 1 They do so largely by 
exploring the relationship between mind and body, particularly its central role in the 
construction of subjectivity. DeLillo takes the view that, in Elisabeth Grosz's words, 
'Body' is too often the 'subordinate term', in the opposition mind/body, and is 
unfairly treated as 'an intrusion' on 'the operation of mind'. 2 In this respect, the 
novels constitute a partial return to the concerns of his earliest works, which often 
emphasise the importance of rapprochement with the physical, for the development of 
subjectivity. But, in these texts, DeLillo goes beyond mind-body unity to consider the 
affinities between mind, body, and natural world, especially the 'mental' qualities that 
may subsist in all organic matter. In so doing, he examines a notion similar to the one 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty calls 'organic thought', or what, in Cosmopolis, DeLillo calls 
the 'counter-consciousness' of the body, and extends his concern with psychological 
unity beyond human life to all organic existence (P. 5 0). 3 
The Body Artist focuses on performance artist Lauren Hartke, who devotes 
herself to 'body work', and her grief at the unexpected suicide of her husband, film 
director Rey Robles (p. 57). Lauren finds solace in the company of an apparently 
1 Don DeLillo, The Body Artist (London: Picador, 2002), p. 104 and Cosmopol is (London: Picador, 
2003) 
2 Elisabeth Grosz, Volatile Bodies: Towards a Corporeal Feminism (Bloomington, IN: University of 
Indiana Press, 1994), p. 3, pp. 3-4. 
3 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Percention, trans. by Colin Smith (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1978), p. 77. 
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retarded, 'sadly gifted', young man, who has been living unnoticed in her rented 
holiday home (p. 100) and to whom she gives the name 'Mr Tuttle', after a science 
teacher at high school, who also 'spoke in unmeasured hesitations' (p. 47). Some of 
Mr Tuttle's mental handicaps, and astonishing abilities, resemble the qualities DeLillo 
associated with the capitalist schizophrenic in previous novels. Yet, here, DeLillo 
raises the possibility that these indicate access to an ultimate reality, as well as to the 
hidden capacities of mind, and therefore of a significant element of 'root identity'. Mr 
Tuttle's apparent violation of the 'limits of the human', particularly his experience of 
past and future events in present time, prompts Lauren to profound reflection on 
temporality and its relation to body and mind and allows her to discover d radically 
expanded view of both (p. 100). Cosmopolis, published two years later, examines the 
final day in the life of multi-billionaire Eric Packer and focuses on the psychological 
and conceptual journey that accompanies his dramatic, seemingly voluntary, descent 
from a commanding position in the world of stock and currency trading to impotence 
and abject poverty. Like Players, the novel combines elements of the science fiction 
and thriller genres and has a protagonist who works in the New York financial 
markets. But, in Eric, DeLillo presents a character that rejects Lyle's reduction of the 
mind to technology and abandons his highly abstract view of consciousness for a 
holistic belief that mind is immanent in the body and that matter may be a less 
rarefied form of mind. 
In The Body Artist, DeLillo explores the feasibility of enquiring into the 
fundamental question of 'who we are when we are not rehearsing who we are', which 
has been implicit in all of his work (p. I 10). He acknowledges that the quest for this 
supposed substratum of subjectivity may be perilous. Although Rey thanks his much 
younger wife for 'helping him recover his soul', he remarks ambivalently that the 
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result 'is bad, but it's like myself when I was myself' (p. 6 1). As Rey's first wife 
Isabele insists, his suicide 'was not a question of chemicals in his brain, but the fact 
that 'he hated who he was', a disturbing possibility that complicates Lauren's grief 
with the guilt of assisting in the exhumation of his loathed former identity (p. 59). 
Nevertheless, Lauren's body art makes her well suited to the search. As herjournalist 
friend Mariella Chapman suggests, the discipline specialises in exploring 'root 
identity' (p. 105), a notion lent support by real-life body artist Simone Forti, who 
regards it as critical in her quest for 'that part of myself' 'that would always be there'. 
4 Mr Tuttle is particularly suitable as partner to Lauren in this enterprise. He occupies 
a zero degree of consciousness without selfhood; he is 'a man anonymous to himself 
5 (p. 95), who endures what, in Players, DeLillo calls 'states of 'reduced sensibility'. 
Although Lauren's search for 'root identity' may appear essentialising, or even 
primitivistic, it is characteristically postmodem in its emulation of the efforts of 
contemporary science to comprehend elucidate the relationship of mind and body and 
its implications for the nature of consciousness. Yet, neither The Body Artist, nor 
Cosmopolis, embraces the scientific objectivism that DeLillo has long questioned. 
Both focus predominantly on the protagonists' subjective perspective and the 
minutiae of their mental and emotional response, thus making clear that consciousness 
is the primary and privileged subject of both texts. 
The Body Artist is the novel by DeLillo, in which the influence of literary 
modernism is most apparent and it is often this use of modernist tropes that critics 
have emphasised. Philip Nel suggests it is DeLillo's 'homage to modernist poetics' 
and takes on the 'modernist (and romantic) project of bridging the gap between word 
WlLouise Steinman, The Knowing Body: The Artist as StorZeller in Contcmpora[y Performance 
(Berkeley, CA: North Atlantic Books, 1995), p. 6. 
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and world'. 6 Similarly, Cornel Bonca examines the parallels between DeLillo's 
treatment of what Bonca calls 'ontological indwelling or presence' and the modernist 
philosopher Martin Heidegger's examination of the issue. 7 David Cowart, 
meanwhile, notes the influence of Virginia Woolf s To The Lighthouse, whose 
famous 'Time Passes' passage is echoed in the first line of The Body Artist: 'Time 
seems to pass'. 8 But this apparently minor distinction between the declarative 
statement in Woolf and the merely apparent duration DeLillo describes is a telling 
one. It signals that, in spite of modernism's influence on DeLillo, he adopts a more 
sceptical and exacting approach to consciousness than that offered by stream of 
consciousness writing, which emphasises phenomenological observation of the 
mind's fluid motion. 
This shift from modernist to postmodernist is enacted in the novel's structure, 
which begins with something close to a stream of consciousness aesthetic, before 
adopting a more contemporary sensibility after Rey's suicide. The opening chapter, 
where Rey and Lauren chat over breakfast, is narrated in typically modernist, 
although highly colloquial, free indirect discourse: 'There were voices on the radio in 
like Hindi it sounded' (p. 10). The breakfast happens in 'real time': our reading of its 
eighteen or so pages is of similar duration to the meal itself, an effect that demands 
painstaking, intensely realist attention to detail and accentuates the close observation 
required by the modernist stream of consciousness DeLillo is imitating. Lauren is 
portrayed as acutely aware of the flow of her perceptions such as the 'savor' of 
3 Don DeLillo, Players (London: Vintage, 1991), p. 205. 
6 Philip Nei, 'Don DeLillo's Return to Form: The Modernist Poetics of The Body Artisf, in 
Contemporary Literature, 43 (2002), 736-59 (p. 736). 
7 Cornel Bonca, 'Being, Time, and Death in DeLillo's The Body Artist'. in Pacific Coast Philology, 37 
(2002), 58-68 (p. 59). 
8 David Cowart, The Physics of Language (Athens, GA, University of Georgia Press, 2002), p. 202. 
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'blueberries'. She is somnolent, 'puddled in dream melt' (p. 7), and this semi- 
consciousness defamiliarises habitual, and hitherto unquestioned, thoughts and 
beliefs, like her sense that 'It was her newspaper', or that 'They both used the 
computer but it was spiritually hers' (p. 12). She also observes, as though for the first 
time, that, in the mornings, she tends to carry 'a voice in her head', 'a voice that 
flowed from a story in the paper' (p. 16). By contrast, the quasi-scientific approach 
that prevails after Rey's death transforms descriptions of driving on a highway or 
reaching for a paperclip into halting analyses, littered with qualifications. On the road, 
'All the cars including yours seem to flow in dissociated motion, giving the 
impression of or presenting the appearance of (p. 3 1), while, after the apparent 
descent of a paper clip, 'you know you dropped it, you remember how it happened, or 
half remember, or sort of see it may be, or something else' (p. 89). Speculation occurs 
under symbolic erasure, with tentative affirmation always about to become negation, 
as with Lauren's assertion, after explaining to Mr Tuttle her need for solitude, that 'Of 
course he understood. But maybe not' (p. 47). In view of DeLillo's frequent 
concentration on mortality, it is worth noting that a death catalyses this 
epistemological shift. In his earlier work, rapprochement with mortality often removes 
an obstacle to 'first-person' 'consciousness' and the creation of subjectivity. Lauren 
does not endure the extreme pathologies of DeLillo's early protagonists and death 
simply causes her to abandon aesthetically pleasurable observation of consciousness, 
for a more methodical type of awareness. A similarly hesitant, exploratory tone is 
adopted, with respect to time. Thinking of Mr Tuttle's predictions of future events, 
Lauren wonders whether 'The laws of nature permit things that in fact, in practice, she 
thought, never happen. But could. But could not. But could. If only in his mind, she 
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thought' (p. 77). Rather than modernist treatment of consciousness as what Paul 
Civello calls a 'separate entity' in opposition to 'the material world', DeLillo 
examines the nature of mind, matter, and the apparent 'flow' of time, as well as the 
relationships between all three. 9 
This postmodernist enquiry appears to act in counterpoint to the novel's 
frequently modernist form, in which major events are left unnarrated, to be signalled 
only by the unannounced introduction of documents into the text. But, the impression 
this creates, of the text as hermetic artefact, engaged primarily in conversation with 
itself, is curiously appropriate to Lauren's intensely subjective, almost solipsistic, 
purpose. Rey's obituary, for example, is the reader's first indication of his death. A 
newspaper article, describing Lauren's imitation of 'a naked man, emaciated and 
aphasic, trying desperately to tell us something' is our only evidence that Lauren 
continues performing and makes artistic use of her experiences with Mr Tuttle 
(p. 105). Although it appears before the end of the novel, the article is undated and 
there is no indication as to whether she performs her piece 'Body Time' within the 
diegetic narrative or at some future time (p. 104). Rather than a conventional reader, at 
these moments, one assumes the position of researcher or fan of the two artists and 
experiences the sudden, uncanny sensation of being situated in their fictional world, 
distancing the spectre of postmodem objectivism and fore-grounding the intensely 
subjective cognition the novel describes. 
DeLillo draws liberally on literary modernism, particularly its notions of time. 
The remark, in the opening paragraph, that 'after a storm' the 'smallest falling leaf is 
stabbed with self-awareness' (p. 7) recalls Septimus' belief in Mrs Dalloway that 
9 Paul Civello, American Litergy Naturalism and its Twentieth-Century Transformations (Athens, 
GA, University of Georgia Press, 1994), p. 68. 
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'leaves were alive' and 'connected by millions of fibres with his own body'. 10 
Although the two perceptions are closely comparable, only DeLillo attributes 
consciousness to the inanimate leaf and makes a link between human consciousness 
and whatever manifestations of 'mind' may exist in vegetable matter. DeLillo extends 
this possibility of mental unity to the animal kingdom, by associating Mr Tuttle with 
the bird life of the cottage garden. Lauren's conversations with Tuttle or thought 
about him often coincide with intense avian activity. When she speculates on whether, 
to understand Tuttle, she requires a 'physicist' to 'tell her what the parameters were', 
'The birds were going crazy on the feeder' (p. 67). Like Tuttle, the birds are physically 
insubstantial. Where he has a 'thinness of physical address', they are 'disembodied', 
'sheer and fleet and scatter-bright' (p. 13), while their apparent ability to view the 
kitchen as 'the apparition of a space set off from time' foreshadows the radical 
timelessness of his consciousness (p. 22). DeLillo therefore pursues the notion of 
psychological unity, again, but in unsuspected connections between human, animal, 
and plant consciousness, as well as the unity of past, present, and future. Rather than a 
function of social or technological circumstances, this unity in nature is treated as a 
true or ultimate reality, comparable to Gregory Bateson's view of Darwinian 
evolution as a6 mental process', in which a 'pattern of patterns, a 'meta-pattem', 
links numerous instances of consciousness. 11 As in Underworld, DeLillo uses the 
second person, to imply a broad commonality of thought and experience. Describing 
Lauren, for instance, the narrator asserts that 'you are driving in the third lane' (P. 3 1), 
while later, when Lauren sees, or hallucinates, her dead husband, Rey, her experience 
is said to be the manifestation 'of every secret intimation you've ever felt' (p. 122). In 
10 Virginia Woolf, Mrs Dalloway (London: Penguin, 1992), p. 24. 
11 Gregory Bateson, Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unily (London: Wildwood House Ltd, 2000), p. 18, 
P. 1 1. 
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his presentation of Mr Tuttle, DeLillo associates intimations of mental unity with 
verbal incoherence, as in Underworld and Libra. But Mr Tuttle's linguistic difficulties 
are of a much higher order than those of Oswald or Marvin Lundy, rendering him 
virtually incapable of conversation, and appear to be the penalty for access to occult 
realities. In response to Lauren's initial enquiry concerning how long he has lived in 
the house, he replies only 'It is not able' (p. 43). Lauren and the reader are left 
perplexed as to whether he is seeking to explain his disability, or if this represents an 
attempt to form the word 'notable', in which case he may be, correctly, prophesying 
the importance of this encounter for Lauren's grieving process. Either way, DeLillo 
suggests that Tuttle's mixture of incapacity and inspiration arises from a quasi- 
mystical psychological abstraction, reminiscent of Karen in Mao 11. Lauren suggests 
that Mr Tuttle walks 'with a slight shuffle' because he 'feared levitation' (p. 45) and 
'amused herself by thinking he'd come from cyberspace' (p. 45), a notion that recalls 
Sister Edgar's climactic journey into the Internet in Underworld. 
DeLillo's exploration of temporal unity in consciousness involves examining 
the possibility that, as T. S. Eliot avers, 'to be conscious is not to be in time' and that, 
in reality, past, present, and future may exist as part of a single, present instant. 12 
After DeLillo's revision of Woolf in his first sentence, he asserts enigmatically that 
'The world happens, unrolling into moments', as though describing the artificial 
f rolling' of a film-like projection, which was preceded by a radically different, 
timeless state (p. 7). Words such as 'happen' or 'happened' occur four times in the 
early pages (p. 7, p. 8, p. 11); for example, 'It happened this final morning that they 
were here at the same time' (p. 7), implying, with the undertone of 'chance 
occurrence', that our adoption of a model of time as successive 'moments' is entirely 
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contingent. In a subtly different form, this concept of 'real' time as a unified entity 
also attracted Virginia Woolf's attention. In Jacob's Room, she suggests the British 
Library contains 'an enormous mind', which connects 'Plato' and 'Shakespeare' to 
the present day, a notion revised and clarified in The Waves, when she refers to the 
'unlimited time of the mind, which stretches in a flash from Shakespeare to 
ourselves'. 13 On a smaller scale, Mr Tuttle's behaviour attributes just such 
'unlimited' scope to our experience of time. In Lauren's judgement, Mr Tuttle's 
'future' is 'simultaneous, somehow, with the present' and 'they are equally 
accessible' to him (p. 77). Bonca argues that such psychological amalgamation of time 
is replicated in Heidegger's views, yet Heidegger's concentration on the intermittent 
eruptions or coming 'into bloom' of past time differs from Tuttle's permanent 
simultaneity. 14 A more striking modernist precursor for DeLillo's treatment of time 
may be found in Henri Bergson. Bergson describes a state, translated as 'Pure 
duration', which consists in the fusion of 'both the present and past states into an 
organic whole' and 'is the form which the succession of our conscious state assumes 
when our ego lets itself live'. 15 But, like Woolf, Bergson says little of the future, 
except to remark that the 'present' has 'one foot' in the 'future', because it is 
'impending over the future'. 16 For modernist speculation on the type of prophecy Mr 
Tuttle practices, one must go to Edmund Husserl. As Barry Dainton shows, Husserl 
12 T. S. Eliot, 'Burnt Norton', in T. S. Eliot: Collected Poems 1909-62 (London: Faber and Faber, 1990), 
pp. 189-195 (p. 192). 
13 Virginia Woolf, Jacob's Room (London: The Hogarth Press, 1971), pp. 107-08 and The Waves 
(London: The Hogarth Press, 196 1), p. 194. 
14 Martin Heidegger, The Question of Technology and other Essays, trans. by William W. Lovitt (New 
York: Harper Torchbooks, 1997), p. 11. 
13 Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, trans. by 
F. L. Porgson (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1913), p. 100. 
16 Henri Bergson, Matter and Menory, trans. by Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer (London: 
George Allen and Unwin, 1913), p. 177. 
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held that 'primal impressions are typically accompanied by short-term anticipation of 
future impressions'. 17 According to Izchak Miller, this led Husserl to conclude that 'a 
fully "prophetic" consciousness is, in principle, always possible'. 18 Husserl's is 
therefore a position that might be stretched to account for the fact that Mr Tuttle 
'remembers the future' (p. 100), notably, in his seeming foreknowledge of Lauren's 
request 'Don't touch it', 'I'll clean it up later', which he 'mimics' long before it is 
made (p. 93). However, in modernist thought, Mr Tuttle's atemporal perception is 
most closely related to Einsteinian relativity, which is made explicit in Lauren's 
suggestion that he inhabits 'an objective world, the deepest description of space-time' 
(p. 83). Roger Penrose notes that Einstein's theory posits 'a 'static' four-dimensional 
space-time', in which 'space-time is just there and time 'flows' no more than does 
space'. 19 Among other things, Einstein's theory is known for its assertion that there 
exists a 'curvature in the fabric of "space-time" . 
20 This may account for DeLillo's 
remark that 'From a long way off, Mr Tuttle appeared to walk 'narrowly, in curved 
space', an idiosyncrasy that reaffirms Tuttle's apparent access to hidden but profound 
truths (p. 95). But, in light of the novel's postmodern epistemology, it is especially 
striking that Tuttle's experience coincides with the speculations of contemporary 
mysticism, which often closely resemble those of Einstein. Tuttle somewhat ethereal 
appearance, with 'something elusive in his aspect' (p. 46), suggests mystical or ghostly 
qualities, which prompt the critic to seek parallels in this area. Numerous 'New Age' 
17 Barry Dainton, Stream of Consciousness: Unily and Continui! y in Conscious Experience (London: 
Routledge, 2000), p. 153. 
18 Izchak Miller, 'Husserl's Account of Our Temporal Awareness', in Husserl. IntentiOnali! y and 
Cognitive Science, ed. by Hubert L. Dreyfus (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982), pp. 12546 (p. 141). 
19 Roger Penrose, Shadows of the Mind (London: Vintage, 1995), p. 384. 
20 Frank Close, Lucifer's Legacy: The Meaning of Asymmeta (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), p. 251. 
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works joyfully embrace the possibility that time is illusory and that, as Eckhart Tolle 
puts it, 'the inner equivalent of time is presence, awareness of the eternal Now'. 21 
Like Woolf in Mrs Dalloway, DeLillo opposes 'inner' 'awareness' of temporality to 
inauthentic clock-time. Lauren progresses from neurotic reliance on the clock, after 
Rey's death, when she is 'eternally checking the time' (p. 73, p. 58), to trusting 
circadian rhythms and viewing time as a function of the body, which can be known 
intuitively. She grows in the conviction that 'Time unfolds into the seams of being' 
(p. 99) and demands of her audience that they also 'feel time go by, viscerally, even 
painfully' (p. 104). In arguing for the artificiality of the concept of time, Tolle's 
interest, like Lauren's, is in exploring 'root identity', or what Tolle calls 'the ever- 
present I am' (p. 3), which, he argues, is 'prior to I am this or I am that' (p. 11). The 
phrase recalls Clarissa Dalloway's defiant refusal to 'say of anyone in the world now 
that they were this or that' (L)alloway, p. 8). Yet, where Woolf's modernist point is to 
emphasise the mercurial fluidity of consciousness, Tolle, and Lauren, seek the 
substratum that may underlie all such superficial flux. In the unexpected appearance 
of Mr Tuttle, at the conclusion of chapter two, Lauren finds an unlikely mentor in her 
pursuit of this goal (p. 41). 
Tuttle's mysterious appearance and subsequent disappearance inevitably raises 
the question of his ontological status. Is he mental patient, spiritual presence, or 
second self? If his existence is truly extra-temporal, if, as Neale Donald Walsch 
quotes 'God' as saying of spiritual reality, for him, 'Past', 'Present', and 'Future' 
exist 'all at once', then he might also be, in some sense, extra-spatial, or illusory. 22 
21 Eckhart Tolle, The Power of Now: A Guide jo-Sjýiritual Enlightenment (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 2005), p. 1 17. 
22 Neale Donald WaIsch, Conversations With. God: An Uncommon Dialogue. Book 2 (London: Hodder 
and Stoughton, 1999), p. 66. 
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Tuttle is certainly resistant to spatiality: when Lauren hears him, before he appears, 
she feels that 'The noise had this quality, of a body shedding space' (P. 40). As Grosz 
remarks, 'the body is fundamentally linked to representations of spatiality and 
temporality', raising the question of whether a body can exist without a relation to 
these categories (p. 90). DeLillo maintains a teasing and uncanny ambiguity on the 
subject. Rey's comments on 'the noises in the walls', before the young man's 
appearance, seems to testify to Tuttle's material existence (P. 18). But, Tuttle's 
inhuman immunity to time suggests he may be a product of Lauren's unconscious. 
After all, as Freud argues, 'The process of the system Ucs. are timeless; i. e. they are 
not ordered temporally, are not altered by the passage of time'. 23 This notion is 
supported by the fact that, before Tuttle's appearance, Lauren's behaviour resembles 
that of her unsuspected guest: she is always 'thinking into tomorrow', as though 
unconsciously yearning for Tuttle's timeless quality (p. 34). During the same period, 
she experiences hallucinations and the apparent fissuring of her identity, which 
implies a second self may be emerging from her unconscious. She begins 'hearing 
herself from other parts of the house' (p. 35) and 'seeing herself from the edge of the 
room' (p. 34). Moreover, her relation to Tuttle seems uncannily close. She is not 
surprised at discovering him 'in a small bedroom', regarding it as 'inevitable' (p. 41) 
and seems to expect to communicate telepathically with him, prefacing her 'need to 
live here alone for a time', with a confident assertion that 'it is surely unnecessary to 
tell you this' (p. 47). Although Lauren believes he is real, she remains uncertain about 
the nature of his being or his possible psychological problems. She tells herself half- 
heartedly that she ought to 'call the hospitals' to report him missing (p. 56), yet later 
23 Sigmund Freud, 'The Unconscious', in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works 
of Sigmund Freud Vol. XIV 0 914-1916), trans. by James Strachey (London: The Ilogarth Press, 
1957), pp. 159-215 (p. 187). 
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asserts that 'He wasn't mental', 'except in the sense that people who threaten our 
assumptions are always believed to be mad' (p. 97). When she does contact 
'institutions', after his disappearance, she experiences an unaccountable feeling of 
fraudulence, adopting 'a made-up voice', while remaining 'mindful of the irony' of 
the conversation, as though acknowledging that, in reality, she may be the one 
suffering from mental illness (p. 96). Tellingly, after his departure, 'When she could 
not remember what he looked like, she leaned into a mirror and there he was', a habit 
that suggests radical, if unacknowledged, doubts about his existence (P. 112). 
Lauren never brings herself to doubt her sanity or Tuttle's reality. In spite of 
his quasi-mystical qualities, therefore, he is what C. F. Keppler calls the 'genuine 
second self which is 'always simultaneously objective and subjective, and never 
explainable as a mistake'. 24 Within this role, Tuttle most closely fits the category 
Keppler calls the 'saviour', in which 'the Power of Good appears as the uncanny and 
suspect counterpart' (p. 101). This 'Power' manifests as subtle guidance to Lauren, 
offered through broken speech and by example. He assists Lauren in her grief, by 
serving as counsellor and substitute love object. In the process, he makes Lauren 
understand the 'hidden thinness of everything around her' (p. 93), directing her 
attention to the possibility of revelatory, quasi-mystical existence. Most importantly, 
though paradoxically, since his characteristics are so abstract as to appear unreal, he 
dissuades her from metaphysical speculation. Instead, he emphasises the strong 
subjectivity and reassuring sense of narrative time that arises from the vigorous union 
of mind and body she experiences during bodywork. Although individual identity and 
narrative time may not be consistent with occult or ultimate reality, Tuttle's behaviour 
implies recognition that, if Lauren is to recreate a resilient sense of self, she must 
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accept these as pragmatic ontological fictions. Following Rey's death, Tuttle acts as a 
conduit for Lauren's sorrow, to the extent that 'she could not miss Rey without 
thinking along the margins of Mr Tuttle' (p. 82). Her grief is symbolised by a 
temporary alienation from the physical and, in particular, the stars. Unlike Kant, she 
cannot 'associate them directly with my own existence' or feel a direct 'connection 
with all those visible worlds'; 25 in Rey's absence, they are no longer a 'soul 
extension', or a 'a thing that lived outside of language in the oldest part of her' (Body 
Artist, p. 37). To reconnect with the physical and her sense of self, she deliberately 
attempts to inhabit 'reality', castigating herself with such maxims as 'Real people 
don't look at ringing phones' (p. 34). DeLillo articulates her sense of estrangement 
with the enigmatic notion that 'the world was lost inside her', implying the paradox of 
a continuing attachment to the natural world, from which she nevertheless feels 
alienated (p. 37). Appropriately, it is at this moment of separation from her 'root 
identity' or 'oldest part' that she encounters Tuttle. As Keppler asserts of the second 
self, Tuttle arrives 'at exactly that juncture at which the first self, however reluctantly, 
is ready for him' (p. 196). Tuttle's semi-coherent, unconventional speech strikes her as 
'pure chant, transparent' (p. 75), recalling the 'pure word' with which Rilke hopes to 
capture, appropriately, the 'untellable stars' in his Ninth Duino Elegy and DeLillo's 
previous reference to the poem's concern with the ineffable in End Zone. 26 His 
'chant', in phrases like 'Coming and going I am leaving' (p. 74), proves highly 
therapeutic, causing her to feel 'an elation that made it hard for her to listen carefully' 
24 C. F. Keppler, The Literature of the Second Self (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 1972), 
P. 190. 
25 Immanuel Kant, Critigue of Practical Reason, trans. by Lewis White Beck (New York: Liberal Arts 
Press, 1956), pp. 161-2. 
26 Rainer Maria Rilke, Duino Elegies, trans. by J. B. Leishman and Stephen Spender (London: The 
Hogarth Press, 1939), p. 85 and Don DeLillo, End Zone (New York: Penguin, 1986), p. 64. 
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(p. 75). Simultaneously, Tuttle guides her away from his own abstract and ethereal 
qualities. When Lauren enquires whether there is 'another language you speak' and 
asks him to 'say some words' in this occult tongue, he replies 'say some words to say 
some words' (p. 55), as though questioning the value of purely verbal enquiry. 
His 'pure chant' and her observation of his physical habits persuade her to 
emphasise flesh, at the expense of intellect: his 'transparent' speech causes 'an easing 
in her body that drew her down out of laborious thought' (p. 74). She allows him to 
lead her in matters of the body. When she notices that 'He ate next to nothing for 
three days running', she imitates him: 'It was suitable in a way. It was what she hadn't 
thought of on her own' (p. 94). The obtrusive presence of his body prompts her to 
intense concentration on the physical. Episodes in which she takes him shopping and 
returns to the car to 'find him sitting in piss and shit' (p. 66) and 'unbashfully' gives 
him a bath (p. 68) serve to refocus her attention on what Louise Steinman calls the 
'wisdom of the body and the rituals that arise to express that wisdom' (P. 3). She 
returns with satisfaction to her complex, ascetic routines of cleansing, exfoliation 
(p. 76, p. 83), and exercise, in which self-discipline reminds her of the indissoluble link 
between body and mind. As DeLillo observes, she 'calculated all the plausible 
requirements. Then she exceeded them ... The mind willed it on the body' (pp. 97-8). 
As this occurs, she becomes increasingly aware of his comparative alienation from the 
somatic. The incoherence of Tuttle's speech is partly explicable by incompetence with 
its material elements, the 'rhythmic intervals' and the 'mutters and hums' that 'pace a 
remark' (pp. 65-6), while his lack of physical presence causes Lauren to feel that 'I'm 
standing closer to you than you are to me' (p. 85). For Lauren, the body comes to 
appear as the centre of her identity and the origin of narrative time. She feels that 
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'Time is the only narrative that matters' and that it is to be located in the flesh, where 
'Everything flows backward from the pelvis' (p. 92). She abandons the notion of being 
what Gay Gaer Luce calls 'a slave to the clock on the wall' and emphasises the 
'circadian fluctuations' that 'bind the fragments of our being into a coherent whole'. 
27 Luce argues that 'Tomorrow's human being' 'will be acquainted with his time 
structure, as we are acquainted with our temperaments' (p. 248), a bold prediction that 
might cause one to reinterpret Tuttle's ability to remember 'the future' (p. 100) as an 
indication that he is a messenger from Luce's hypothetical 'tomorrow'. Lauren 
believes that, in its estrangement from the body, Tuttle's existence lacks 'narrative 
quality' (p. 65) and the possibility of subjectivity: the 'stirrings of tremulous self 
(p. 85). She senses that, as Antonio Damasio argues, a 'sense of self' and temporal 
awareness emerge simultaneously, in the process by which an organism creates a 
narrative with a 'beginning, a middle, and an end', based on bodily experience. 28 
Lauren therefore concludes, paradoxically, perhaps disingenuously, that, although 
bodily narrative time may be an illusion, this is where her 'root identity', or the 
'oldest part of herself, is located. She declares 'we are made out of time' (p. 92) and, 
in the novel's last line, affirms her need 'to feel the sea tang on her face and the flow 
of time in her body to tell her who she was' (p. 124). 
These conclusions are responsible for the title of her work 'Body Time'. In 
this piece, Lauren explores the consequences of the discovery that, as real-life 
performance artist Fakir Musafar puts it, only a 'disembodied consciousness' is 'free 
of time and space'. 29 Consequently, as its name suggests, the piece conveys a sense 
27 Gay Gaer Luce, Body Time (London: Maurice Temple Smith, 1972), p. 15, p. 25, p. 15. 
28 Antonio Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Makina of 
Consciousness (London: William Heinemann, 1999), p. 3, p168. 
29 Fakir Musafar, Spirit and Flesh (Santa Fe, NM: Arena, 2002), p. 5. 
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of time passing 'viscerally' (p. 104), in successive moments. To convey this, among 
other things, Lauren employs a video of a web site, which she has watched 
intermittently at home and which shows an empty road in Kotka, Finland (p. 38), with 
'a digital display that records the time' (p. 107). Lauren also pays homage to her 
mentor and second self, Mr Tuttle, by playing a version of him, as an 'emaciated and 
aphasic' man, 'trying desperately to tell us something', while sporting 'ash white' hair 
(p. 103) to represent his 'pale-haired' (p. 47) and sometimes 'chalky' appearance 
(p. 66). Lauren's decision to honour Tuttle is well judged, since, as we discover in the 
final Pages, he has also succeeded in transmitting to her his ability to experience the 
unity of past and present time. After his unexplained departure, she plans to 'deliver 
herself into his reality' (p. 114) and 'walk down the hall into his time' (P. 115). She 
accomplishes exactly this, seeming to merge with Tuttle, hearing 'him in her chest 
and throat' (p. 12 1), and is led to the bedroom by 'chant, a man's chanted voice' 
(p. 120), where she experiences a return of past time, in which Rey appears, as though 
on the day of his death. DeLillo's debt to Proust in this scene is clear and calls one's 
attention to the recurrence of the words 'intermittent' and 'intermittently' throughout, 
(p. 28, p. 100, p. 107), which, in light of this climax, may be a reference to 'The 
Intermittences of the Heart' section of In Search of Lost Time. 30 The chapter in 
question is particularly important to Proust's opus, since its main theme, that 'with the 
perturbations of memory are linked the intermittencies of the heart', is central to the 
novel's thesis (p. 147). Moreover, as Michael Wood notes, "The Intermittences of the 
Heart' was at one point Proust's title for the whole novel' .31 The connection of 
30 Marcel Proust, 'The Intermittencies of the Heart', in In Search of Lost Time Vol. Three, trans. by 
C. K. Scott Moncrieff and Terence Kilmartin (London: Everyman, 200 1), pp. 141-69. 
31 Michael Wood, 'The Thing', in London Review of Books, 6h January 2005, pp. 18-20 (p. 19). 
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memory and emotion also proves highly appropriate to Lauren's experience in this 
scene, which has a profoundly cathartic effect. Her apparent meeting with Rey goes 
well beyond the imaginary returns of time envisaged by the modernist Proust; it 
engages fully with Tuttle's quasi-mystical experience of an eternal present, permitting 
Lauren the sense of wholly re-imagining and remaking her past. DeLillo suggests that 
it is only a 'question of fitting herself to the moment' of that 'final morning' (P. 7), 
which is, in reality concurrent with her own (p. 122). Once she does this, he declares, 
'It is the simplest thing in the world when she goes out to his car and takes his car 
keys ands hides them, hammers them, beats them, eats them, buries them in the bone 
soil', to prevent him driving to New York, to his self-inflicted death (p. 123). 
Although Rey's apparently 'real body' does not remain present (p. 120), Lauren's 
temporary immersion in past time ameliorates her grief and extinguishes a 
longstanding sense of guilt. Its effect is such that it prompts a second, equally 
therapeutic, temporal eruption. She recalls that 'Her mother died when she was nine' 
and feels similarly able to transform this memory, with the liberating understanding 
that 'It wasn't her fault. It had nothing to do with her' (p. 124). It seems likely that 
these episodes precede Lauren's performances of Body Time, which requires more 
concentrated energy than she appears to possess in the diegetic narrative. If so, then 
these returns of lost time may have assisted her creative process. Certainly, Proust 
would argue that her experience is the most valuable possible for the growth of 
creativity. In Time Regained, he asserts that the gift which most 'profoundly 
modifies' the mind of an artist is an event 'that reverses the order of time for them by 
making them contemporaries with another epoch in their lives'. 32 
32 Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time Vol. Four, trans. by C. K. Scott Moncrieff and Terence 
Kilmartin (London: Everyman, 2001), p. 297. 
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'Cosmonolis': Chaos Theory and Counter-Consciousness 
Cosmol2olis (2003) explores the radical change in the view of consciousness 
and the relationship between mind and matter taken by twenty-eight year old 
businessman Eric Packer, who begins the single April day in which the novel is set 
with a personal fortune worth 'tens of billions' (p. 12 1). Eric also has a queasy 
aversion to organic matter, which causes him to emphasise orderly intellectual 
configurations and exclude the somatic and the chaotic or asymmetrical from his 
abundant theorising. This distaste for physicality and concomitant neglect of what his 
eventual assassin Benno Levin calls the 'little quirk', 'the thing that's skewed a little' 
(p. 200), is symbolised by the 'asymmetry' of his prostate gland (p. 52). As Benno 
reproves Eric, in a lengthy final scene, the 'answer' to his intellectual uncertainties lay 
'in your body' (p. 200). During the novel's diurnal time-span, Eric concludes that, 
rather than brilliant manipulation of abstruse numerical systems, his financial success 
is due to his recognition of 'a pattern latent in nature itself' (p. 63). Eric perceives an 
'order at some deep level', which is characteristic of postmodem chaos theory (p. 86), 
what Joseph M. Conte calls the 'appreciation of order as the possible emanation of 
disorder', which he suggests is typical of contemporary American Fiction. 33 Eric's 
exploration of a unifying principle between mind, body, and the natural world is 
accompanied by the same desire to define a 'root identity' that motivates Lauren 
Hartke. To this end, he places himself in dire material need and proximity to death, 
first, by gambling away his fortune and that of his wife, the heir to a European 
33 Joseph M. Conte, Design and Debris: A Chaotics of Postmodern American Fictign (Tuscaloosa, AL: 
University of Alabama Press, 2002), p. 9. 
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banking fortune named Elise Shiffin, in ill-advised speculations on the Yen. He then 
deliberately seeks out his former employee and assassin Benno Levin, who, he is well 
aware, presents 'a credible threat' to his life (p. 121). 
Cosmopolis goes beyond the necessity for accepting the unity of mind and 
matter that DeLillo examines in his early fiction. It explores the possibility that mind 
and matter are not just inextricably linked, but that matter possesses low-level mental 
qualities and, viewed rightly, is a crude form of mind. As Jean-Frangois Lyotard 
argues, mind is only the most refined form of consciousness: 'Mind is matter which 
remembers its interactions, its immanence'. 34 Eric begins to suspect the immanence 
of mental activity in the organic, while studying the 'affinity between market 
movements and the natural world' (p. 86). The intelligible patterns in the currency 
markets strike him as an enigmatic sign of low level consciousness in the physical 
world; an example of what Bateson calls 'mind as an explanatory principle' in nature 
(p. 19). Eric later calls this a 'counter-consciousness' within the body (P. 50) and, in 
the concluding pages, enlists it as a powerful argument against his own erstwhile view 
that 'consciousness' might be easily transferable to 'chip' or 'disk' (p. 206), protesting 
that the body has provided him with invaluable information regarding consciousness: 
'He'd come to know himself, untranslatably, through his pain' (P. 207). 
The novel's emphasis on financial speculation makes particularly notable its 
location in April 2000, during the last months of Bill Clinton's presidency. The period 
is known for its considerable economic growth, which allowed Clinton, in the words 
of his economic advisor Bruce Reed, to be 'the only leader in all of history to leave a 
34 Jean-Frangois Lyotard, The Inhuman: Reflections on Time, trans. by Geoffrey Bennington and 
Rachel Bowlby (Cambridge: Polity Press, 199 1), p. 40, 
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budget surplus of such magnitude'. 35 Even more, though, Clinton's administration is 
remembered for exceptional stock market growth, which opened the possibility of 
millionaire status to an unprecedented proportion of the U. S. population. Much of this 
success has since been revealed to have been based on a damaging separation between 
share prices and real economic activity, some of which was the result of large-scale 
fraud, as in the famous case of the power company Enron. It was a time in which, as 
Eric tells Benno, 'Nobody's against the rich. Everybody's ten seconds from being 
rich. Or so everybody thought' (p. 196). The concluding note of doubt is apposite 
because April 2000 is also notable for being the month in which the stock market 
began to fall. Eric's descent into penury is therefore historically coterminous with a 
substantial drop in the value of the assets held by many U. S. investors. Bearing in 
mind that the novel appeared only three years after these events, Cosmopolis is 
another DeLillo novel that portrays a contemporary situation with startling 
immediacy. In this fictional world, the Clinton presidency becomes the 'Midwood 
administration', a name that suggests the kind of uninspired period of interregnum 
that is consonant with Eric's evident desperation for dramatic change, especially for 
connection with real physical matter, so frequently neglected in the economic 
predictions of overly optimistic or fraudulent American firms in the 1990s (p. 76). 
Certainly, we are made aware that, in the postmodern era of globalised capital, where 
multi-national corporations elude the control of any single government, executive 
power is impotent relative to the financial speculations of international enterprises 
like Packer Capital. When Eric learns that 'The President's in town', he simply asks 
nonchalantly 'Which President' (p. 11) and responds to fears about the Commander- 
in-Chief's safety with the sly enquiry 'Do people still shoot at presidents? I thought 
35 Joe Klein, The Natural: The Misunderstood Presidency of Bill Clinton (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 2002), p. 198. 
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there were more stimulating targets' (p. 20). President Midwood is portrayed as 
preoccupied by the media and his personal image, appearing on 'live videostrearn, 
accessible worldwide', on which he sits passively, with a 'gaze' that was 'empty', 
'without direction or content'. Like his Presidency, he seems to Eric to carry no sense 
of 'vital occupancy', as though existing 'in some little hollow of non-time' (P. 76), 
even appearing to inhabit some medial state between spirit and flesh, resembling the 
'undead' in 'occult repose', 'waiting to be reanimated' (P. 77). 
The President's need for 'reanimation' by external forces contributes to the 
sense of cartoon-like unreality typical of the novel's postmodernist aesthetic. The 
world of Cosmopolis often betrays a factitious aura, which, again, is allegorical of the 
characters' sense of their own unreality, and which recalls Baudrillard's comparison 
of the postmodem U. S. to a vast cartoon landscape. Baudrillard argues that 'Los 
Angeles and the America that surrounds it are no longer real, but belong to the 
hyperreal order' and that 'Disneyland is presented as imaginary in order to make us 
36 believe that the rest is real'. Eric's stretch limousine possesses a 'bruised cartoonish 
quality' and resembles 'a car in a narrative panel' (p. 157). Characters are often 
ludicrous caricatures who exhibit the signs of 'distortion' and 'exaggeration' that John 
Geipel argues are typical of the cartoon as a medium. 37 Although a billionaire at 
twenty-eight, Eric is presented as super-fit, highly sexed, and, most implausibly, as a 
serious intellectual, who reads Einstein's 'Special Theory' at night, 'in English and 
German' (p. 6). His employees are personifications of, by turns, nihilism, intellectual 
brilliance, and abject humility. Vija Kinski, his 'chief of theory' (p. 82), declares 
36 Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, trans. by Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor, MI: The 
University of Michigan Press, 2004), p. 12. 
37 John Geipel, The Graphic Cartoon: A Short I isto of r 11- r-A- -4 (Newton Abbot: 
David and Charles, 1972), p. 20. 
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expansively that the market is composed entirely of 'random phenomena', without 
'plausible realities' to be 'traced and analyzed' (p. 85), while his 'currency analyst' 
'Michael Chin' (p. 2 1) remains largely silent in Eric's company because, as he says, 'I 
know I can't answer these questions without losing your respect' (p. 22). Its concern 
with the cartoonishness of postmodernity revisits the themes of DeLillo's most recent 
play, Valparaiso, which examines the relation between the search for 'root identity', 
or what DeLilllo calls the 'naked shitmost self', and the artificially 'heightened 
brightened' self cultivated by television. 38 The play's main characters, Michael and 
Livia, enter this disturbing parallel world when Michael achieves momentary fame, 
through a well-publicised trip to various cities around the world named 'Valparaiso', 
rather than his intended destination: Valparaiso, Indiana. The circuitous j ourney 
represents the anomie pervading a postmodem America saturated by impersonal 
technologies and globalised industries. As in Cosmopolis, immersion in this unreal 
milieu creates a craving to explore its obverse, the 'naked shitmost self' (p. 91) and, in 
both texts, only the determination to explore this fundament of consciousness permits 
escape from the quasi-animated aesthetic of postmodem America. 
Although DeLillo's cartoon-like aesthetic has contemporary literary parallels, 
including the bitter satire of Robert Coover's The Public Burning and David Foster 
Wallace's luridly caricatured portrayal of Lyndon Johnson, the contemporary work 
closest to it may be Quentin Tarantino's Pulp Fiction. 39 DeLillo's frequent use of 
cinematic technique makes it appropriate that such a parallel be drawn from film. Yet, 
neither the movie, nor DeLillo's novel employs a traditional cinematic aesthetic. As 
38 Don DeLillo, Valparaiso: A Play in Two Acts (London: Picador, 2004), p. 80. 
39 Robert Coover, The Public Burning (New York: Viking, 1977), David Foster Wallace, 'Lyndon', in 
The Girl With Curious Hair and Other Stories (London: Abacus, 1997), pp. 75-118 and Pulp Fiction. 
Dir. Quentin Tarantino. A Band Apart et al. 1996. 
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Dana Polan points out, Pulj2 Fiction is situated in 'made-up spaces, cartoon-like built 
environments'. 40 In his view, Pulp Fiction's 'disjunctions, 'loops of narrative', and 
'dramatic shifts of tone and image' belong to a revolutionary genre he calls 'cyber- 
cinema', which appeals to a form of 'visual literacy' that emerged with the Internet 
(p. 37). In Cosmopolis, DeLillo's interest in cinema is fused with a more postmodern 
concern with video and digital images. Eric associates film with the tedium of 
childhood, as in his weary recollection of 'movies', in which the 'door is always 
locked' and the hero always 'kicks it open' (p. 183). By contrast, he associates video 
with elevated status and feels nostalgia for the days when 'his image was 
videostreamed worldwide from the car', before security concerns made him operate 
on 'a closed circuit' (p. 15). DeLillo's choice of metaphor also favours more 
contemporary technologies, as in his assertion that, in periods of ennui, Eric resists the 
temptation to 'take long walks into the scrolling dawn' (p. 5). Their cartoonish 
aesthetic has caused both works to be dismissed as vacuous. Walter Kim argues 
DeLillo's thirteenth novel is full of 'sleek despair' and 'medium cool existential 
aimlessness' and 'as riddled with trite conventions and canned attitudes as late 
medieval chivalric poetry'. 41 As Polan notes, Pulp Fiction has often prompted the 
reaction that 'it doesn't seem to have anything to say and renders cinematic 
experience as pure play' (p. 7). Like Cosmopolis, the film makes explicit reference to 
animation. Polan shows that Tarantino drew directly on cartoons, basing Mafia Moll 
Mia Wallace's dance moves 'on one of the cats in the animated film The Aristocats' 
(pp. 19-20). In a restaurant scene at 'Jack Rabbit Slim's', Mia accuses her companion 
40 Dana Polan, Pulp Fiction (London: BFI Publishing, 2000), p. 73, p. 37. 
41 Walter Kim, Tong Day's Journey into Haircut', at <bi-tp-ý/-/gLie! 3ý. n)iimes. com, search/full- 
pa2e? res=9EO2E7DF1638F93OA25757COA9659 last accessed 6/2/05. 
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Vincent Vega of being a 'square' but, rather than speak the word, she draws the shape 
in mid air and it appears on the screen in animated form. Eric's obsession with 
technological progress, at the expense of history and collective memory, which 
manifests in his contempt for supposedly outmoded words such as 'airport' (p. 22) and 
'handgun' (p. 19), leads unexpectedly to the fulfilment of his fantasy of knowing 'the 
truth about the future' (p. 64). In implausible cartoon fashion, his video equipment 
begins screening actions moments before they happen. This prophetic camera is 
evocative of science fiction, and it is interesting to note that such a device did appear 
in an episode of the 1960s science fiction television show The Twilight Zone, entitled 
'A Most Unusual Camera'. 42 As in Fredric Jameson's description of a 'new 
depthlessness' caused by a 'weakening of historicity' in the age of 'the simulacrum', 
Eric's alienation from the past proves pathological and, in his case, unsustainable. 43 
Far from feeling excitement at the technological miracle of making gestures 'a second 
or two after he's seen it on-screen', Eric is disturbed by the challenge the camera's 
predictions pose to his self-image as seer (p. 22). Vija Kinski comforts Eric by 
suggesting obsequiously that he catalysed this unfeasible occurrence, declaring that 
'Genius alters the terms of its own habitat'. This hints that Eric may be a Tuttle-like 
figure, whose 'consciousness' is 'hypermaniacal' and has 'contact points beyond the 
general perception' (p. 95). Yet, rather than embrace Tuttle's eternal present, Eric 
clings, temporarily, to a belief that 'the past is disappearing' (p. 86) and that the anti- 
capitalist protestors he meets are mere luddites, vainly seeking to 'hold off the future' 
(p. 91) and the 'force of cyber-capital' (p. 90). DeLillo comically indicates Eric's 
42 <http: //www. tzone. tlie-croc. com/tceplist/camera-ht 1>, last accessed 7/3/05. 
43 Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (London: Verso, 1993), 
p. 6. 
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contempt for memory by his use of 'prousted' to describe the sound proofing of his 
limousine with cork, a term that reduces Proust's exposition of 'past time' to the 
single biographical detail of his cork-lined bedroom (p. 70). 
DeLillo subtly questions and undermines Eric's asymmetrical approach to 
time, most tellingly through Eric's own embryonic wish to explore memory, which is 
implicit in his willingness to traverse New York for a haircut from his childhood 
barber. As he declares, the experience has 'Associations' (p. 15). Even Vija hints that 
the exclusion of Past and present is impossible to maintain. She demonstrates an 
uncanny, metafictional grasp of the text's diurnal timeframe, remarking that 
'something will happen soon, maybe today' 'To correct the acceleration of time. 
Bring nature back to normal' (p. 79). Moreover, the novel's climax, in which Benno 
kills Eric, in retaliation for Eric firing him, is a dramatic eruption of the past time Eric 
seeks to repress. During the day, Eric himself grows increasingly attracted to 
Jamesonian 'historicity', primarily, through recognition of the organic as a tangible 
history of the human subject, what Merleau-Ponty calls the body as the 'specific past' 
of being (p. 85). He notices the factitious, disembodied quality of his immediate 
employees, remarking of Vija that she was 'a voice with a body as an after thought'. 
'Give her a history and she'd disappear' (p. 105). On noticing that 'The Sikh at the 
wheel' of his limousine 'was missing a finger', he calls the 'stub' 'a serious thing', 'a 
body ruin that carried history and pain' (p. 17), while the 'ravaged eye' of another 
driver, Ibrahim, evokes, for Eric, 'a brooding folklore of time and fate' (P. 170). Eric's 
concentration on these physical scars counters his former neglect of body in favour of 
mind and of real economic activity for stock market abstraction. Moreover, the 
immigrant, possibly refugee, status of these characters calls attention to the title 
Cosmopolis, with its implication of a cosmopolitan cityscape, and the material 
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struggles of the developing world, on which decisions made in America's major cities 
have such a profound impact. Indeed, the association of physical scarring and these 
immigrants' relative poverty suggests Eric's rediscovery of the body seems partly 
allegorical of America's need to consider the overseas impact of its economic 
policies. 
Physical asymmetry recurs in the text, in the form of Benno Levin's exercise 
bike with its 'missing pedal' (p. 61) and Eric's failure to acquire more than half a 
haircut from his barber Anthony (p. 169). Their use is comparable to Samuel Beckett's 
black humour of bodily histories in MollOV, where comparable examples of physical 
disproportion appear, notably the narrator's 'short stiff leg', 'the loss of the toes' on 
his 'left foot', and a bicycle that 'had no brakes'. 44 The similarity alerts one to a more 
profound parallel: the oscillation in Beckett's work between cartoon-like hurnour and 
the brute facts of physicality and DeLillo's exploration of cartoonishness and the 
'naked shitmost self'. Indeed, though Beckett is sometimes treated as exclusively 
modernist, some of his works, for example Endgame, share elements of the cartoon- 
like aesthetic in Cosmopolis and Puln Fiction. 45 Endgame's main characters, HAMM 
and CLOV, are outrageous 'cartoon stereotypes' of power and submission. Its world, 
like that of Cosmopolis, is claustrophobic, artificially closed system or 'parallel 
universe', which excludes the organic. As CLOV announces, 'There's no more 
nature' 'In the vicinity' (p. 16). Like Eric, and Mafia boss Marsellus Wallace in Pulp 
Fiction, the play is ruled by an absolute monarch, HAMM, who bullies spineless 
subordinates with the prospect that beyond his blessed kingdom lies desolation: 
'Outside of here it's death' (p. 45). The aura of fantasy is reinforced by a cast of low 
44 Samuel Beckett, Molloy: Malone Dies: The Unnamable (London: Calder and Boyars, 1966), p. 23, 
p. 55, p. 47. 
45 Samuel Beckett, Endgame (London: Faber and Faber, 1964) 
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life characters who speak a highly literate, sometimes quasi-Shakespearean, prose in 
lines like HAMM's 'Accursed progenitor', addressed to his elderly father (p. 15). In 
spite of his reputation as, in Anthony Cronin's words, 'The Last Modernist', 
therefore, Beckett may have contributed significantly to DeLillo and Tarantino's 
postmodernist aesthetic and may be considered, as Michael Worton argues, 'one of 
the founding fathers of, and one of the major witnesses to, our Post-Modern 
condition'. 46 
Like Cosmovolis and Endgame, Pulp Fiction renders character in terms of 
what Robert Crumb would call 'classic cartoon stereotypes'. 
47 Marsellus Wallace's 
tyrannical behaviour resembles that of Eric and HAMM. Although, unlike his 
counterparts, Marsellus rules by brutal physical force, all three appear to guarantee the 
relative stability of their unreal world with the force of their personality or reputation. 
Marsellus' status as a cartoon stereotype of African American brawn and criminality 
is reinforced by the many rear-angle shots of him, which obscure his identity for 
much of the movie. Mia is a stereotypical youthful white 'trophy wife', who 
reinforces his status in a white dominated world. As in Endgame, the unreal quality of 
the action in Cosmopolis and Pulp Fiction is heightened by low-life characters 
employing an elevated register. In an anti-capitalist slogan, 'A RAT BECAME THE 
UNIT OF CURRENCY', which seems to symbolise Eric's connection of organic 
matter with the 'arcane charting' (p. 63) of currency trading, he recognises a line of 
poetry he has recently read (pp. 96-7). DeLillo's epigraph informs us that the line is by 
Zbigniew Herbert (pp. 96-7). Pulp Fictio 's gangsters appear similarly contemplative 
46 Anthony Cronin, Samuel Beckett: The Last Modernist (London: Harper Collins, 1996) and Michael 
Worton, 'Waiting for Godot and Endgame', in The Cambridge Companion to Beckett, ed. by John 
Pilling (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 67-87 (p. 85). 
47 Robert Hughes, 'Roll Right Up Folks! ', in The Guardian: G2,7h March 2005, pp. 5-7 (p. 7). 
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and literate: after carrying out a Mafia hit, Vincent concludes a scene by asking his 
colleague Jules Winnfield whether we should 'continue this th6ological discussion 
elsewhere'. This animated 'parallel universe' also contains characters who seek 
peaceful sequestration, as though to reaffirm that their cartoon-like immunity to 
quotidian pressures and dangers. This attraction to safe, interior spaces may account 
for the infantile humour that circulates around anality in Pulp Fiction and Cosmopolis. 
DeLillo's novel contains Eric's ludicrous prostate examination, carried out with his 
chief of finance in attendance (p. 48), while, in Pulp Fiction, we learn of boxer Butch 
Coolidge's father, who, as a POW, carries a pocket watch 'in his ass' for the sake of 
his son's patrinomy. Yet, frequently, the unfortunates who crave safety re-emerge to 
find that their fears have precipitated a violent return of the repressed and catastrophe 
has ensued in their absence (p. 72). Mob enforcer, Vincent, repeatedly retreats to the 
toilet, only to encounter disastrous situations on his return, in the last of which Butch 
appropriates his weapon and murders him. Eric, similarly, secretes himself in 
limousines and elevators, to the extent of commandeering two elevators in his 
apartment building as 'private' (p. 28) and denying any distinction between the 
'office' and the 'car' (p. 15). When he finally sheds his heavy personal security and 
leaves the womb or anus-like environs of his car/office, he, like Vincent, suffers a 
rapid, violent demise. The parallel suggests that the 'root identity' Eric discovers in 
poverty and death is the obverse of his glossy animated world and that one may call 
the other into being. The compelling power of the cartoon landscape is such that only 
self-abnegation and ascesis provide hope of escape. Eric's eagerness, and that of Jules 
in Pulp Fiction, to effect such an exit testifies to the ennui their banal existence 
provokes and to the satirical intent of these works, which, as Geipel argues of the 
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cartoon generally, 'accentuate the essential imbecility of the situation they depict' 
(p. 33). In Cosmopolis, Eric seeks liberation by 'pissing away' his wife's 'birthright' 
in 'the smoke of rumbling markets' (p. 123); his loss of various garments, including 
'necktie', 'jacket, and 'socks', at regular intervals, seems symbolic of the process and 
also suggests that he unconsciously desires it (p. 68. p. 118. p. 179). Maf ia hit man, 
Jules, meanwhile, foregoes his profitable career and the briefcase of gold bullion he is 
carrying to 'walk the earth', or as Vincent puts it contemptuously, to 'be a bum'. Just 
as Eric aims to find a 'root identity' by being seen 'pure and lorn' in 'killing light' 
(pp. 123-4), in poverty, Jules is determined to become 'Just Jules', 'no more, no less'. 
Eric's emphasis on the body arises from his intimation of unity between mind 
and organic matter and a Batesonian suspicion that both entities possess 'mental' 
qualities. Like Lauren, in The Body Artist, Eric adopts a quasi-scientific mode of 
enquiry into the mind-matter relation, which is, again, characterised by oscillation 
between assertion and doubt, this time apparent in his supplementing numerous 
observations with the proviso 'but maybe not' (p. 16, p. 78). Notably, his eventual 
position implies a radically different reinterpretation of the issues Lyle confronts in 
Players. Where Lyle cherished 'stock symbols' for an 'impression of reality 
disconnected from the resonance of his own senses' (p. 70), Eric becomes convinced 
that 'data on a screen' is inextricable from the organic swell of the 'life process': of 
his 'streams of numbers', he remarks 'Here was the heave of the biosphere'. 'Our 
bodies and oceans were here, knowable and whole' (p. 24). Eric's failed attempt to 
analyse the Yen is pivotal to his arrival at this holistic view. The importance of the 
currency to the U. S. economy and collective psyche makes its presence especially 
noteworthy and may indicate that Eric's intellectual j oumey is needed by the nation as 
a whole. As R. Taggart Murphy shows, since the Reagan Presidency, the U. S. has 
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borrowed vast sums from Japan to finance a deficit that 'exploded', under the pressure 
of tax cuts and stable public spending. 48 Eric's massive purchasing of Yen might 
therefore be regarded, by some, as a heroic balancing of accounts with a country 
whose large-scale investment in dollars causes America to feel uncomfortably 
indebted. 
Unfortunately, Eric's misjudgements produce the kind of financial catastrophe 
some analysts predict for America's over-stretched economy. He begins from the 
assumption that he is, as his finance expert Jane Melman calls him, a 'seer', 
intuitively cognisant of the 'predictable components' of fluctuations in 'technology 
stocks' (p. 46). In this sense, he is typical of professional stock analysts who, as 
Sydney S. Alexander explains, 'operate on the assumption that there exist certain 
trend generating facts' 'that will guide a speculator to profit'. 49 Unexpectedly, 
however, he perceives more than 'predictable' patterns; he encounters the 
'interrelation of order and disorder' characteristic of Chaos Theory (Design, p. 2) and, 
in his view, a 'pattern latent in nature itself (p. 63). This rouses his interest in organic 
matter and, again, like Chaos Theory, he sees 'Common forces at work' within 
phenomena as disparate as 'fruit flies and heart attacks' (p. 37). Their daunting 
complexity leads him to attribute a form of 'mental function' to them (Mind, p. 93); of 
the Yen's startling behaviour, he declares the 'Yen is making a statement' (p. 21) and, 
later, reflects privately that 'The Yen knew itself that it could not go any higher' 
(p. 84). This seeming anthropomorphism culminates in the assertion that his prostate 
gland contains 'some bundled other brain, a counter-consciousness' that caused him 
48 R. Taggart Murphy, The Weight f The Yen: How Dgnial imperils America's Future and Ruins an 
Alliance New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1996), p. 32. 
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to feel 'He was living in the gland' (p. 50). The notion of low level intelligence in the 
body causes him to adopt his doctor's verdict on a 'blackhead', 'Let it express itself' 
(p. 45), as a refrain, with which he responds to many apparent crises (p. 5 1, p. 74, 
p. 186). Eric's attribution of mental qualities to the body recalls Merleau-Ponty's 
notion of an 'organic thought, through which' 'the relation of the 'psychic' to the 
'physiological' becomes conceivable' (p. 77). This radical view of matter as mind has 
a long, if little discussed, philosophical history: Lyotard quotes Leibniz's assertion 
that 'One can consider every body as a mind that is instantaneous but deprived of 
memory' (p. 39). Eric's search for configurations 'latent in nature' goes further, 
looking for evidence of mental action throughout the physical world. Just as Bateson 
finds an 'aesthetic' 'unity' (p. 19) in the way the natural world is 'joined together in its 
mental aspects' (p. 18), Eric accepts he is seeking 'An aesthetics of interaction' in his 
biological speculations (p. 86). Yet, Eric finds asymmetry within this unity and 
therefore the same fusion of order and disorder that is articulated in Chaos Theory. 
Reflecting on his prostate, Eric asserts that asymmetry was 'a counterforce to balance 
and calm, the riddling little twist, subatomic, that made creation happen' (p. 52). This 
notion seems to allude to the theory of matter and anti-matter, which, in Frank Close's 
words, 'suggests that the stuff of which we are made is but half of a symmetric whole' 
(p. 4) and that there resides 'an intrinsic asymmetry in nature's fabric' (p. 252). When 
Eric later attends the funeral of humorously named Sufi rap singer Brutha Fez, there is 
a performance of an 'anti-matter rap'. The song champions idiosyncrasy, one might 
say asymmetry, in its lament about a 'Prince of the street', who 'had a case of 
conventional wisdom/Never say nothing the others don'Lsay' (p. 137). With his 
49 Sidney S. Alexander, 'Price Movements in Speculative Markets: Trends or Random Walks, in The 
Random Character of Stock Market Prices, ed. by Paul H. Cootner (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1964), pp. 199-218 (p. 199). 
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endless stream of advisors and desperate quest for coherent pattern, the song seems 
directly applicable to Eric. As Benno tells him, his ruin was precipitated by his 
mistaken belief that the Yen would behave predictably; he overlooked 'the 
importance of the lopsided', 'The little quirk. The misshape' (P. 200). Some noted 
reviewers have therefore concluded that, in Michiko Kakutani's words, Cosmo 
central theme is that 'chaos and asymmetry will trump the search for order and 
patterns', but the principles of chaos and order remain inextricably linked. 
50 The 
paradox of Benno's observation is that without Eric's asymmetrical outlook, his 
horror of the body and his possession of 'half a heart' (p. 190), he would not have 
undergone the radical intellectual shift that prompts his asceticism and leads to his 
climactic meeting with Benno. The plot or ordering principle of the work itself is set 
in motion by this asymmetry and 'order' and 'disorder' are united in the structure of 
the novel. 
The importance of Eric's adoption of 'organic thought' is signalled partly by 
his horror of human biology, in the earliest parts of Cosmovolis, which prompts him 
to enrol sophisticated technologies in order to avoid physical contact. He revels in the 
'context' of his limousine being 'nearly touchless', requiring him only to 'talk' 
&systems into operation' (p. 13). In his rarefied sex life, he has only to 'say the words' 
(p. 5 1) for 'man and woman' to reach 'completion', 'touching neither each other nor 
themselves' (p. 52), while his bodyguard Torval's 'force and brawn' is sufficient 
4provocation' (p. 20) for Eric to shoot and kill the man (p. 146). The same revulsion at 
physicality underlies his boast that he exercises his self-confessed 'ruthless efficiency' 
(p. 3 1) in reducing himself to 'six percent body fat' (p. I 11). For Eric, excess flesh is 
50 Michiko Kakutani, 'Books of the Times; Headed Towards a Crash, Of Sorts, in a Stretch Limo', at 
<http//: www. query. nytimes. com/search/full-page? res=940CE7D6173OF937A15750COA9659>, last 
accessed 6/2/05. 
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metonymic of the organic in general and he treats it as what Julia Kristeva calls the 
'abject', a being or quality ejected by the superego to re-establish psychic equilibrium. 
51 Near the novel's climax, however, Eric recuperates what he has rejected. An 
exemplary moment arrives when he discovers a scene being filmed with 'three 
hundred naked people sprawled in the street' (p. 172) and follows his craving to be 
'here among them, all-body, the tattoed, the hairy-assed, those who stank' (p. 176). In 
the act, he fulfils Merleau-Ponty's criteria for the fullest 'experience' of 
consciousness, something achievable through 'communication with the world, the 
body and other people, to be with them instead of being beside them' (p. 96). The 
presence of cameras adds ambiguity to his courage in stripping off, suggesting the 
enduring attraction that the simulacral world he has inhabited may retain for him, but 
the event nevertheless demonstrates a hitherto unseen willingness to confront 'bodies' 
as 'blunt facts' (p. 173). 
In many respects, his assassin is a human metaphor for the somatic he rejects. 
The squalor of the building in which Benno lives, 'without water, heat or lights' 
(p. 150), his lack of coordination, manifest in his walking 'whatever, funny' (P. 57), 
and the fact that he is unemployable because, as he explains, 'I stink. Smell me' 
(p. 193) are ugly facets of physicality that terrify Eric and towards which he gravitates 
in search of 'root identity'. For Eric, Benno is an example of what Kristeva calls the 
'utmost abjection', which is 'death infecting life' (p. 3). Having clearly declined to his 
'naked shitmost self', he is qualified to instruct Eric in his search for the substratum of 
subjectivity. His sense of self is so utterly enervated that he feels 'It's all I can do to 
be a person' (p. 196) and firmly believes he is degenerating towards asexuality, 
51 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abiection, trans. by Leon S. Roudiez (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1982), p. 2. 
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because 'my sex organ is receding into my body' (p. 192). His prose writing is 
characterised by a similarly half-formed quality, with numerous sentences ending 
prematurely or lacking an object: for example, 'I steal electricity for a lamppost. I 
doubt if this occurred to him, for my living space' (p. 57). This eccentric grammar 
does not prevent him developing comically grandiose ambitions for his 'Confessions', 
of which we receive two instalments (pp. 55-61, pp. 149-55), and which he regards as a 
'spiritual autobiography', presumably in the manner of St. Augustine. 
Benno seems related to the low life characters of Dostoevsky's fiction, 
particularly the narrator of Letters from the Underground, who he resembles in terms 
of age, 'Forty-one' (p. 189) to the 'forty' of Dostovesky's character, and occupation, 
having been a 'professor of computer applications' at a 'community college' (P. 189), 
and therefore, like his counterpart, a civil servant. 52 Like Benno, this subterranean 
figure has 'never succeeded in being anything at all' and now wishes to be 'a 
colourless being, since a man of character, a man of action, is a being who is 
essentially limited' (p. 6). The final remark is appropriate to Eric's quest, which is 
predicated on exactly this sense of the limitations of the 'man of action. Eric's search 
for Benno arises from an intuitive realisation that his assassin is his doppelganger or 
second self and, as such, can assist him in resolving the blatant 'asymmetry' of his 
being. Benno can clearly be taken to represent the 'disorder' that counterbalances the 
'ruthless efficiency' of Eric's 'order' and the 'organic' to match Eric's dynamic 
'intellect', but DeLillo adds numerous, often comical, details that confirm Benno's 
status as his victim's double. Benno unknowingly departs from Eric's contemptuous 
indictment of the term 'automated teller machines' as 'burdened by its own historical 
52 Fyodor Dostoevsky, Letters from the Underground, trans. by C. J. flogarth (London: J. M. Dent and 
Sons Ltd., 1913), p. 5. 
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memory' (p. 54), by remarking, several pages later, that the ATM has 'a charisma that 
still speaks to me' (p. 60). By contrast with Eric's effortless mastery of the 'global era' 
(p. 91), Benno's use of the Web results in his acquisition of numerous 'syndromes' 
(p. 202), with such bewildering titles as 'hwaby1ing', a form of 'cultural panic' from 
Korea, which he has 'caught on the Internet' (p. 56). But, perhaps, the evidence that 
clinches their intimacy is the revelation that Benno's prostate is also 'asymmetrical' 
(p. 199), which confirms Eric as matter to Benno's anti-matter and each as 'half of a 
symmetric whole' (Lucifer's, p. 4). As Close points out, 'when any particle of matter 
meets its miffor anti-particle, mutual annihilation occurs' (p. 4) and the destructive 
consequences of the pair's eventual meeting fulfils all such dark prophecies. Much of 
the humour in the long final scene arises from the implausibly reasonable tone in 
which the two men discuss at length the reasons for Eric's impending murder, while 
Benno's resolve to carry out the deed remains steadfast. Eric is sufficiently relaxed to 
enquire into Benno's toilet facilities, asking 'What happens to your wasteT (p. 190), 
while his doppelganger is happy to assure his former boss that his prostate is 'a 
harmless variation. Nothing to worry about' (p. 199). The novel ends with Eric gazing 
into 'the crystal of his watch' observing another quasi-animated portrayal of future 
events (p. 209). In this case, it is his imminent death and transportation to the 'hospital 
morgue' as the unidentified 'Male Z', a designation that confirms his attainment of a 
zero degree of consciousness and exploration of an unmistakably 'root identity' 
(p. 208). Observing this scene, he reflects on Artificial Intelligence, which has 
engaged DeLillo's interest for more than twenty-five years, and explicitly rejects his 
former desire to witness consciousness 'transcending his body mass, the soft tissue 
over the bones' and live as 'data' or 'quantum dust' (p. 206). He concludes that the 
somatic contributes vastly towards his sense of self, his 'pain' being 'crucial to his 
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distinctiveness' and 'not susceptible, he didn't think, to computer emulation', as well 
as to his thought process, which Eric calls the 'veer of his libidinous intellect' (p. 207). 
It is the most explicit rejection, in DeLillo's work, of what Searle calls 'Strong AI'. 
Some of Eric's Predecessors have met equally unpleasant ends on account of their 
wish for digitalised 'transcendence', but his intellectual conversion and insistence that 
4my situation has changed in the course of the day' earns him no reprieve (p. 202). 
This may be because escape from the unreal, cartoon-like dimension he inhabits can 
only be achieved in death. As long as he remains alive, he is reduced to the status of 
spectator in his own life, viewing his dead body, but 'still alive in original space, 
waiting for the shot to sound' (p. 209). 
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Conclusion 
In spite of giving an increasing number of interviews to journalists over the 
last fifteen years, it is still Don DeLillo's 'nature', as he once put it, 'to keep quiet 
about most things. Even the ideas in my work'. 1 Notably, DeLillo has avoided being 
interviewed by the academics who study his work, perhaps sensing that the scholar is 
more likely than the average journalist to probe the intellectual process and thematic 
concerns that have given rise to his highly sophisticated oeuvre. In a letter to me, he 
explained that his determination to 'keep my distance from studies of my work' 
arises, not from a 'strategy', but an 'elemental impulse', a remark that indicates the 
uneasiness he experiences in articulating even the most fundamental concerns of his 
fiction. 2 As I noted in the introduction to this thesis, it was 2003 before DeLillo made 
the slightest mention of his lifelong reverence for Ernest Hemingway or of 
Hemingway's influence on his work. 3 
Nevertheless, in recent conversations with newspaper columnists and the 
occasional publisher, such as his former editor Gerald Howard, DeLillo's mentions of 
the term 'consciousness' have grown noticeably more frequent, almost matching his 
numerous uses of the word in his fiction. As we saw, he told Peter Henning that, in 
Underworld, he wanted to 'broaden consciousness' to 'open it up' (Henning). In his 
interview with Howard, DeLillo also makes explicit his view that the value of the 
1 Tom LeClair and Larry McCaffery, eds. An4hing Can Happen: Interviews with Contempora 
American Novelists (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1983), p. 80. 
2 Don DeLillo, Letter to the author, August 2003. Although Tom LeClair famously interviewed 
DeLillo, this was part of a book of interviews with American novelists and was not connected with his 
later study of DeLillo In The Loop: Don DeLillo and the Systems Novel (Urbana, IL: University of 
Illinois Press, 1987) 
3 Peter Henning, 'An Interview with Don DeLillo', in Frankfurter Rundschon, 20 th November 2003, 
271, pp. 28-29, trans, by Julie Apitzsch at <http: //www. perival. com/delillo/ddinterview-henning. html>, 
last accessed Yd April 2005. 
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novel form lies in its ability both to examine consciousness and to acknowledge its 
importance, by giving free rein to its considerable powers. 4 As he puts it, 'The novel 
expands, contracts, becomes essay-like, floats in pure consciousness' (p. 5). Moreover, 
in 'The Power of History', he says of the historical novel's ability to slip 'into the skin 
of historical figures' that 'This is how consciousness is extended and human truth is 
5 
seen new'. 
I interpret DeLillo's new readiness to discuss this subject as a greater openness 
that has come with the knowledge that, at the age of sixty-eight, thirty four years after 
the publication of Americana, the bulk of his work as a novelist is now done. 
Statements like these make clear what DeLillo's novels have long implied, that his 
central and abiding concern is with the nature of human consciousness and the status 
it has acquired, or failed to acquire, in the discourses of American postmodernity. 
DeLillo has made comparable remarks on the strength and resilience of the self, 
which he has called 'free and undivided', which affirm what has long been apparent 
to careful readers, that much of his interest in consciousness is in how the growth of 
subjectivity is hindered or encouraged by contemporary U. S. culture and, of equal 
concern, what forms of selfhood are available in that cultural milieu (Power, p. 62). 
Undoubtedly, the phrase 'free and undivided' does little justice to the variety of 
DeLillo's portrayals of the self, which range from absolute nullity to the balance 
between maintaining an individual sense of self and sharing in the unified 'deep 
mind' of the wider culture, which is present in Underworld, for example. Yet, it is an 
4 Gerald Howard ... The American Strangeness": An Interview with Don DeLillo', in Hunpry Mind: an 
Independent Book Review at 
<http: //web. archive. oriz. web/19990129081431/http: //www. bookwire. com/hmr/hmrintcr>. last 
accessed 6h October 2004. 
5 Don DeLillo, 'The Power of History', in The New York Times, 7h September 1997, pp. 60-63 (p. 63). 
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apt description of the degree of autonomy that DeLillo attributes to the self, when 
consciousness realises its full potential, to choose, actively and freely, between 
competing epistemologies. 
Tbroughout the thesis, I have attempted to do justice to the range of 
epistemologies that DeLillo explores, from the hyper-rationality of scientific, 
behaviourist, or computational thought that many of his early protagonists choose in 
order to escape their own mind and body, to the deeply intuitive modes of thought that 
often prevail in his later fiction. These, less rational, epistemologies frequently cause 
a measure of intellectual impairment and psychological disorientation, but 
compensate by their dissemination of a unified model of mind that transforms ethical 
thought, and by their appreciation of mind-body unity, which permits a more subtle 
understanding of the nature of consciousness. Where I believe my contribution has 
been particularly original is in my analysis of the relation between knowing and 
being, or epistemology and ontology, as I have often called it. I have tried to 
demonstrate that DeLillo consistently shows mind taking a leading role in this 
relationship and, moreover, that it has a direct, causal effect on the sense of self, 
including physical and emotional response. Precisely how and why the action of the 
mind has this impact on subjectivity remains mysterious in DeLillo's fiction. In 
Ratner's Star, Billy Twillig indicates the stubborn obscurity of the interstice between 
epistemology and ontology. In Billy's words, 'There is something in the space 
between what I know and what I am and what fills this space is what I know there are 
no words for'. 61 apply the term 'mysterious' advisedly, since numerous 
commentators, and DeLillo himself, have alluded to his use of the word and the 
enigmatic quality that informs his oeuvre. He once told Anthony De Curtis that 'in the 
6 Don DeLillo, Ratner's Star (London: Vintage, 199 1), p. 3 70. 
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background of my work' there is 'a sense of something extraordinary hovering just 
beyond our touch'. 7 This dissertation suggests that much of the uncanny quality that 
pervades DeLillo's novels arises, above all, from the difficult confrontation with the 
uncharted territory of consciousness. 
7 Anthony De Curtis, "'An Outsider in This Society": An Interview with Don DeLillo', in Tntroducina 
Don DeLillo ed. by Frank Lentricchia (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), pp. 43-66 (p. 63). 
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